Emeka Prince Lath v. State NCT of Delhi

96. What is most important to note in Pawan Kumar (supra) is that the search was not only of the bag, but also of the person of the accused, however, the contraband was recovered only from the bag and not from the person of the accused therein. What we are trying to highlight is that although in Pawan Kumar (supra) the search was of the accused as well as the bag, yet since the recovery of the contraband was only from the bag, this Court took the view that Section 50 would have no application....

103. Accordingly, Section 50 was read to be understood as applicable only to the personal search of a person and that would not extend to search of a vehicle or a container or a bag.

104. The language of Section 50 was interpreted to include search in relation to a person and not to a search of premises, vehicles or articles....

109. Thus, one view which originated from Dilip (supra) and relied upon in SK. Raju (supra) implied that if a person is searched and along with him or her, his or her bag is also searched, then the benefit of Section 50 should be extended while conducting the personal search of the accused.

110. However, it is pertinent to note that although Pawan Kumar (supra) has been referred to and considered in SK. Raju (supra) yet, the Court in SK. Raju (supra) overlooked the fact that in Pawan Kumar (supra) also the search was not only of the person of the accused but also of his bag. Even in such circumstances, the larger Bench in Pawan Kumar (supra) took the view that Section 50 would not apply if nothing incriminating is recovered from the person of the accused. Thus, there is an apparent conflict between the two decisions.” (emphasis added) 11.[6] The Supreme Court then relied upon Baljinder Singh (supra) to state that, Section 50 would not be applicable, when recovery was made from a bag or a premises. The relevant extracts from the said decision, as noted in Ranjan Kumar Chadha (supra), are as under:

It is only upon fulfilment of and strict adherence to said requirements that the contraband recovered pursuant to “personal search” of a person can be relied upon as a circumstance against the person. xxx

29. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the firm opinion that the object with which the right under Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act, by way of a safeguard, has been conferred on the suspect viz. to check the misuse of power, to avoid harm to innocent persons and to minimise the allegations of planting or foisting of false cases by the law enforcement agencies, it would be imperative on the part of the empowered officer to apprise the person intended to be searched of his right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate. We have no hesitation in holding that insofar as the obligation of the authorised officer under sub-section (1) of Section 50 of the NDPS Act is concerned, it is mandatory and requires strict compliance. Failure to comply with the provision would render the recovery of the illicit article suspect and vitiate the conviction if the same is recorded only on the basis of the recovery of the illicit article from the person of the accused during such search. Thereafter, the suspect may or may not choose to exercise the right provided to him under the said provision.” (Emphasis supplied)

113. The Court went on to hold that Section 50 would be applicable only to the personal searches and not to the searches of vehicles or bags. This was in line with the ratio laid down in Pawan Kumar (supra) and Baldev Singh (supra). This Court held that: —

11.[7] In reference to High Court’s decision in Akhilesh Bharti v State 2020 SCC OnLine Del 306, which relied upon SK. Raju (supra), the Supreme Court in Ranjan Kumar Chadha (supra) stated as under:

11.[8] In the final analysis, the following was stated in Ranjan Kumar Chadha (supra):

Method (1994)]. In the said case, the issue before the U.S. Court was that whether a person can be held guilty for the offence of burglary more particularly when such person did not enter the house per se but tried to steal the object with the help of tree snips. The statute clearly declared that for burglary to happen, the defendant should be physically present. In this case, although the defendant never entered the house, yet he did extend his tree snips through the window. The Court held that, “there is no meaningful difference between the snips and his arm because the penetration by the snips was merely an extension of Klein's person.” Therefore, in the said case, the object which a person was carrying was held to be part of his body. A similar view could also have been adopted while interpreting the term “personal search”. However, in view of plain and unambiguous statutory provision, there is no scope of interpreting Section 50 in any other manner than the interpretation explained in Baldev Singh (supra) and Pawan Kumar (supra).” …

