M/S. DELHI BHATTA WELFARE ASSOCIATION v. UNION OF INDIA

1. Whether the reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? No

2. To be referred to the reporter or not? No

3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the „Digest‟? No REKHA SHARMA, J. (ORAL) The appellant had filed a suit for the recovery of a sum of Rs.47,090/- against the respondent, i.e. the Union of India through General Manager, Northern Railways. The suit was filed on October 19, 1987 in the Court of the District Judge. It was later transferred to the Railway Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal). The Tribunal by order dated June 05, 1996 held that the recovery made by the respondent was illegal and consequently 2010:DHC:1783 further held that the respondent was liable to refund the same to the appellant subject to its finding on issue No.4 which issue was as under:- “4. Whether the claim is time barred?” The finding on the aforesaid issue No.4 went against the appellant. The Tribunal held the claim of the appellant to be barred by the law of limitation. The result was that the appellant, even though it succeeded on merits, failed to get the refund of the amount claimed. Feeling aggrieved by the order so passed, the present appeal was preferred way-back in the year 1996. The facts are not in dispute and they are as under:- The appellant booked coal consignments from Singrauli to Nangloi under Invoices No.1 to 10 (RR Nos.011382 to 011391) dated February 16, 1982. As per the relevant rules, the consignments had to be booked by the Railways via the shortest route at the cheapest rate. The appellant had booked the consignments via Chopan-Chunar which was the shortest route and the freight charges were also invoiced accordingly by the forwarding station. However, on arrival of the consignments at the destination station, an excess freight of Rs.47,090/- was demanded from the appellant by the Railways on the ground that the consignment was booked and carried via a longer route. The appellant did pay the extra freight of Rs.47,090/-, but under protest. The payment was made in February, 1982. It is not disputed that after making the payment, the appellant was engaged in correspondence with the respondent resulting in a letter dated August 23, 1982 from the latter informing the former that the matter was under reference with the SM/NNO and the appellant would be addressed again shortly. The only other letter that the appellant received from the respondent was of January 16, 1986 informing the appellant that no refund was admissible and that the freight charges were correctly recovered. According to the appellant, it is this letter of January 16, 1986 which gave rise to the cause of action to file the suit. Accordingly, the same was filed on October 19, 1987 in the Court of the District Judge which, as noticed above, was subsequently transferred to the Tribunal. The Tribunal vide the impugned order dated June 05, 1996 has held that it is Article 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which is applicable to the facts of the case and that the suit having not been filed within three years in terms of the said Article, the same was barred by time. Before I proceed further, let me reproduce Article 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It runs as under:- Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run For money payable Three years When the money is by the defendant to received. the plaintiff for money received by the defendant, for the plaintiff‟s use The learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the order of the Tribunal on the ground that it is not Article 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which is attracted to the facts of the present case, but Article 113 of the Act. According to the counsel, the facts of the present case are such that no other Article of the Limitation Act fits the bill except Article 113 and that what is to be seen is whether the suit is within limitation in terms of the said Article. Insofar as Article 113 is concerned, it provides that, “in a suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule, the period of limitation will be three years from the date when the right to sue accrues.” In view of the aforesaid, the question that arises for consideration is whether it is Article 24 or Article 113 of the Limitation Act which is applicable to the facts of the present case. What is of significance is that after the sum of Rs.47,090/- was paid by the appellant to the respondent, the parties were in correspondence with each other. The respondent sent a letter dated August 23, 1982 to the appellant informing it that the matter was under reference with the SM/NNO and the appellant would be addressed again shortly. It was only on January 16, 1986 that the appellant was finally told that no refund was admissible. Hence, it is the letter of January 16, 1986 which gave rise to the cause of action and if the period of limitation is computed from the said date, the suit which was initially filed in the court of the District Judge on October 19, 1987 was within limitation. The finding of the Tribunal that it is Article 24 of the Limitation Act which was applicable is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. For what has been noticed above, I set-aside the order of the Railway Claims Tribunal and hold the appellant entitled to the sum of Rs.47,090/- along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of the filing of the suit till realization. As the claim pertains to the year 1982, the Railway is directed to make the payment within five months from today, failing which the amount shall carry interest @ 9% instead of 6%. REKHA SHARMA, J. MARCH 25, 2010 ka