Hind Broadcasting Company Pvt. Ltd v. Union of India

Delhi High Court · 14 Sep 2009 · 2008:DHC:14381
Manmohan
LPA 71/2008
2008:DHC:14381
administrative appeal_allowed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court held that forfeiture of reserve licence fee by the State without express contractual provision was arbitrary and illegal, allowing writ petitions against the State's action in a contractual dispute.

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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
LPA 71/200. LPA 227/2008, LPA 78/2008 & LPA 291/2008
Date of Decision: 14**^ September. 2009
JUDGMENT

1. LPA 71/2008 HIND BROADCASTING COMPANY PVT. LTD &ORS Appellants Through Mr.C.A.Sundaram, Sr.Advocate with Ms.Ritu Bhalla, Ms.Jasleen Oberoi, Ms.Rohini Musa, Mr.Abhishek Gupta, Mr.Zafar Inayat, Mr.Anandh Kannan, and Mr.Monark Gahlot, Advocates UNION OF INDIA versus Respondent Through Mr.Parag Tripathi, ASG with Mr.Rajeev Sharma, Mr.Abhishek Birthray, Mr.Amey Nargolkar and Ms.Arti Gupta, Advocates

2. LPA 227/2008 NEW MEDIA BROADCASTING PVT. LTD & ANR Appellants Through Mr.Maninder Singh, Sr.Advocate with Ms.Prathiba M. Singh and Mr.T.Singhdev, Advocates versus UNION OF INDIA Respondent Advocates

3. LPA 78/2008 DREAM RADIO (INDIA) PVT. LTD & ORS Appellants Through Mr.Harish Malhotra, Sr.Advocate with Mr.Tanuj Khurana, Advocate versus UNION OF INDIA (LPA 71-2008 & other cases) Respondent Advocates 2008:DHC:14381 'V;.•*- (M)

4. LPA 291/2008 VERTEX BROADCASTING COMPANY PVT. LTD & ANR...Appellants Through Mr.Sudhir Makkar and Ms.Meenakshi Singh, Advocates versus UNION OF INDIA Respondent Mr.Amey Nargolkar and Ms. Aarti Gupta, Advocates CORAM: HON BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR.

JUSTICE MANMOHAN

1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?

3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? AlIT PRAKASH SHAH.

CHIEF lUSTICE (ORAL)

1. As all these four cases involve similar questions of fact and law, they were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

2. We may, however, notice the fact of the matter involved in LPA No.71/2008. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India decided to "open up Radio Broadcasting in the VHP- FM band (87-108 MHz) to private participation". In keeping with the same, the Ministry issued Notice Inviting Tender (NIT), inviting tenders from companies registered under the Connpanies Act, 1956 for the purpose of granting licence for private FM Broadcasting (LPA 71-2008 aether cases) 2 Services in 40 centres. Appellant Nos. 1 & 2 submitted their bids on 10^'' November, 1999 along with the Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) as required under Clause 12 and 50% Reserve Licence Fee as per Clause 8(b) of the Licence Conditions.

3. Auction was conducted on March, 2000 and appellant Nos. 1 & 2 were declared successful bidders for stations at Bangalore, Calcutta, Delhi, Chennai and Jalandhar regions. NIT had specifically provided for furnishing of a certificate to the effect that the applicants had read the licence conditions and undertake to ^ fully comply with the terms and conditions therein. The said draft licence conditions were part of the NIT. It specifically provided under Clause 12 that if the applicant did not abide by his offer, his EMD shall be forfeited. The said tender conditions did not provide for forfeiture of the reserve licence fee except in condition 8(f) where the balance licence fee was not paid within ten days after the Wireless Planning & Coordination Wing's (WPC) intimation that the operational licence was ready to be issued. Bids made by the parties including the appellants were accepted on different dates in March 2000. One such letter was produced before the learned single Judge in LPA 227/2000 (New Media Broadcasting v. Union of India). Copies of similar letters in other cases have been placed before us.

