Jai Singh v. Lt. Governor & Ors.

12. The Petitioner is essentially seeking directions from the Court that the subject land is free from all acquisition in terms of the orders passed in Balak Ram Gupta Vs. UOI and Ors.[1] [hereinafter referred to as “the BRG-I judgment”]. The BRG-I judgment is a judgment of a Full Bench of this Court, which decided 73 Writ Petitions, which had challenged notifications issued under Section 4 of the LA Act, which were dated 05.11.1980 and 25.11.1980. The declarations under Section 6 of the LA Act were made on various dates including 27.05.1985 and 18.06.1985, thus, clearly beyond the period of three years from the date of Section 4 Notification. The Full Bench held that the time period during which stay orders were in force in various matters, needed to be excluded in computing the time period of Section 6 declaration validity. It therefore held that where the Section 6 declarations qua the notifications dated 05.11.1980 and 25.11.1980, were issued within the period of three years, after AIR 1987 Delhi 239 excluding the period during which stay order(s) were operational, these declarations under Section 6 of the LA Act, would be valid. The relevant extract of the BRG-I judgment reads as follows: “39. We have, for the reasons stated above, come to the conclusion that the period during which stay orders were in force should be excluded in computing the validity of the declaration under S. 6. So far as the notification dated 25-11-80 is concerned, we find that the latest of the S. 6 declarations was on 26-2-86. The stay order (in C.M.P. 668/81) was in operation from 18-3-81 to 15-11-83 i.e. for a period of 2 years, 7 months and 27 days. They are therefore in time having been issued within three years plus 2 years 3 months, i.e., 5 years 3 months of the S. 4 notification. So far as the notification dated 5-11-1980 is concerned, we find that the latest of the S. 6 declaration was issued on 7-6-1985, i.e., 4 years 7 months after the S. 4 notification. They stay order (in CMP 4226/81) was operative from 30-9-1981 to 15-11-1983, i.e., for 2 years and 11/2 months. If this period is excluded the declaration is within time. We answer the principal issue debated before us accordingly.

40. We have dealt with the principle contention…..” 12.[1] The Full Bench, thus, directed that the Section 6 declarations under the LA Act were valid and within time, and the 73 Writ Petitions be listed before a Division Bench for the hearing of the other contentions of the Petitioners and for further arguments.

13. As discussed above, the present Petition was disposed of by the 1988 Order in terms of the decision of the BRG-I judgment. 13.[1] It is averred by the Petitioner that the acquisition proceedings of the subject land have been quashed by judgments and orders dated 14.10.1988 and 18.11.1988. These orders were, however, not produced by the Petitioner. Both these orders were passed in a matter titled as B.R. Gupta v. Union of India. The only difference being the dates of the orders and their respective citations. 13.[2] By the order dated 14.10.1988, a Division Bench of this Court in Balak Ram Gupta Vs. UOI and Ors. being CW 1639 of 1985[2] [hereinafter referred to as “the BRG-II judgment”] held that acquisition proceedings in all Petitions were quashed and set aside. It further directed the Respondents to complete pleadings in the matter. The order comprising of one paragraph is set out below: “The orders of Land Acquisition Collectors under Section 5-A and the notifications issued by the Lt. Governor under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act together with further and acquisition proceedings in all the above writ petitions are quashed and set aside with cost. There shall be two set of counsel's fees only at Rs. 15007/each as the group of petitions were heard mainly in the two writ petitions. The respondents have also not filed the counter affidavits in all the petitions as it was agreed to complete two sets of petitions with counter affidavits. The rule is made absolute Reasons to follow. Petition allowed.”

14. Subsequently, a Division Bench of this Court, in a detailed judgment dated 18.11.1988 titled as Balak Ram Gupta v. UOI and Ors. in CW 1639 of 1985[3] along with other connected Writ Petitions [hereinafter referred to as “the BRG-III judgment”] allowed the 73 Petitions which were before the Court in the BRG-I judgment. The villages concerned included the villages of Maidan Garhi under Section 4 of the LA Act notifications issued qua these villages in November,

1980. This judgment records that 325 objections were received under Section 5A of the LA Act in respect of village Maidan Garhi. The (1989) 38 DLT 243 (DB) (1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB) Court held that the Section 6 of the LA Act notifications could not be sustained in law and quashed these notifications, and all 73 Writ Petitions were allowed by the Court.

15. The Petitioner being resident of Maidan Garhi, contends that the acquisition proceedings qua his land are thus also invalid.

16. The record shows that the 1988 Order disposed of the present Petition in “in terms of the decision of the Court reported in AIR 1987 Delhi 239”. This citation refers to the Full Bench judgment in the BRG-I judgment. Subsequently, the 2001 Order clarifies that the Writ Petition numbers and the case number is as: CW No. 1639/1985 etc. and the name Balak Ram Gupta Vs. Union of India & Ors. be added to the 1988 Order.

17. Both the BRG-II and BRG-III judgments contain the name and the Writ Petition numbers as mentioned above. While the BRG-II judgment is a single paragraph order, quashing and setting aside the Section 6 notifications issued for acquisition of the villages, including for village Maidan Garhi, the detailed alanysis is set out by the Court in the BRG-III judgment.

18. Thus, for the purposes of this judgement, it is necessary to examine the BRG-III judgment. This case was essentially a challenge to the legal and constitutional validity of the acquisition of 50000 bighas of land in 11 villages of Delhi and was the judgment pursuant to the BRG-I judgment directions of a Full Bench of this Court. The acquisitions in the village Maidan Garhi, where the subject land is situate, were also taken up in this case. It was held that at the time of arguments, it was found that some lands mentioned in the Section 4 Notification were deleted at the stage of the Section 6 Notification and some lands were deleted at the stage of making the Award. The Court further held that there was material on record to show nonapplication of mind and mechanical attitude in passing orders which were dealt with in non-speaking report/orders by the LAC as well. As regards to the village of Maidan Garhi [where the subject land is situate], the Court held that the report of the LAC is non-speaking report and thus, the order disposing of the objections under Section 5A of the LA Act are vitiated. The relevant extract is reproduced below: “These Writ Petitions, seventy-three in number, challenge legal and Constitution validity of acquisition of land in eleven villages in South Delhi, covering about 50,000 bighas of land. The operative order quashing the Land Acquisition Collector's order under Section 5-A and notification under Section 6 issued by the Lt. Governor in relation to the said villages pronounced by us on October 14, 1988. The concerned villages are Chhatarpur, Satbari, Maidan Garhi, Shayoorpur, Rajpur Khurd, Neb Sarai, Khirkee, Devli, Khanpur, Tughlakabad and Tigri. xxxx xxx xxxx

8. As regards three villages, Rajpur Khurd, Shayoorpur and Maidan Garhi, 325 persons, 60 persons and 13 persons respectively had filed the objections. From the record it is not clear as to whether all the objectors were served with the notices and whether the personal hearing was given to each one of them. Although large number of objections were filed, the report of the Collector under section 5A mentions only seven points. There is no explanation as to why the other objections were not considered. Even in regard to the said seven objections the Land Acquisition Collector B.S, Rana had not decided any objection but merely stated that they were all answered by this court in Munni Lal's case, CW.P. 426/81.

9. Munni Lal's case was decided by this court at the stage of section 4 notification only. There is material difference between section 4 notification and section 6 notification. Under section 4 notification, if it appears that land in any particular locality is needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose, notification can be issued. But under section 6 the general intention is not sufficient. The appropriate Government must be satisfied and that too after hearing and considering the report under Section 5A that the authorities can proceed. Out of the total land in the locality the authorities must state which particular land is actually needed and for what public purpose. The Land Acquisition Collector had not kept in mind the different requirements of the said two sections. It was incumbent on him to consider each objection separately and whether it was considered in Munni Lal's case nor/not. This can be illustrated with reference to the agricultural lands as green belts in the area. The first master plan came into force on 1.9.1962 and lapsed in 1981 after twenty years. The second/revised master plan for Delhi upto the year 2001 was approved by Delhi Development Authority in its meeting dated 30.6.1984. When Munni Lal's case, which was decided on 15.11.1983, although the life of first Master Plan bad come to an end, the proposals for new Master Plan were being worked out and the blue print was being prepared. The Bench further held that the Master Plan can always be amended. The Land Acquisition Collector failed to notice and consider that the second revised Master Plan was already approved by the D.D.A. and a Gazette Notification S.O. 289 (E) was already published on 6.4.1985. In the revised Master Plan also the lands belonging to the petitioners were shown as agricultural land and in the green belt and in the rural areas. The revised plan provided that farm houses in the minimum of one hectare land could be located in the rural used zone. These could be developed for flowers, fruits, vegetables, poultry farmings etc. In other words the land used that was vague and not yet finalised when Munni Lal's case was decided by this court, was crystalised in second Master Plan extending upto 2001. When the Bench stated in Munni Lal's case that the Master Plan can be amended at any time, it has to be understood in its context that the scheme and proposals for new Master Plan were being prepared. The Gazette Notification dated 6.4.1985 in fact asserted “the following extensive modifications which the Central Government proposes to make in the Master Plan for Delhi, keeping in view the perspective for Delhi 2001 and new dimensions in the urban development are hereby published for public information.” This illustration would demonstrate the total non-application of mind and mechanical manner in which reports under section 5A were made. The Land Acquisition Collector was yet free to reject the petitioners contentions that their land being agricultural farms in the rural area consisting mainly of agricultural land are not to be acquired, after nothing the extensive modification made by the revised Master Plan, and by adducing proper reasons. The report of the Land Acquisition Collector is a non-speaking report. The report under section 5A is thus vitiated for non-application, of mind, mechanical approach and being a non-speaking report. Such report is of no use for the Administrator for his satisfaction that a particular land is required for the public purpose. The petitioner whose land is being taken by the Government without his consent has a right to know the reasons as two why his claim for exemption was being rejected.

10. The legal infirmity in the section 5A report stated above applies to the reports in relation to seven villages mentioned above, where the alleged hearing is given by one L.A.C. and the report is submitted by another L.A.C.” 18.[1] After detailed discussions, the Court in the BRG-III judgment, held that not only was Section 5A of the LA Act inquiry and the report given by the LAC vitiated, but even the satisfaction as accorded under Section 6 of the LA Act was not real satisfaction but a mere mechanical exercise. Thus, the orders passed with respect to these 11 villages were quashed by the Court and hence, declarations under Section 6 of the LA Act were quashed. The relevant extract is reproduced below:

one day. The Lt. Governor also failed to notice the infirmities in the reports under Section 5A filed by the L.A.Cs. For example the L.A.Cs. had mechanically stated that the objections were already disposed of by this Court in Munni Lal's case against the objectors. We have earlier demonstrated as to how this assertion was incorrect. It was expected of the Lt. Governor to make a positive statement after going through Munni Lal's judgment as to whether the assertion of the L.A.C. Or that of the objectors was correct. If the Lt. Governor had (really) carefully gone through the report under Section 5A-(as is asserted in his order) he should have noticed that in relation to some villages the LAC has not recommended in so many words as to how much of the land should actually be acquired. He should have also noticed that some L.A.Cs. had included abadi deh land in the land meant for acquisition while some other L.A.Cs. had not done so. There were deletion of certain acres of land in most of the villages after section 4 notification was issued and the process was continuing. The Lt. Governor ought to have noticed this fact. In relation to some villages it was stated in the report that the sanctioned layout/building plans were not forthcoming, as the same were yet not sent by the MCD. In spite of this, the L.A.Cs. had included such lands in the report under Section 5-A. If the Lt. Governor had carefully considered the report under Section 5-A he could have noted all these infirmities in regard to actual acreage of the land that was required to be notified under Section 6. The satisfaction expressed by the Lt. Governor in his order under Section 6 is not the real satisfaction but a mere mechanical exercise. The orders passed by the Lt. Governor in regard to the said eleven villages are, therefore, not sustainable in law and are quashed.

16. We may note that there are number of other contentions raised by the petitioner in the writ petition apart from the ones that are mentioned and considered above. We need not go into all of them and give any finding, since we have already come to the conclusion that reports under Section 5-A and orders under section 6 cannot be sustained in law on the basis of the contentions already noted by us. … A careless and mindless exercise of powers by L.A.Cs. and the Administrator in these cases had left us with no option but to quash all land acquisition proceedings in regard to eleven villages. There is a lesson to the policy-makers and Administrators which, if not heeded to, would be unbearable for this poor country.

17. The rule is made absolute. The Writ Petitions are allowed.”

19. The Respondents have raised a two-fold objection to this Application. The primary being that the Petitioner has been agitating all these contentions before the Civil Suit filed by him, and has not brought forth these facts in the present Application. Reference is made to the Suit for permanent injunction filed by the Petitioner as well as the Appeal and Review Petition filed against the Civil Suit to contend that all these proceedings filed by the Petitioner were dismissed and the dismissal has not been disclosed by the Petitioner in this Application before this Court. Thus, the Petitioner is guilty of supressing material facts in the present Application. 19.[1] In addition it is averred by the Respondents that the ratio in the BRG- III judgment does not apply to the Petitioner’s case as it was not a judgement in rem but in personem.

20. The record shows that the Petitioner filed the Civil Suit praying that a decree of permanent injunction be passed in favour of the Petitioner and against the Respondents (Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, Deputy Commissioner, Mehrauli, SDM Mehrauli and DDA) restraining them from dispossessing the Petitioner from the subject land without due process and from interfering in his peaceful possession.

21. The learned Trial Court by the 04.06.2013 judgement, rejected the Petitioner’s contention that the BRG-III judgment applied to the facts of this case for two reasons; one that the judgment has a different citation, and, second that relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Delhi Administration Vs. Gurdeep Singh Uban,[4] it was observed that persons who did not file objections under Section 5A of the LA Act would not be permitted to contend that the notification was quashed in their cases. 21.[1] The Civil Suit was dismissed. The challenge to the dismissal of the Civil Suit in RCA No. 18/2013 was also dismissed by learned Trial Court on 01.06.2016 upholding the judgment in the Civil Suit and reiterating that the BRG-III judgment would only be applicable to the 73 Petitioners and no one else. The review filed against the decision of the 01.06.2016 was also dismissed by order dated 03.03.2022. A reference was also made to the orders passed by this Court in the Second Writ Petition [W.P.(C) 2182/2015], also filed by the Petitioner.

22. As discussed above, there is no reference by the Petitioner to either the Civil Suit or the second Writ Petition in the proceedings by the Petitioner before this Court or in the Application filed before this Court.

23. The documents in relation to these proceedings have been provided by the Respondent/DDA. Concededly, the Petitioner did not file a copy of proceedings in the Civil Suit or disclose the fact that these issues were agitated by the Petitioner before other forums as well.

24. Since the Respondent has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Gurdeep Singh Uban case, it is necessary to examine the same. The Gurdeep Singh Uban case was filed by a resident of Chhatarpur village (which was one of the villages covered by the Balak Ram Gupta case). It was contended on behalf of the Petitioners in that case, that the declarations under Section 6 of the LA Act stood quashed even though, the Petitioners had not filed any objection under Section 5A of the LA Act, while relying upon the BRG-III judgment. A similar argument to the one made by the Petitioner in the present case. 24.[1] The Supreme Court however, in the Gurdeep Singh Uban case, rejected this contention while relying on the judgment passed by a three Judges’ Bench in the case of Abhey Ram v. Union of India.[5] After discussing the judgment in the BRG-III judgment, it was held in Gurdeep Singh Uban case, that those persons who did not object to the Section 4 Notification, by filing objections under Section 5A of the LA Act, cannot be permitted to contend that the notification was quashed with respect to their lands. The relevant extract is below:

and hence the writ petitioners could rely on that judgment even though they had not filed any objections under Section 5-A. The result, according to the appellants, of the Section 6 declaration being quashed would be that the Section 4(1) notification would also lapse. It is against the above judgment that the Delhi Administration has preferred these appeals.

5. In these appeals, the learned counsel for the appellant, Ms Geeta Luthra contended before us that in a similar appeal preferred to this Court decided by a three-Judge Bench in Abhey Ram v. Union of India [(1997) 5 SCC 421: JT (1997) 5 SC 354] in respect of the same group of notifications it was held that in the case of owners who had not filed objections under Section 5-A, they could not take advantage of the judgment of the Division Bench in B.R. Gupta case [(1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB)] dated 18-11-1988. It was also held that upon a proper understanding of the judgment of the Division Bench dated 18-11-1988, it could not be held that the entirety of the Section 6 notification stood quashed by the said judgment. The above contention of the learned counsel for the Delhi Administration was supported by the learned Senior Counsel for the Delhi Development Authority, Shri Ravinder Sethi. xxxx xxxx xxxx

8. In connection with owners or persons interested who have not filed objections under Section 5-A, in principle, it must be accepted that they had no objection to the Section 4 notification operating in respect of their property. On the other hand, in respect of those who filed objections, they might have locus standi to contend that the Section 5-A enquiry was not conducted properly. We, therefore, agree in principle with the view of the three-Judge Bench in Abhey Ram case [(1997) 5 SCC 421: JT (1997) 5 SC 354] that those who have not filed objections under Section 5-A, could not be allowed to contend that the Section 5-A enquiry was bad and that consequently the Section 6 declaration must be struck down and that then the Section 4 notification would lapse. If, therefore, no objections were filed by the respondents, logically the Section 6 declaration must be deemed to be in force so far as they are concerned.

9. But learned Senior Counsel for the respondents contends that the judgment of the Division Bench dated 18-11-1988 in B.R. Gupta case [(1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB)] had quashed the entire Section 5-A proceedings and that even in case the respondents had filed objections, the position would not have been different. We cannot accept this contention. We are of the view that in respect of those who did not object to the Section 4(1) notification by filing objections under Section 5-A, the said notification must be treated as being in force. The writ petitioners cannot be permitted to contend that in some other cases, the notification was quashed and that such quashing would also enure to their benefit.”

25. The reasoning in the Gurdeep Singh Uban case turned on the fact that the persons who had not challenged the Section 4 Notification of the LA Act by filing objections under Section 5A of the LA Act could not be permitted to take benefit of the ratio of the BRG-III judgment.

26. The Petitioner has contended that he filed his objections under Section 5A of the LA Act and this finds mention in paragraph 3 of the Petition filed by him, which is set out below:

26.[1] However, no copy of these objections have been placed on record by the Petitioner in the petition. 26.[2] Since, no objections were made available, this Court called for the record in the Second Writ Petition as well. A review of the Second Writ Petition filed by the Petitioner reveals that this Petition is based on the same cause of action as the Petitioner there seeks to declare that the acquisition proceedings in respect of the subject land have lapsed. However, there is no mention in this Petition of the filing of objections under Section 5A of the LA Act. No copy of the Section 5A objection has been placed in the Second Writ Petition either. Since no copy of the objections under Section 5A of the LA Act has been made available by the Petitioner, applying the judgement of the Gurdeep Singh Uban case, we hold that the Petitioner cannot take the benefit of the BRG-III judgment.

27. The Respondents also seek to rely on the orders dated 22.07.2021, 25.08.2021 and 27.08.2021 passed in the Second Writ Petition to contend that the Petitioner has sought a similar relief, which was dismissed with costs by a Coordinate bench of this Court on 08.10.2021. 27.[1] The Second Writ Petition was listed pursuant to directions passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court on 22.07.2021 in view of the judgment passed in Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal.[6] The plea taken by the Petitioner in the Second Writ Petition was that the provisions of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act were applicable, since there was no record to show that the possession of the subject land was taken. The Coordinate Bench did not accept the contention of the Petitioner. It was held that the possession was duly taken by the Defendants and demarcation and possession report were made available before the Civil Court, in the Civil Suit. The relevant extract of the order dated 27.08.2021 passed in the Second Writ Petition is reproduced below: “4. The submission of Mr. Vinaik is that the respondents have not produced any record to show that the possession was taken by drawing up a Memorandum/Panchnama in the presence of witnesses. Till the same is established, it could not be claimed by the respondents that possession had been taken.

5. We do not find any merit in his submission. Even in the writ petition, the only bald averment of the petitioner was that possession of the land in question had not been taken. The petitioner did not plead that possession had not been taken by holding valid possession proceedings by drawing up a Memorandum/ Panchnama in the presence of witnesses. Therefore, there was no occasion for the respondents to say anything more and what they did namely that possession of the land in question had been taken “in accordance with the law”.

