Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
MOHD SABUDDIN .....Appellant
Through: Ms. Manpreet Kaur, Advocate
Through: Mr. S.D. Wadhwa,
JUDGMENT
1. The instant appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter as the “Act/ MV Act”) has been filed on behalf of the appellant challenging the judgment dated 20th February, 2016 (hereinafter as the “impugned order”) passed by the learned Motor Vehicles Claims Tribunal, South East District, Saket Court, New Delhi (hereinafter as the “Tribunal”) in Suit No. 335/14, seeking the following reliefs – “a) Call for the Trial Court records. b) Set aside the judgment and order dated 20.02.2016 passed by Ms. Madhu Jain, Presiding Officer, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, South East District/ Saket Courts, New Delhi in suit no.33/ 14 in FIR case no.406/ 04 PS Sangam Vihar, New Delhi. b) Pass any such order(s) which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice.”
FACTUAL MATRIX
2. On 1st June, 2004, at about 9:45 AM, Mr. Mohd. Zakir, the respondent no. 1 herein/claimant before the learned Tribunal, was riding his Chetak Scooter bearing registration number DL-3S-D-6493 along with his brother-in-law, Mr. Mohd. Usman, from Sangam Vihar to Subhash Camp. When the claimant reached near one shop namely Munna Auto Welder, Shanny Bazar, Devli, New Delhi, one scooter bearing registration number DNF-7071 (hereinafter as the “offending vehicle”), allegedly being driven in a rash and negligent manner, coming from the opposite direction, collided with the claimant‟s vehicle. As an effect, the claimant and the pillion rider fell from the scooter and the claimant sustained grievous head injuries. Consequently, the claimant was immediately moved to the Batra Hospital, Delhi for his medical treatment.
3. Thereafter, an FIR bearing number 406/2004 was registered with Police Station Sangam Vihar and upon completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the appellant/driver under sections 279/338 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
4. Subsequently, the claimant filed a claim petition bearing Suit NO. 335/14 before the learned Tribunal seeking compensation for the grievous injuries sustained by him in the accident. In its impugned order, the learned Tribunal held that the appellant/driver was driving in a rash and negligent manner, thereby, causing grievous injuries to the respondent no.1/claimant, and awarded a compensation of Rs.2,72,922/- with an interest @ 9% to be payable by the appellant/driver from the date of filing of the said claim petition till its realisation.
5. Aggrieved by the impugned award, the appellant has filed the instant appeal seeking setting aside of the impugned order.
PLEADINGS BEFORE THE COURT
6. By way of filing this instant appeal, the respondent no. 1/claimant has challenged the impugned award on the following grounds:
I. Because as the claim filed by the respondent it was admitted by the respondent that both the scooter heated from the front was head on collusion hence it is a case of contributory negligence on the part of respondent and petitioner.
7. No reply has been filed on behalf of the respondent nos. 1 and 2 in the instant appeal and therefore, this Court is adjudicating the instant appeal on the basis of the material placed on record.
8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal is liable to be set aside as the same is passed in contravention to the settled principles of law and facts of the case. It is further submitted that the claim petition was filed by the claimant after a considerable delay of 4 years, 2 months and 3 days and therefore, the same has been erroneously decided by the learned Tribunal.
9. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal erred in not considering the fact that the claimant failed to stop its vehicle despite seeing the appellant coming from the opposite direction, which was at a distance of 10 feet. This only proves that the claimant was driving the vehicle in a high speed, thereby, being rash and negligent, due to which the accident occurred.
10. It is further submitted that the claimant did not possess a valid driving license at the time of the accident, which is a punishable offence under the Act. Hence, non-possession of driving license amounts to rash and negligent driving, thereby, contributing to the accident.
11. It is submitted that the claimant did not have an insurance cover for his vehicle, which is mandatory as per the provisions of the Act. Moreover, at the time of the accident, the claimant was driving the vehicle without paying any adherence to the mandate of wearing of the helmet, which is another violation of the provisions of the Act. Hence, the appellant herein has been wrongly held liable to pay the compensation.
12. It is submitted that at the time of accident, the appellant was working as a plumber with Mr. Deepak Ray/respondent no.2, who was running a business of manufacturing spare parts for submersible motor pumps, under the name and guise of M/s Deepak Engineering Works, and had been employed from the years 2004 to 2006.
13. It is submitted that the respondent no.2 wrongly claimed that the offending vehicle was sold to the appellant in the year 1998, whereas the appellant joined the respondent no.2 only in the year 2004. Moreover, the respondent no.2 falsely testified that he had obtained the signature of the appellant on a handwritten receipt, which was prepared by the respondent no.2 and that the offending vehicle was sold to the appellant for a sum of Rs. 10,000/-.
14. It is submitted that since the sale transaction between appellant and respondent no.2 has not taken place, the ownership of the offending vehicle lies with the respondent no.2 and hence, the learned Tribunal has wrongly held that the appellant is liable to pay the compensation amount despite the respondent no.2 being the owner of the offending vehicle. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
15. It is submitted that the appellant is economically and socially underprivileged, who is dwelling in a Jhuggi cluster and works as a plumber, which makes it difficult for him to make his two ends meet on a daily basis.
16. Therefore, in view of the foregoing submissions, it is submitted that the instant appeal may be allowed, and the impugned order may be set aside. (on behalf of the respondent no. 1)
17. Per Contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no.1/claimant before the learned Tribunal vehemently opposed the instant appeal submitting to the effect that the same is liable to be dismissed being bereft of any merits.
18. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal was right in holding the appellant liable for rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. It is also submitted that the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants are incorrect as both the claimant and the pillion rider were wearing helmets at the time of the accident, despite which the claimant incurred grievous head injury. Furthermore, the respondent no.1 was a valid holder of driving license when the accident took place.
19. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal failed to make respondent no. 2 liable for paying the compensation along with the appellant, as the former is a registered owner of the offending vehicle as per the records of Registering Authority, and therefore, he is liable to be made jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation amount to the claimant.
20. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal has perused the testimonies of the witnesses in detail in the impugned order, which also includes the averments made with respect to the liability of registered owner. However, the said issue on liability has not been discussed by the learned Tribunal while passing the impugned order and has failed to make the respondent no. 2 liable to pay the compensation amount.
21. It is submitted that as per the settled position of law, the registered owner of a vehicle is bound by law to visit the Registering Authority for formally transferring the vehicle in the name of the purchaser after the completion of the sale transaction.
22. It is submitted that the respondent no.2 is jointly and severally liable along with the appellant to pay the overall compensation awarded to the respondent no.1/ claimant.
23. Therefore, in view of the foregoing contentions, it is prayed that the instant appeal may be partly allowed qua the liability of the respondent no.2 to pay the compensation.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
24. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
25. The instant appeal is admitted.
26. It is the case of the appellant that the learned Tribunal failed in taking into account the law and facts in determining the negligence of the respondent no.1/claimant, who was driving his vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, without possessing a valid driving licence, vehicular insurance, helmet etc., at the time of the accident, which are a mandate as per the provisions of the Act.
27. In rival submissions, it is contended by the respondent no.1/ claimant that the learned Tribunal rightly held that the appellant herein was driving the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, thereby causing severe injuries to the claimant and there arises no contributory negligence on his part. It is contended that the respondent no.2 is the rightful owner of the offending vehicle as his name appears as a registered owner in the records of the Registering Authority. Hence, it is prayed that the instant appeal may be partly allowed qua the liability of respondent no.2 in paying the compensation.
28. Taking into consideration the aforesaid arguments, the following issues arise before this Court for adjudication:-
I. Whether the respondent no.1/ claimant was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner?
II. Whether Mr. Deepak Ray/respondent no. 2, allegedly being a registered owner of the offending vehicle, be made jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation to the claimant?
29. Before delving into the issues at hand, this Court deems it apposite to peruse the findings and reasons recorded by the learned Tribunal in the impugned order. The relevant portion of the same is reproduced as follows – “Issue no. 1 (Negligence)
20. PW[1] Mohd. Zakir in his affidavit of evidence (Ex.PW1/A) categorically stated that he got injuries due to the rash and negligent driving of respondent no. 1. Nothing came in his cross examination to disbelieve his version. His version is duly corroborated by police investigation. Police during investigation also found respondent no.1 accused of rash and negligent driving, hence chargesheeted him for commission of offence under section 279/338 of Indian Penal Code.
21. To determine the negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle, I am being guided by the judgment of Hon'ble High Court (MP) in case titled as "Basant Kaur & Ors Vs. Chattar Pal Singh and Ors" [2003 ACJ 369 MP (DB)], wherein it has been held that registration of a criminal case against the driver of the offending vehicle is enough to record the finding that the driver of offending vehicle is responsible for causing the accident. Further it has been held in catena of cases that the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act are not akin to the proceedings as in civil suit and hence strict rules of evidence are not required to be followed in this regard. I am also being guided by the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in "National Insurance Company Limited V[5]. Pushpa Rana" (2009 ACJ 287), wherein it was held that in case the petitioner files the certified copy of the criminal record or the criminal record showing the completion of the investigation by the police or the issuance of charge sheet under Section 279/304 A IPC or the certified copy of the FIR or in addition the recovery memo or the mechanical inspection report of the offending vehicle, these documents are sufficient proof to reach to the conclusion that the driver was negligent. It is also settled law that the term rashness and negligence has to be constructed lightly while making a decision on a petition for claim for the same as compared to the word rashness and negligence as finds mention in the Indian Penal Code. This is because the chapter in the Motor Vehicle Act dealing with compensation is a benevolent legislation and not a penal one.
22. In view of the above discussion, petitioner is able to prove that he suffered injuries due to rash and negligent driving of the respondent no. 1. Accordingly the issue no. 1 is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents. Issue no. 2 (Compensation)
23. In injury cases, the claimants are entitled to pecuniary as well as non pecuniary damages. Apex court in Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar 2011 (1) SCC 343 held that compensation awarded must be "just compensation" means to the extent possible Tribunal fully and adequately restore the claimant to the position which he/she was having prior to the accident. The person is not only to be compensated for physical injury, but also for loss which he /she suffered as a result of such injury. Apex court in R.D.Hatangadi Vs Press Control (India) Pvt Ltd (1995) 1 SCC 551 held that pecuniary and non pecuniary compensation to be assessed separately. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred, which are capable of being calculated in terms of money, whereas non pecuniary damages are those which are not capable of being assessed by arithmetical calculation, however no amount of compensation can restore the physical frame of the victim, therefore object to compensate such injury is "so far as money can compensate", because it is impossible to equate money with the human suffering or personal deprivation. To compute compensation involved some guess work, some hypothetical considerations, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of disability caused. In Nagppa Vs Gurdayal Singh 2003 (2) SCC 274 apex court observed that while calculating such damages Tribunal required to have some guess work taking into account the inflation factor.
24. In the light of aforesaid guidelines and parameters, this Tribunal has to assess the compensation to-be awarded to the claimant/petitioner.
