Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of order: 27th August, 2024
ROYAL SUNDARAM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Pankaj Gupta, Proxy counsel for Ms. Suman Bagga, Advocate
Through: Mr. Somnath Parashar, Advocate for claimant
Ms. Archana Sharma, Advocate for R-2 and 3 AND
2979/2023 ROYAL SUNDARAM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Pankaj Gupta, Proxy counsel for Ms. Suman Bagga, Advocate
Through: Mr. Somnath Parashar, Advocate for claimant
Ms. Archana Sharma, Advocate for R-7 and 8
CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J (Oral)
ORDER
1. The captioned appeals have been filed on behalf of the appellant insurance company under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 („MV Act‟ hereinafter) against the common impugned judgment and award dated 31st August, 2021, passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal, East District, Karkardooma Courts, New Delhi, in cases bearing nos. 320/2021, titled as “Shivani vs. Ravi @ Rohit”, and 321/2021, titled as “Kamlesh & Ors. Vs. Ravi @ Rohit & Ors.” seeking setting aside of the same.
2. Since both the captioned appeals are arising out of a common accident dated 19th October, 2015 and are against the same impugned award dated 31st August, 2021, this Court deems it appropriate to dispose of the captioned appeals by way of the instant common order.
3. Both the appeals have been filed by the appellant insurance company in a connected matter against common impugned award passed in MACP no. 553/16 filed by Smt. Kamlesh i.e., the wife of Constable Manoj Kumar („the deceased‟ hereinafter) along with 5 other legal heirs of the deceased, and in MACP no. 554/16 filed by Constable Shivani i.e., the injured (Constable is “Ct.” hereinafter).
4. The relevant facts that led to the filing of the instant appeals are as under: i) On 19th October, 2015, at about 11:50 pm, after finishing their duty, Constable Manoj Kumar along with Constable Shivani reached A to Z showroom, 26 Block at Trilokpuri in East Delhi on their motorcycle, when a white colored Swift Car bearing registration no. DL- 2CAT-5702 („offending car‟ hereinafter), being driven by Ravi @ Rohit, („the driver‟ hereinafter) hit the aforesaid motorcycle. ii) As a result of the aforementioned collusion, Ct. Shivani was thrown into the air after which she fell on the bonnet of the offending car. Whereas, the deceased was dragged along with the motorcycle for a considerably long distance. Thereafter, the driver reversed the offending car, causing Ct. Shivani to fall to the ground and thereupon drove forward due to which she suffered grievous injuries. Subsequent to this, both the victims sustained injuries for which they were taken to Max Hospital by the by-standers, where their MLC‟s were registered. Unfortunately, the aforesaid accident led to the demise of Ct. Manoj Kumar and Ct. Shivani sustained injuries. iii) Pursuant to the above, an FIR bearing no. 690/15 was lodged under Sections 307/354-D/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 („IPC‟ hereinafter). Upon conclusion of the investigation, offence under Section 302 of IPC was also added in the chargesheet. iv) Thereafter, the claimants, i.e., Ct. Shivani and Smt. Kalmesh, filed separate claim petitions under Section 166/140 of the MV Act, wherein, the learned Tribunal by a common award dated 31st August 2021, („impugned award‟ hereinafter) framed various issues, following which, it adjudicated the case in favor of the respondents/claimants, thereby, awarding a total compensation to the tune of Rs. 82,41,750/- along with interest @ 8% per annum in MACP no. 553/16, and, awarded a compensation of Rs. 3,73,000/- along with interest @ 8% per annum in MACP no. 554/16. v) Being aggrieved by the aforementioned award, the appellant i.e., the insurance company has filed the instant appeals seeking setting aside of the same.
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the learned Tribunal committed an error of law by allowing the claim petitions and the same is not maintainable under Section 166 of the MV Act, as the present case is not of rash and negligent driving of the offending motor vehicle but an intentional and deliberate act of revenge against Ct. Shivani, which falls under the ambit of murder simpliciter.
6. It is submitted that the driver of the offending car intentionally, with a premeditated mind, hit the motorcycle which was being driven by the deceased and Ct. Shivani/pillion rider, in order to kill Ct. Shivani which is evident from the material documents of the criminal case, such as the FIR and chargesheet which are placed on record that prima facie establishes the presence of both actus reus and mens rea, i.e., intent of the driver to cause serious and fatal injuries to the riders of the motorcycle due to his annoyance with Ct. Shivani.
