Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
JUDGMENT
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. ..... Appellants
Through: Mr. Vivek K. Tankha, ASG with Mr. Arjun Harkauli, Mr. Sumeer Sodhi, Advs.
Through: Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Sanjeev Anand, Mr.Shaunak, Mr. Bikash Mohanty, Ms.Mandeep Kaur, Mr.Umesh
Agarwal, Advs.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA
1 Whether reporters of the local papers be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3 Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes DIPAK MISRA, CJ In this Letters Patent Appeal, the legal acceptability and pregnability of the order dated 6th May, 2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No.13872/2009 is called in question. Sans unnecessary details, the essential facts which are to be exposited are that the respondent-writ 2011:DHC:3152-DB petitioner (hereafter referred to as the respondent-petitioner), M/s Edward Keventer (Successors) Pvt. Ltd. (EKSPL), invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for issue of a writ of certiorari for quashing the letter dated 3rd February, 1998 issued by the Land & Development Office (L&DO), Ministry of Urban Affairs & Employment, Government of India withdrawing the earlier letter dated 24th July, 1992 for the re-development of the property situate in Block No.48, Diplomatic Enclave, Sardar Patel Marg, New Delhi and the letter dated 25th August, 2009 issued by the L&DO disallowing the respondent‟s application for change of land use from Dairy Farm to Residential Group Housing in respect of the property in question.
2. It was averred in the writ petition that on 16th October, 1920, the Secretary of State for Indian Council executed a perpetual lease deed in favour of one Edward Keventer of Aligarh Dairy Farm in respect of the property in question admeasuring 22.95 acres. On 3rd August, 1942, the said Edward Keventer assigned the aforesaid land to the respondent- EKSPL. On 11th February, 1970, the respondent requested for permission to use the property in question for construction of ownership flats. It was pointed out that out of 22.95 acres, only 4 acres were used for the dairy farm. By communication dated 24th July, 1992, the L&DO granted permission for conversion of land use and the respondent was called upon to pay the conversion charges amounting to Rs.8.[5] Crores approximately. By letter dated 5/6 August, 1992, the respondent conveyed the acceptance and paid Rs.2.[8] Crores towards the part payment of the conversion charges. On 23rd November, 1992, the respondent was informed by the L&DO that it would be given one month‟s extension to comply with the terms of conversion offered by the letter dated 24th July, 1992. Thereafter, certain correspondence went on between the parties regarding payment of the balance conversion charges. On 11th January, 1995, the Ministry of Urban Development, Lands Division, issued revised orders rationalizing and simplifying the conversion charges and other terms for group housing and/or commercial complexes. It is worth noting, on 30th January, 1995, the respondent applied for rationalization of conversion charges enclosing the calculations in terms of the said revised orders. A claim was put forth that it was entitled to refund of Rs.1,54,53,150.64 being the excess payment already made.
3. As certain cavil arose with regard to the conversion charges, by letter dated 3rd February, 1998, the present appellant withdrew the earlier letter dated 24th July, 1992 allowing the conversion of the land use to residential. Being dissatisfied with the said communication, the respondent preferred WP(C) No.3509/2001 and sought a mandamus to the appellants to re-compute the conversion charges as per their policy. On 31st May, 2006, the said writ petition was disposed of permitting the respondent to make a representation to the appellants for grant of No Objection Certificate for re-development without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in the writ petition. The said representation was rejected by the appellants on 19th July, 2006 on the ground that there was a title dispute pending in respect of the said property. The respondent filed CM No.6470/2007 in the said writ petition seeking a direction to the appellants herein to compute the conversion charges. On 28th March, 2008, the conversion charges were computed at Rs.67,57,74,806/-. Eventually, the writ petition was disposed of on 22nd August, 2008 referring to the affidavit dated 28th March, 2008 filed by the L&DO. We shall refer to the said order at a later stage.
4. In pursuance of the aforesaid order, the respondent deposited the conversion charges on 1st September, 2008 with L&DO along with an application for conversion. On 25th August, 2009, a communication was made rejecting the change of user from dairy farm to residential on certain grounds and subsequently, the conversion charges amounting to Rs.67,57,74,806/- was refunded to the respondent. As is evident from record, the respondent filed CM No.6014/2009 in the pending WP(C) No.3509/2001 which was disposed of by requiring the respondent to challenge the said communication by an independent writ petition.
