Punjab National Bank v. Niraj Gupta and Anr.

16. The appellant -bank preferred an Appeal under Section 7(7) of the Act before the Appellate Authority, however, deposited a sum of Rs.15 Lakhs with the Appellate Authority, as determined by the Controlling Authority. The learned Appellate Authority vide order dated 7.04. 2022 dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant-Bank thereby, holding that since the essential conditions as stipulated under Section 4( 6)(b )(ii) of the Act are not proved against the respondent No. 1-employee by a Court of competent jurisdiction, the action of the appellant- Bank to forfeit the gratuity payable to him, was not justified and is unlawful. Thereby, the learned Appellate Authority upheld the order passed by the learned Controlling Authority and directed to take an appropriate action in terms of Rule 18(7) and 18(8) of the Act.

17. Pursuant to the above, the respondent No.2 i.e., The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) passed an order dated 26.04.2022 whereby, the gratuity deposited by the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), New Delhi under the Head of Account “8443- Civil Deposits-Personal Deposits” vide Challan No.04 dated 7.04.2022 amounting to Rs.15 Lakhs was directed to be released in favour of the respondent No. 1-employee.

18. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred the writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 7247/2022 before the learned Single Bench of this Court, seeking quashing of order dated 26.04.2022. In the meantime, the amount deposited with the learned Appellate Authority was released to the respondent No.1. 18:50

19. The case of the appellant before the learned Single Judge was that the learned Authorities below have erred in law by failing to consider the settled position of law with regard to forfeiture of gratuity thus, wrongfully holding that the act alleged against the respondent No. 1 employee does not amount to 'moral turpitude'. The appellant pleaded that the findings of the learned Controlling as well as Appellate Authority that the act alleged against the respondent No. 1 employee does not amount to „an offence‟ involving moral turpitude are perverse and are liable to be set aside, as the allegation levelled against him have been duly proved by the ICC as well as the departmental authorities hence, the act squarely falls under the ambit of moral turpitude.

20. The stand of the respondent No. 1 before the learned Single Judge was that the impugned order had been passed after taking into consideration the settled position of law and the entire evidence on record and his case does not fall within the ambit of action, which may lead to forfeiture of his gratuity. The respondent No. 1 pleaded before the learned Single Bench that the contention of appellant that his conduct amounts to moral turpitude is not substantiated as no criminal proceedings were ever initiated against him either by the Bank or by the complainant and to bring his case within the ambit of moral turpitude, a criminal complaint is necessary, which has to be dealt by a Court of competent jurisdiction as prescribed under Section 4(6)(b)(ii) of the Act.

21. The learned Single Bench, in the light of submissions made by both the sides, vide order dated 09.07.2023 held that the order of forfeiture of gratuity payable to the respondent No. 1 employee was pre-mature as the said respondent was not convicted by the Court of competent jurisdiction as per Section 4(6)(b)(ii) of the Act. 18:50

22. In the present petition, the aforesaid order dated 09.07.2023 is assailed on nine grounds, however, at the time of hearing, learned counsel for the appellant confined relief only to three grounds i.e. A, B and C, which are reproduced as under:-

23. Since the relief sought in the present appeal is confined to the issue as to whether the conduct of respondent No. 1 falls within the act of moral turpitude, this Court heard learned counsel for the parties on this limited aspect. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of impugned judgment as well as other material placed on record, we find that the learned Single Bench has taken note of the core issue before it was to consider as to whether the action of the Bank to forefeet the gratuity was in 18:50 conformity with the provisions of Section 4( 6)(b) of the Act, as the employee was dismissed under Regulation 4(j) of Punjab National Bank Officer Employees‟ (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1977. The learned Single Bench also observed that the provision under Regulation 4(j) does not mandate that termination of an employee would amount to forfeiture of the gratuity of the accused employee. The learned Single Bench further observed that in order for an employer to invoke the provisions contained under Section 4(6)(b)(ii) of the Act for forfeiture of gratuity of an employee, the conditions that must be satisfied are (i) the terminated employee must be convicted for an offence punishable by law for the time being in force and

(ii) the said offence must be an offence involving moral turpitude.

24. On this aspect the learned Single Bench in the impugned judgment has held as under:-

25. It is not in dispute that in the present case, no FIR was registered against the respondent and the allegations levelled against him were never 18:50 proved before the Court of Law. As per Section 4(6) of the Act, payment of gratuity has to be denied to an employee only if his dismissal is on account of an act, wilful omission or negligence committed by the employee and the same causes any damage or any loss, destruction of property belonging to the employer.

26. In view of facts and circumstances of the present case, in our considered opinion, the judgment dated 09.07.2024 in W.P.(C) No.7247/2022 passed by the learned Single Bench does not suffer from infirmity, therefore no interference is required by this Court.

27. With aforesaid observations, the present appeal and pending applications are accordingly dismissed. (SURESH KUMAR KAIT) JUDGE (GIRISH KATHPALIA)

JUDGE SEPTEMBER 12, 2024 uk/r 18:50