4. Thereafter Letter of Intent (LOI) dated 2"^^ August, 2000 was forwarded conveying the intention of the Central Government to issue licence in view of the appellants' highest bid. However, the LOI mandated under clause (11) signing of a licence agreement as per draft enclosed to the LOI and under clause (ill) the formation for (LPA 71-2008 &other cases) 3 '(2^ a consortium as per proforima agreement enclosed with the same. It further introduced a new condition under clause (3) that if the appellants do not furnish a bank guarantee or execute a licence agreement as per the draft sent with the LOI, it would result in the forfeiture of the reserve licence fee deposited by them and also would result in blacklisting, in their being ineligible to apply for any of the radio station licences in future. According to the appellants the LOI introduced new licence conditions which were not part of the licence conditions forming part ofthe NIT. The appellants protested vide a detailed letter dated 4'' October, 2000 since there were substantial departures from the terms and conditions of the licence agreement as per NIT. The correspondence ensued thereafter resulted in the appellants' apprehending that owing to their being unwilling to abide by the new terms included in the LOI and draft documents submitted therewith the respondent would forfeit their earnest deposit as also their reserve licence fee and, therefore, the appellants filed WP(C) 6588 of 2000 seeking a declaration that since there is no consensus ad idem between the parties and since there is no clause entitling the respondent to do so, the respondent is not entitled to forfeit the EMD and the 50% reserve licence fee and for refunding of the said EiVjD and the said reserve licence fee.

5. All the four matters were taken up for hearing together. During the course of hearing, documents filed by the appellants and the respondent were taken on record with the consent of the parties and the parties accepted that the matters can be disposed of on the basis of the documents produced and submissions placed on record (LPA 71-2008 & Other cases) 4 @) ^ without the Union of India formally filing a counter affidavit. Since the facts were not in dispute, legal submissions had been placed on record. Respondent had raised an objection to the maintainability of the writ petitions, claiming that the petitioners (appellants), if they wish to pursue the case, had to be relegated to their civil remedy. The learned single Judge, following the judgments of the Supreme Court in Mahavir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corporation (1990) 3 see 752, Express Newspapers Pvt Ltd and Ors v. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCG 133, and ABL International Ltd & Anr v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd & Ors, (2004) 3 see 553, held that consideration of the appellants' case cannot be excluded simply on the ground that the transaction was in the realm of contract. The learned single Judge, however, held that the plea of the appellants that in the absence of a forfeiture clause, the government has no right to forfeit the EMD and the reserve licence fee cannot be upheld as the government is entitled to retain these amounts inter alia to reimburse itself for a wrongful loss caused by the refusal of the appellants to sign the final agreement. The learned single Judge further held that the changes in the terms of the tender cannot be termed as material as it was within the power of the government to provide for such changes, which was admittedly done after considering the representations of the bidders. The submission that there was no concluded contract was also rejected. The learned single Judge, therefore, concluded that the appellants have failed to make out a case for exercise of writ jurisdiction in their favour. (LPA 71-2008 & other cases) 5

6. Mr. C.A.Sundaram, Mr. Maninder Singh and Mr.Harish Malhotra, learned senior counsel and Mr.Sudhir Makkar, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, strenuously contended that the NIT was an invitation to offer and the response thereto and the bidding was the offer of the appellants. The LOI as issued thereafter was not an acceptance of the offer but in ternns announted to a counter offer to which the appellants were not willing and, therefore, no contract had come into existence. Learned counsel subnnitted that the so-called letter of acceptance does not really mean any ^ acceptance and it merely records the fact that the appellants are i the highest bidders and are successful in the auction. Learned counsel further submitted that assuming that the offer made by the appellants and ther0 being declared successful at the auction gave rise to any contract, even then, upon failure of appellants to abide by such offer, NIT specifically provided only for forfeiture of the EMD. Therefore, even in such an event, there could be no question of forfeiture of reserve licence fee which would necessarily have to be returned. It was submitted that the action of the respondent in unilaterally departing from the conditions of NIT, unilaterally imposing penalties of which the appellants were never put on notice at the stage of making their offers in response to the NIT and thereafter without any authority of law withholding large sums of the appellants' monies is wholly illegal, unreasonable and arbitrary. According to the learned counsel the test of arbitrariness would pervade even the contractual field where the State is a party to the contract. In this regard reliance was placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of UP, (LPA 71-2008 & Other cases) 6 r (1991) 1 see 212, Union of India v. Internationai Trading Company, (2003) 5 SCC 437 and ABL international Limited v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India (supra). It was submitted that in the event of the State retaining the amounts without authority of law the Court can also issue a writ of mandamus for refund of monies wrongly withheld. Reliance was placed on ABL International Limited (supra) and Salonah Tea Co. Ltd V. Superintendent of Taxes, Nowgong & Others,