7. It is further submitted that the learned Tribunal erred by ignoring the testimony of Ct. Shivani (PW2/eye witness of the accident), wherein, she testified that the driver of the offending car intentionally and deliberately caused the accident when she refused to marry him, while categorically stating that “Ravi (respondent no.2) has deliberately attacked us with his car with the intention of killing us.”
8. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal erred by ignoring the testimony of the driver of the offending car, which rules out the element of rash and negligent driving on his part, wherein he has confessed to his motive behind the accident i.e., he wanted to take revenge against Ct. Shivani as she had refused to marry him. It is further submitted that the driver of the offending car is also facing trial for the offence of murder of the deceased herein.
9. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal failed to take into consideration the addition of the offence under Section 302 of the IPC, thereby, making out an offence of murder which further proves the absence of negligence on his part.
10. It is also submitted that the learned Tribunal erred in holding the appellant to be liable for payment of compensation on account of „rash and negligent‟ driving of the driver of the offending car, as his act of ramming into the motorcycle from behind and reversing the offending car in order to crush Ct. Shivani shows his pre-calculated intent to kill both the riders on the motorcycle. It is further submitted that the intention of the driver to kill can be observed in the statement of the eyewitness, PW[2], i.e., Ct. Shivani wherein she has stated that the driver had threatened her by saying that“if you do not listen to me, then I won’t leave you and whosoever will come in between I will see him too also.”
11. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate that there is absence of proof of „rashness‟ and „negligence‟ which primarily means an over-hasty act as opposed to deliberate act, and a breach of duty to take reasonable care as imposed by law, respectively. It is further submitted that it is evident from the material placed on record that there was an intention and knowledge of the act committed by the driver, making his act of driving of the offending car and causing the accident fall under the purview of Section 299 or Section 300 of the IPC instead of Section 304A of the IPC which defines cause of death by negligence.
12. It is submitted that proof of negligence is sine qua non for maintainability of a claim petition under Section 166 of the MV Act and that the claimants i.e., Ct. Shivani and Smt. Kamlesh have utterly failed to show the negligence of the driver.
13. It is further submitted that the learned Tribunal erred in law by misconstruing the settled position of law as laid down in the judgments of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Sukhdev Singh Vs. Delhi State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2003) 7 SCC 443 and Rita Devi & Ors. Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC 113, wherein it was held that an act is said to be accidental when the same is done without the intention of causing it, whereas if the dominant intention of the act of felony is to kill any particular person, then such killing is not an accidental murder instead the same is a murder simpliciter.
14. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal committed an error in ignoring the relevant material placed on its record and grossly erred in passing the impugned award by placing the liability on the appellant insurance company for compensation since the instant case is prima facie of murder simpliciter and not of an accident as contemplated under the provisions of MV Act, hence, the appellant has no liability to pay any compensation in the present case.
15. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal also committed an error in not deducting an amount of Rs. 20 Lakhs paid to Smt. Kamlesh as ex gratia which ought to have been adjusted in the impugned award.
16. It is submitted that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court passed in Dharampal v. U.P. SRTC, (2008) 12 SCC 208 held that the rate of interest in claims filed under MV Act should be the prevailing rate of interest on bank deposits as on the date of passing of such award and in the instant case, the learned Tribunal erred in awarding an exorbitant interest @ 8% per annum.
17. Therefore, in view of the foregoing submissions, it is submitted that the present appeal may be allowed and the reliefs be granted as prayed.
18. It is pertinent to mention here that vide order dated 24th July, 2024, the respondents in both the appeals were directed to file their reply, however, they have failed to place the same on record. Therefore, the instant appeal shall be decided on the basis of the material available on record including the Lower Court‟s Record.
19. Per Contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents vehemently opposed the instant appeal and submitted that the same is liable to be dismissed being devoid of any merits.
20. In MAC.APP no. 320/2021, it is submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Ct. Shivani that the learned Tribunal rightly adjudicated the claim petition and held the appellant insurance company liable for compensation to the tune of Rs.3,73,000/- along with interest @ 8% per annum by thoroughly examining the facts and evidence placed on its record.