25. Medical Expenses: PW[1] petitioner in his affidavit of evidence stated that after accident, he was immediately removed to Batra Hospital, New Delhi in an unconscious state where O/E, he was found to be drowsy, restless and incontinent by the M/E as per the detail inscribed on the enclosed Medico Legal Report of dated 01.06.2004 at 10.59am. He further stated that he remained under treatment in Batra hospital from 01.06.2014 to 12.06.2014. He further stated that thereafter, he was admitted in IHBAS from 09.04.2010 to 06.05.2010. Discharge summary of Batra hospital (Mark X) shows that petitioner admitted on 01.06.2004 and discharged on 12.06.2004 and diagnosed to have suffered ''head injury-left temporal contusion''. Medical Board Report of Patient Mohd. Zakir ( Ex. PW2/B) mentioned that "Patient Mohd. Zakir was examined by the Medical Board at IHBAS on 31.03.2010. The board opines that patient needs inpatient evaluation for resolving some clinical issues and for other relevant investigations for final medical board opinion. The patient will be taken up for review Medical Board after 4-6 weeks Another Medical Board Report of Patient Mohd. Zakir says that " patient Mohd. Zakir was examined by the Medical Board at IHBAS on 05.05.2010. The board opined that based on evidence from clinical history and ward behavior observation, neuropsychological assessment and neuro imaging findings the patient is diagnosed as a case of "post traumatic cognitive impairment". Discharge summary of IHBAS shows that petitioner admitted on 09.04.2010 and discharged on 06.05.2010. In the discharge summary mentioned that "patient sustained significant head injury. Remained in coma for 3 weeks and had to be operated. After gaining consciousness, he c/o memory impairment/inability to plan a head/ADL &dys function in work". During proceedings, petitioner was examined for disability. Discharge card of HAH Centernary hospital shows that petitioner admitted on 16.05.2013 and discharged on 22.05.2013 and final diagno.sis is ''Tuberculosis ABD". Disability certificate dated 28.02.2012 issued by the medical board of Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya hospital opined that petitioner suffered 75% permanent disability in relation to his whole body. This condition is non progressive, not likely to improve and reassessment is not recommended. Petitioner for claiming expenses relied upon medical bills (Ex. PW1/C) of Rs. 16,764/-. Nothing material has come in his in cross examination to dispute the veracity of these bills. Hence a sum of Rs. 17,000/- is granted to the petitioner towards medical expenses.
26. Compensation for Pain & Sufferings: Petitioner has suffered 75% permanent disability in relation to his whole body, therefore, keeping in view the nature of injuries, duration of treatment and trauma of accident, a sum of Rs. 5,000/- is granted to the petitioner towards pain and sufferings.
27. Loss of Amenities and enjoyment of Life: Petitioner suffered permanent disability in relation to his whole body, this injury will definitely hamper his daily activities and enjoyment in every walk of life. Hence, a sum of Rs. 10,000/is granted towards loss of amenities and enjoyment of life.
28. Loss of income/leaves during treatment:- Petitioner in his affidavit of evidence stated that at the time of accident, he had been engaged /occupied in the trade of selling meat by running a shop in Subhash Camp, Dakshinpuri, New Delhi-62 and earning about one lac a year with the cooperation and active assistance of his wife prior to his involvement in RTA but since the date of accident, he is totally unemployed and his family is being fed by his father, four brothers and his in laws. In his cross examination, he stated that he was having his own meat shop. He has not filed any document regarding his ownership on the said shop. He further stated that it is correct that there is no document filed on record regarding his meat business. He further stated that it is also correct that there is no document filed on record regarding his monthly income. He did not file any documentary evidence regarding his salary. In these circumstances, income of the petitioner is to be assessed under minimum wages act applicable for unskilled on the date of accident i.e 01.06.2004 is Rs. 2862.90/—(round figure as Rs. 2863/-). Keeping in view the nature of injuries and duration of treatment a lump sum amount of Rs 2863X[6] =Rs. 17,178/- is granted to the petitioner towards loss of income during treatment.
29. Loss of future income: In the claim petitioner, age of injured and disability certificate is mentioned as 30 years. In the ration card, age of injured is mentioned as 45 years. In the election I card, age of injured is mentioned as 25 years as on 01.01.1994, therefore, he is around 39 years at the time of accident i.e. 01.06.2004. The age of injured is taken as 39 years on the basis of election I card. Due to the present injuries his entire carrier is ruined. It is natural that with this disability and injuries the petitioner entire future career/earning capacity has been destroyed. However, present injury will somehow diminish his earning capacity. As per disability certificate, petitioner suffered 75% permanent disability in relation to his whole body, in view of the judgment of Delhi High Court titled as "Laxmi Narain Vs. Trilochan Singh & Ors., FAO No. 289/99, dated 04.05.2009, Delhi", the total functional disability towards whole body is assessed around 38%.
30. Petitioner's income is assessed at the rate of Rs. 2863/per month. Petitioner being aged around 39 years, also entitled for 50% increase in income towards future prospect [relied upon Sanjay verma Vs Haryana Roadways 2014 ACJ 692 (SC), Mirajuddin Vs Shonki Ram & Ors MAC App 604/2011 dated 03.12.2013 (Delhi), Reliance General Insurance Company Litimed Vs Haresh Kumar @ Harish Kumar MAC App no. 399/12 dated 27.05.2014 (Delhi), Uttranchal Transport Corporation Vs. Navneet Jerath 2013 ACJ 1966 (Delhi), Neerupam Mohan Mathur Vs New India Assurance Company 2013 (14) SCC 15J. Therefore, his monthly income is assessed around (Rs. 2863/-+ Rs.50% of Rs.2863/-= Rs.4294.5/-). Apex court in Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar 2011(1) SCC 343, mandated multiplier method for calculation of compensation for future loss of earning capacity which is as follows: (a) Annual income= Rs.4294.5/-X12=Rs. 51,534/- (b) loss of future earning per annum (38% of the prior annual income) =Rs. Rs. 51,534/-X 38% =Rs 19,582.92/-
(c) Petitioner is found to be around 39 years of age at the time of accident, Therefore, applicable multiplier as per Sarla Verma Case is 15.
(d) Loss of future earnings= Rs 19,582.92/- X 15= Rs.
31. Attendant Charges: Petitioner suffered disability injuries and will require attendant for most number of occasions throughout entire life. Hence a lump sum amount of Rs.10,000/- is granted towards attendants charges.