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7. In his reply, Mr.Parag Tripathi, learned ASG, raised objection to maintainability of the writ petitions. He submitted that the writ petitions are for recovery of money, namely, recovery of reserve licence fee and EMD and such writ petitions for recovery of money are not maintainable. He submitted that the question of interpretation of the terms of contract and that too in the commercial sphere cannot be the legitimate subject-matter of a writ petition. Apart from the jurisdictional issue where the State is participating in a commercial field and dealing as a commercial enterprise, then it is treated like any other private party and, therefore, writ petition is not the appropriate remedy. He sought to rely upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Suganmal v. State of MR, AIR 1965 SCC 1740, State of UP v. Bridge and Roof Co.. (1996) 6 SCC 22 and LIC v. Escorts, (1986) 1 SCC 264. On merits the learned ASG submitted that the appellants had participated in the open auction for the grant of FM broadcasting license at different places and the offers were accepted by the (LPA 71-2008 &Other cases) 7 Cv) Union of India by issuing letters to each of the concerned parties. Thus a contract had come into force subject only to the completion of procedural formalities. Relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shri Hanuman Cotton Mills v. Tata Air Craft Ltd, (1969) 3 see 522 learned ASG further submitted that the reserve licence fee has to be treated as an earnest money. Clause 8(f) of the tender conditions though deals with a specific default but makes it clear that in the event of failure to deposit the balance 50% of the annual licence fee, the reserve licencefee would stand forfeited. A combined reading of Clauses 8(b) and 8(f) thus shows that reserve licence fee is in the nature of earnest money. He submitted that it is settled position of law that in the event of breach of contract by the other party, the party holding earnest money has an implied right to forfeit the earnest money. In support of his case he placed reliance on the decisions in Managing Director Hindustan Sliipyard, Vishakhapatnam v. Attili Appalaswami, AIR 1963 AP 71 and Abdul Gani & Co v. Trustees of the Port of Bombay, AIR 1952 Bom 310.

8. As would be seen from the arguments addressed by the parties and also the decision of the learned single Judge, one of the questions that falls for our consideration is whether the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are maintainable to enforce the contractual obligation of the State or its instrumentalities.

9. In our opinion this question is no more res Integra and is settled by a large number of pronouncements of the Supreme Court. (LPA 71-2008 &other cases) 8 tsD In D.F.O. V. Ram Sanehi Singh (1973) 3 SCC 864, the Supreme Court after referring to its earlier decision in K.N.Guruswamy v. State of Mysore AIR 1954 SC 592 held: "By that order he has deprived the respondent of a valuable right. We are unable to hold that merely because the source of the right which the respondent claims was initially in a contract, for obtaining relief against any arbitrary and unlawful action on the part of a public authority he must resort to a suit and not to a petition by way of a writ. In view of the judgment of this Court in K.N. Guruswamy case there can be no doubt that the petition was maintainable, even if the right to relief arose out of an alleged breach of contract, where the action challenged was of a public authority invested with statutory power."

10. In the case of Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Lotus Hotels (P) Ltd., (1983) 3 SCC 379 the Supreme Court following its earlier decision in Ramana Dayaram Shetty y. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 held: (SCC pp.385-86, paras 9&11) "The instrumentality of the State which would be 'other authority' under Article 12 cannot commit breach of a solemn undertaking to the prejudice of the other party which acted on that undertaking or promise and put itself in a disadvantageous position. The appellant Corporation, created under the State Financial Corporations Act, falls within the expression of 'other authority' in Article 12 and if it backs out from such a promise, it cannot be said that the only remedy for the aggrieved party would be suing for damages for breach and that it could not compel the corporation for specific performance of the contract under Article 226."