126. As such, there is no direct conflict between SK. Raju (supra) and Baljinder Singh (supra). It is pertinent to note that in SK. Raju (supra) the contraband was recovered from the bag which the accused was carrying, whereas in Baljinder Singh (supra) the contraband was recovered from the vehicle. This makes a lot of difference even while applying the concept of any object being “inextricably linked to the person”. Parmanand (supra) relied upon the judgment in Dilip (supra) while taking the view that if both, the person of the accused as well as the bag is searched and the contraband is ultimately recovered from the bag, then it is as good as the search of a person and, therefore, Section 50 would be applicable. However, it is pertinent to note that Dilip (supra) has not taken into consideration Pawan Kumar (supra) which is of a larger Bench. It is also pertinent to note that although in Parmanand (supra) the Court looked into Pawan Kumar (supra), yet ultimately it followed Dilip (supra) and took the view that if the bag carried by the accused is searched and his person is also searched, Section 50 of the NDPS Act will have application. This is something travelling beyond what has been stated by the large Bench in Pawan Kumar (supra). Baljinder Singh (supra), on the other hand, says that Dilip (supra) does not lay down a good law.

127. In the facts of the present case, there is no scope of applying the ratio of Parmanand (supra) and SK. Raju (supra). At the cost of repetition, we may state that in the case on hand, there is nothing to indicate that the search of the person of the accused was also undertaken along with the bag which he was carrying on his shoulder....

131. The aforesaid observations made by the seven-Judge Bench of this Court, more particularly the last three lines referred to above, “These considerations become still more significant when the earlier decision happens to be a unanimous decision of a Bench of five learned Judges of this Court.” persuade us to say that we must adhere to the principle of law as explained by the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh (supra) and the larger Bench in Pawan Kumar (supra).” 11.[9] What is notable in the facts of this present case, is that search was first from the bag which was thrown by petitioner and subsequently, there was search of his person, but Section 50 notice still had been given. This fact is admitted by petitioner as well since there is an argument raised that the notice itself was not properly framed and omitted the word ‘nearest’ (which issue is dealt subsequently in this judgment).

11.10 As noted by the Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar (supra), the search was both of accused as well as of the bag he was carrying but since nothing was recovered from his personal search, Section 50 would not apply.

11.11 Taking benefit of this detailed enunciation by the Supreme Court, it is quite clear that the petitioner cannot have the benefit of argument they wish to press in respect of non-compliance of Section 50 NDPS mandate before the bag was searched. Considering that the bag was searched first and it was separate in any event, from his body, the requirement of Section 50 notice would not be necessary and subsequently, when his personal search was done, it was done after having complied with Section 50 notice. The Court therefore, does not find any infirmity, considering that the Supreme Court has conclusively held that the language of the statute has to be read in its plain and unambiguous manner and since Section 50 itself includes the word ‘in person’, it would be construed strictly.

