Rajesh Kumar Ravi v. P.O., Delhi School Tribunal & Anr.

9. The next argument of Mr. Arora was in respect of violation of the rule regarding appointment of Presenting Officer (hereinafter referred to as “PO”) by the respondents. He submits that in the present case, no PO was ever appointed, contrary to all principles of Administrative Law and in violation of the said Rules as also the principles of natural justice. The IO himself acted like the PO and conducted proceedings in a manner unknown to law. He urges that that IO, donning the role of PO, has acted like a judge in his own cause, which according to learned counsel, is impermissible in law. He submits that, on that count, the disciplinary proceedings itself ought to be declared to be vitiated and accordingly, quashed.

10. Mr. Arora submits that one of the witnesses and the present respondent no.4 had a bias against the petitioner and had a malafide intention of removing the petitioner from the services of the respondent no.2. Learned counsel was at pains to take this Court through the correspondences and other documents on the strength of which he sought to demonstrate that respondent no.4, who was also one of the witnesses, was inimically disposed towards the petitioner and as such, this aspect not having been appreciated either by the IO or the DA, would itself vitiate the veracity and the authenticity of the disciplinary proceedings. He submits that the IO never cross checked from any of the witnesses as to whether the incident, as alleged by respondent no.4 as witness, was true or not. To that extent, learned counsel submits that the inquiry proceedings were not only bias and collusive but also displayed a partisan attitude.

11. Mr. Arora referred to and read various paragraphs of the impugned order dated 17.07.2003 of the learned DST to submit as to how the learned DST too, did not appreciate all the aforesaid contentions.

12. On issue of violation of statutory rules, learned counsel submits that there has been a gross violation of procedure prescribed in Rule 120 of the said Rules. He submits that, firstly, the DA did not provide a copy of the Inquiry Report to the petitioner; secondly, no Show Cause Notice was ever issued by the DA; thirdly, no opportunity to file his Statement of Defence/reply to the Inquiry Officer’s report was afforded to the petitioner; fourthly, no opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner and lastly, the suspension which was extended was in gross violation of Rule 115 of the said Rules. By referring to various Clauses of sub-rule 1 of Rule 120 of the said Rules, learned counsel sought to demonstrate that in the present case, there has been a gross violation of the aforesaid mandatory provisions. Resultantly, according to him, impugned order dated 12.07.1993 of the DA cannot withstand the scrutiny of law and ought to be quashed and set aside.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT:-

13. Per Contra, Mr. J. Rajesh, learned counsel for the respondent/Institute, refutes the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner. He submits that that impugned order dated 17.07.2003 of the learned DST is complete in all respects and was passed after considering all the contentions of the parties and is a reasoned order.

14. On facts, Mr. Rajesh submits that so far as the inquiry proceedings are concerned, the IO was to evaluate only issues on facts and there was no occasion to deal with any provision of law and as such, the same cannot be vitiated. He draws attention of this Court to the Articles of Charge as noted by the IO to submit that all that the IO was supposed to analyse was factual aspect regarding the petitioner’s misconduct of using criminal force on respondent no.4 by kicking the respondent no.4 on his chest and the statement of witnesses supporting/corroborating the said fact alone. He submits that all the three Articles of Charge were duly proved by the witnesses in accordance with the procedure prescribed. He submits that the nonattending of the said inquiry proceedings by the petitioner was at his peril alone. He submits that the IO had assured the petitioner of protection during the inquiry proceedings, which the petitioner did not avail of and now to call the ex parte inquiry proceedings vitiated, is untenable on facts. In support of the aforesaid, learned counsel referred to various correspondences and proceedings sheets of the IO to the petitioner, of granting opportunities to join the enquiry proceedings, which were not availed of by the petitioner.

