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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 03.05.2024
VED PRAKSH (DECEASED)
THROUGH HIS LRS & ORS. ..... Petitioners
Through: Mr. B.P. Gupta & Mr. Rajesh Gupta, Advs.
Through: Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak, Mr. Sunil Kumar Jha, Mr. M.S. Akhtar, Ms. Nidhi Thakur, Mr. Mayank Arora, Ms. M. Benazir & Mr. Mayank Madhu, Advs.
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE TARA VITASTA GANJU VIBHU BAKHRU, J. (Oral)
JUDGMENT
1. The petitioners have filed the present petition, inter alia, praying that directions be issued to the Land Acquisition Collector (hereafter LAC) to forward their reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereafter LA Act). The petitioners claim that their land comprised in Khasra Nos.592 min (5-17) and 593 (5-7) situated in the revenue estate of village Kilokari, New Delhi (hereafter the subject land) was acquired in terms of an Award No.9/1999-2000, dated 31.03.2000. The petitioners claim that they became aware of the said award on 24.12.2003, when the LAC tendered the compensation for the acquisition of the subject land.
2. It is not in dispute that no notice under Section 12(2) of the LA Act was served to the petitioners. Immediately after receiving the compensation and RAWAL after becoming aware of the award in question, the petitioners filed a reference under Section 18 of the LA Act on 06.02.2004. The said reference was not forwarded by the concerned LAC to the concerned court on the ground that the same was barred by limitation. The concerned LAC sent a communication dated 04.01.2021 (hereafter the impugned communication) informing the petitioners that the reference dated 06.02.2004 filed by them was beyond the period of limitation.
3. It is the petitioners’ case that the question of limitation is required to be decided by the Reference Court and not by the LAC. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners’ relies on the decision dated 08.05.2017 of the Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.2318/2014 captioned Arpit Bhargava v. GNCT of Delhi & Ors. in support of this contention. The relevant extract of the said decision reads as under:
4. He also relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in Madan & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra: (2014) 2 SCC 720. In the said decision, the Supreme Court considered the question whether limitation would commence from the date of the award in terms of the proviso to Section 18 of the LA Act. The Supreme Court held that the said words could not be construed in a RAWAL literal or mechanical manner. In particular, the Supreme Court also noted the following findings recorded by the Reference Court: “9…….the petitioners had no knowledge about the passing of the award till the date of payment of compensation on 5.9.1991 because they were held entitled to receive the compensation after the decision of Reference under Section 30 dated 4.9.1991.” And, after taking note of the aforesaid finding, the Supreme Court held as under:
RAWAL for enhanced compensation can be legitimately sought by the claimant in whose favour the order of apportionment is passed either by the Court in the reference under Section 30 or in the civil suit, as may be.”
5. Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent countered the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners. He referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) & Anr. v. Shah Manilal Chandulal & Ors.: (1996) 9 SCC 414 and drew the attention of this Court to Paragraph 8 of the said decision, which reads as under:
RAWAL validity of the reference because the very jurisdiction of the court to hear a reference depends upon a proper reference being made under Section 18. If the reference is not proper there is no jurisdiction in the court to hear the reference. It was, therefore, held that it is the duty of the court to see that the statutory conditions laid down in Section 18 including the one relating to limitation, have been complied with and the application is not time-barred. It is not debarred from satisfying itself that the reference which it is called upon to hear is a valid reference. It has to proceed to determine compensation and if it is time-barred, it is not called upon to hear the same. It is only a valid reference which gives jurisdiction to the court. Therefore, the court has to ask itself the question whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the reference. If the reference is beyond the prescribed period by the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act and if it finds that it was not so made, the court would decline to answer the reference. Accordingly, it was held that since the reference was made beyond the limitation, the court was justified in refusing to answer the reference.” [ emphasis added]
6. Mr Pathak pointed out that the said decision was not brought to the attention of this Court in Arpit Bhargava v. GNCT of Delhi & Ors. (supra), which is relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners. He also seeks to distinguish the decision of the Supreme Court in Madan & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra (supra) on the ground that in the said case there was some dispute in respect of the entitlement of the parties to receive compensation. However, he fairly stated that there have been cases where the issue of limitation has been left to be decided by the Reference Court and it is not in all cases that the LAC decides the issue of limitation.
7. The decision in the case of Madan & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra (supra) sets out a fundamental rationale for reckoning the commencement of limitation for availing remedies – the same would run from the date of knowledge as to the cause or the date when such knowledge could be reasonably imputed. We are unable to accept that the proviso to Section 18 of RAWAL the LA Act is required to be construed in disregard to the said principle. In the present case, no notice was issued to the petitioners under Section 12 of the LA Act and the petitioners became aware of the same only on receipt of compensation.
8. In the peculiar facts of this case, we consider it apposite to allow the present petition and direct the concerned LAC to forward the petitioners’ reference to the concerned Court. The impugned communication rejecting the petitioner’s request to forward the reference to the concerned Court, is set aside.
9. The petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
VIBHU BAKHRU, J TARA VITASTA GANJU, J MAY 03, 2024 ‘gsr’ Click here to check corrigendum, if any RAWAL