5. Before the learned Single Judge, it was contended that the order of rejection was absolutely unsustainable in law and the grounds stated therein are absolutely unfounded inasmuch as the property in question had never changed hands; that the lease continues to stand in the name of EKSPL although the management has changed; that there is no title dispute since the matter has been put to rest in WP(C) No.4521/2007 (Nirmal S. Saigal v. Union of India) which has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge with costs of Rs.[1] lakh and further, the appeal preferred against the same order and the Special Leave Petition have also been dismissed. It was urged before the learned Single Judge that in the Master Plan for Delhi, 2021 (MPD), the area where the property in question is located is earmarked for residential purpose and, hence, there can be no impediment on the part of the L&DO to accede to the prayer for conversion of the user of land from dairy farm to residential. It was also submitted that as and when any development plans are submitted to the department, the same can be processed in accordance with the prevailing norms consistent with the MPD and the policy of the Government.
6. On behalf of the present appellants, the respondents in the writ petition, it was put forth that no mandamus can be issued to them to grant permission for change or conversion of the land use from dairy farm to residential since the discretion is vested in the Government in entirety and the respondent-writ petitioner had no statutory right; that the proposal submitted by the respondent for re-development of the land cannot be considered in view of the policy of the Central Government regarding high intensity development in and around the Lutyens Bungalow Zone (LBZ); and that the area in question comes within the vicinity of LBZ President‟s Estate and involves security concerns.
7. The learned Single Judge first dealt with the maintainability of the writ petition and came to hold that it was maintainable since the action of the present appellants was amenable to judicial review as it cannot act in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The learned Single Judge placed reliance on the decisions in Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Coop. Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 145 and Union of India v. Muralidhara Menon, (2009) 9 SCC 304 and eventually came to hold as follows on the issue of maintainability: “In the instant case the Respondents do not deny that the area in which the property is located is earmarked for residential use under the MPD. Under the Delhi Development Act (DD Act) it is the duty of the Delhi Development Authority to ensure that the development of Delhi takes place in accordance with the MPD, which in terms of the DD Act is of a statutory character. Therefore in accepting the request of the petitioner for change of land use to residential, the Respondents would be performing a statutory duty consistent with the MPD norms. Therefore, it is not right to say that the Petitioner has no legal enforceable right to have the land use in relation to the property in question converted from dairy farm to residential. The objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition is accordingly rejected.”
8. After so holding, the learned Single Judge proceeded to address the issue on merits and came to hold that there was no transfer of the said property to anyone else as of date; that the question of payment of any unearned increase does not arise; that the ground mentioned with regard to the title was not correct and justified as the same had been put to rest by the decision of this Court as well as of the Apex Court; that the letter/ communication does not refer to any ground of security and, therefore, the same cannot be taken aid of in view of the decision in Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi, (1978) 1 SCC 405; that the grant of permission to convert the land use to residential does not ipso facto imply approval of the proposal for re-development; that it has to be separately considered in the light of the MPD norms and prevailing policy; and that as the grounds were not germane to the rejection, the said letter/ communication deserved to be axed and, accordingly, lanceted the same. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge directed the writ petitioner to redeposit the conversion charges within two weeks from the date of the order without any interest and commanded the present appellants to grant approval for conversion of land use in respect of the property in question with further stipulation that if thereafter the writ petitioner would submit a plan for re-development, it would be processed by the department in accordance with law.
9. Mr. Vivek K. Tankha, learned Additional Solicitor General, challenging the legal tenability of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, has submitted that the grounds mentioned in the order of rejection are totally absent and are not justified on facts and, therefore, the order suffers from manifest errors. It is his further submission that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that there is a difference between a quasi-judicial order and a purely administrative order and, hence, the decision rendered in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the case. The learned Additional Solicitor General would further submit that the ground of security which was put forth in the counter affidavit should have weighed with the learned Single Judge but as the same has been totally brushed aside, the order suffers from substantial infirmity warranting interference in this intra-Court Appeal. It is canvassed by him that the appellant being the lessor and the respondent being the lessee, as per the terms of the lease deed, obtaining consent is the condition precedent and the appellant has the discretion to give the consent and, therefore, a writ of mandamus could not have been issued to grant permission for change of user on payment of conversion fees. The refusal of permission comes within the domain of policy decision and, therefore, the court should not have interfered in a decision of the present nature. To bolster the aforesaid submissions, he has commended us to the decisions rendered in Ashoka Smokeless Coal India (P) Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others, (2007) 2 SCC 640, Pancham Chand and others v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2008) 7 SCC 117 and Chairman, All India Railway Recruitment Board and another v. K. Shyam Kumar and others, (2010) 6 SCC 614.