32. Special Diet and Conveyance Charges:- Keeping in view the nature of injuries and duration of treatment, a sum of Rs. 5,000/- each is granted towards special diet and conveyance charges. Total sum of Rs. 10,000/- is granted under this head.
33. Disfigurement: Petitioner suffered permanent disability in relation to his whole body which causes disfigurement of the body, therefore a sum of Rs.10,000/- granted to him towards disfigurement.
34. The total compensation is assessed for injured as under:-
35. The petitioner is hereby awarded a sum of Rs. 3,47,922/- (Rupees Three lacs forty seven thousand nine hundred twenty two only) with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of filing of the present petition, till the date of realization of the amount in favour of petitioner and against the respondent no. 1 Mohd. Sabuddin on account of their liability being joint and several.
36. The driver R-1 Mohd. Sabuddin is the principal tort feasor as well as fully liable for his act as he is the owner of the vehicle also and the offending vehicle is not insured also.
37. In view of the above discussion, the respondent Mohd. Sabuddin is directed to discharge the liability of the award amount within a period of 30 days from today along with the interest @9% per annum, failing which interest @12% per annum shall be charged for the period of delay.”
30. At the outset, the learned Tribunal categorically dealt with the issue of negligence as well as the compensation to be awarded to the claimant. While determining the issue of negligence, the learned Tribunal has placed reliance on the testimonies of the witnesses as well as the material on record and concluded its findings based on the principle of preponderance of probabilities that the appellant/ driver was driving the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, which caused grievous injuries to the claimant/respondent no.1 herein.
31. In order to determine the compensation for the injuries sustained by the claimant/respondent no.1, the learned Tribunal assessed various documents placed on record such as the medico-legal report, discharge summaries, medical board report, election identity card, disability certificate etc. Upon consideration of the aforesaid documents and situational difficulties surrounding the claimant/respondent no.1, the learned Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.2,72,922/- as compensation to the claimant, which is to be payable by the driver/appellant. However, out of the said total compensation, the respondent no.2/ Mr. Deepak Ray paid Rs. 25,000/- as interim relief.
32. It is the case of the appellant that the claimant/respondent no.1 was driving his vehicle in a rash and negligent manner as he failed to see the appellant‟s vehicle coming from the opposite direction, despite being at a reasonable distance of 10 feet, indicating that the claimant was driving his vehicle in a high speed, thereby contributing to the accident.
33. Before going into the merits of the case, it is imperative for this Court to delve into the concept of contributory negligence, especially in motor vehicle accidents. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court specifically deals with the concept of negligence and contributory negligence in the case of Prem Lal Anand v. Narendra Kumar[1], wherein it was observed as under:
“11. At this stage, it would be appropriate to consider pronouncements of this Court on contributory negligence. 11.[1] In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Laxman Iyer[1], this Court discussed the concept of negligence and its types, i.e., composite and contributory, in the following terms:— “6. …. Negligence is omission of duty caused either by an omission to do something which a reasonable man guided upon those considerations, who ordinarily by reason of conduct of human affairs would do or be obligated to, or by doing something which a prudent or reasonable man would not do. Negligence does not always mean absolute carelessness, but want of such a degree of care as is required in particular circumstances. Negligence is failure to observe, for the protection of the interests of another person, the degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The idea of negligence and duty are strictly correlative. Negligence means either subjectively a careless state of mind, or objectively careless conduct. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one; it is rather a comparative term. No absolute standard can be fixed and no mathematically exact formula can be laid down by which negligence or lack of it can be infallibly measured in a given case. What constitutes negligence varies under different conditions and in determining whether negligence exists in a particular case, or whether a mere act or course of conduct amounts to negligence, all the attending and surrounding facts and circumstances have to be taken into account. It is absence of care according to circumstances. To determine whether an act would be or would not be negligent, it is relevant to determine if any reasonable man would foresee that the act would cause damage or not. The omission to do what the law obligates or even the failure to do anything in a manner, mode or method envisaged by law would equally and per se constitute negligence on the part of such person. If the answer is in the affirmative, it is a negligent act. Where an accident is due to negligence of both parties, substantially there would be contributory negligence and both would be blamed. In a case of contributory negligence, the crucial question on which liability depends would be whether either party could, by exercise of reasonable care, have avoided the consequence of the other's negligence. … Contributory negligence is applicable solely to the conduct of a plaintiff. It means that there has been an act or omission on the part of the plaintiff which has materially contributed to the damage, the act or omission being of such a nature that it may properly be described as negligence, although negligence is not given its usual meaning. …. It is now well settled that in the case of contributory negligence, courts have the power to apportion the loss between the parties as seems just and equitable.” (Emphasis supplied) 11.[2] This Court in Pramodkumar Rasikbhai Jhaveri v. Karamasey Kunvargi Tak[2] observed:
circumstances of the case. In many cases, it may be proper for a plaintiff to rely on the defendant to perform its duty. But there is no absolute rule. The duties and responsibilities of the defendant are a variable factor in determining whether contributory negligence exists and, if so, to what degree. In some cases, the nature of the duty owed may exculpate the plaintiff from a claim of contributory negligence; in other cases, the nature of the duty may reduce the plaintiff's share of responsibility for the damage suffered; and in yet other cases the nature of the duty may not prevent a finding that the plaintiff failed to take reasonable care for the safety of his or her person or property. Contributory negligence focuses on the conduct of the plaintiff. The duty owed by the defendant, although relevant, is one only of many factors that must be weighed in determining whether the plaintiff has so conducted itself that it failed to take reasonable care for the safety of its person or property. (Emphasis supplied)”
34. Upon perusal of the aforementioned extracts, it is observed that negligence cannot be determined by way of a strict formula, rather the same is determined by looking into the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreover, in case of contributory negligence it is necessary for the Courts to determine whether both the parties had the means to exercise reasonable care, thereby avoiding the accident.