15. On the issue of legal submission urged on behalf of the petitioner regarding vitiation of the inquiry proceedings on account of nonappointment of the PO, he submits that there are no specific pleadings either before the learned DST or before this Court to demonstrate that during the inquiry proceedings, the IO acted as a Prosecutor as also a Judge. He submits that mere bald statement on factual allegation without any demonstrable evidence would not vitiate the inquiry proceedings and this Court would be loath in reaching such conclusion. To the aforesaid, learned counsel submits that even otherwise, there is no such specific provision in the said Rules requiring appointment of a PO. As such, there is no violation of the statutory rules in respect thereto. To the aforesaid proposition, learned counsel relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Ram Lakhan Sharma reported in

16. So far as the issue of assessment of evidence and recording of findings by the IO is concerned, learned counsel read through the Report of IO to submit that since the only issue which was to be examined by him was whether the petitioner on that particular day had misconducted himself by using criminal force on respondent no.4, the noting of such incident alongwith the observation that the statement of the witnesses were found to have corroborated the said incident, was enough to comply with the principles of natural justice. He submits that a fact which was put as an Article of Charge was proved by way of the said fact being ascertained and proved by way of examination of the witnesses. It could have been challenged or rebutted only if the petitioner had cross-examined such witnesses. The question of analysis would only be required upon such cross examination having taken place. Since the petitioner failed to participate in the proceedings, the IO merely had to rely upon the statements given by the witnesses without having anything more. That having been done, learned counsel submits that there cannot be any fault found in the IO’s Report.

17. Mr. Rajesh invited attention of this Court to the impugned order dated 17.07.2003 of the learned DST to submit that the aforesaid contentions were raised by the petitioner and fairly dealt with by the learned DST in various portions of its order. He submits that this Court in exercise of judicial review is precluded from considering questions of facts which have been tested right uptill the stage of learned DST, as has been settled by various judgments of the Supreme Court.

18. In the context of the contention raised by the petitioner regarding purported violation of Rule 120 of the said Rules, learned counsel submits that there is nothing to establish or demonstrate on record that any such violation of the statutory rules had at all occurred. That apart, learned counsel draws attention of this Court to sub-rule 1 of Rule 120, particularly to the words “as far as may be” to submit that the said words emphasize that the procedure prescribed therein is directory and not mandatory. This argument, learned counsel submits, is an alternate argument and asserts that there has been no violation of the various Clauses of sub-rule 1 of Rule 120 of the said Rules by the respondents in this case. For the aforesaid propositions, learned counsel relies upon the judgments in Samarth Shiksha Samiti v. Directorate of Education, reported in 2011 SCC OnLine Del 1919; Mgt. Commt. Ramjas Foundation v. S.K. Aggarwal, reported in 2012 SCC OnLine Del 2822; Rosary Senior Secondary School v. Directorate of Education, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1871.

19. In regard to the allegation and contention of non-payment of Subsistence Allowance, learned counsel submits that the said nonpayment, if at all would not vitiate the proceedings in any manner whatsoever. He submits that that the respondents had in fact tendered the Subsistence Allowance to the petitioner on 13.07.2005, vide the cheque dated 14.07.2005 for a sum of Rs.7,681/- which was accepted by the petitioner on 14.07.2005. As such, according to learned counsel, the Subsistence Allowance having been paid, no grievance can be raised by the petitioner at this stage.

20. In view of the above, learned counsel prays that the present petition be dismissed with exemplary costs.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION:-

21. This Court has heard the arguments of Mr. Rajat Arora and Mr. J. Rajesh, learned counsel appearing for the parties, perused the record and considered the judgements relied upon.

22. As has been observed by this Court in matters relating to disciplinary proceedings, the quintessential issue raised by the employee usually revolves around the factual disputes emanating from the Report of the Inquiry Officer who is the only and final fact finding authority. The next level of arguments is on the violation of statutory rules or prescribed procedure which would, if found correct, vitiate the proceedings or render the penalty order, non est. Other cases may be based on violation of principles of natural justice as permissible in administrative law. The cases before the Courts exercising judicial review may encompass one of the above, or all, or a combination of two or more. Either way, the power of judicial review of Courts exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 are circumscribed by the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the evergreen landmark judgements in the cases of B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 and Union of India & Ors. Vs. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610. The ratio laid down therein is consistently being followed in the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Subrata Nath reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1617.

23. Since the present case involves a challenge to the Inquiry Report, the inquiry proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority’s dismissal order and the order rejecting the Appeal passed by the learned DST, it would be apposite to extract the relevant paras of the aforesaid judgements, which are as under: (a) B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India & Ors.

each case.

