Ramesh Kumar Dhamija v. Nirmal Ahluwalia

Delhi High Court · 08 Aug 2008 · 2008:DHC:2305-DB
T.S. Thakur; Sunil Gaur
R.F.A. No. 35/2007
2008:DHC:2305-DB
civil appeal_allowed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal holding that the admitted status of the appellant as adopted son and successor-in-interest of the tenant entitled him to tenancy rights, setting aside the trial court's decree for damages and declaration of trespass.

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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
JUDGMENT
reserved on: August 06, 2008
Judgment delivered on : August 8, 2008 R.F. A. No. 35/2007
Shri Ramesh Kumar Dhamija … Appellant
Through: Mr. Valmiki Mehta, Senior Advocate with Ms. Madhu Sapra, Advocate.
versus
Smt. Nirmal Ahluwalia ... Respondent
Through: Mr. H.S. Paul, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.S. THAKUR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR

1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

2. To be referred to Reporter or not?

3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? SUNIL GAUR, J.

1. This is defendant’s appeal against judgment and decree dated 11th October, 2006 vide which defendant has been directed to pay a sum of Rs.4,60,800/- alongwith pendentelite and future interest @ 6% p.a for the use and occupation of premises no. F-14/6, Model Town, Delhi as defendant has been declared as trespasser after death of his adoptive father Late Sh.Ram Niranjan who was a tenant under the plaintiff / respondent.

2. The factual scenario of this case is that the plaintiff/ respondent in the suit filed by her, had claimed that defendant / 2008:DHC:2305-DB appellant’s adopted (to be read as adoptive) father was the tenant in the aforesaid premises under the plaintiff/respondent who claims that the said tenancy was terminated by a notice prior to a death of appellant/defendant’s father in the year 1988. There is no averment in the plaint about the date of termination of the said tenancy or of the service of the notice of termination of tenancy upon the appellant/defendant. Anyhow, plaintiff/ respondent proceeded to claim damages for the period from June, 2002 to May, 2004 for the use and occupation of the premises in question. In the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent, decree for damages of Rs. 4,60,800/- was claimed with interest @ 18% p.a.

3. Aforesaid suit of the plaintiff/ respondent was contested by the defendant/ appellant by filing a written statement, stating that the averment of the plaintiff/respondent to the effect that defendant is the adopted son of the tenant of the plaintiff/ respondent is not denied and in the replication filed by the plaintiff/ respondent, the factual assertion of the defendant/ appellant being the adopted son of the tenant of the plaintiff/respondent has not been controverted.

4. The issues framed by the Trial Court reads as under:- “(i). Whether plaintiff is entitled to a decree for a sum of Rs.4,60,000/-, with pendentelite and future interest @ 8% per annum from the date of filing of the suit till realization? OPD. (ii). Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not (iii). Whether the suit is liable to be stayed under section 10 CPC? OPD. (iv). Whether suit is barred under section 50 of DRC Act? OPD

(v) Relief.”

5. The evidence led in this case consisted of the deposition of the plaintiff/ respondent Mrs. Nirmal Ahluwalia (PW-2) and of her attorney Sh.P.S.Ahluwalia (PW-1) and that of defendant Ramesh Kumar Dhamija (DW-1).

6. The suit proceedings stood concluded vide impugned judgment and decree dated 11th October, 2006 whereby, appellant/ defendant has been called upon to pay the damages @ of Rs.19,200/- p.m. for the use and occupation of the tenanted premises i.e appellant/defendant has suffered a decree of Rs.4,60,800/- with interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of the suit, till realization. So, this appeal.

7. With the assistance of learned counsels for both the sides, we have done a strict scrutiny of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence on record.

8. The basic issue involved in this appeal is the status of the appellant in the present proceedings. When the law was set into motion in the suit proceedings by filing of a plaint by the plaintiff/respondent, the defendant / appellant was referred to in the context of his adopted (to be read as adoptive) father being a admission of the fact of defendant/ appellant being the adopted son of the tenant of the plaintiff/respondent. There is no ambiguity about it.

9. The aforesaid admission of appellant/defendant being adopted son of the tenant of the plaintiff/Respondent is first in point of time. Plaintiff/ respondent had a second opportunity at the time of filing of the replication to controvert the specific assertion of the defendant/appellant in the written statement of being adopted son of the tenant of the plaintiff/respondent but in the replication, the fact of appellant/defendant being adopted son of the tenant of the plaintiff/respondent is not controverted.

10. Non denial amounts to admission of fact. In view of order VIII, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, non denial of averment in a plaint specially, has to be taken to be the admission of the said fact. In the instant case, the plaintiff/respondent himself has defined the status of the appellant /defendant as that of adopted son of the tenant of the plaintiff/respondent. Needless to say that admitted facts need not be proved. (Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872).

11. Not only the plaintiff Smt.Nirmala Ahluwalia (PW-2) but even her attorney Sh.P.S.Ahluwalia (PW-1) in their evidence have categorically deposed that appellant/ defendant’s adopted (to be read as adoptive) father was a tenant under the respondent/ that the tenancy in question was commercial. Undisputedly, commercial tenancies are heritable. (Gyan Devi Anand Vs. Jeevan Kumar and Ors. (1985) 2 SCC 683).