11. In Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra) also the Supreme Court examined the question in the background of Article 14 and the Court held thus: (LPA 71-2008 & other cases) e22) "There is an obvious difference in the contracts between private parties and contracts to which the State is a party. Private parties are concerned only with their personal interest whereas the State while exercising its powers and discharging its functions, acts indubitably, as is expected of it, for public good and in public interest. The impact of every State action is also on public interest. This factor alone is sufficient to import at least the minimal requirements of public law obligations and impress with this character the contracts made by the State or its instrumentality. It is a different matter that the scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling within the domain of contractual obligations may be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies provided for adjudication of purely contractual disputes. However, to the extent, challenge is made on the ground of violation of Article 14 by alleging that the impugned act is arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable, the fact that the dispute also falls within the domain of contractual obligations would not relieve the State of its obligation to comply with the basic requirements of Article 14. To this extent, the obligation is of a public character invariably in every case irrespective of there being any other right or obligation in addition thereto. An additional contractual obligation cannot divest the claimant of the guarantee under Article 14 of nonarbitrariness at the hands of the State in any of its actions. It was further held: " The requirement of Article 14 being the duty to act fairly, justly and reasonably, there is nothing which militates against the concept of requiring the State always to so act, even in contractual matters." Regarding the public law element in contractual matter, the Court settled the position in the case as follows: Even assuming that it is necessary to import the concept of presence of som.e public element in a State action to attract Article 14 and permit judicial review, we have no hesitation in saying that the ultimate impact of all actions of the State or a public body being undoubtedly on public interest, the requisite public element for this purpose is present also in contractual matters. We, therefore, find it difficult and unrealistic to exclude the State actions in contractual matters, after the contract has been made, from the purview, of (LPA 71-2008 &other cases) 10 judicial review to test its validity on the anvil of Article 14." tS)

12. Thus, the position is clear that once the State action is attacked as unreasonable, unfair and against public interest irrespective of the sphere, the State action is amenable to judicial review. In the words of Verma, J (as his Lordship then was) in Kumari Srilekha Vidyarthi's case (supra): "The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State and we find it difficult to accept that the State can be permitted to act otherwise in any field of its activity, irrespective of the nature of its functions when it has the uppermost duty to be governed by the rule of law. Non-arbitrariness, in substance, is only fair play in action. We have no doubt that this obvious requirement must be satisfied by every action of the State or its instrumentality in order to satisfy the test of validity."

13. In Air India Statutory Corporation and Ors v. United Labour Union & Ors, (1997) 9 SCC 377 it was observed as follows: "Founding fathers placed no limitation or fetters on the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution except self-imposed limitations. The arm of the Court is long enough to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Court as 'sentinel on the quivive' is to mete out justice in given facts.... The public law remedy given by Article 226 of the Constitution is to issue not only the prerogative writs provided therein but also any order or direction to enforce any of the fundamental rights and "for any other purpose". (LPA 71-2008 & other cases) 11

14. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd & Anr v. Dolly Das (1999) 4 SCC 450, which was a decision referring to interference in contractual matters, the Supreme Court held thus: "We may now advert to the contention that the writ remedy is not appropriate in this case. Where interpretation of a contract arises in relation to immovable property and in working such a contract or relief thereof or any other fallout thereto may have the effect of giving rise to an action in tort or for damages, the appropriate remedy would be a civil suit. But if the facts pleaded before the court are of such a nature which do not involve any complicated questions of fact needing elaborate investigation of the same, the High Court could also exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in such matters. There can be no hard and fast rule in such matters. When the High Court has chosen to exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution we cannot say that the discretion exercised in entertaining the petition is wrong."