13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718: AIR 1964 SC 364: (1964) 1 LLJ 38] this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” (b) Union of India & Ors. Vs. P. Gunasekaran

13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

(i) reappreciate the evidence;

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court has circumscribed the powers of judicial review in matters arising out of disciplinary proceedings, however, carved out an exception in matters involving stark violation of principles of natural justice and those involving clear violation of the statutory rules or prescribed procedure. Though, to the mind of this Court, violation of statutory rules or prescribed procedure would also subsume within itself violation of the principles of natural justice.

24. In the present case, the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner revolved around how the petitioner was victimized, harassed and finally, by conducting a mock inquiry, was dismissed from service. Mr. Arora was at pains to take this Court through the Inquiry Officer’s Report, the DA’s order dated 12.07.1993 and the impugned order dated 17.07.2003 of the learned DST.

25. Learned counsel pointed out that on an earlier occasion too, the respondents had forced the petitioner to submit a resignation letter, albeit, on false and frivolous grounds, however, the 1st disciplinary proceedings ended with the Disciplinary Authority passing a penalty order dated 07.10.1992 imposing a penalty of (i) Censure and; (ii) withholding of two increments. He submits that this inquiry was a prequel to the 2nd disciplinary proceedings which are subject matter of the present petition. According to Mr. Arora, the allegation of bias and malafide commenced from the previous instance and ended up with the impugned dismissal order on a completely conjured up facts.

26. What is relevant to the issue would be the Inquiry Officer’s Report which is undated. The paragraphs where the analysis and findings concluded have been recorded are reproduced hereunder:

. Shri ML saran and Shri Ram Sumiran Yadav had gone together to hand over the AFGJI letter No. AFGJI/6/10/Pers dt 13 Apr 92 regarding assembly of the Inquiry to the house of Shri Rajesh Kumar Ravi. Shri Ram Sumiran Yadav confirms having seen that charged officer Shri Rajesh Kumar Ravi hit Shri ML Saran, OS, with his (Rajesh Kumar Ravi) leg. There is no reason to doubt the statement of Shri Ram Sumiran Yadav. Article-II c) The second charge against the accused is of misbehaving with Shri ML Saran. This charge is also supported by the statement of Shri Ram Sumiran Yadav where he says that Shri Rajesh Kumar Ravi questioned the arrival of Shri ML Saran to his house and they were about to grapple with each other. This clearly shows that Shri Rajesh Kumar Ravi was in bad mood and he misbehaved with Shri ML Saran, OS. Article-III d) The third charge is that Shri Rajesh Kumar Ravi threatened Shri ML Saran, OS on 02 May 92 at AFGJI to kill him through gundas hired by him. This charge is corroborated by the statement of Shri SK Gaur, Accountant who is an eye witness and heard the threat given by the charged officer to Shri ML Saran, OS. General The accused was not present for the Inquiry. Inspite of giving various opportunities and assurances to his safety during recording of evidence the charged officer, did not appear before the Inquiry Officer. His absence is wilful and intentional. The Inquiry Officer had no option but to finalise the Inquiry Exparte.

8. Findings On the basis of the evidence addressed in the case before me I hold that Shri Rajesh Kumar Ravi is guilty of all the three charges beyond any reasonable doubt.” (emphasis supplied) This Court is acutely aware of the prescription mandated by the Supreme Court, yet dares to enter this arena. This is so because the Inquiry Officer is the only and final fact finding authority and in the considered opinion of this Court, the Inquiry Report ought to speak the mind of the Inquiry Officer in clear and cogent findings. A word of caution, it need not be like a judgement of a Trial Court in a civil suit. However, at the same time, it cannot be cryptic and non-speaking. Moreso, when the proceedings may entail major penalty like dismissal or removal from service.

27. To the mind of this Court, the Inquiry Officer has, in his “Analysis and Assessment of Evidence” merely repeated the Articles of Charge and stated that the same were supported by the statements of the witnesses, and except that, has not even analysed as to whether the statements corroborate the allegations. No doubt that the proceedings were ex parte, however, in the opinion of this Court, it was all the more reason to extricate the findings to a more pure level, so as to ensure purity can be apparently perceived. In the penultimate paragraph regarding “Findings”, the Inquiry Officer merely notes that the petitioner is guilty of all the 3 Articles of Charge beyond reasonable doubt. In the considered opinion of this Court, the said analysis suffers from the vice of non application of mind. No evidence has been appreciated except for a bald averment and the conclusion suffers from the vice of being non speaking and having no finding.

