Vijay Chopra v. Ravinder Kumar

(1) Whether reporters of local paper may be allowed to see the judgment? (2) To be referred to the reporter or not? (3) Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest ? I U D G M E N T ARUNA SURESH. I. (Oral)

1. Respondent Ravinder Kumar leased out the suit property to the appellant on 1.7.1990. A rent agreement was entered into between the parties on 16.11.1990. Since the appellant was not paying the electricity charges which ran into huge arrears, the respondent served a legal notice dated 22.10.2003 RSA 29/2009 Page lofS 2009:DHC:10091 demanding the arrears of rent and electricity charges with effect from 1.8.2001 and also terminated the tenancy with effect from 30.11.2003. Since the appellant failed to hand over the vacant possession of the suit property^ namely Shop No.13, Durga Market, Kondii, respondent filed a suit for possession, recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits. In the plaint respondent also averred that Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as DRC Act) has not been made applicable to Kondii where the property in suit situates. Therefore, he was entitled to file a suit for possession. The trial court, vide its detailed judgment and decree dated 20.2.2007, was pleased to decree the suit of the respondent.

2. Against the said judgment and decree, appellant filed regular first appeal. The appellate court framed an additional issue regarding the locus standi of the respondent to file the suit and remanded back the case for decision afresh.

3. The trial court, after completion of the trial, decreed the suit of the respondent, vide its judgment and RSA 29/2009 Page 2 of[5] decree dated 2.8.2008. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the trial court, appellant filed an appeal which was dismissed' by the Additional District Judge on 28.1.2009. Hence, the present second appeal before this Court under Section 100 of the CPC.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that respondent has failed to prove that he is the owner of the property in suit and therefore, had no locus standi to file the suit for possession against the appellant. Besides, the suit for possession was hit by the provisions of Section 50 of the DRC Act. The alleged rent agreement dated 16.11.1990 is forged and fabricated document. Therefore, the decree of the trial court is a nullity. He has submitted that substantial question of law arises in this appeal which needs adjudication.

5. The appeal has been duly contested.

6. Relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is not in dispute. Appellant being the tenant was not entitled to challenge the ownership rights of the respondent in the suit premises. Therefore, RSA 29/2009 Page 3 of[5] J" the substantial question of law as agitated in this appeal i.e. if the respondent is the owner of the property in suit, is irrelevant and needs no adjudication.

7. As regards application of Section 50 of the DRC Act to the demised premises, the trial court, vide its order dated 6.4.2004 had decided preliminary issue, "if the suit was barred under the DRC Act", and returned a finding that the Jurisdiction of the court was not barred by the provisions of DRC Act. It is not in dispute that the said order attained finality and was never challenged by the appellant in appeal.

8. Whether the rent agreement dated 16.11.1990 is a forged and fabricated document is a question of fact on which there are concurrent findings of the courts below. These findings do not raise any substantial question of law to be decided by this Court in this appeal.

9. Receipt of the notice is not disputed by the appellant. The trial court in para 47 of its judgment observed that all the three essential ingredients for RSA29/2009 Page 4of[5] the applicability of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act were duly fulfilled and complied with by the respondent in its notice dated 22.10.2003 whereby the tenancy of the appellant was terminated.

10. Legality of the notice was to be adjudged on the basis of facts and evidence of the parties which has been rightly assessed by the trial court and upheld by the appellate court.

11. The fact that demised premises is commercial in nature does not ipso facto raise any substantial question of law. Transfer of Property Act applies to leases of immovable property irrespective of the fact that they are residential or commercial in nature.

12. Under these circumstances, the appellant has failed to raise any substantial question of law which needs formulation and adjudication by this Court. Hence, finding no merits in the appeal, I hereby dismiss the same.

(ARUNA SURESH) JUDGE August 7, 2009