Ashok Kumar Rana v. Delhi Public School & Anr.

Delhi High Court · 21 Jul 2008 · 2008:DHC:2079-DB
The Chief Justice; Dr. Justice S. Muralidhar
LPA No.107/2008
2008:DHC:2079-DB
labor appeal_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court held that a Labour Court has no jurisdiction under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act to decide disputed entitlement claims not previously adjudicated or recognized, dismissing the appellant's claim for pay re-fixation.

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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
LPA No.107/2008 ASHOK KUMAR RANA ..... Appellant
Through Mr.Ajit Kumar with Ms.Nikita Sharma, Advocates
VERSUS
DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through Mr.Punit Mittal with Mr.Rahul Malik, Advocates for R-1&2
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE S.MURALIDHAR
JUDGMENT

1. Whether reporters of the local papers be allowed to see the judgment ?n

2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ?n

3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest ?n

JUDGMENT

21.07.2008

1. The appellant is working as a Computer Assistant in the respondent No.1 school. He made an application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which came to be dismissed by the learned Labour Court as not maintainable. The writ petition filed by the appellant is also dismissed by the learned single Judge concurring with the view taken by the learned Labour Court that the claim of the appellant is not based on any pre-existing right and the claim is disputed by the [LPA 107/2008] 2008:DHC:2079-DB employer.

2. The appellant has been employed as a Computer Assistant with the first respondent since 1st July, 1984 on the initial salary of Rs.1,180/- per month. In 1999 the management implemented the Fifth Central Pay Commission with effect from 1st January, 1996 with some modifications and accordingly the pay of the cadre of administrative staff was fixed in the basic pay of Rs.5,000/-. Grievance of the appellant is that the respondent with ulterior motive fixed his pay in the basic pay of Rs.4,200/- per month instead of Rs.5,000/- and the arrears have been paid according to the basic pay of Rs.4,200/-. The stand of the management is that the appellant is in the category of administrative staff and was given the right pay scale of Rs.4,200/-. The respondent denied that on the basis of parity the appellant is entitled to the basic pay of Rs.5,000/-

3. The scope and ambit of Section 33(C)(2) has been considered by the Supreme Court in a series of judgments. In Punjab National Bank v. K.L.Kharbanda 1962 (1) LLJ 234, Central Bank of India v. P.S.Rajagopalan 1963 (2) LLJ 89, Bombay Gas Company Limited v. Gopal Bhiva 1963(2) LLJ 608, East India Coal Company Limited v. Rameshwar 1968 (1) Lab I.C. 6. Some of these decisions have been again reviewed by a three judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak 1995 (1) SCC 335 wherein the Court held thus: “The ratio of these decisions clearly indicates that were the very basis of the claim on the entitlement of the workman to a certain benefit is disputed, there being no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer, the dispute relating to the entitlement is not incidental to the benefit claim and is, therefore, clearly outside the scope of a proceeding under S.33c(2) of the Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workman’s entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under Section 33C(2) of the Act. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognized by the employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court’s power under S.33C(2) like that of the executing Court’s power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution…..”

4. In the present case, the appellant has claimed re-fixation of his basic pay. The very basis of the claim has been disputed by the respondent as there is no earlier adjudication or recognition of the claim. The Court has no jurisdiction first to decide the workman’s entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated in exercise of power under Section 33(C)(2). The learned Labour Court is thus right in holding that the claim of the appellant is not maintainable under Section 33(C)(2) of the Act. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has placed reliance on the decision of A.K.Sikri, J in the case of Jeet Lal Sharma v. Presiding Officer Labour Court-IV reported in 200 (53) DRJ 735 wherein the petitioner has claimed encashment of leave of 188 days on his retirement. It was one of the service conditions that the workman on his retirement would be entitled to encash the leave lying to his credit. The case of the management was that the leave of 188 days was not due to the workman and there was only four days leave to his credit. It was held that this being one of the service conditions and this service condition being a pre-existing right, it would entitle the workman to get his claim. If the entitlement is based on service conditions one does not have to take recourse to reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act for adjudication of the matter. That situation would have become necessary only if there was a dispute about the entitlement to get the leave encashed. The dispute was not about the entitlement to get the leave encashed but about the number of days to which the petitioner was entitled. Such a question could have been decided by the Labour Court in a proceeding under Section 33(C)(2). We fail to see how this decision is applicable to the facts of the present case. In the instant case the very claim of the workman that fixation of his salary after the Fifth Central Pay Commission was erroneous is disputed by the management. In the circumstance, it was not permissible for the Labour Court to entertain a proceeding under Section 33(C)(2) of the Act. The remedy lies in raising an industrial dispute under Section 10 of the Act. We thus find no infirmity in the impugned order of the learned single Judge. The appeal has no merit and is dismissed.

CHIEF JUSTICE S.MURALIDHAR JULY 21, 2008 (JUDGE) “v”