21. Similarly, in MAC.APP no. 321/2021, the learned counsel on behalf of Smt. Kamlesh, submitted to the effect that the learned Tribunal correctly adjudicated the matter by meticulously examining the evidence placed on its record which proves that it was a case of accidental murder and not a murder simpliciter and rightly adjudicated the liability for payment of compensation. Therefore, there is no illegality in the impugned award.
22. Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and perused the material placed on record.
23. The appeals are admitted. =(On what date) and when it came for final hearing.
24. It is the case of the appellant that the learned Tribunal grossly erred by adjudicating the claim petition and the same is not maintainable under Section 166 of the MV Act as it is a clear case of murder simpliciter rather than an accidental murder since there is lack of proof of rashness and negligence on the part of the driver of the offending car. Further, the driver deliberately and intentionally hit the motorcycle in order to kill the riders which is further corroborated by the material placed on record such as the FIR and the chargesheet. While placing reliance on the judgments of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court passed in Sukhdev Singh vs. Delhi State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2003) 7 SCC 433, and Rita Devi & Ors. Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC 113, it has been contended that as per the settled position of law, when the dominant intention of the act of felony is to kill any particular person, then such killing is not an accidental murder but a murder simpliciter.
25. After taking into account the foregoing averments, the limited question for adjudication before this Court is whether the learned Tribunal erred in ascertaining that it was a case of accidental murder instead of murder simpliciter, and whether the learned Tribunal erred in awarding interest @8% per annum.
26. To answer the same, this Court deems it necessary to peruse the impugned award, relevant excerpts of which is as follows: “….ISSUE NO. 1;- Whether on 20.10.2015 at 01:50 a.m., near A to Z Showrom, 26 Block, Trilokpuri, Delhi, Ct. Manoj Kumar suffered injuries in a motor vehicular accident due to rash and negligent driving of offending vehicle bearing registration No. DL-2CAT-5702 (Swift Car) by respondent No.1 and consequently died on 03.11.2015? OPP ***
9. Since issue no.1 in both the cases are interlinked, these would be decided together. In an action founded on the principle of fault liability, the proof of rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle is sine qua non. However, the standard of proof is not as strict applied in criminal cases and evidence is tested on the touchstone of principle of preponderance of probabilities.
10. To prove the case of petitioners, PW[2] Ct. Shivani appeared in the witness box, being injured as well as eye-witness of the accident. She deposed on the lines of FIR. During crossexamination conducted by respondent No.3/ insurance company, she replied that she had seen the registration number of the offending vehicle, which had caused the accident. Further, she mentioned that she had got her statement recorded u/s 164 Cr.PC. She further replied that respondent No.1 caused the accident intentionally. During cross examination conducted by respondent No.1 & 2, she replied that both of them were wearing helmet at the time of accident.
11. Considering the aforesaid cross-examination of the eyewitness/ injured, it has become clear that nothing could be extracted for the purpose of rebutting her testimony. It is also evident that FIR was registered without any delay and the registration number of the offending vehicle was mentioned therein. Further, there is no dispute that respondent No.1 was arrested in the aforesaid criminal case and he is facing trial in that case. Further, the mechanical inspection report of the offending vehicle Ex.R3W1/4 clearly shows that the offending vehicle suffered damages on the front bumper, front number plate, front grills, bonnet, left and right front fenders, front wind glass, right front door glass and outside mirror. Thus, there is sufficient material to show that accident was caused by respondent No.1 by driving the offending vehicle at fast speed and rashly and negligently.
12. However, learned counsel for insurance company has argued that since the chargesheet was filed for the offence of murder and sufficient material has come on record to show that respondent No.1 wanted to kill Ct. Manoj and Ct. Shivani, the present claim petition filed under Motor Vehicle Act, is not maintainable. On this aspect, reliance has been placed on the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Reeta Devi & Ors. vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. &Anr., (2000) 5 SCC 113. On going through the said judgment, this Tribunal is of the view that same is of no help to the case of insurance company. In that case, Supreme Court has held that "if the dominant intention of the Act of felony is to kill any particular person then such killing is not an accidental murder but is a murder simpliciter, while if the cause of murder or act of murder was originally not intended and the same was caused in furtherance of any other felonious act then such murder is an accidental• murder."