35. It was testified by PW-1/claimant, in his cross examination that on the day of accident, at around 10:30 AM, he was going from his house on his scooter along with his brother-in-law, Mr. Usman, who was a pillion rider, to purchase certain articles and that the offending vehicle hit the claimant‟s vehicle from the left side. It is further stated that he noticed the appellant only when he was at a distance of 10 feet from the offending vehicle, which was coming from the opposite side of his scooter. PW-1 further stated that by the time he tried to apply brakes upon seeing the offending vehicle coming from the opposite direction, the same hit him with great force and he became unconscious thereafter.
36. Additionally, this Court has also perused the site plan produced on record, however, the same barely reflects how the accident occurred and therefore, the same cannot assist this Court in determining the instant issue.
37. It is further the case of the appellant that the claimant was not holding a valid driving licence, vehicular insurance, and was not wearing a helmet at the time of the accident, thereby, amounting to contributory negligence.
38. In light of the aforementioned contention, this Court finds it pertinent to mention the case of Mohd. Siddique vs. National Insurance Co.2, in which the Hon‟ble Supreme Court draws a correlation between the violation of the provisions of the MV Act and its impact on the accident or the victim. The relevant extracts of the same are as follows:
violation of the law. But such violation by itself, without anything more, cannot lead to a finding of contributory negligence, unless it is established that his very act of riding along with two others, contributed either to the accident or to the impact of the accident upon the victim. There must either be a causal connection between the violation and the accident or a causal connection between the violation and the impact of the accident upon the victim. It may so happen at times, that the accident could have been averted or the injuries sustained could have been of a lesser degree, if there had been no violation of the law by the victim. What could otherwise have resulted in a simple injury, might have resulted in a grievous injury or even death due to the violation of the law by the victim. It is in such cases, where, but for the violation of the law, either the accident could have been averted or the impact could have been minimised, that the principle of contributory negligence could be invoked. It is not the case of the insurer that the accident itself occurred as a result of three persons riding on a motorcycle. It is not even the case of the insurer that the accident would have been averted, if three persons were not riding on the motorcycle. The fact that the motorcycle was hit by the car from behind, is admitted. Interestingly, the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the deceased was wearing a helmet and that the deceased was knocked down after the car hit the motorcycle from behind, are all not assailed. Therefore, the finding of the High Court that 2 persons on the pillion of the motorcycle, could have added to the imbalance, is nothing but presumptuous and is not based either upon pleading or upon the evidence on record. Nothing was extracted from PW 3 to the effect that 2 persons on the pillion added to the imbalance.
13. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence to show that the wrongful act on the part of the deceased victim contributed either to the accident or to the nature of the injuries sustained, the victim could not have been held guilty of contributory negligence. Hence, the reduction of 10% towards contributory negligence, is clearly unjustified and the same has to be set aside.”
39. In view of the aforementioned extracts, it is pertinent to look into the deposition of PW-1/claimant, wherein he testified that he held a valid driving licence at the time of the accident. However, he also stated that he is not aware of the whereabouts of his driving license, especially after the occurrence of the accident.
40. It is pertinent for this Court to mention that driving a vehicle without a licence is punitive as per the MV Act provisions. However, the same itself does not lead in finding negligence with respect to the accident. The said view has been discussed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Sudhir Kumar Rana v. Surinder Singh[3],. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgement are reproduced herein below:
8. If a person drives a vehicle without a licence, he commits an offence. The same, by itself, in our opinion, may not lead to a finding of negligence as regards the accident. It has been held by the courts below that it was the driver of the mini-truck which was being driven rashly and negligently. It is one thing to say that the appellant was not possessing any licence but no finding of fact has been arrived at that he was driving the two-wheeler rashly and negligently. If he was not driving rashly and negligently which contributed to the accident, we fail to see as to how, only because he was not having a licence, he would be held to be guilty of contributory negligence.
9. The matter might have been different if by reason of his rash and negligent driving, the accident had taken place”
41. This Court has perused the record and found that no driving license or insurance of the claimant‟s vehicle were placed on record. Therefore, applying the aforementioned case laws Mohd. Siddique vs. National Insurance Co. (Supra) as well as Sudhir Kumar Rana v. Surinder Singh, (Supra), this Court is of the view that mere absence of driving license and vehicular insurance does not amount to contributory negligence on the part of the claimant despite being a punishable offence under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as the same has no impact on the accident and the grievous injuries caused to the claimant.
42. As far as the argument of not wearing a helmet at the time of the accident is concerned, this Court acknowledges that the same plays a significant role in the instant case as the claimant suffered grievous head injuries in the said accident.
43. In light of the same, it is pertinent to state that in the deposition of PW-1, he testified that he and his brother-in-law were wearing helmets at the time of the accident. However, the said deposition has not been contradicted in the appellant‟s affidavit.
44. Therefore, at this stage, this Court deems it appropriate to state that the strict principles of evidence are inapplicable to the claims filed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and that the requirement of standard of proof is one of „preponderance of probabilities‟, rather than „beyond reasonable doubt‟. This principle has been reiterated in a plethora of cases, including Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand[4].
45. Therefore, with respect to the aforesaid contentions of the appellant as to the issue of contributory negligence herein, this Court, after relying on Prem Lal Anand v. Narendra Kumar, (Supra) as well as the testimonies of the witnesses, opines that the claimant cannot be said to be rash and negligent in driving his vehicle as per the principle of preponderance of probabilities. This Court has further perused the impugned order and is of the view that the learned Tribunal rightly adjudicated the issue of negligence thereby holding the appellant rash and negligent in driving the offending vehicle.
46. Accordingly, the issue no. 1 stands decided in favour of the claimant/respondent no. 1. ISSUE – 2: Whether Mr. Deepak Ray/respondent no. 2, allegedly being a registered owner of the offending vehicle, be made jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation to the claimant?