28. That apart, the Court would now examine the issue of blatant violation of the statutory rules and prescribed procedure. During the course of arguments, this Court had queried the learned counsel for the respondent as to whether the copy of the Inquiry Report was furnished to the petitioner and as to whether the Disciplinary Authority had issued any Show Cause Notice and if the petitioner was afforded an opportunity of hearing vide this Court’s order dated 02.04.2024. Mr. J. Rajesh, learned counsel had informed this Court on 09.04.2024 that the records being old are not traceable, however, submitted that the Report as also the Show Cause Notice must have been furnished and opportunity of hearing must have been afforded to the petitioner.

29. The aforesaid information does not suffice the query put, nor falls within the purview of proper compliance of the statutory rules and the prescribed procedure. The present case involves an employee of a School and thus, the respondent as well as the petitioner is bound by the Delhi Schools Education Act, 1973 and the Rules made thereunder. It is trite that when there are in existence, statutory rules or prescribed procedures governing the disciplinary proceedings by virtue of an enactment or O.M. or other Government Circulars/Notifications issued under the powers of delegated legislations, then those stipulations alone are to be followed and none other. Since there is undoubtedly a statutory rule and a prescribed procedure to be mandatorily followed, the same cannot be ignored or overlooked.

30. The present disciplinary proceedings would therefore be governed primarily by Rule 120 of the Delhi Schools Education Rules 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the “said Rules”). In order to appreciate the issue in the context of the rule position, it would be apposite to extract Rule 120 of the said Rules which is as under:

may itself make inquiry into such of the charges as are not admitted or if considers it necessary so to do, appoint an inquiry officer for the purpose;

(c) at the conclusion of the inquiry, the inquiry officer shall prepare a report of the inquiry regarding his findings on each of the charges together with the reasons therefore;

(d) the disciplinary authority shall consider the record of the inquiry and record its findings on each charge and if the disciplinary authority is of opinion that any of the major penalties should be imposed, it shall:—

(i) furnish to the employee a copy of the report of the inquiry officer, where an inquiry has been made by such officer;

(ii) give him notice in writing stating the action proposed to be taken in regard to him and calling upon him to submit within the specified time, not exceeding two weeks, such representation as he may wish to make against the proposed action;

(iii) on receipt of the representation, if any, made by the employee, the disciplinary authority shall determine what penalty, if any, should be imposed on the employee and communicate its tentative decision to impose the penalty to the Director for his prior approval;

(iv) after considering the representation made by the employee against the penalty, the disciplinary authority shall record its findings as to the penalty which it proposes to impose on the employee and send its findings, and decision to the Director for his approval and while sending the case to the Director, the disciplinary authority shall furnish to him all relevant records of the case including the statement of allegations charges framed against the employee, representation made by the employee, a copy of the inquiry report, where such inquiry was made, and the proceedings of the disciplinary authority. (2) No order with regard to the imposition of a major penalty shall be made by the disciplinary authority except after the receipt of the approval of the Director. (3) Any employee of a recognised private school who is aggrieved by any order imposing on him the penalty of compulsory retirement or any minor penalty may prefer an appeal to the Tribunal.” It is manifest from the above that the rules postulate strict adherence to the procedure prescribed. In that, the copy of the Inquiry Report has to be furnished to the Charged Officer/employee; the Disciplinary Authority has to mandatorily issue a Show Cause Notice; and give an opportunity to submit a Statement of Defence to such employee. The prescription is in complete compliance of the principles of natural justice and is a mandatory facet of administrative law. Such exercise is not a mere formality but mandatory. Any violation thereof may entail the disciplinary proceedings itself being declared vitiated. In the opinion of this Court, the said prescription has been engrafted for domestic disciplinary proceedings, not only in tune with the principles of natural justice, but also keeping in view the bargaining power of the employee in comparison to his/her employer, which would be insignificant. Though, it appears that the opportunity of personal hearing has not been specified, however, on the touchstone of principles of natural justice, it would follow that the said right of personal hearing is inherent in disciplinary proceedings. Moreover, the said right has been held to be a Constitutional right by the Supreme Court in Yoginath D. Bagde vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1999) 7 SCC 739. The Supreme Court had in fact held that there could be no rule or statutory enactment denying such opportunity of hearing at all. It would be apposite to refer to the relevant paragraph which is as under:

stage that the delinquent employee should be given an opportunity of hearing after he is informed of the reasons on the basis of which the disciplinary authority has proposed to disagree with the findings of the enquiry officer. This is in consonance with the requirement of Article 311(2) of the Constitution as it provides that a person shall not be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. So long as a final decision is not taken in the matter, the enquiry shall be deemed to be pending. Mere submission of findings to the disciplinary authority does not bring about the closure of the enquiry proceedings. The enquiry proceedings would come to an end only when the findings have been considered by the disciplinary authority and the charges are either held to be not proved or found to be proved and in that event punishment is inflicted upon the delinquent. That being so, the “right to be heard” would be available to the delinquent up to the final stage. This right being a constitutional right of the employee cannot be taken away by any legislative enactment or service rule including rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution.” The aforesaid observation leaves no room for any doubt that even if the statutory rules or the prescribed procedure does not specifically provide for an opportunity of hearing to the employee, it has to be inherently and readily inferred to exist. This would be an indelible component of the principles of natural justice which need to be zealously guarded by the Constitutional Courts.

31. Having the aforesaid in the backdrop, it appears from the records before this Court that no copy of the Inquiry Report was furnished to the petitioner, nor was any Show Cause Notice issued and there is any amount of doubt as to whether the petitioner was given an opportunity of hearing by the DA. Just to complete the sequence, it would be relevant to consider the order of the DA dismissing the petitioner from services. The said order dated 12.07.1993 is extracted hereunder: “ REGD A/D Phone: 3292819 Air Force Golden Jubilee Institute Subroto Park, New Delhi – 110 010 Ref. No. AFGJI/6/10/Pers Sh. Rajesh Kumar Ravi C/o Late Sh Hukam Singh PO: Mahipalpur New Delhi – 110 037 ORDER: REMOVAL FROM SERVICE

1. Please refer to the disciplinary case initiated against you vide No. AGFJI/6/10/Pers dated 05 Aug 92 subsequent proceedings of the Disciplinary Authority.

2. The Disciplinary Authority after having considered the complete case, record of Inquiry & statement of your defence, has decided to impose the following penalty in terms of Rule 119(b) iii of DSER 1973 “Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for further employment in any other recognized private school.”

3. Your services from this school stand terminated wef 12 Jul 93. You are, therefore, advised to come to the Institute and settle your accounts immediately. (SK Sharma) Air Cmde Chairman Managing Committee” A perusal of the aforesaid order brings to fore two clear things. One, it is conspicuous by the absence of reference to the issuance of Show Cause Notice; and two, there is no reference either to an opportunity ever being afforded to the petitioner or that he was heard at all. Though, it generally refers to some Statement of Defence, no such document has been placed on record either by the petitioner or the respondent in support thereof. In fact, the said order is absolutely cryptic, non-speaking and does not advert to any allegations, facts found, the analysis or as to why the DA is agreeing with the findings and conclusions reached by the Inquiry Officer. The DA is deemed to be, under the Rules, an Independent Authority exercising quasi-judicial functions as postulated in the administrative law and not a rubber stamp. The DA is expected to apply the mind rationally and analyse the findings and consider the grounds in the Statement of Defence. In the aforesaid order, all the above ingredients are conspicuous by their absence. As such, it is well nigh impossible to sustain the same.