12. Mention of word ‘nearest’ in Section 50 NDPS 12.[1] Petitioner seeks to rely on decision by Coordinate Bench of this Court in Mohd. Jabir v State (2023) (supra) which mandated that the word ‘nearest’ must be mentioned in the notice, to ensure complete compliance of Section 50 NDPS Act. Notwithstanding, that the decision in Mohd. Jabir (supra) is now under challenge before the Supreme Court and the matter is pending, the Court deems it fit to give its own opinion in the matter, on assessment of language of the provision itself. 12.[2] Section 50 of NDPS Act prescribes the conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted. It is premised on a search being conducted by an officer authorised under Section 42. It mandates that such search would be made without unnecessary delay before the nearest Gazetted Officer [of any department mentioned in Section 42 i.e. Central Excise, Narcotics, Customs, Revenue Intelligence, or any other department of the Central Government empowered by special order of the government] or to a nearest Magistrate. The mandate prescribed is to take such a person to the nearest Gazetted Officer or to the nearest Magistrate. This, as per the provision, ought to be accomplished only after the person being searched “so requires”. Thus, a requirement has to be ascertained from the person being searched. The provision in itself does not specify as to how that requirement is to be ascertained. 12.[3] The decisions in State of Punjab v Baldev Singh 1999 6 SCC 172 (para 25) seems to suggest that even an oral determination is enough. However, decisions in Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja v State of Gujarat 2011 1 SCC 609 (para 24) seem to mandate that it ought to be in writing. Either way, it is well-settled by State of Punjab v Baldev Singh (supra) (para 32), that compliance of Section 50 is mandatory and not optional. Therefore, what needs to be ascertained is the option to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate, and not whether the said Gazetted Officer or Magistrate is the ‘nearest’. 12.[4] When the person being searched is asked to exercise the option, they are effectively being told that since the search is a body search, it can be before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate in order to obviate and avoid any suspicion of planting narcotics on the person. This conflates with the principle of inviolability of personal space and privacy and the sanctity thereof. The person being searched is, therefore, to be asked, in writing, and has to respond, to be recorded in writing, so that the recorded evidence shows that an option has been duly exercised either which way. 12.[5] Subsequently, if the option exercised is for a search to be conducted before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, the mandate is to take them to the ‘nearest’ one available, clearly in order to avoid any further distress to a person who has yet not been searched. Therefore, to amplify the requirement of “taking” to a nearest Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, into the language of the notice itself, omission of which maybe taken as a serious procedural lapse, is in the opinion of this Court, not the correct view. Mohd. Jabir (supra), takes this view only on the particular facts therein that the search was conducted after the option being exercised, by the ACP who formed a part of the raiding party. This Court in Mohd. Jabir (supra) was dealing with a situation where the rights of the person searched were compromised or would cast a shroud of doubt if a raiding party member itself becomes the supervisory officer, being gazetted per his rank. Seen from the viewpoint of the person searched, this would introduce an element of being falsely implicated with contraband with no real assurance of independent supervision. In this light, testing on facts in Mohd. Jabir (supra), it could be possible that even if the notice mentioned the ‘nearest’, and the option was exercised, it could still include the Gazetted Officer/ACP or a higher officer who was present at that point. 12.[6] A Coordinate Bench of this Court in Bantu v. State Govt. Of NCT of Delhi 2024:DHC:5006 has also taken a similar view and considered that omission to mention ‘nearest’ is at best, a procedural issue, and the accused must show prejudice being caused. In any event, a Special Leave Petition bearing no.SLP (Crl.) 1173/2024 State of NCT of Delhi v Mohd. Jabir against Mohd. Jabir (supra) is pending before the Supreme Court and, as of 30th August 2024, the matter has been listed for 2nd December 2024. 12.[7] Reliance is placed on Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja v State of Gujarat (supra), where it is stated that substantial compliance, short of complete compliance of Section 50, cannot be permitted in law. Considering this view taken by Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court, in the opinion of this Court, complete compliance has to be made, notice in writing ought to be given, communicated in the language that the person to be searched understands, without a proforma reply typed out, necessitating a written note with signatures of option being exercised by the person searched, and being taken to a nearest Gazetted Officer or Magistrate. 12.[8] In this regard, in State v Denis Jauregul Mendizabal 2022:DHC:5752, this Court stressed that Section 50 of the NDPS Act demands strict compliance, including providing notice in the accused’s language (the accused was a Spanish National) and involving an independent witness and a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate. The Court found these procedural failures critical, underscoring the need for complete adherence to ensure justice. 12.[9] It may be useful to extract a list of requirements envisaged by Section 50 of NDPS Act, as enumerated by the Supreme Court in Ranjan Kumar Chadha (supra). The relevant portion is extracted as under:

(viii) Where during a search under any statute other than the NDPS Act, a contraband under the NDPS Act also happens to be recovered, the provisions relating to the NDPS Act shall forthwith start applying, although in such a situation Section 50 may not be required to be complied for the reason that search had already been conducted.

(ix) The burden is on the prosecution to establish that the obligation imposed by Section 50 was duly complied with before the search was conducted.

(x) Any incriminating contraband, possession of which is punishable under the NDPS Act and recovered in violation of Section 50 would be inadmissible and cannot be relied upon in the trial by the prosecution, however, it will not vitiate the trial in respect of the same. Any other article that has been recovered may be relied upon in any other independent proceedings.”