15. The argument that the writ petition for refund of money cannot be granted in a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is stated to be rejected. It may be noted that the decision relied upon by the learned ASG in Suganmai's case (supra) has been explained in the subsequent decision in the case of UP Pollution Control Board v. Kanoria Industrial Limited and Another, (2001) 2 SCC 549: AIR 2001 SC 787 wherein the Court held as follows: "In the para extracted above, in a similar situation as arising in the present cases relating to the very question of refund, while answering the said question affirmatively, this Court pointed out that the courts have made distinction between those cases where a claimant approached a High Court seeking relief of obtaining refund only and those where refund was sought as a consequential relief after striking down of the order of assessment, etc. In these cases also the claims made for refund in the writ petitions were consequent upon declaration of law made by this (LPA 71-2008 & other cases) 12 f Court. Hence, the High Court committed no error in entertaining the vyrit petitions. in support of the submission that a writ petition seel<ing mandamus for mere refund of money was not maintainable, the decision in Suganmal v. State of M.P. was cited. In AIR para 6 of the said judgment, it is stated that - "We are of the opinion that though the High Courts have power to pass any appropriate order in the exercise of the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution, such a petition solely praying for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the State to refund the money is not ordinarily maintainable for the simple reason that a claim for such a refund can always be made in a suit against the authority which had illegally collected the money as a tax". Again in AIR para 9, the Court held: "'We, therefore, hold that norrnally petitions solely praying for the refund of money against the State by a writ of mandamus are not to be entertained. The aggrieved party has the right of going to the civil court for claiming the amount and it. is open to the State to raise all possible defences to the claim, defences which cannot, in most cases, be appropriately raised and considered in the exercise of writ jurisdiction." This judgment cannot be read as laying down the law that no writ petition at all can be entertained where claim is made for only refund of money consequent upon declaration of law that levy and collection of tax/cess as unconstitutional or without the authority of law. It is one thing to say that the High Court has no power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ of mandamus for making refund of the money illegally collected. It is yet another thing to say that such power can be exercised sparingly depending on facts and circumstances of each case. For instance, in the cases on hand where facts are not in dispute, collection of money as cess was itself without the authority of law; no case of undue enrichment was made out and the amount of cess was paid under protest; the writ petitions were filed within a reasonable time from the date of the declaration that the law under which tax/cess was collected was unconstitutional. There is no good reason to deny a relief of refund to the citizens in such cases on the principles of public interest and equity in the light of the cases cited above. However, it must not be understood that in all cases where collection of cess, levy or tax is held to be unconstitutional or invalid, the (LPA 71-2008 aether cases) 13 A.\ n refund should necessarily follow. We wish to add that even in cases where collection of cess, levy or tax is held to be unconstitutional or invalid, refund is not an automatic consequence but may be refused on several grounds depending on facts and circumstances of a given case."

16. After in-depth analysis of the earlier judgments on the issue including Suganmal v. State of MP, State of UP v. Bridge and Roof Co. and LIC v. Escorts, a two judge Bench in ABL International Ltd's case (supra) held that the following legal principles emerge as to the maintainability ofthe writ petition: "(a) In an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a State or an instrumentality of a State arising out of a contractual obligation is maintainable. (b) Merely because some disputed questions of fact arise for consideration, same cannot be a ground to refuse to entertain a writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule.

(c) A writ petition involving a consequential relief of monetary claim is also maintainable."

17. It is in the above understanding of law, we will now consider ^ the facts to find out whether the appellants are entitled to the relief as prayed for in the writ petition filed by them.