47. Now adverting to the second issue at hand, it is imperative to reiterate that after addressing the issues on negligence and compensation AIR 2011 SC 1504. award, the learned Tribunal directed the driver/respondent no.1 to pay the compensation amount to the claimant.
48. However, a contention has been raised before this Court by the respondent no.1/claimant that the registered owner of the offending vehicle, the respondent no.2 herein, must be held jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation amount.
49. Before delving into the issue of ascertaining the liability of respondent no.2, it is appropriate to firstly determine whether the respondent no.2 is the rightful owner of the offending vehicle. In light of the same, it is apposite to delve into the statutory provisions pertaining to „ownership‟.
50. As per the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the definition of the term “owner” is enumerated in Section 2(30), which is as follows: “2. Definitions xxxxx (30) “owner” means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase, agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement”
51. The bare perusal of the provision indicates that the term “owner” refers to the person in whose name the motor vehicle is registered. It can be observed that the legislature intended that the registered owner as reflected in the records of the Registering Authority will primarily be considered as the “owner” for the purposes of this Act, except in cases of minor or an agreement of hire-purchase, lease, or hypothecation, as explicitly stated in the latter part of the Section 2(30) of the Act, wherein mere possession of the vehicle is sufficient to fall within the ambit of the provision.
52. The distinction between the definition of the “owner” of the erstwhile Act of 1939 and that of the new Act of 1988 was discussed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar[5], wherein the former did not include the registration of the owner, which came into existence only with the enactment of the Act of 1988. This distinction clearly sheds light on the legislative intent behind the specific change brought forth by the new Act of 1988, which gives primacy to the registered owner rather than the possessory owner.
53. The said legislative intent has also been discussed in the case of Surendra Kumar Bhilawe vs. The New India Assurance Company Limited[6], where the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed as follows:
36. It would also be pertinent to note the difference between the definition of owner in Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the definition of owner in Section 2(19) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which has been repealed and replaced by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Under the old Act 'owner' meant the person in possession of a motor vehicle. The definition has undergone a change. Legislature has consciously changed the definition of 'owner' to mean the person in whose name the motor vehicle stands.”
54. The introduction of „registered owner‟ within the ambit of Section 2(30) of the Act establishes that it is presumed that the person whose name is reflected in the records of the Registering Authority is to be regarded as the owner of the vehicle. The position of law has been further discussed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Pushpa alias Leela and Ors. v. Shakuntala and Ors[7], wherein for the purposes of liability, the Hon‟ble Court addressed the question of who shall be considered as the owner of the offending vehicle. The relevant paragraphs of the same are as follows:
10. Then, Section 50 of the Act lays down the procedure for transfer of ownership. It is a long section and insofar as relevant it is reproduced below:
50. Transfer of ownership. (1) Where the ownership of any motor vehicle registered under this Chapter is transferred,- (a) the transferor shall,-
(i) in the case of a vehicle registered within the same State, within fourteen days of the transfer, report the fact of transfer, in such form with such documents and in such manner, as may be prescribed by the Central Government to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction the transfer is to be effected and shall simultaneously send a copy of the said report to the transferee; and
(ii) xxxx
(b) the transferee shall, within thirty days of the transfer, report the transfer to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction he has the residence or place of business where the vehicle is normally kept, as the case may be, and shall forward the certificate of registration to that registering authority together with the prescribed fee and a copy of the report received by him from the transferor in order that particulars of the transfer of ownership may be entered in the certificate of registration. (2) xxxx (3) xxxx (4) xxxx (5) xxxx (6) On receipt of a report under Sub-section (1), or an application under Sub-section (2), the registering authority may cause the transfer of ownership to be entered in the certificate of registration. (7) A registering authority making any such entry shall communicate the transfer of ownership to the transferor and to the original registering authority, if it is not the original registering authority.
11. It is undeniable that notwithstanding the sale of the vehicle neither the transferor Jitender Gupta nor the transferee Salig Ram took any step for the change of the name of the owner in the certificate of registration of the vehicle. In view of this omission Jitender Gupta must be deemed to continue as the owner of the vehicle for the purposes of the Act, even though under the civil law he ceased to be its owner after its sale on February 2, 1993.
12. The question of the liability of the recorded owner of a vehicle after its sale to another person was considered by this Court in Dr. T.V. Jose v. Chacko P.M. MANU/SC/1691/2001: (2001) 8 SCC 748. In paragraphs 9 and 10 of the decision, the Court observed and held as follows:
9. Mr. Iyer appearing for the Appellant submitted that the High Court was wrong in ignoring the oral evidence on record. He submitted that the oral evidence clearly showed that the Appellant was not the owner of the car on the date of the accident. Mr. Iyer submitted that merely because the name had not been changed in the records of R.T.O. did not mean that the ownership of the vehicle had not been transferred. Mr. Iyer submitted that the real owner of the car was Mr. Roy Thomas. Mr. Iyer submitted that Mr. Roy Thomas had been made party-Respondent No. 9 to these Appeals. He pointed out that an Advocate had filed appearance on behalf of Mr. Roy Thomas but had then applied for and was permitted to withdraw the appearance. He pointed out that Mr. Roy Thomas had been duly served and a public notice had also been issued. He pointed out that Mr. Roy Thomas had chosen not to appear in these Appeals. He submitted that the liability, if any, was of Mr. Roy Thomas.
10. We agree with Mr. Iyer that the High Court was not right in holding that the Appellant continued to be the owner as the name had not been changed in the records of R.T.O. There can be transfer of title by payment of consideration and delivery of the car. The evidence on record shows that ownership of the car had been transferred. However the Appellant still continued to remain liable to third parties as his name continued in the records of R.T.O. as the owner. The Appellant could not escape that liability by merely joining Mr. Roy Thomas in these Appeals. Mr. Roy Thomas was not a party either before MACT or the High Court. In these Appeals we cannot and will not go into the question of inter se liability between the Appellant and Mr. Roy Thomas. It will be for the Appellant to adopt appropriate proceedings against Mr. Roy Thomas if, in law, he is entitled to do so.