12.10 The Supreme Court premised these conclusions on the specific view that post the information provided to the suspect, the choice exercised by accused has to be put in writing and the matter would not rest with just an oral statement of the suspect. In this regard, the following extract from Ranjan Kumar Chadha (supra) is instructive:

, after being apprised by the empowered officer of his right under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistate categorically waives such right by electing to be searched by the empowered officer. The words “if such person so requires”, as used in Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act would be rendered otiose, if the person proposed to be searched would still be required to be searched only before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate, despite having expressly waived “such requisition”, as mentioned in the opening sentence of sub-Section (2) of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. In other words, the person to be searched is mandatorily required to be taken by the empowered officer, for the conduct of the proposed search before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate, only “if he so requires”, upon being informed of the existence of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate and not if he waives his right to be so searched voluntarily, and chooses not to exercise the right provided to him under Section 50 of the NDPS Act.

65. However, we propose to put an end to all speculations and debate on this issue of the suspect being apprised by the empowered officer of his right under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate. We are of the view that even in cases wherein the suspect waives such right by electing to be searched by the empowered officer, such waiver on the part of the suspect should be reduced into writing by the empowered officer. To put it in other words, even if the suspect says that he would not like to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate and he would be fine if his search is undertaken by the empowered officer, the matter should not rest with just an oral statement of the suspect. The suspect should be asked to give it in writing duly signed by him in presence of the empowered officer as well as the other officials of the squad that “I was apprised of my right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate in accordance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act, however, I declare on my own free will and volition that I would not like to exercise my right of being searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate and I may be searched by the empowered officer.” This would lend more credence to the compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. In other words, it would impart authenticity, transparency and credit worthiness to the entire proceedings. We clarify that this compliance shall henceforth apply prospectively.”

12.11 There is nothing in the analysis in Ranjan Kumar Chadha (supra) which emphasises on a written notice mentioning ‘nearest’ Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. In the aforesaid paragraphs, what seems to be the opinion (though the specific issue of the omission of ‘nearest’ was not before the Court), is that basis an oral or written information to the accused about his rights, a no objection/waiver, if any, by the accused has to be taken in writing.

12.12 The endeavour, as stated in para 64(vi) of the requirements enunciated in Ranjan Kumar Chadha (supra) would then require that the endeavour would be made to take suspect to nearest Gazetted Officer or nearest Magistrate. It is also important to note that the Supreme Court in requirement at para 64(iv) indicates that the Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate must be independent and in no way connected to the raiding party. In the opinion of this Court, the requirements laid down in Ranjan Kumar Chadha (supra) are instructive, applicable and serve as useful guideposts for the prosecution agencies to comply. Therefore, in light of the above discussion, the contention of petitioner relating to omission of ‘nearest’ cannot be accepted and would not serve to prima facie absolve him.

13. Delay in submission of the seized contraband to the FSL 13.[1] Petitioner’s counsel relied on Kashif v NCB 2023:DHC:3438, a decision by a Coordinate Bench of this Court, which relied on Clause

1.13 of the Standing Order 1/88, to hold that reasonable time to move an application for sample collection depends on facts and circumstances of each case. It was stated that it was ‘desirable’ that an application under Section 52A be made within 72 hours or near about the said time frame. In the facts of Kashif (supra), application under Section 52A was filed after 51 days from the period of seizure therefore, the Court held that it was in violation of Section 52A and benefit of bail would be given to accused. 13.[2] In the facts of this case, seizure was made on 7th April 2022 and on 8th April 2022 request was made under Section 52A for drawing of samples of the contraband. Subsequently, on 11th April 2022, samples were deposited with FSL, Rohini for expert opinion. This, by no means would be an unreasonable delay considering that post seizure, FIR was registered in the intervening night of 7th and 8th April 2022 and application being moved under Section 52A and samples being sent to FSL on 11th April 2022, within about 4 days, would amount to acceptable compliance. Even if the accused has to show that serious prejudice has been caused on this account of one day’s delay at best, this would be a matter of trial and at this stage prima facie cannot be concluded, that this would give benefit to the accused or dent the case of the prosecution. 13.[3] The Court would like to draw attention to Order dated 2nd November 2023 in Criminal Appeal No. 2027 of 2012 titled Jagwinder Singh v State of Punjab, where the Supreme Court held as under: “8. Further, the delay in sending the sample for FSL report, in our considered view, is not fatal to the prosecution case. In any case, orders have been obtained from the Jurisdictional Magistrate for undertaking the said exercise which has attained finality.”