13. On going through the testimony of sole eye-witness (PW[2] injured Ct. Shivani), it becomes clear that nowhere it was said that respondent No.1 wanted to kill her and her colleague Ct. Manoj Kumar since beginning. It has also come on record that Ct. Manoj was not known to respondent No.1 prior to the date of accident and Ct. Manoj met respondent No.1 on that day when respondent No.1 came to meet the injured Ct. Shivani about an hour prior to the accident. It is no one's case that respondent No.1 was having any enmity or grudge against the deceased Ct. Manoj Kumar. Even in his disclosure statement given to police after his arrest, respondent No.1 mentioned that he was annoyed with Shivani as she refused to marry him and that is why he wanted to take revenge from her. In the given facts and circumstances of the case, it is clear that had Ct. Manoj Kumar not accompanied Shivani at the time of accident, there was no reason before respondent No.1 to cause any bodily injury or to kill him. At the same time, no material has come on record to show that respondent No.1 had gone to meet injured Ct. Shivani prior to accident with an intention to cause injury to her. In these facts and circumstances, it becomes clear that the murder of Ct. Manoj Kumar and causing of injuries to Ct. Shivani was not originally intended by respondent No.1. Unfortunately, Ct. Manoj Kumar lost his life as he was accompanying Ct. Shivani on the motorcycle at the time of accident and that being the case, such killing is accidental murder and not a murder simpliciter or in other words, the act of murder of Ct. Manoj Kumar was not originally intended as discussed in the aforesaid case law. Moreover, learned counsel for insurance company has given suggestions to their own witness R3W[1] (10) to the effect that accident had happened on account of rash and negligent driving o respondent No.1 and not with an intention of respondent No.1 to cause death or injury to the victims. It was further suggested that the chargesheet should have been filed under Sections 279/304-A IPC instead of Section 302 IPC. In view of this, it is held that the present claim petition is maintainable under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the claimants are entitled for the compensation.
14. Further, postmortem report Ex.R3W1/5 of deceased Ct. Manoj Kumar shows that cause of death was shock due to antemortem cranio-cerebral damage associated with multiple organs failure consequent upon blunt force impact. Furthermore, the MLC of injured Ct. Shivani shows that she suffered grievous injuries with multiple fractures.
15. In view of this Court, aforesaid material is found sufficient to establish that the accident had occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by respondent no.1, resulting into death of Ct. Manoj Kumar and grievous injuries to Ct. Shivani. Therefore, issue no.1 in both the cases is decided in favour of the petitioner(s)…”
27. Upon perusal of the above, it is made out that the learned Tribunal observed that the mechanical inspection report of the offending vehicle shows that it suffered various damages on the front bumper, front number plate, front grills, bonnet, left and right front fenders, front wind glass, right front door glass and outside mirror which categorically prove the act of rash and negligent driving of the driver. Moreover, the testimony of the Investigating Officer suggested that the accident happened on account of rash and negligent driving of the driver which was done without the intention of causing death or any other bodily injury to the victims.
28. On the aspect of maintainability of the claim petition before it, the learned Tribunal took into consideration the relevant extract of the judgment of Hon‟ble Supreme Court passed in Rita Devi (Supra) and noted that the same is not of any relevance in the present matter.
29. Further, the learned Tribunal perused the testimony of the sole eyewitness, PW[2] i.e., Ct. Shivani and observed that there was no mention of a statement claiming that the driver wanted to kill her and her colleague i.e., the deceased. It has been duly observed by the learned Tribunal that prior to the date of accident, the deceased was not known to the driver. It was also noted that there was no enmity or grudge between them.
30. The learned Tribunal also took into consideration the disclosure statement given by the driver wherein he admitted to the fact that he was annoyed with Ct. Shivani as she had refused to marry him which prompted him to take revenge from her. Due to the aforesaid, the learned Tribunal concluded that there was no reason for the driver to cause any bodily injury or to kill him. Hence, the learned Tribunal held that the driver never originally intended to cause death or cause grievous injuries to either of the victims and the unfortunate demise of the deceased was an accidental murder and not a murder simpliciter.
