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CM No.6192/2007 & CM No.6193/ 2007 IN RFA (OS) No.27/1980
Date of Decision: August 8, 2008
Shri A. R. Nim & Ors. … Appellants
Through: Mr. R.S. Kela, Advocate
Through: Mr. Sandeep Sethi, Sr. Advocate with
Ms.Geetika Kanwar, Advocate
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA
JUDGMENT
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? No
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? No SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA, J.
1. This order disposes of two applications filed by appellants. CM. No. 6192/2007 is an application filed by the appellants under Order 41, Rule 19 read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code for restoration of the appeal which was dismissed in default 2008:DHC:2289-DB condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The relevant facts are as follows;
2. This appeal was filed in the year 1980 by Mr. A. R. Nim and his wife Mrs. Satya Bala Nim impugning a judgment delivered against them in Suit No. 29/1972, where it was held that the plaintiff in that suit, Mr. Vishwa Mitra, is the owner of the suit property, i.e. 16, Hanuman Road, New Delhi, and that Mr. Nim and his wife are injuncted and directed to vacate the portion bearing No. 16-B, within two months and hand over the possession to the plaintiffs. At that time the appellants were represented by Mr. R. S. Kela and Mr. S. K. Tiwari advocates. Over the period of time, the above named appellants have been represented by different advocates including Mr. L. R. Gupta. We also notice that on some dates the appellant Mr. A. R. Nim has appeared in person.
3. Thereafter on 29th May, 1984 this Court disposed of an application under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code, whereby the respondent was permitted to file an amended plaint within 6 weeks and the matter was adjourned to 8.10.1984. Dissatisfied with the terms of the said order dated 29.05.1984, the respondent moved the Supreme Court of India seeking Special Leave to Appeal against the said order. On 02.05.1985, the Supreme Court was pleased to stay further proceedings before this Court. As a result none appeared before this Court stayed further proceedings, no further action is necessary and that the matter should now be put up when it can proceed further.
4. Thereafter, a letter dated 7.11.2000 was sent by the second appellant, Mrs. Satya Bala Nim, addressed to the Hon‟ble Chief Justice of this Court, praying for early disposal of the appeal. The matter was sent to the listing section for taking further action. However, before the case could be taken up Mrs. Satya Bala, expired on 25.12.2000. Thereupon, two CMs were filed under Order 22, Rule 3 for substitution of the second appellant, Mrs. Satya Bala, by her legal representatives. These were, CM No.47/2001 filed by the first appellant Mr.A.R.Nim on 7.03.2001, for substituting himself, Ms. Manju Chhaya, daughter of the second appellant and Mr. Dalip Nim, son of the second appellant, as legal representatives of the second appellant; and CM No.52/2001 filed by Ms. Manju Nim Chhaya on 7.03.2001, claiming to substitute only her along with appellant No.1 as legal representative of the second appellant, and not Mr. Dalip Nim.
5. Ultimately on 19.03.2001, when the matter was put up before the Joint Registrar, Mr.Gagan Gupta, who is noted as having appeared for appellant no. 1, was directed to intimate whether the interim stay of the Supreme Court of India in the aforesaid SLP, still continues or not, and the matter was adjourned to 30.03.2001. On that day, Mr.Gagan Gupta, had been withdrawn on 23.10.1992 and that there was no stay operating in the matter. The applications for substitution were also listed on that day. Notices of these applications were accepted in Court and the matter was adjourned for reply and rejoinder thereto to 25.05.2001.
6. On 25th May, 2001 the Presiding Officer was on leave and the matter was notified for 11.09.2001. It appears that in the meanwhile, on 26.07.2001 the appeal came for hearing in the category of old cases. However, since both the aforesaid applications for substitution of Legal Representatives were pending, the Court directed that the appeal be posted for hearing after the Legal Representatives of appellant No. 2 Mrs. Satya Bala are brought on record.
7. From the record, we find that on 7.03.2001, a Vakalatnama was filed by Sh. S. S. Tripathi, Mr. Manish Vashisht and Mr. Gagan Gupta, Advocates on behalf of Mr. Dalip Nim, who was the son of the deceased second appellant. There is another Vakalatnama that has been filed by Anil Kumar, J. as counsel, as His Lordship then was, on behalf of Ms. Manju N. Chhaya, the daughter of deceased second appellant. Although, this Vakalatnama is dated 7.3.2000, we feel that this is a mistake and the date should be 7.3.2001 for two reasons. Firstly, it is stated to have been filed on behalf of Ms. Manju N. Chhaya, daughter of, “late Smt. Satya Bala…” The said Mrs. Satya Bala died on 25.12.2000. Furthermore, even from the court record, we find that the documents placed before and after this vakalatnama pertain to the year 2001. From this, it is quite obvious that the date of the vakalatnama is incorrect and it was filed on 7.3.2001.