13. Again, in P.P. Mohammed v. K. Rajappan and Ors. (2008) 17 SCC 624, this Court examined the same issue under somewhat similar set of facts as in the present case. In paragraph 4 of the decision, this Court observed and held as follows:
4. These appeals are filed by the Appellants. The insurance company has chosen not to file any appeal. The question before this Court is whether by reason of the fact that the vehicle has been transferred to Respondent 4 and thereafter to Respondent 5, the Appellant got absolved from liability to the third person who was injured. This question has been answered by this Court in T.V. Jose (Dr.) v. Chacko P.M. wherein it is held that even though in law there would be a transfer of ownership of the vehicle, that, by itself, would not absolve the party, in whose name the vehicle stands in RTO records, from liability to a third person. We are in agreement with the view expressed therein. Merely because the vehicle was transferred does not mean that the Appellant stands absolved of his liability to a third person. So long as his name continues in RTO records, he remains liable to a third person.
14. The decision in Dr. T.V. Jose was rendered under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. But having regard to the provisions of Section 2(30) and section 50 of the Act, as noted above, the ratio of the decision shall apply with equal force to the facts of the case arising under the 1988 Act. On the basis of these decisions, the inescapable conclusion is that Jitender Gupta, whose name continued in the records of the registering authority as the owner of the truck was equally liable for payment of the compensation amount. Further, since an insurance policy in respect of the truck was taken out in his name he was indemnified and the claim will be shifted to the insurer, Oriental Insurance Company Ltd.”
55. The aforementioned judgment has clearly distinguished the position of law under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, wherein the latter Act requires the existence of the transfer, however, mere existence of transfer does not absolve the liability of the registered owner as required by the former Act. The said distinguishing requirement has been further dealt in the case of Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar (supra) by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, interpreting the mandate of Section 2(30) of the Act, which stipulates that the registered owner is liable to compensate the victim of motor vehicle accident. The relevant portion is reproduced hereinunder:
12. The consistent thread of reasoning which emerges from the above decisions is that in view of the definition of the expression 'owner' in Section 2(30), it is the person in whose name the motor vehicle stands registered who, for the purposes of the Act, would be treated as the 'owner'. However, where a person is a minor, the guardian of the minor would be treated as the owner. Where a motor vehicle is subject to an agreement of hire purchase, lease or hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement is treated as the owner. In a situation such as the present where the registered owner has purported to transfer the vehicle but continues to be reflected in the records of the registering authority as the owner of the vehicle, he would not stand absolved of liability. Parliament has consciously introduced the definition of the expression 'owner' in Section 2(30), making a departure from the provisions of Section 2(19) in the earlier Act of 1939. The principle underlying the provisions of Section 2(30) is that the victim of a motor accident or, in the case of a death, the legal heirs of the deceased victim should not be left in a state of uncertainty. A claimant for compensation ought not to be burdened with following a trail of successive transfers, which are not registered with the registering authority. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the salutary object and purpose of the Act. Hence, the interpretation to be placed must facilitate the fulfilment of the object of the law. In the present case, the First Respondent was the 'owner' of the vehicle involved in the accident within the meaning of Section 2(30). The liability to pay compensation stands fastened upon him. Admittedly, the vehicle was uninsured. The High Court has proceeded upon a misconstruction of the judgments of this Court in Reshma and Purnya Kala Devi.
13. The submission of the Petitioner is that a failure to intimate the transfer will only result in a fine Under Section 50(3) but will not invalidate the transfer of the vehicle. In Dr. T.V. Jose, this Court observed that there can be transfer of title by payment of consideration and delivery of the car. But for the purposes of the Act, the person whose name is reflected in the records of the registering authority is the owner. The owner within the meaning of Section 2(30) is liable to compensate. The mandate of the law must be fulfilled.”
56. In light of the above discussions, it is pertinent to examine the testimony of the witnesses relevant to the said issue. As per the record, R2W2/respondent no. 2 stated in his examination that he had purchased the offending vehicle i.e., two-wheeler scooter bearing registration number DNF-7071, to which he was the owner, up until the year 1998, and the same was sold to the appellant/driver in the very same year. He further testified that all the necessary documents pertaining to the vehicle were handed over to the driver after getting his signature on one delivery receipt. In his cross-examination, R2W[2] also deposed that he sold the vehicle to the driver/respondent no.1 at a sale consideration of Rs.10,000/-, however, stated that the receipt of the same has not been acquired, hence, not placed on record. Further, he deposed that all the requisite documents have been handed over to the driver, including the insurance as well as Form nos.29 and 30. However, he admitted that he neither went to the Registering Authority nor did he attempted to formally transfer the vehicle in the name of the transferee i.e., driver.
57. The aforementioned transaction of sale has been starkly rejected by RW1/appellant herein in his deposition stating that the respondent no. 2 did not sell the vehicle to him and no Form Nos. 29 and 30 were handed over to him regarding the alleged sale.
58. In view of the foregoing deposition, this Court has further, perused the relevant documents on record, i.e., the delivery receipt and Certificate of Registration (Form-G). The contents of the former document reveals that the offending vehicle bearing number DNF-7071 of 1989 model along with the registration documents have been delivered to Mr. Mohd. Sabuddin/appellant by Mr. Deepak Rai/respondent no. 2. The said receipt bears the signature of the driver/appellant and is dated 19th December,
1998. However, the document in question seems vague as it holds no authenticity of the contents mentioned therein as there is no other document on record pertaining to the alleged sale transaction between the driver/appellant and respondent no. 2. Therefore, in view of the same, the delivery receipt cannot be taken into consideration for proving the ownership of the offending vehicle.