31. In view of the abovementioned observations, the learned Tribunal passed an award in favour of the claimants and granted a compensation to the tune of Rs. 82,41,750/- [(Rs. 79,98,750/- under loss of dependency) + (Rs. 2,53,000/- under other non-pecuniary heads) – (Rs. 10,000/- towards cremation charges)] in MACP. No. 553/16 and awarded a compensation of Rs. 3,73,220/- [(Rs. 2,33,220/- towards loss of income during treatment) + (Rs. 1,00,000/- towards pain and suffering) + (Rs. 40,000/- towards conveyance, special diet and attendant charges)] in MACP. No. 554/16 along with interest @8% per annum in both.
32. Now adverting to the issue at hand.
33. This Court is of the view that murder is a deliberate and felonious act committed with the intention to kill; however, there are some instances when an accident can also be termed under the color of murder. For the determination of the same, the proximity of the cause of such murder is looked upon. Here, it is imperative to delve into the distinction between the meaning of accidental murder and murder simpliciter.
34. With regard to the above, this Court has referred to the judgment of Rita Devi (Supra), wherein, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed as under:
having to prove wrongful act or neglect or default of anyone. Thus it is clear, if it is established by the claimants that the death or disablement was caused due to an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle then they will be entitled for payment of compensation. In the present case, the contention of the Insurance Company which was accepted by the High Court is that the death of the deceased (Dasarath Singh) was not caused by an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle. Therefore, we will have to examine the actual legal import of the words “death due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle”.
10. The question, therefore is, can a murder be an accident in any given case? There is no doubt that “murder”, as it is understood, in the common parlance is a felonious act where death is caused with intent and the perpetrators of that act normally have a motive against the victim for such killing. But there are also instances where murder can be by accident on a given set of facts. The difference between a “murder” which is not an accident and a “murder” which is an accident, depends on the proximity of the cause of such murder. In our opinion, if the dominant intention of the Act of felony is to kill any particular person then such killing is not an accidental murder but is a murder simpliciter, while if the cause of murder or act of murder was originally not intended and the same was caused in furtherance of any other felonious act then such murder is an accidental murder…”
35. Upon perusal of the aforesaid, it is observed that as per the settled position of law, when the dominant intent of an act is to kill a particular individual, such an act would be considered as a murder simpliciter, and in such cases the insurance company cannot be made liable to pay compensation and the liability would fall upon the driver or the owner of the offending vehicle. However, when the dominant intent to kill is missing and the death occurs in the course of any other felonious act, not originally intended to result into a murder, such a case would come under the purview of accidental murder. In such cases, the insurance company is held liable for compensation as the murder is a byproduct of another criminal act and is caused accidentally.
36. Applying these principles to the present case, it is observed that the deceased had no prior acquaintance with the driver of the offending vehicle, nor had any interaction before the date of the incident. Further, no substantial evidence has been produced to show that the driver had the intention to kill the deceased and it is pertinent to mention here that Ct. Shivani only sustained injuries, and did not die. The appellant‟s case is that the driver of the offending car had the intention to kill Ct. Shivani, however, in the absence of any material evidence to substantiate the said contention and as Ct. Shivani survived the accident, the argument of the appellant does not hold any water, thus, rejected.
37. As per the jurisprudence of motor vehicle accident cases, claims under MV Act are to be dealt by delving into the establishment of the claims on touchstone of preponderance of probabilities rather than proving them beyond reasonable doubt. In simpler words, for adjudicating claims under the MV Act, the learned Tribunal only needs to consider whether the case of the claimant is probable and while doing so, the learned Tribunal is not bound by strict standard of proof which is „beyond all reasonable doubts‟, followed in criminal cases.
38. In paragraph no. 13 of the impugned award, the learned Tribunal has categorically observed that the eye-witness (Ct. Shivani) has nowhere stated in her testimony that the driver of the offending vehicle had intention to kill her and Ct. Manoj Kumar i.e., the deceased. Moreover, it has also been rightly observed that had the deceased not been present at the site of the incident, he would not have been the part of the unfortunate incident. Additionally, in paragraph no. 13 itself, the disclosure statement of the driver is recorded which states that he was just annoyed with Ct. Shivani as she had refused to marry him due to which he wanted to take revenge from her. Therefore, death of Ct. Manoj prima facie is accidental murder, and the same was not originally intended but occurred due to the negligence of the driver.