18. At the outset, we may state that there is no substance in the plea of the appellants that there was no concluded contract between the parties. The appellants were successful bidders in the auction and letters acknowledging this fact were sent to all the appellants. Copies of those letters have also been placed on record. We, therefore, proceed on the basis that there was a contract between the parties. The question which really falls for our (LPA 71-2008 &other cases) 14 1 • consideration is as to whetlner forfeiture of reserve licence fee was arbitrary. The contract has a specific clause under which reserve licence fee can be forfeited. Tender conditions do not provide for forfeiture of reserve licence fee except under Clause 8(f) where if the balance licence fee was not paid within ten days of the WPC intimating that the operational licence was ready to be issued, the licence fee paid by the applicant was liable to be forfeited. There is no dispute that none of the abovesaid stages had been reached. In fact reserve licence fee was deposited by the appellants under Clause 8(b), which stipulates deposit of the 50% of the licence fee as eligibility condition. Clause 10(d) provides for forfeiture of the entire first year's licence fee in the event of failure of the applicant to install the broadcast facilities and admittedly this clause is not attracted in the present case. Clause 12 is the only clause whereby forfeiture of earnest money is provided in the event of applicant not abiding by his offer. Clauses 8(b), 8(f), 10(d) and 12 are reproduced below: "8(b) All the applicants found eligible after scrutiny shall be invited to witness / participate in an open auction. All such applicants desirous of participating in the auction process shall have to deposit 50% of the Reserve Licence fee for the first year as prescribed in Annexure-1, through A/c Payee Demand Draft drawn on any scheduled bank and in favour of Pay & Accounts Officer, Ministry of l&B, New Delhi payable at Delhi, prior to the commencement of auction process. All the unsuccessful applicants will be given back their respective deposits of Reserve Licence fee immediately after the auction process. 8(f) The licence fee has to be paid by each licencee every year in advance within seven days of the beginning of the year. For the first year, balance of the licence fee will have to be paid within 10 days of WPC's intimation that operational licence is ready to be (LPA 71-2008 &other cases) 15 issued. Failure to do so will result in forfeiture of amount already deposited. The licence period will be reckoned from the date of issue of operational licence by Wireless Planning Sc Coordination Wing (WPC), _ Ministry of Communications." 10.(d) The successful applicant shall also complete the installation of the broadcast facilities including studios, transmitter infrastructure etc and commission the service within 12 months from the date of frequency earmarking by WPC. If the successful applicant fails to do so, the first year licence fee paid by the applicant shall stand forfeited.

12.

EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT (EMD): The applicant shall enclose with the tender document a crossed A/c payee demand draft payable at any scheduled bank in New Delhi for the amount defined below, in favour of the Pay & Accounts Officer, Ministry of l&dB, Shastri Bhavan, New Delhi-1 payable at Delhi towards earnest money deposit. The earnest money deposit shall be forfeited in case the applicant does not abide by his offer. No relaxation of any kind on earnest money deposit will be given to any applicant. EMD will be returned to unsuccessful applicants. After payment of licence fee and furnish of bank guarantee, the EMD will be returned to successful applicant. Category EMD Rs. Lakhs A+ 2.00 A 1.00 B 0.75 C&D 0.5"

19. The argument of the learned ASG that the reserve licence fee was in the nature of earnest money is contrary to the plain reading of Clauses 8(b), 8(f) and 12. In case of the appellants not abiding by their offer, the NIT itself stipulated the consequence thereof, which was only the forfeiture of the earnest money deposit. The tender conditions specifically provided for the situations in (LPA 71-2008 & Other cases) 16 which forfeiture is permissible and it is not open for the respondent to travel beyond the scope of express terms of the contract. The situation contemplated by Clause 8(f) providing for forfeiture of the reserve licence fee admittedly had not arisen. In the present case the entire controversy arose not because the appellants failed to abide by their offer but because the respondent introduced certain new terms and conditions and insisted that the contract should be proceeded on such revised terms and conditions. The respondent while exercising its power of forfeiture is required to act within the four corners of the contract. While doing so, the terms of the contract cannot be altered so as to include extraneous matters which were not contemplated by the parties. The express provisions for forfeiture of EMD and reserve licence fee ought to be given the meaning as expressly contemplated under the tender conditions and it is not possible to read in the contract some implied meaning so as to enlarge the power for forfeiture conferred on the respondent. Reliance placed on the judgment of Bombay High Court in the case of Abdul Gani & Co's case (supra) is of no assistance as the said decision had been specifically overruled in Fateh Chand