10. Mr.Soli Sorabjee, learned senior counsel resisting the aforesaid submissions of learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the appellants cannot travel beyond the reasons stated in the order and hence the direction issued by the learned Single Judge does not suffer from any infirmity. Once a finding is recorded by the learned Single Judge that the grounds mentioned in the order are absolutely invalid and in fact do not really exist, the order deserves to be quashed and as a fall out, a writ of mandamus deserves to be issued and has been appositely issued. The submission that the lessor has paramount right to refuse consent is unacceptable inasmuch as the appellants, the Union of India and its functionaries, while dealing with a citizen cannot act in an arbitrary, whimsical and capricious manner. That apart, submits Mr.Soli Sorabjee, learned senior counsel that on earlier occasions before this Court the appellants have only raised the cavil with regard to the conversion charges and nothing else and hence, the question of consent has paled into insignificance. It is his further proponement that the ground of security had not been raised at any point of time and had it been raised, the respondent would have been in a position to satisfy that in the same locality residential buildings exist, subject to certain restrictions and in that event a different order would have resulted. But without affording the respondent an opportunity of being heard, the appellants have acted in a unilateral manner in the name of security. It is urged by him that the security concept has come into existence on the basis of due correspondence between an officer of the Union of India and a law officer, which were never brought on record and, therefore, there is no justification for interference in this intra-Court appeal. To buttress his submission, he has commended us to the decisions in P. Bhooma Reddy v. State of Mysore and others, AIR 1969 SC 655, M/s. Krishna Cinema, a partnership firm, Rajkot & Others v. The State of Gujarat & Anr., AIR 1971 Gujarat 103, A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150, The Kesava Mills Co. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1973 SC 389, S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., (1980) 4 SCC 379, State of Karnataka & Anr. v. All India Manufacturers Organization & Ors., 2006 (4) Scale 398, State of Gujarat & Anr. v. M/s. Krishna Cinema & Ors., AIR 1971 SC 1650, Union of India & Ors. v. M/s Indo Afghan Agencies Ltd., (1968) 2 SCR 366, Mohinder Singh Gill (supra), Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Lotur Hotels Pvt. Ltd., (1983) 3 SCC 379, Ram Singh Vijay Pal Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2007) 6 SCC 44, The Bihar Eastern Gangestic Fishermen Co-operative Society Ltd. (supra), Muralidhara Menon (supra), Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16 and ABL International Ltd. & Anr. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 553.
11. At the very outset, it is appropriate to state that in course of hearing, we had called for the file to peruse the communications with regard to the ground of security and learned Additional Solicitor General has produced the file for our perusal.
12. First, we shall refer to the order of rejection. It reads as follows: - “Sir/Madam, I am to refer to your application dated 1st September, 2008 which has been filed for conversion/change of land use from Dairy Farming to Residential/Group Housing in respect of above mentioned property and to inform that your application for change of purpose from dairy farm to residential has been examined and it has been decided with approval of the Ministry that the said application is disallowed because
(i) there is evidence that the property has changed hands in violation of lease provision;
(ii) the issuer relating to unearned increase remain to be addressed; and
(iii) there is a dispute about the title.
2. Sanction for refund of Rs.64,76,00,000/- (Rupees sixty four crores seventy six lakhs) the amount deposited with your application dated 1st September, 2008 is being issued separately.”
13. The learned Single Judge in paragraph 18 has opined thus – “On merits, this Court finds that none of the grounds on which the Petitioner‟s request for conversion of land use was refused is either factually or legally tenable. Admittedly the lease still stands in the name of EKSPL, the Petitioner herein. While the management of EKSPL may have changed, it continues to be the lessee in respect of the property in question. There is, therefore, no transfer of the said property to anyone else as of date. Consequently, the question of payment of any unearned increase does not arise. As regards the third ground, it is factually incorrect and Mr.Tankha did not contest the position. The dispute raised by Mr.Nirmal
Supreme Court. If Mr.Saigal has thereafter kept writing to the MoUD that will not amount to a „title dispute‟ on the basis of which the request for conversion can be refused to the Petitioner.”