39. The appellant has failed to show on record whether the driver of the offending vehicle knew the deceased prior to the accident. It is pertinent to mention here that although it has been recorded in the testimony of Ct. Shivani that the driver came to meet her and the deceased Ct. Manoj about an hour prior to the accident, however, the same is not corroborated by any substantial evidence, and mere allegations that the driver of the offending vehicle had threatened to kill is not sufficient.
40. The appellant has also contended that the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate the fact that the eyewitness i.e., Ct. Shivani has clearly deposed in her statement that the driver threatened her by stating that “if you do not listen to me, then I won’t leave you and whosoever will come in between I will see him also.” With respect to the same, this Court is of the view that nothing has come on record to show that the driver had any intention to kill the deceased as also discussed herein above. Further, it has already been ascertained by this Court as well as by the learned Tribunal that it was a rash and negligent act of the driver that led to the demise of Ct. Manoj Kumar, and a mere statement made by Ct. Shivani, stating the aforesaid does not prove that the driver had any intention to kill the deceased.
41. Thus, from the above, it is perceptible that the claim petitions filed before the learned Tribunal were maintainable under the MV Act and there is no merit in the arguments advanced by the appellant with regard to the same. Further, it is deduced that the other material produced on record of the learned Tribunal evidently states that the driver was driving in a rash and negligent manner which resulted in death of Ct. Manoj and injuries to Ct. Shivani.
42. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the driver of the offending vehicle has been charge-sheeted by the police under Sections 307/354(D)/506/34/302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, thus, the driver of the offending vehicle ought to have been made solely liable for payment of compensation as the act of killing Ct. Manoj is murder simpliciter and not accidental murder.
43. It is a settled position of law, as held by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Sunita v. Rajasthan SRTC, (2020) 13 SCC 486, that mere registration of an FIR under Sections 302/307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, does not mean that the accused against whom the FIR is registered had murdered the deceased or had any intention to kill such person.
44. It has been categorically held that an FIR is only an information or complaint made subsequent to the incident in which the particulars of the said incident are alleged and the offence has to be duly proved in the Court of law beyond reasonable doubt to convict the person against whom such FIR has been registered. A mere recording of an FIR consisting of allegations will not make a case of murder. In view of the same, the aforesaid contention of the appellant does not hold any substance, and accordingly, stands rejected.
45. Further, upon perusal of the testimony of the driver before the Investigation Officer, it is observed by this Court that there is an absence of any personal enmity of the driver with the deceased. Thus, the term „murder simpliciter‟ cannot be ascertained in the instant case due to absence of essential ingredients.
46. As revealed in the disclosure statement, the driver‟s motive was aided by a personal grievance against Ct. Shivani, who had refused his marriage proposal, prompting a desire for revenge. Given this context, the death of Ct. Manoj and the injuries sustained by Ct. Shivani do not fall under the category of murder simpliciter as the killing occurred in the course of an act directed at someone else, hence, the intention to kill Ct. Manoj cannot be prima facie, ascertained. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the learned Tribunal‟s findings concur with the observations made herein above, establishing that the deceased‟s death was contingent upon his presence with Ct. Shivani during the incident.
47. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court‟s interpretation in Rita Devi (Supra) is centered on “death due to accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle” as per Section 163-A of the MV Act. The primary issue was whether a murder, under certain circumstances could be classified as an accident for the purpose of claiming compensation under a motor vehicle insurance policy.
48. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court has clarified that murder is generally understood as a deliberate and felonious act with intent to kill, however, there could be instances where a murder might be considered as an accidental occurrence, depending on the proximity and nature of the felonious act leading to death. The distinction lies in the perpetrator‟s dominant intention as per which, when the said intent was specifically to kill a particular individual, such an act would be considered a murder simpliciter and not an accidental murder. In such cases, the insurance company would not be liable for compensation, and the responsibility would fall on the accused or the owner of the vehicle. However, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court also acknowledged scenarios where a death occurs in the course of a felonious act wherein the offender did not originally intend to commit a murder, and in such cases, the insurance company could be liable for compensation.
49. Therefore, as per the principles laid down in Rita Devi (Supra), the death of Ct. Manoj Kumar prima facie falls under the ambit of „accidental murder‟. In view of the same, the respondents/claimants are entitled to the compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal and the liability to pay the same has been rightly attributed to the insurance company which has been rightly considered by the learned Tribunal as the unfortunate death was not originally intended in the case before this Court.
