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Date of Decision: 22.07.2008
Delhi Development Authority ….… Petitioner
Through: Mr.C. Mohan Rao, Advocate for the petitioner/DDA.
Through : Mr.R.N. Vats, APP for the State.
Mr.Ankur Goel, Advocate for respondent Nos.2 & 3.
JUDGMENT
1. Whether reporters of Local papers may YES be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? NO
3. Whether the judgment should be reported NO in the Digest? ANIL KUMAR, J. *
1 The petitioner has impugned the order dated 15th July, 2006 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate on a complaint under section 14 read with Section 29(2) of Delhi Development Act, 1957.
2 By order dated 15th July, 2006, it was held that the Appellant has been able to make out and prove his case beyond all shadow of reasonable doubt that the premises was misused by Mr. Rohit Gupta, but as far as the present respondents are concerned, it was held that 2008:DHC:2085 the Appellant has not been able to prove its case beyond all shadow of reasonable doubt, as there is not enough material to support the finding that the respondents no.2 and 3 are the persons in charge and responsible for conducting day to day affairs of the said firm, M/s Umang Motors, and therefore, the benefit of doubt was given to them and they were acquitted.
3 Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that it was confirmed by the Sale Tax Department that M/s Umang Motors (Respondent No.1) is a partnership firm constituting respondent No.2 and 3 besides Mr. Rohit Gupta as partners. It has been asserted by the learned counsel that respondent No.2 and 3 and Mr. Rohit Gupta, who has been convicted, are partners and therefore, all are jointly and severely responsible and it is for the individual partners to show that they are not in charge or responsible for the business of the firm, as the conduct of business is exclusively within the knowledge of the partners and therefore, it is for them to show that they are not responsible for the business of the firm and it is not for the appellant/complainant to prove that all or any of them are responsible or in charge of the business. It has been very strongly contended by learned counsel that once it is proved that the accused are partners of the offending firm, it is for the accused to prove that they are not responsible or in charge of the business of the firm and falls within the exception carved out.
4 The learned counsel also contended that respondents were given opportunity to lead the evidence, however, they did not lead any evidence and in absence of any evidence on behalf of the respondents, the inferences as drawn by the learned M.M. could not be drawn. The Learned counsel also relied on Section 32 of the Delhi Development Act and Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act and contended that though they are para materia, the substantial provision of the Acts are entirely different in as much as Section 14 of the Delhi Development Act provides that no person shall use or permit to use any land or building in that zone otherwise than in conformity with such plan
5. To hold a partner of a firm vicariously liable u/S-32, the prosecution has to prove that at the time of commission of offence the partner was in charge of and was responsible to the firm for the conduct of business of the firm, or that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of the partner. Merely establishing that a person was a partner in a partnership firm is not sufficient to attract S-32.
6. In the present case all that can be gathered from the disposition of CW-2 is that Satish Kumar Gupta, Jai Kishan Goyal, Rohit Gupta and R.K Goyal are the partners of the firm M/s Umang Motors. The prosecution has placed nothing on record to prove that any of the partners, other that Rohit Gupta, was responsible for the day to day affairs of the company. In fact Rohit Gupta had disclosed to CW-1, the Surveyor, at the time of inspection that he himself was the proprietor of the firm. Further in his cross-examination, CW-1 had admitted that he had not met Satish Kumar Gupta and Jai Kishan Goyal at the time of inspection nor had seen them working at M/s Umang Motors.
7. In Adarsh Marwah & Ors. v. Nehar Ranjan Bhattacharya & Anr, 41(1990)DLT167 this Court had held that „no vicarious liability in criminal law could be imputed unless the partner is shown to be responsible for the business of the partnership firm. The principle enunciated is that the prosecution must plead that partner/Director of a firm/company to be prosecuted was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.‟
8. In Sham Sunder and Ors v. State of Haryana, (1984)4 SCC 630, the Apex Court was dealing with Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1995 which is identically worded as Section -32 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957. The Court observed:-
9. In Delhi Development Authority v. Kamalesh Kumari & anr, ILR 1993 Delhi 64 a complaint was filed against a partnership firm comprising of 4 partners and the owner of the premises on the allegation that they had put the property to non conforming use. This Court acquitting two of the partners had observed:- “Now, the question which arises for consideration is as to who are to be convicted for the commission of the said offence? In the complaint it was averred that all the partners of Maharaja Hotel are responsible for running of the business of the partnership and thus they are liable for commission of the aforesaid offences. It is evident from the record the complainant has not produced an iota of evidence to show that which of the partners has been responsible for and in charge of the business being run on behalf of the partnership firm. However, in the crossexamination of PW[2] it has come out that on two or three visits to the hotel the witness had noticed Maharaj and Parvesh, the two partners of Maharaja Hotel, functioning. No suggestion was given that they were neither in-charge of nor responsible for the running of the business of the hotel. A suggestion was however, given specifically that there was no evidence to show that ladies were partners or were in charge of and responsible for running of the business. The omission to put any question with regard to Parvesh and Maharaj in cross examination in this connection leads to the inference that they were in charge of and were responsible for running of the business of the partnership at the relevant time. It is also to be emphasised that in Ex. DW2/A M.K. Sachdeva sought permission for running the lodging house after disclosing that the restaurant being run in that premises has since been closed and he has signed as a partner. This shows that he was conducting the business of the partnership and was in charge of the same. So far as Smt. Kamlesh Kumari is concerned, she being the owner is also guilty of the said offence for having permitted the said non conforming user on the part of Maharaja Hotel. We allow these appeals and convict Maharaja Hotel, a partnership firm, and its two partners namely Parvesh Sachdeva and Maharaj Sachdeva, for an offence punishable under S. 29(2) read with S.14 of the Act and convict Kamlesh Kumari of having permitted the said non conforming use for offence punishable under S. 29 read with S. 14 of the Act. “
10. The Appellant has not been able to establish that the respondents were responsible for day to day business of the firm and are liable. There is no apparent or manifest error in the order of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate dismissing the complaint of the appellant against the respondents. The Appeal in the facts and circumstances is without any merit and the Applicant/appellant is not entitled for leave to appeal against the order dated 15th July, 2006 dismissing the complaint of the applicant/appellant under section 14 read with section 29(2) of DDA Act. The application for grant of leave is therefore, dismissed. July 22, 2008 ANIL KUMAR J ‘Dev’