V. Balkishan Dass, AIR 1963 SC 1405 wherein the Supreme Court categorically held that it cannot be assumed that because there is a stipulation for forfeiture, the amount paid must bear the character of a deposit for due performance of the contract. We may also refer to the following passage from Mulla - Indian Contract and Specific Relief Act, 12'" Ed.: (page 1692) "(b) Provision for Forfeiture Required (LPA 71-2008 & other cases) 17 Forfeiture of the right to money or other property already delivered and falling under s.74 can be had only if the contract contains a stipulation in that regard. To justify forfeiture of advance deposit, being a part of price as 'earnest', the terms of the contract should be sufficiently explicit and made known to the party making the deposit. Where, therefore, the bidders, were not pointedly told that one-fourth initial deposit would be treated as 'earnest' and would be liable to be forfeited in the event of default by the highest bidder to deposit the remaining auction money within the stipulated time, it was held that the forfeiture, of onefourth deposit could not be supported by the provisions of s.74. Where a sum of money is paid as advance and as a part of the consideration money, it cannot be forfeited in absence of a provision for forfeiture even if the defaulting party be liable for damages for breach. In a case of sale of goods, Rs.3,000 was paid by way of advance and deposit as security for due performance of the contract. This money was variously described as 'deposit', 'advance', 'earnest money' i.e. 'biana'. Hence, the money was liable for forfeiture even in the absence of a provision to that effect."

20. Reference may also be made to the judgment of this Court in Bhim Sain v. Union of India, AIR 1981 Delhi 260 where in the context of action for blacklisting the Court observed that "in the conditions contained in the invitation of tender it was specifically stated that in the event of default by the tenderers, the tenderers would be liable to forfeit 10 per cent of the security amount. No other liability could be fastened on the tenderers as per the terms and conditions thereof". In yet another decision in Bhanwarlal & Others v. Babulal & others, AIR 1992 MP 6 the Court held that to justify forfeiture of advance deposit, being a part of price as 'earnest', the terms of contract should be sufficiently explicit and made known to the parties making the deposit. The decision in Shri (LPA 71-2008 &other cases) 18 @) Hanuman Cotton M/Z/s (supra) relied upon by the learned ASG lays down the following broad principles regarding 'earnest': (1) It must be given at the moment at which the contract is concluded. (2) It represents a guarantee that the contract will be fulfilled or, in other words, 'earnest' is given to bind the contract. (3) It is part of the purchase price when the transaction is carried out. (4) It is forfeited when the transaction falls through by reason of the default or failure of the purchaser. (5) Unless there is anything to the contrary in the terms of the contract, on default committed by the buyer, the seller is entitled to forfeit the earnest.

21. In a recent decision in DDA v. Joint Action Committee, Allottees of SFS Flats, (2008) 2 SCC 672 the Supreme Court rejected the argument of DDA that regulations confer residuary power on the authority to determine the cost of construction. The Court held that even while exercising the residuary power the authority is required to act within the four corners of the contract. While doing so the terms of contract cannot be altered to include any other factors which were not contemplated thereunder. The Court held thus: "Strong reliance has been placed upon the residuary power conferred upon the Authority to determine the cost of construction. When the same is done having regard to the relevant factors on the basis of which brochure as well as the notice inviting tender was issued, the superior courts may not interfere; but the same must be done in terms of the original contract and not de hors the same. The Authority, even while exercising its residuary power, is required to act within the four corners of the contract. While doing so, the terms of the contract cannot be altered to include any other factors which were (sic not) contemplated (LPA 71-2008 &Other cases) 19 CV) thereunder. While computing the extra cost, no additional factor thus, can be tal<en into consideration. If such a power is conceded in the Authority, the same would give rise to exercise of arbitrary power. It is not contemplated in law. When construing a provision which delegates a power on an authority under a statute, the constitutional provisions must be kept in mind."

22. In our opinion, the licence conditions categorically provide for forfeiture of reserve licence fee only in certain eventuality and it is admitted position that such eventuality had not occurred. Therefore, in our opinion, the forfeiture of the reserve licence fee cannot be justified. It is not permissible in view of the specific provisions of the contract. In the result, we hold that the forfeiture of the reserve licence fee by the respondent is arbitrary and illegal. The forfeited amount is required to be refunded to the appellants. We direct the respondents to refund the aforesaid amount to the appellants within a period of four weeks from today. The appeals stand disposed of.