14. In view of the aforesaid finding returned, there cannot be a trace of doubt that the said reasons were not valid. It is not in dispute before us that the only ground that actually survives to be dwelled upon is the ground of security, which was put forth in the counter affidavit before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge has disregarded the said ground on the basis that as the said reason was non-existent in the communication, it cannot be taken recourse to and, in any event, it may be germane when the petitioner would submit a plan for re-development hereafter.
15. Mr.Tankha, learned Additional Solicitor General has referred to the terms of lease deed to highlight that a mandamus cannot be issued for grant of permission. He has referred to clauses 6, 7 and 8 of the lease deed. The learned Single Judge has referred to the said conditions in the impugned order. He has also referred to the earlier orders passed in WP
(C) No. 3509/2001 and CM No. 6470/2007. We think it appropriate to reproduce the order passed on 22nd August, 2008 in WP (C) No. 3509/2001 on the basis of an affidavit filed by the L&DO. The said order reads as follows: -
Thereafter, the respondent deposited the conversion charges with the department. On the basis of the aforesaid order, the plea canvassed by the learned ASG that it was within the discretion of the appellant to grant consent or not as per the lease deed does not survive. What is contended by Mr.Tankha in the alternative is that the controversy was not finally put to rest on payment of conversion charges. The permission for user could be granted but if there are other grounds, the same can be refused. While pyramiding the said submission, learned ASG would submit that it can use its discretion.
16. At this juncture, we may refer to certain decisions with regard to exercise of discretion by the executive, for the simon pure reason, the grant of permission for refusal in a case of present nature has to be adjudged on the parameter the way the authorities of the State are expected to deal with a citizen.
17. In Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India; (1979) 3 SCC 489, it has been held thus - “12…..This proposition would hold good in all cases of dealing by the Government with the public, where the interest sought to be protected is a privilege. It must, therefore, be taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other forms of largesse, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norms which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largesse including award of jobs, contracts, quotas, licences etc., must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the Government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory.” (Emphasis supplied)
18. In Common Cause (Petrol pumps matter) v. Union of India: (1996) 6 SCC 530, it has been held thus -
19. In Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. (1991) 1 SCC 212, it is held thus -
20. In LIC v. Consumer Education & Research Centre; (1995) 5 SCC 482, the Court negatived the argument that exercise of executive power of the State was immune from judicial review and observed thus:
21. In M/s. Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, AIR 1989 SC 1642, their Lordships have held thus –
22. We have referred to the aforesaid decisions to highlight that the action of the State has to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It cannot smack of arbitrariness. A decision cannot be taken in a capricious or cavalier manner. It has to have a rational base.
23. Presently, we shall advert to the submission urged by Mr.Tankha that there is a distinction between a purely administrative order and a quasi-judicial order.
24. In Pancham Chand (supra), a two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court was dealing with the issue whether the Chief Minister of a State has any role to play in a matter of grant of stage carriage permit in terms of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. In the said case, the fourth respondent had approached the Chief Minister directly by a letter which was received in the official residence of the Chief Minister. The office of the Chief Minister had communicated the Commissioner, Transport that permit be sanctioned in favour of the appellant. Being grieved by the same, a writ petition was filed by some persons and eventually, the High Court dismissed the writ petition. It was contended before the Apex Court that the grant of permit in favour of the fourth respondent therein was on the basis of wrong principle since an application could not have been submitted to the Chief Minister other than the statutory authority referred to in the Act. Their Lordships scanned the anatomy of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and opined thus – “Factual matrix, as indicated hereinbefore, clearly goes to show that the fourth respondent filed the application before the Chief Minister straightaway. Office of the Chief Minister communicated the order of the Chief Minister, not once but twice. Respondent 2 acted thereupon. It advised the Regional Transport Authority to proceed, after obtaining a proper application from Respondent 4 in that behalf. This itself goes to show that prior thereto no proper application was filed before the Regional Transport Authority. Such an interference on the part of any authority upon whom the Act does not confer any jurisdiction, is wholly unwarranted in law. It violates the constitutional scheme. It interferes with the independent functioning of a quasi-judicial authority. A permit, if granted, confers a valuable right. An applicant must earn the same.” In the said case, their Lordships referred to the decisions in D. Nataraja Mudaliar v. State Transport Authority, AIR 1979 SC 114 and Gordhandas Bhanji (supra). In that context, their Lordships referred to Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) and reproduced the following paragraph -
25. The learned Additional Solicitor General has put immense emphasis on para 25 but in our considered opinion, the said decision is not for the proposition what is being canvassed by Mr.Tankha. What is submitted by Mr.Soli Sorabjee, learned senior counsel, is that unless a ground is incorporated in the order that is communicated to the petitioner, the same cannot be validated by adding another ground. That apart, it is also canvassed by him that the order has to stand the test of Article 14 of the Constitution of India which ostracizes all kinds of arbitrariness or capricious exercise of power. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that the said decision is distinguishable on facts.