14. Prolonged custody and delay in trial 14.[1] Undoubtedly, the petitioner is incarcerated for about 2 years and 4 months and trial is still in progress, and only 8 out of 23 witnesses have been examined so far. Needless to state, there is no standard guideline to assess as to what would be the period of custody that should be considered as ‘prolonged’; each case would have to be seen in its own facts and circumstances. Especially when no other factor, as contended by petitioner would give him benefit under Section 37 of the NDPS Act to overcome the prescribed threshold. 14.[2] The Supreme Court has consistently held in various decisions that bail on ground of undue delay in trial is unfettered by rigors by Section 37 NDPS where there is prolonged custody even in cases of commercial quantity. In this regard the decisions of Rabi Prakash v State of Odisha 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1109 (recovery of 247 kgs of ganja and applicant had been in custody for more than three and a half years), Dheeraj Kumar Shukla v State of U.P. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 918 (seizure of about 65 kgs of ganja and the petitioner was in custody for about two and a half years), Man Mandal & Anr. v State of West Bengal 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1868 (seizure which was commercial in nature and the petitioner had been incarcerated for about two years), Badsha Sk. v State of West Bengal 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1867 (seizure of 100 bottles of Phensedyl Cough Syrup, 100 ml. each, containing Codeine Phosphate, the petitioner had been in custody for about 2 years 4 months) and Mohd. Muslim alias Hussain v State (NCT of Delhi) 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352 (recovery of 180 kg of ganja and applicant was in custody for over 7 years and 4 months), are relevant. 14.[3] Coordinate benches of this Court have also considered the principles set out by the Supreme Court and granted bail in Gurpreet Singh v State of NCT of Delhi 2024 SCC OnLine Del 696 wherein a seizure of 26.790 kgs of ganja was done and only 2 witnesses had been examined, having been in custody for three and a half years, the petitioner was granted bail; in Ramesh Kumar v D.R.I. 2024 SCC Online Del 5304, where recovery of 457 kgs of ganja, the petitioner having been in custody for about three and a half years, the Court in relying upon these principles laid out by the Supreme Court granted bail; in Gopal Dangi v State 2024 SCC OnLine Del 4825, a case of recovery of 260 kgs of ganja and only one witness having been examined and the petitioner having been in custody for about 2 years, was granted bail. 14.[4] In SLP (Crl) 4648/2024 titled Ankur Chaudhary v State of Madhya Pradesh order dated 28th May 2024, it was held by the Supreme Court as under: “It is to observe that failure to conclude the trial within a reasonable time resulting in prolonged incarceration militates against the precious fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and as such, conditional liberty overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37(1)(b) of the NDPS Act may, in such circumstances, be considered.” 14.[5] What may be relevant to weigh in balance in the present case, is the nature of the contraband seized. Most of the decisions cited above, giving benefit of bail for prolonged custody, seem to be cases where ganja was involved and were based on their own peculiar facts. Though this cannot be formulaic, the analysis serves as a guidepost. 14.[6] In this case, there has been seizure of 602 gms of heroin from the petitioner, which has been suitably documented, sampled and checked, being much above the threshold of 250 gms for commercial quantity. In this regard, observations of the Supreme Court in Ranjan Kumar Chadha (supra) are relevant and extracted under: “129. It has been observed in Baldev Singh (supra) that drug abuse is a social malady. While drug addiction eats into the vitals of the society, drug trafficking not only eats into the vitals of the economy of a country, but illicit money generated by drug trafficking is often used for illicit activities including encouragement of terrorism. It has acquired the dimensions of an epidemic, affects the economic policies of the State, corrupts the system and is detrimental to the future of a country. Reference in the said decision has also been made to some United Nation Conventions which the Government of India has ratified. It is, therefore, absolutely imperative that those who indulge in this kind of nefarious activities should not go scot-free on technical pleas which come handy to their advantage in a fraction of second by slight movement of the baggage, being placed to any part of their body, which baggage may contain the incriminating article.”

