Full Text
LPA 212/2008
M/S. BHAGAT BROTHERS ..... Appellant
Through Mr.Apurab Lal, Advocate
Through Mr.Rama Shankar, Advocate
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DR.S.MURALIDHAR O R D E R
13.08.2008 Admit. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent waives service of notice. By the consent of the parties, the appeal is taken up for hearing.
JUDGMENT
2. This appeal has been filed against the order of the learned single Judge dated 12th March, 2008 passed in WP(C) 9299/2006 whereby the writ petition of the appellant-management challenging the order of the Labour Court denying permission to the appellant-management to be represented by an advocate was dismissed.
3. The relevant facts lie in a narrow compass. Pursuant to the notice, the appellant-management appeared before the Labour Court through its lawyer on 3rd June, 2004 and filed its written statement. The respondent workman LPA 212 of 2008 2008:DHC:2356-DB who was represented by a senior union representative filed his replication on 29th October, 2004. Thereafter the respondent workmen filed his evidence by way of affidavit. Throughout the proceedings the workman and his representative did not take any objection to the appearance of Mr.J.K. Singhal, Advocate on behalf of the appellant-management. However, an application came to be filed on behalf of the workman on 5th July, 2005 seeking that the management be not allowed to be represented by an advocate. On 30th November, 2005, by the impugned order, the application was allowed by the Labour Court and the management was directed to appoint a new authorized representative as an advocate could not be allowed to appear on behalf of the management in view of provisions of Section 36(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
4. Mr.Apurab Lal, learned counsel appearing for the appellantmanagement, strenuously submitted that from the records of the Labour Court it is clear that on 3rd June, 2004 when the appellant filed his written statement through its advocate, the workman and his representative were personally present before the Labour Court. Learned counsel pointed out that this was the first date on which the union representative would have taken objection to the presence of Mr. J.K. Singhal on behalf of the management. Even thereafter no objection was raised by the workman or his representative and the union representative with his large experience in the field, cannot be said to have lost sight of such an important objection. According to the learned counsel therefore it can therefore be inferred that the union representative in his fair sense waived the objection considering the fact that the appellant is a small partnership firm. Learned counsel submitted that this is clearly a case of implied consent and the Labour Court was not right in barring appearance of the advocate to represent the appellant-management before the Labour Court.
5. On the other hand Mr.Rama Shankar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent workman, submitted that the impugned order is in consonance with the provisions of Section 36(4) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 as no advocate or legal practitioner is permitted to appear in any proceedings under the Act without the consent of the other party and without leave of the Court. According to the submission of the learned counsel the respondent-workman had not given his consent to the appellantmanagement to be represented by Mr. J.K.Singhal as legal practitioner and even the Labour Court had not given leave to such legal practitioner to appear in the proceedings. It was, therefore, submitted by the learned counsel that there was no question of there being an implied consent to the appellant-management to be represented by its legal practitioner.
6. Section 36(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 reads as follows: “(4) In any proceeding before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the proceeding and with the leave of the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be.”
7. Section 36(4) does not prescribe that the consent must be given in a particular manner or in a particular form. In a given case the consent of a party, which is the basis for grant of leave to the other party for being represented by an advocate in a proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act, could be inferred from the surrounding circumstances as also the conduct the consenting party. Section does not insist upon a written consent. Consent can be implied. Consent once given cannot be revoked at a later stage because there is no provision in the Industrial Disputes Act enabling such withdrawal or revocation. In a similar circumstance, a single Judge of Kerala High Court in the case of Calicut Cooperative Milk Supply Union v. Calicut Cooperative Milk Supply Workers’ Union 1986 LAB 1.C. 1681 has held that consent can be inferred from the conduct of the party and the consent once given by a party entitling the other party to be represented in the proceedings by an advocate would enure to his benefit till the proceedings are finally disposed. A similar view is taken by the Calcutta High Court in Reckitt and Colman v. Jitendra Nath AIR 1956 Calcutta 353.
8. In T.K.Varghese v. Nichimen Corporation 2002-IV-LLJ (Suppl) Bombay 1018 the Bombay High Court has held that if there was no objection raised on the first date of the proceedings to the appearance of a legal practitioner on behalf of the other side, the consent is to be taken as implied consent. Since the Labour Court has allowed the legal practitioner to appear on behalf of the respondent company it will have to be deemed that the Labour Court had granted leave to appear for the respondent company.
9. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are inclined to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant-management that since there was no objection raised to the appearance of legal practitioner on behalf of the other side, the consent is to be taken as implied consent. As the Labour Court has also allowed Mr. J.K.Singhal, the legal practitioner, to appear on behalf of the appellant company, it will have to be deemed that the Labour Court had granted leave to Mr. Singhal to appear for the appellant-management, though there was no specific or express consent given by the respondent workman or his representative and though the Labour Court had not specifically granted leave to Mr. Singhal to appear for the appellant-management. From the conduct of the union representative as well as from the fact that Mr. Singhal was allowed to appear in the matter before the Labour for several dates, leave will have to be inferred having been granted.
10. While interpreting Section 36(4) we must remember a crucial fact that when the Industrial Disputes Act was enacted in the year 1947 the trade union movement in this country was in its infancy and was absolutely a novice before the adjudication machinery. The Legislature had visualized a legal battle between two unequals before the Industrial Adjudicators. In order to bring about and maintain fairness and equality, the Legislature provided under Section 36 of the Act how the parties would be represented in the proceedings under this Act. However, there has been sea change in the circumstances. A large number of small employers have also come up in the industrial scene. They cannot be denied the service of a legal practitioner when they are dragged into industrial litigations. Trade unions have also become financially well off to engage services of legal practitioners. Many a times union representatives appearing for the workmen are extremely knowledgeable and possess vast experience in the field. Constitutional validity of Section 36(4) has been upheld by this Court in The Cooperative Store Limited, New Delhi v. O.P.Dwivedi, P.O.Industrial Tribunal –II & Others 1988 1 LLJ 135. However, thereafter when the same issue came up before the Allahabad High Court, Markandeya Katju, J (as he then was) vide his decision reported in 1992-1- LLN 972 (ICI India Ltd. v. Labour Court (IV) & Another) has held that Section 36(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act and a similar provision i.e. Section 6-I(2) of the UP Industrial Disputes Act are ultra vires of the Constitution. In view of our finding that there was implied consent it is not for us to re-examine the constitutional validity of Section 36(4) but we feel that in the changed circumstances a fresh look is necessary at Section 36(4). With these observations, we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Labour Court as also of the learned single Judge and hold that the management is entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner before the Labour Court.
CHIEF JUSTICE S.MURALIDHAR AUGUST 13, 2008 JUDGE “v”