26. In M/s. Krishna Cinema (supra) it has been held thus: “It is within the powers of the High Court to issue a writ of mandamus where it finds that the Government or the Government Officers in whom the discretion is vested has not exercised that discretion in accordance with the requirement of law, or has taken any extraneous matters into consideration. In matters where the High Court has jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari on the same principle the High Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against the State or its Officers.”
27. In A.K. Kraipak (supra), the Apex Court has held thus: “The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the organ of the State under our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its validity if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner.”
28. In The Kesava Mills Co. Ltd. (supra), their Lordships have held thus: “…The only essential point that has to be kept in mind in all cases is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and that the administrative authority concerned should act fairly, impartially and reasonably. Where administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly. See, for instance, the observations of Lord Parker in In re H. K. (an infant) [1967] 2 QB 617. It only means that such measure of natural justice should be applied as was described by Lord Reid in 1964 AC 40 as "in susceptible of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances". However, even the application of the concept of fair play requires real flexibility. Everything will depend on the actual facts and circumstances of a case. As Tucker L. J. observed in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk (1949) 1 All. E.R.
109. “The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject matter that is being dealt with and so forth.””
29. From the aforesaid, it is clear as crystal that the fine distinction drawn by the learned ASG has lost its significance and the order passed by the government or the instrumentalities of the State cannot run counter to the constitutional mandates. Thus, analysed, both on the factual analysis regard being had to the previous orders passed in this case and the principle of law, we are of the considered opinion that there cannot be a refusal of consent in an arbitrary manner but in a manner which is rational, cogent, germane and tenable in law.
30. Presently, we shall advert to the issue whether a ground of security could have been taken as a ground in the counter affidavit. Submission of Mr.Tankha is that though the same has not been incorporated in the order, yet regard being had to the area in question, the security ground cannot be totally brush aside. Per contra, Mr.Soli Sorabjee, learned senior counsel would contend that at no stage the ground of security was ever urged in previous litigations and the same does not find mention also in the communication/order but wisdom had dawned only in the counter affidavit. Learned senior counsel further contend that the only ground of security is that the change of use cannot be allowed as it relates to residential purposes but there are many residences in the area. It is urged by him that it can be controlled or restricted. The learned senior counsel submits that had there been a grant of opportunity to put forth his case in that regard, in all possibility the respondent would have been in a position to convince the authorities. In this context, we may refer to a passage from Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) –
31. In S.L. Kapoor (supra), it has been held as follows: “The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away and now even an administrative order, if involves civil consequences, must comply with the rules of natural justice. In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence.” Thereafter, their Lordships held as follows:
32. In K. Shyam Kumar (supra), their Lordships held as follows:
33. Keeping in view the aforesaid enunciation of law, it is to be borne in mind that in a case of the present nature, the balance is required to be struck. True it is, the appellants have put forth a ground of security but it is not disputed that there are residential premises in the said area and the Master Plan of Delhi permits thus. It is the duty of the Court to do justice by promotion of honesty and good faith. That is the sacrosanctity of justice. The Court is under obligation to exercise the said power that lies within its domain. Therefore, we are disposed to think that the cause of justice would be best subserved if the order passed by the learned Single Judge directing deposition of conversion charges and grant of approval is set aside with a direction that the appellant shall afford an opportunity of hearing with regard to the purpose of user, which relates to security measure and take a final decision within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of the order passed today. We may hasten to clarify that we have thought it appropriate to afford an opportunity of hearing to the respondent as we have been apprised that the Master Plan permits the user for residential areas and there are many other residential premises in the area. Possibly there may be certain restrictions or constrictions. In this regard, we are not in a position to express our opinion but leave it to the authorities to deal with it with total objectivity by following the doctrine of audi alteram partem. Consequently, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. There shall be no order as to costs.
CHIEF JUSTICE JUNE 03, 2011 SANJIV KHANNA, J. pk