8. Again, on 20.11.2001, while Mr. S.S. Tripathi, Advocate, entered appearance for the first appellant, Mr. A.R. Nim, Mr. Anil Kumar, Advocate appeared for Ms. Manju Nim Chhaya, i.e., daughter of the deceased second appellant. On that date, this Court directed substitution of the son and daughter of the deceased appellant No.2. They were arrayed as appellant Nos.2(b) and 2(c) in the amended memo of parties filed on 21.12.2001. While the matter was pending, Shri Anil Kumar Advocate, was elevated to the Bench of this Court on 16.7.2004.
9. Thereafter, the matter was taken up on 7.4.2005. On that date, there was no appearance for the appellants and the matter was dismissed by this Court for that reason. The order reads: “Present: None for the appellant Mr. M.S. Vohra for the respondent. RFA (OS) 27/1980 Nobody is present for the appellant. Dismissed.”
10. Ultimately, on 29.3.2007, appellants No.2(b) and 2(c), i.e., the aforesaid Mr. Dalip Nim and Mrs. Manju Nim Chhaya, moved
11. The appellants‟ case is that they came to know that the appeal had been dismissed in default only on 12.3.2007. They say that they had been continuously staying abroad and that their counsel never informed them of this fact. In addition, they say that before the order dismissing their appeal in default was passed, their counsel, Mr. Anil Kumar had already been elevated to the Bench, which fact was also not intimated to them. Under the circumstances, what is to be seen is whether the grounds pleaded by the appellants constitute „sufficient cause‟ to condone the delay in seeking restoration of the appeal. The Supreme Court in Kanta Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 held that: ”If the appellant makes out sufficient cause for the delay, the Court may in its discretion condone the delay. As laid down in Krishna v. Chathappan (4) "section 5 gives the Courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words "sufficient cause" receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bonafides is importable to the appellant."
12. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Ram Nath Sao Vs. Gobardhan Sao (2002) 3 SCC 195, explaining the scope of the expression “sufficient cause held that: “12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner…”
13. Similarly, while deciding an application for condonation of delay, the Supreme Court in State of W.B. Vs. Administrator, Howarah Municipality (1972), 1 SCC 366 held that the delay in filing of the appeal should not have been for the reasons which indicate the party‟s negligence in not taking the necessary steps, which he could have or should have taken. What would be such necessary steps will depend on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. It was further held that the words „sufficient cause‟ should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bonafide is imputable to a party.
14. From the above judgments it can be inferred that there cannot be a straight jacket formula for determining as to what constitutes „sufficient cause‟ and it will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. However, while considering the sufficiency of the cause what has to be kept in mind that although the expression “sufficient cause‟ must be construed view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in R.K. Churiwala Vs. Kunj Behari And Anr, ILR (2004) 2 Del 651 where it was held that the expression “sufficient cause” should be given liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence, inaction or want of bonafide is imputable to a party.
15. In the case at hand, the applicants were impleaded as appellants No.2(b) and 2(c) in place of the deceased appellant No.2, Mrs. Satya Bala on 20.12.2001. Thereafter, the matter remained dormant for the next three and a half years. Ultimately, pursuant to an earlier order of this Court dated 26.7.2001, wherein it was directed that the appeal be posted to hearing after the legal representatives of the deceased appellant No.2 were brought on record, the matter was posted by the Registry for hearing on 7.4.2005, i.e., after nearly three and a half years. On that date, since there was no appearance on behalf of the appellants, the matter was dismissed. This order has clearly been made under Order XLI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure due to the appellants‟ default. The applicants state that they have been continuously staying abroad. At the bar, it was also contended that the main counsel, who was looking after their matter, was Mr. Anil Kumar who had been elevated as a Judge of this Court on 16.7.2004. They state that because of the elevation of their counsel, no further information was given to them about the progress of this case. The applicants also state that they through one of the relatives of the appellant No.2(c), Mrs. Manju Nim Chhaya, who then conveyed this information to her brother, i.e., the other appellant, Mr. Dalip Nim.
16. From the submission of the parties, it is obvious to us that although appellant No.2 (b), Mr. Dalip Nim, had also engaged some other counsel in 2001; there was no gainsaying the fact that the counsel for appellant No.2(c), Mrs. Manju Nim Chhaya, had been elevated to the Bench of this Court on 16.7.2004. It is also obvious that Shri Anil Kumar, Advocate, as His Lordship then was, was the main counsel looking after the entire matter. In addition, looking to the circumstances, we can see no other reason why the appellants would not normally pursue this appeal.
17. In that view of the matter, we condone the delay and set aside the dismissal of the appeal in default by the order dated 7.4.2005. Consequently, both applications are allowed; the delay is condoned subject to costs of Rs.11,000/- and the appeal is restored to its original number and status.
18. The applications stand disposed of. Sudershan Kumar Misra, J. Manmohan Sarin, J. August 8, 2008