Full Text
OMP 232/2005
D.M. JAWAHAR MERICAN …… Petitioner
Through : Mr. Anil Kher, Sr. Advocate with Mr. P.K. Mahapatra, Advocate
Through : Mr. Ashok Mathur with Mr. Gaurav Srivastava
JUDGMENT
1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat (Oral)
1. In this proceeding under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the `Act’), the petitioner challenges the validity of the award of a sole arbitrator, made on 18.01.2005. The respondent, at the threshold objects to maintainability of the proceedings on the ground that the petition under Section 34 of the Act, was filed beyond 2008:DHC:2457 OMP No.232/2005 Page 2 time prescribed by law.
2. To better appreciate the controversy the following essential facts are narrated. The award was announced on 18th January, 2005. The arbitrator at that stage communicated copies of the award to the parties. He however, recorded that the original award was not being communicated since it had to bear the prescribed stamp duty. The claimant (i.e. the petitioner here) was directed to ascertain the required amount and send the stamp papers to enable the arbitrator to have the award imprinted on it. On 12.02.2005, the petitioner moved the arbitrator for clarification, correction and interpretation of the award under Section 33 (1) of the Act. Among several contentions, it was urged that the arbitrator, in his award committed an error in overlooking that the claim, as made originally, was for US Dollars 500,000 and that in the award he erroneously assumed the claim to be MR 211,250. The arbitrator by his order dated 20th February, 2005 rejected this application. It is not in dispute that the award was eventually stamped and sent on 13.03.2005. The petitioner claims that the date on which he received the award was 13.04.2005. The present petition under Section 34 (3) of the Act, was filed on 04.07.2005.
3. Mr. Ashok Mathur, learned counsel for the respondent contends that the time for filing objections to the award under Section 34 (3) is fixed and judgments of the Supreme Court have now established conclusively that objections have to be filed within the time prescribed, failing which resources OMP No.232/2005 Page 3 to the Limitation Act is excluded. He relied upon text of Section 34 (3) of the Act and contended that enforceability of the award which is linked with the period within which the petition under Section 34 (3) of the Act, has to be preferred, cannot be confused with the executability of an award. He relied upon the judgment reported as Anusuya Devi & Another Vs. M.Nanik Reddy & Others, (2003) 8 SCC 565, where it was held that the question as to whether the award is required to be stamped or registered is relevant only when the parties would file the award for its enforcement under Section 36 of the Act. On the strength of this authority, it was contended that the parties can object to admissibility of such a decree arising out of a award on account of non-registration and non-stamping at that stage. However, it was, contended that the sequitor is that the petition under Section 34 of the Act has to be preferred within the period prescribed under Section 34 (3) of the Act i.e. ninety days from date of receipt of the arbitral award, which in this case was 18.01.2005.
4. Learned counsel also relied upon another judgment of the Supreme Court reported as Dr. Chiranji Lal (D) By L.R.s., Appellant Vs. Hari Das (D) by L.Rs. AIR 2005 SC 2564, for the proposition that the period of limitation starts or commences from the date when the decree (in this case award) is passed and not from the date when it is engrossed on the stamp paper. It was therefore, urged that the award in this case was obtained by the petitioner, in terms of Section 31 (1) of the Act on 18.01.2005 when a copy was OMP No.232/2005 Page 4 communicated. So construed the last date for filing the objections or the present petition was 17th April, 2005 and in case the petitioner were to rely upon the proviso to Section 34 (3) of the Act, the extended period expired on 16.05.2005. The counsel submitted that the present petition was filed on 04.07.2005 and therefore is clearly beyond the time contemplated; it has to be rejected as time barred.
5. Mr. Anil Kher, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner contended that the proceedings were lodged within the time stipulated. He emphasized on the conditions on the Section 34 (3) of the Act, to say that the outer limit of 3 months (or the extended period under the proviso) is subject to an exception where a party applies for clarification under Section 33 of the Act. In this case, the petitioner had applied for clarification under Section 33 in February 2005; that application was disposed of on 20.02.2005. It was contended that the arbitrator admittedly asked for calculation of costs. The award was stamped on 13.03.2005. The counsel contended that since there is no dispute, about the petitioner having received the original award on 13.04.2005, the objection should be construed as having been preferred within the time limit prescribed by law. Learned counsel in this context, relied upon the ruling of the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors, AIR 2005 SC 1832, to submit that the expression of an party “having received”, the award should not be treated as a mere formality since parties’ substantive rights OMP No.232/2005 Page 5 are involved. The expression has to be construed meaningfully which would entail that, in a case like the present one, when the award was in fact received on 13.04.2005.
6. Learned counsel relied upon two judgments of this Court reported in Union of India & Another Vs. Saboo Minerals Pvt. Ltd., 106 (2003) DLT 92, and Vindhya Telelinks Ltd. Vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Anr., 103 (2003) DLT 82 in this regard. He submitted that the application under Section 33 of the Act in this case was made within the time prescribed for that purpose i.e. one month. The award announces on 18.01.2005 and the application under Section 33 of the Act was made on 12.02.2005. Therefore, the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of latter of portion of Section 34 (3) of the Act.
7. Counsel contended that this Court had noticed inter-play between the various provisions of the Act such as Sections 33 (2), 33 (5), 33 (6) and 33 (7), in this case while considering the issue of limitation. Placing reliance on Vindhya Telelinks Ltd. case (supra), it was therefore contended that the petition was filed within the time and should be considered on its merits.
8. The facts as may be noticed are undisputed. There is no dispute about the fact that the petitioner received a copy of the award announced on 18.01.2005. On that day, the arbitrator also required the claimant (i.e. the petitioner) to arrange for the requisite stamp papers and observed as follows: “I am herewith communicating the copies of the Final Award. However, the original Award is not being OMP No.232/2005 Page 6 communicated for the reason that the Award having been made at Delhi, it has to bear the stamp duty as prescribed by law. The claimant is directed to ascertain the amount of stamp duty payable on this Award and send me the stamp papers at the earliest. The stamp papers may be purchased in my name. I will have the Award transcribed on the said stamp papers and send the original Award to the claimant.”
9. The petitioner thereafter approached the arbitrator under Section 33 of the Act, undeniably within the time prescribed for the purpose (30 days) on 12.02.2005. That application was rejected on 20.02.2005 and the stamped award, received on 13.04.2005. The question, therefore, is as to whether first point for reference for filing a petition under Section 34 (3) of the Act – Is it 18.01.2005 as contended by the respondent or 13.04.2005 as contended by the petitioner?
10. In Anusuya Devi’s case (supra), the Supreme Court was concerned with a case involving a decree arising out of an award. The court noticed the purpose of Sections 34 and 36 of the Act in the context of argument that award could not be looked into unless it was appropriately stamped. The Court rejected the contention in the following terms: “The question as to whether the award is required to be stamped and registered, would be relevant only when the parties would file the award for its enforcement under Section 36 of the Act. It is at this stage the parties can raise objections regarding its admissibility on account of non-registration and non-stamping under Section 17 of the Registration Act. In that view of the matter, the exercise undertaken to decide the said issue by the civil court as also by the High Court was entirely an exercise in futility. The question whether an award requires stamping and OMP No.232/2005 Page 7 registration is within the ambit of section 47 of the code of Civil procedure and not covered by Section 34 of the Act.”
11. In Dr. Chiranji Lal’s case, (supra) the Supreme Court was called upon to consider a somewhat analogical argument as is being urged in this case. The Supreme Court observed as under: