National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajinder Singh Yadav & Ors.

2. The learned counsel for the claimant/respondent has referred to and relied upon the following two judgments:-

(i) General Manager Nofthern Railway V. Vishva

Nath Nangia, 118 (2OO[5]) Delhi Law Times 286(DB) - "3. lt has not been averred as to when the matter. was sent to the Railway Advocate and when the opinion of the Railway Advocate was obtained; when the Railway Panel changed; when the new Advocate was appointed; when the application for certified copies was filed. In our opinion the decision to file the writ petition has not been taken with due x, v \ MAC.APP. 52312008 2010:DHC:11308 \-] diligence by the officers concerned so as to condone the delay in the facts and circumstances of this case. The"condonation of delay is not a matter of right. The delay has to be properly explained and from the averments made in this application, we do not find any semblance of explanation tendered by the petitioner."

(ii) Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai-ll V.

Customs, Excise & Gold (Control) L2O (2005) Delhi Law Times 549 DB -

received by the Appellant on 11.4.2002 and the Appellant had filed a reference on 25.L0.2002. According to the Applicant, there is 14 days of delay in fling the present appeal being CEAC No. 19/2005. Thus, it is prayed that the delay be condoned. We find that the averments in the application are vague and do not correctly state the facts which appear from the record before us. We may also notice here that during hearing of the case we had even called report on the case from the Registry of the Court which again shows that the facts have not been correctly mentioned in the application.

5. From the copy of the order of the Appellate Tribunal placed on record before us it is clear that the order was passed on 6.3.2002 copy thereof was ready on 26.3.2002 and there is no document on record to show that as to how the Appellant has received the copy on !I.4.2002. Even if, it is presumed in favour of the Appellant that copy was received on 11.4.2002, then they had allegedly filed the Reference in the Registry of this Court on

25. L0.2002 apparently, beyond the period of limitation The Appellant has hardly given any satisfactory explanation for this inordinate delay. There is not even an iota of averment as to why the so-called reference application which itself was not \': maintainable in law, was never refiled even till date. This only shows complete callous and irresponsible attitude on the part of the Respondents in dealing with the legal matters. Wherever the Statute provides a limitation it must be construed and applied strictly as a definite right accrues to the other party on expiry of such period before the other party can be divested of such benefit there should be definite and proper explanation on record before the Court to condone the delay in filing an appeal. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right and such discretion should not be exercised by the Court or the authorities in a mechanical manner. Legislative intent behind prescribing the period of limitation normally is to create a bar in institution of the proceedings upon expiry of the period except for the exceptions specifically provided in that provision itself. Delay cannot be condoned as a matter of right or on the mere asking of the party. lt is expected of the Court to exercise such discretion as per settled guidelines and is inevitable for a party to show a sufficient cause while requisiting the Court to exercise such discretion in favour of the Applicant, In the case of Shanti Devi v. State of Haryana and Ors., 1999 (5) SCC 703, the Supreme Court held that delay should be explained properly and sufficient cause should be shown b'efore the Court can condone the delay.

6. We have already noticed that in the application for condonation of delay the Applicant has failed to give any plausible reasons. Similar is the position in regard to application for condonation of delay in refiling the appeal. The said application, in fact, is misconceived. The reference application was never refiled by the Applicant while the appeal in hand was filed in the Registry of this Court for the first time on 1.10.2005. Thus, this application would hardly be even maintainable. The only reason stated in the application for condonation of delay is that there was communication gap between the Counsel and the Department as a result of which necessary steps could not be taken by the Department within the period of limitation. May be the Respondents are not strictly required to explain each day of delay but they are duty bound to at least render some plausible explanation for the substantial period for which condonation is prayed. In both these applications there is no averment as to what happened after 25.t0.2002 till L.3.2005.

7. We cannot help but to observe that conduct of the Department is not satisfactory in the present case and it also does not meet the minimum standard of administrative function. in the Government department particularly when it relates to recovery of revenue. There is no cause shown much less a sufficient cause for condoning the delay. The application is vague and no satisfactory explanation has been rendered in the application which could persuade the Court to condone such a long delay in filing the appeal'

8. We dismiss these applications and consequently, the appeal does not survive for consideration being hopelessly barred by time."

3. The averments made by the appellant in the application for condonation of delay do not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The appellant has made vague averments in the application. No case of condonation of delay is made out from the application filed by the appellant.

4. The application for condonation of delay is dismissed. MAC.APP. No.523/2008

1. The appeal is dismissed as barred by limitation. MAC.APP. s2312008