50. Thus, it is concluded that the instant matter is a case of accidental murder and not murder simpliciter, as determined by the learned Tribunal and the contention of the appellant that, it is not liable to pay the compensation under the „no fault liability‟, is not applicable to the facts of the instant case since there is nothing on record to show that the driver of the offending vehicle committed any breach of insurance policy.
51. In MAC. APP. No. 321/2021, it has also been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Tribunal erred by not deducting an amount of Rs. 20 Lakhs as ex-gratia amount, which has already been paid to the wife of the deceased i.e., Smt. Kamlesh, and ought to have been adjusted in the final awarded amount granted by the learned Tribunal.
52. An ex-gratia payment by its dictionary meaning is considered to be voluntary and in literal terms, it means „by favour‟. It is a payment made to an individual by an organization, government or insurer for damages or claims but it does not require the admittance of liability by the party making the payment.
53. Furthermore, Section 165 of the MV Act empowers the State Government to constitute one or more Motor Accident Claim Tribunals for the purpose of adjudication of claims to grant compensation to the victims of motor vehicle accident which has resulted into death or bodily injury. This provision particularly states the adjudication of claims regarding compensation in motor vehicle accident cases, whereas, ex-gratia payment is a payment not legally required.
54. In the present case, the amount of Rs. 20 Lakhs given to the wife of the deceased as ex-gratia amount is on compassionate basis which cannot be the ground for denial or reduction of the compensation as awarded by the learned Tribunal.
55. In light of the aforesaid, this Court is of the considered view that since the ex-gratia payment is voluntary and compensation under MV Act is mandatory, there is no merit in the contention of the appellant that the amount of Rs. 20 Lakhs which has been already paid to Smt. Kamlesh as ex gratia, ought to have been adjusted in the compensation. Accordingly, the compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal is not interfered with.
56. The appellant has also contended that the learned Tribunal erred in awarding interest @ 8% per annum, which is on a higher side and more than the prevailing rate of interest in bank deposits.
57. As stated by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court as well as various High Courts in a catena of judgments, the MV Act is a beneficial and welfare legislation which has been enacted with the intention to provide relief to the victims and their families which are affected due to motor vehicle accidents, by the way of awarding “just and fair compensation”.
58. The aim of this welfare legislation is to alleviate the emotional as well as the financial distress of the victims and their families. This beneficial legislation is a remedial enactment and must be construed in furtherance with the purpose with which it has been framed. Hence, MV Act should receive a liberal construction so as to promote its objectives.
59. Interest is compensation for forbearance or detention of money, which ought to have been paid to the claimant. In furtherance of the objectives of the MV Act, the rate of interest ought to be just and fair to the victims so as to make restitution for the loss that they have endured. It is also a settled position of law that although no rate of interest is fixed under Section 171 of the MV Act, in view the beneficial aim of the MV Act, the same has to be fixed by the Courts upon its discretion and in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.
60. Having regard to the above and taking into consideration the fact that Ct. Manoj Kumar died due to the accident and Ct. Shivani sustained severe injuries, this Court finds no merit to interfere with the rate of interest awarded by the learned Tribunal and the averment made by the learned counsel on behalf of the appellant with regard to the modification of the rate of interest fixed @8% per annum is rejected and this Court upholds the same.
61. Summarily stated, this Court has observed in the preceding paragraphs that the learned Tribunal has rightly determined that the instant matter is a case of „accidental murder‟ and not „murder simpliciter‟. Further, the appellant has failed to produce any material on record to show that the driver of the offending vehicle had the intention to kill the deceased Ct. Manoj Kumar. Therefore, it is held that the appellant insurance company has been unable to put forth any material propositions in order to make out its case that the impugned award suffers from illegality and that the learned Tribunal erred in determining its liability to pay the compensation amount.
62. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the impugned judgment and award dated 31st August, 2021, passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal, East District, Karkardooma Courts, New Delhi, in cases bearing nos. 553/2016 and 554/2016 is upheld.
63. Accordingly, the captioned appeals stand dismissed along with the pending applications, if any.
64. The order be uploaded on the website forthwith.
CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J AUGUST 27, 2024 Dy/sm/av