6. Moreover, the petitioner had himself filed a Civil Suit before the Civil Court – wherein the finding were returned against the petitioner that the petitioner was not in possession and the possession had been duly taken over by the authorities concerned. A copy of the judgment rendered in the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the judgment of the Trial Court in Jai Singh Vs. Governor of Delhi, RCA No. 18/2013, decided on 01.06.2021, has been placed on record – wherein the Appellate Court, inter alia, has returned the following finding:- “Plaintiff has failed to show any order by virtue of which he is covered by the order dated 18.11.1988. Defendants on the contrary have relied upon Ex.D4W1/P[1] and Ex.D4W1/P[2] which are demarcation reports and possession reports. On the basis of these two reports, possession has already been taken over by the Delhi Development Authority on 29.06.1987. D4W[2] Sh. Rajender Singh Yadav through documents has been able to prove that the land in question has been transferred to land and building department vide roznamacha dated 28.08.1987. The plaintiff has thus failed to prove on record that he is either in possession of land or that acquisition proceedings have been quashed.”” 27.[2] The Coordinate Bench also found that the Petitioner did not disclose the Judgment in the Civil Suit before the Court and the findings of fact have attained finality before the Civil Court in the second Writ Petition and it was not open for the Petitioner to contend to the contrary before the Court. The Second Writ Petition was, thus, dismissed with costs on 27.08.2021. 27.[3] An Application was filed by the Petitioner seeking modification and review of the order dated 27.08.202,[1] in the Second Writ Petition being CM Appl. 35697/2021. This Application was also dismissed on 26.10.2021 by a Coordinate Bench of this Court. Paragraph 5, 6 and 7 are apposite to be referred to and are extracted below: “5. In view of the aforesaid position, the said sentence is substituted and read as follows: “The aforesaid findings of the Civil Court have been affirmed in the petitioner’s First Appeal, though the Review Application of the petitioner is stated to be pending.”

6. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner’s submission that compensation had not been paid to the petitioner.

7. We do not agree with this submission. The respondent LAC has stated in its counter affidavit that the compensation has been deposited in the revenue deposit. There is no rejoinder to controvert this submission of the respondent. Ms. Sharma states that no details have been provided in the counter affidavit with regard to the said deposit. In our view, even if details have not been provided, that does not take away from the categorical assertion of the respondent that the compensation stands deposited in the revenue deposit which is sufficient compliance of the obligation to offer payment of compensation to the land owner. In our order dated 25.08.2021, we have taken note of the stand of the LAC and the DDA in their counter affidavits on record. The stand of the respondents clearly is that possession of the land had been taken on record and compensation payable for the same has been deposited. The counter affidavits were filed way back in the year 2015/2018 and no rejoinder has been filed by the petitioner to dispute the said position.”

28. From the aforegoing discussions, it is clear that once again the Petitioner has come before this Court without disclosing all the proceedings which have been initiated by him with respect to the subject property. As stated above, no Section 5A objections have been filed by the Petitioner before this Court so as to claim parity in terms of the BRG-III judgment. The findings of fact in the Civil Suit is that the possession of the subject land was already taken by the Respondent/LAC. The findings in the Civil Suit have attained finality as the Review Petition filed against the Civil Suit has also been dismissed on 03.03.2022. Thus, the finding qua possession of the subject land being taken by the Respondent/DDA, has also attained finality.

29. It is settled law that one who comes to the Court with unclean hands or without disclosing all relevant facts before the Court is guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as the on the opposite party. 29.[1] The Petitioner has filed an Application on 06.05.2022 and was bound to disclose all the details of all proceedings filed by him with respect to the subject property and all judgments and orders passed by the learned Trial Court as well as the Coordinate Benches of this Court with respect to the subject land, which has not been done by him. The Petitioner cannot take the benefit of the BRG-III judgment either as has been discussed above.

30. This Court finds merit in the contention of the Respondents that the Petitioner has filed the present Application after he has failed to secure a favourable order from both the Civil Court and Coordinate Bench of this Court in the Second Writ Petition.

31. The Application as filed by the Petitioner is misconceived. Accordingly, the present Application is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 25,000/-. The costs be deposited with the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks.

TARA VITASTA GANJU, J VIBHU BAKHRU, J JULY 01, 2024 g.joshi/SA Click here to check corrigendum, if any