22. Another argument urged on behalf of the respondent was that the prescription stipulated in Rule 120 of the said Rules is not mandatory since in sub-rule (1) of Rule 120, the words “as far as maybe” have been employed. In other words, learned counsel for the respondent seeks to urge that even if the respondent may not have complied with furnishing of Inquiry Report or afforded an opportunity of hearing, the rule in this regard was only directory and not mandatory. This argument is noted only to be rejected. It is clear from the ratio laid down by the judgment of Yoginath D. Bagde (supra) that even where the statute or rules do not provide for an opportunity of hearing to the Charged Officer/employee by the DA or where there is an actual denial, it must be inferred and read in, apart from holding the same to be a constitutional right. Thus, once it has been held to be a constitutional right, whether such procedure is prescribed or not, the same has to be made applicable across the board. That apart, Clause (d) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 120 of the Rules employs the word “shall” in more than one place which in the ordinary sense too, would imply mandatory nature of the stipulation. In other words, if the proposition urged by the respondent is agreed to, then there would be a complete chaos and the domestic tribunals being within the confines of institutions, would become “Kangaroo Courts”, existing for the namesake. This surely cannot be the intent of the Legislature. For the aforesaid reasons, the judgement in the case of Samarth Shiksha Samiti v. Directorate of Education, reported in 2011 SCC OnLine Del 1919, for the proposition predicated on the words “as far as maybe” relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondent is misplaced. That apart, in the said judgement, this Court had reached its conclusion of the provisions being directory and not mandatory on the basis that there was sufficient compliance of the provisions of Rule 118 and 120 of the said Rules subsequently, though not done earlier, considering the exigencies arising in that case. Whereas, in the present case, there has been a blatant violation of the procedure prescribed.

32. This Court has also perused the impugned order dated 17.07.2003 passed by the learned DST. From a careful scrutiny, it appears manifest that the learned DST did not even consider as to whether statutory rules and the prescribed procedures have been complied with by the respondent school. The learned DST proceeded and presumed as if all statutory compliances have been made by the respondent. It is clear that the learned DST did not consider the most crucial part of the case, which is violation of Rule 120 of the said Rules. Once it is clear from the record that statutory rules and the prescribed procedures have been violated, the issue of examining the case on facts and merits ought not to have been undertaken. That apart, it appears from the reading of the impugned order that none of the judgements of the Supreme Court have been considered and applied to the facts arising in the present case. Having regard to the legal conclusions reached by this Court in the preceding paragraphs, the impugned orders dated 17.07.2003 of learned DST is unsustainable and is set aside.

33. Since this Court is disposing of this petition in the above issue, the other arguments of the petitioner regarding the proceedings being vitiated for being conducted without the Presenting Officer, nonpayment of subsistence allowance during the proceedings etc. are not being adverted to, nor any opinion is rendered.

34. This Court has considered the judgements relied upon by the respondent in the case of Samarth Shiksha Samiti v. Directorate of Education (supra), Mgt. Commt. Ramjas Foundation v. S.K. Aggarwal (supra), Rosary Senior Secondary School v. Directorate of Education (supra). This Court finds that there is not even a single observation by the Court that conditions of furnishing of Show Cause Notice or affording of the opportunity of hearing to the charged officer were ever violated in those cases. However, in the present case, the DA had not provided an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and as such, the act fell foul of the ratio of the judgement in Yoginath D. Bagde (supra) vitiating the Inquiry itself.

35. The travesty of justice in this case is apparent, in that, the petitioner was dismissed from service in the year 1993, the impugned order was passed in the year 2003, the present writ was filed in the year 2003 and is being disposed off in the year 2024.

36. As an upshot, the impugned order dated 17.07.2003 passed by the learned Delhi School Tribunal in Appeal No. 26/1993 and the impugned order dated 12.07.1993 of the DA are quashed and set aside. Consequently, the petitioner would be deemed to have been reinstated from the date of dismissal and accordingly, would be entitled to 50% of his wages all throughout with entitlement of increments and promotions, if any. In case the petitioner has superannuated in the meanwhile, all the retiral benefits accruable to the petitioner shall also be released in favour of the petitioner. The said exercise be completed within 6 weeks from today failing which interest at the rate of 6% p.a. would be liable to be paid by the respondents upon the arrears of all dues.

37. Ordinarily, while setting aside the disciplinary proceeding, this Court would have directed de novo proceedings, however, keeping in view the facts obtaining in the present case, i.e., no records of the inquiry proceedings being available as admitted by learned counsel for the respondent, coupled with the passage of more than 3 decades from the initiation of such proceedings, it would be unjust, onerous, and unfair to the parties, to direct de-novo disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. The same view is strengthened by the judgement of the Supreme Court in Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari reported in (2017) 2 SCC 308.

38. The writ petition, alongwith pending applications, is disposed of.

TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J. APRIL 16, 2024