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12. Surprisingly, trial Court has noticed the abovesaid clear cut admission made in the pleadings as well as in the evidence by the plaintiff/respondent regarding the status of appellant/defendant being adopted son of the tenant of the respondent/plaintiff but has chosen to brush them aside, by going beyond pleadings to rely upon some statement being made in the probate proceedings about it being correct that appellant was adopted son of the tenant as projected by both of them. The finding of the trial Court on this vital aspect is that it amounts to no admission by the husband/attorney of the plaintiff/respondent. The view taken by the trial Court on this crucial aspect is that the abovesaid admission is qualified to be projected one and the finding returned is that the mere use of the word ‘adopted’ in the plaint by the plaintiff is not sufficient admission to negate the requirement of the factum of legally being adopted to be proved by the defendant/appellant.

13. We find it difficult to subscribe the aforesaid view of the trial Court and to sustain the above referred finding as no party can be taken by surprise. It is true that there is an exception to the cardinal rule of admitted facts being relied upon without being formally proved. Proviso to Section 58 of the Evidence Act gives the discretion to the Court to require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions i.e by evidence. In all fairness, trial Court ought to have given reasonable opportunity by putting the party (making the admission) to notice to lead evidence to prove the admitted fact.

14. Aforesaid is the general rule which could have been applied to a case where defendant had made an assertion regarding a particular fact which was not controverted in the replication. Present case appears to be extra ordinary one, which is an exception to the aforesaid general rule. Here is a case where status of the defendant is declared by the plaintiff and the defendant does not deny it and in the evidence led also, the plaintiff maintains the status of the defendant to be adopted son of the tenant of the plaintiff. This is such a peculiar case where even the proviso to Section 58 of the Evidence Act cannot come to the rescue of the plaintiff/ respondent because she cannot be called upon to prove that the defendant/appellant is the adopted son of the tenant. Had this fact been asserted by the defendant/plaintiff, then only, the defendant could have been put to proof.

15. In our considered opinion, trial Court has transgressed its limits in ignoring the admission made in the pleadings as well as in evidence regarding appellant/defendant being adopted son of the tenant of the respondent/ plaintiff and by returning a finding of there being no admission of this fact by attorney of the plaintiff by referring to some statement made in other proceedings by the attorney of the plaintiff (which is not duly proved on record) regarding adoption being correct as projected by them. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the aforesaid finding of the trial Court of there being no categoric admission of the fact of adoption is unsustainable and is hereby set aside.

16. We fail to understand as to what was the need for the trial Court to return a finding regarding assignment of tenancy through Will in favour of the defendant/appellant by the tenant of the plaintiff/ respondent being illegal, when neither the Will nor the probate was before the trial Court for adjudication. In any case, this aspect is not required to be gone into as in the pleadings as well as in the evidence, the status of the appellant/defendant stood defined by the respondent /plaintiff as that of adopted son of the tenant and since the tenancy is commercial and heritable by virtue of being adopted son of the tenant, therefore, appellant does not lose the status of being a tenant as after the death of statutory tenant, his successor–in-interest would continue to have estate in the tenanted premises (Sarwan Kumar and another Vs.Madan Lal Aggarwal (2003) 4 SCC 147).

17. The question of termination of the tenancy in question by a notice has been casually and vaguely pleaded in this case and in fact there are no averments regarding the service of notice to terminate the tenancy of tenant during his life time but still the trial Court has proceeded to decide it without there being any issue or evidence on this aspect and has jumped to a wild conclusion of appellant being a trespasser in the tenanted premises after the death of his adoptive father. We are constrained to observe that in the impugned judgment, trial Court has noticed that the appellant/ defendant had contended before it that the notice did not validly terminate the tenancy and despite the said notice being not on record, trial Court has held that the tenancy of the adoptive father of the appellant / defendant stood validly terminated during his life time.

18. In the face of the evidence on record, we find that the aforesaid finding of the Trial Court declaring Appellant/defendant to be a trespasser in the tenanted premises is nothing but perverse and we unhesitatingly set it aside and we hold that the Appellant is successor-in-interest, being adopted son of Late Shri Ram Niranjan, statutory tenant of the plaintiff/Respondent. As a consequence thereof, the grant of damages by the Trial Court to the Respondent/plaintiff are rendered unsustainable and the impugned judgment and decree is accordingly set aside and the suit of the Respondent/plaintiff is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Trial court record be remitted back.

19. During the pendency of this appeal, 50% of the decretal amount, i.e., Rs.2,64,961/- was deposited by the Appellant with the Registrar General of this Court and in terms of order dated 14th November 2007, of this Court, Respondent was permitted to withdraw the aforesaid amount subject to furnishing of the security to the satisfaction of the Registrar of this Court. As this appeal succeeds, the Registrar of this Court is directed to invoke the bank guarantee furnished by the Respondent and thereafter to release the aforesaid amount with interest if so accrued, to the Appellant within six weeks from today. In case the needful is not done, as directed above, then the aforesaid amount would carry interest @ 9% per annum for the delay, if any, is there on the part of the respondent.

20. With the abovesaid directions, this appeal is disposed of.

SUNIL GAUR, J T.S. THAKUR, J August 8, 2008 PKB