15. Independent witness 15.[1] Petitioner’s counsel has contended that there was no independent witness or videography at the time of seizure, particularly when the raiding party was coming basis an ‘information’ and the house from where seizure was made, was in a crowded area with surrounding market. Reliance in this regard was placed on decision of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Bantu v State of Govt. of NCT of Delhi 2024:DHC:5006 which necessitated the requirement of independent witness and videography, particularly in cases of public places and/or in crowded areas. However, the APP for the State has pointed out to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jagwinder Singh (supra) where it has been held otherwise, and the relevant paragraph of which is extracted as under: “7. We find no merit in this appeal. Law does not require only an independent witness to prove a charge attracting the provisions of NDPS Act. As was rightly held by the Courts below, there is procedural compliance with respect to arrest, seizure and recovery. PW-3 is competent to undertake the exercise of gathering evidence and, in any case, PW-7 who himself is a gazetted officer was very much present. The recovery was also made from the car. The views expressed by the Courts below that non-filling of the CFCL form at the site where the arrest and recovery was made would not vitiate the case as it constitutes a part of procedural law.” 15.[2] The Supreme Court has therefore, reiterated that these are procedural issues and may not necessarily require independent witnesses to be present at that stage. 15.[3] It has been noted in various judgments including the Supreme Court, that witnesses do not sometimes agree to join in matters related to seizure, considering that they fear the prolonged process, that they would get involved in. Further, in Baldev Singh v State of Haryana 2015 17 SCC 554 it has been held in para 9, that there is no legal proposition that testimonies of officials uncorroborated by independent witnesses cannot be relied upon/accepted. Even in Bantu (supra) and Sovraj (supra) the Court has effectively held that absence of independent witnesses may have an effect on prosecution’s case during trial, however, the benefit cannot be denied to accused at the stage of bail. To the contrary it has been held in Mohd. Jabir (supra) that it could not be concluded that accused was falsely implicated merely due to absence of independent witness or videography. There cannot be any quarrel with the fact that presence of independent witness and videography would be desirable and would give substantial credence to the prosecution’s case. However, simply if independent witnesses have been unable to join, the prosecution agency cannot hold their hands and not seize the contraband being carried by a person. Seizures are made in all kinds of circumstances and they cannot be disbelieved merely on the basis that no independent witness was present. Needless to state, that the prosecution is required to put its house in order, in order to ensure that each step by them during seizure is buttressed and supported by adequate evidence, which ensures that no allegation of false implication can survive and subsist. Aside from this, reference can be made to Section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which is extracted as under:

as to illustration (e)—a judicial act, the regularity of which is in question, was performed under exceptional circumstances…”

16. Discrepancy in the stock register 16.[1] Regards the counsel for petitioner’s contention that the stock register shows that Field-Testing-Kit was issued in 2021 and is issued for only 18 months and therefore, there would be discrepancy in the prosecution’s case that they were present with a Field-Testing-Kit at the time of raid, are issues which have to be necessarily filtered in the trial. At this stage, it would be difficult to give benefit of doubt to the accused for the purpose of considering Section 37 NDPS Act threshold. 16.[2] Petitioner’s contention that the raiding team was carrying laptop, UPS, printer, sealing material and weighing machine is a falsity, are issues of facts depending on documents before the Trial Court, as well as, examination of witnesses, some of which are yet to be examined and the Court cannot form a prima facie opinion at this stage regarding this issue. Conclusion

17. The grounds which have been taken by petitioner are frequently asserted by other accused as well, in bail petitions under NDPS Act and therefore, a slightly detailed and comprehensive analysis has been presented. This is also in context of the fact that there are varying decisions of Coordinate Benches of this Court, on some of these issues.

18. In view of the above discussion and analysis, the Court is unable to reach a conclusion that the threshold under Section 37 of NDPS Act has been overcome by petitioner and is unable to grant him benefit of bail at this stage. Needless to state, that if the trial does not proceed expeditiously and there is prolonged custody, petitioner shall be at liberty to move a fresh bail application at a subsequent stage.

19. The observations made in the judgment are purely for the purposes for assessing the bail of petitioner and shall have no bearing on merits of the matter, i.e. the case of either the prosecution or the accused.

20. Petition is accordingly dismissed, along with pending applications, if any.

21. Judgment be uploaded forthwith on the website of this Court.

JUDGE OCTOBER 04, 2024/sm/na