59. On the other hand, the latter document i.e., the Certificate of Registration reveals that the registration of vehicle bearing no. DNF-7071 was transferred from one Mr. Balbir Singh to Mr. Deepak Rai/respondent no. 2, thereby officiating the respondent no. 2 as the registered owner as per the records.
60. Since there is no other document on record contradicting the aforesaid contents of the documents, and placing reliance on the judgments cited herein, it is evident that respondent no. 2 remains the registered owner of the offending vehicle as he falls within the definition of “owner” as per Section 2(30) of the Act.
61. Now adverting to the issue of liability.
62. It has already been discussed in the aforementioned judgments that the liability to pay the compensation is fastened upon the registered owner of the offending vehicle. However, a question arises as to the extent of liability of the registered owner.
63. Therefore, what needs to be addressed at this stage is whether the registered owner of the offending vehicle i.e., respondent no. 2 shall be solely liable or jointly and severally liable along with the driver of the offending vehicle i.e., appellant.
64. To determine the aforesaid question of liability, it is imperative to look into the findings of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Godavari Finance Company vs. Degala Satyanarayanamma & Ors.8, wherein it was categorically stated that the person who is in possession and control over the offending vehicle will be held liable for the payment of the compensation amount. However, the test mentioned in the said case law must be construed subject to the factual scenario of each case. For the purpose of convenience, the relevant paragraph of the judgment is reproduced as under:
may be held to be constructively liable as the employer of the driver. What is, therefore, essential for passing an award is to find out the liabilities of the persons who are involved in the use of the vehicle or the persons who are vicariously liable. The insurance company becomes a necessary party to such claims as in the event the owner of the vehicle is found to be liable, it would have to reimburse the owner inasmuch as a vehicle is compulsorably insurable so far as a third party is concerned, as contemplated under Section 147 thereof. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the possession or control of a vehicle plays a vital role.”
65. Similarly, in the recent judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Vaibhav Jain vs. Hindustan Motors Pvt. Ltd[9], it was discussed in length that at the time of the accident, if the person who has the actual possession and control of the vehicle and under whose direction and command the driver is obliged to operate the same, shall be subjected to the liability to pay the compensation.
66. Keeping in view of the aforementioned principles, this Court further perused the testimonies of the witnesses, wherein it was testified by RW[1] that he was working as an employee of respondent no.2‟s proprietary firm i.e., M/s Deepak Engineering Works from the January, 2004 to October, 2006, drawing a salary of Rs. 2,500- 3,000/- per month. He further testified that he used to work from 10 AM to 5PM as a plumber and that the respondent no.2 would lend his scooter bearing number DNF-7071 for attending complaints.
67. The said deposition of RW[1] has been patently refuted by R2W2/ respondent no.2 in his testimony. It was stated that the driver/appellant 2024 INSC 652. was working as an employee of respondent no.2 till the year 1998 and that the appellant was not working for him in the year 2004. He further stated that he maintained all the records pertaining to the employment of the workers, however, later admitted that he is not in possession of documents such as attendance register, salary slips etc. upto the year
2004. He further denied that the scooter bearing no. DNF-7071 was not given to the workers for attending the complaints.
68. Upon perusal of the aforesaid testimonies, it is observed that the employer-employee relationship between appellant/driver and respondent no.2 cannot be proved as the same has been utterly contradicted by the parties in its testimonies. Moreover, no such document was placed on record showing that on the day of the accident, the appellant was driving in the course of employment or under the direction of the respondent NO. 2.
69. Therefore, applying the principles enunciated in the cases of Godavari Finance Company vs. Degala Satyanarayanamma & Ors. (supra) and Vaibhav Jain vs. Hindustan Motors Pvt. Ltd. (supra) to the facts of the instant case, it is observed that since the driver/appellant was held liable for the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle, and in absence of any evidence pertaining to the control of respondent no. 2 on the driver, this Court is of the view that the driver herein is also liable to pay the compensation amount to the claimant.
70. Although the possession and control of the offending vehicle is with the driver/appellant, it does not mean that the registered owner is not liable for the same just on the pretext of non-possession and non-control, thereby making both the driver as well as the registered owner jointly and severally liable. The said stance has been taken by the co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal and Ors. vs. Manish Kumar and Ors.10, where the Court observed that the registered owner shall continue to remain liable to pay the compensation to the victim of motor accident and the mere possession and control of the vehicle shall not absolve the person from paying the said compensation to the victim. It further stated that the liability would remain joint and several in such cases between the registered owner and the person who was in actual possession of the vehicle at the time of the accident.
71. Keeping in view the foregoing reasoning and findings, this Court is of the view that both driver/appellant as well as registered owner/ respondent no.2 are jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation amount to the claimant/ respondent no. 1 herein.
72. Accordingly, issue – 2 stands decided in aforesaid terms.
CONCLUSION
73. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a beneficial legislation which was brought in force with an intent to provide relief to the victims or their families, who were subjected to motor vehicle accidents. Therefore, while determining the issue of negligence, the Courts are not subjected to apply the strict principles of evidence to the motor vehicle accident cases as the standard of proof required in such cases is one of „preponderance of probabilities‟.
74. Moreover, for establishing a case of contributory negligence, the Courts are to determine whether the parties involved in the accident exercised reasonable care in ensuring that the accident does not take place. If the said care is exercised, at least by one of the parties therein, then it is not a case of contributory negligence.
75. It is also discussed that certain acts of the parties such as nonpossession of driving licence, vehicular insurance etc. are violative of the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. However, mere violation of the provisions does not amount to negligence of the parties and in order to determine the same, a correlation between the violation and the impact of such violation on the accident must be assessed.
76. As per the settled principles of law, the person whose name reflects in the records of the Registering Authority will be considered as the registered owner of the vehicle. However, the extent of liability is determined based on the possession and control over the offending vehicle and also differs with the involvement of parties in the accident.
77. Therefore, by way of filing the instant appeal, the appellant sought for the setting aside of the impugned order as the learned Tribunal has wrongly held that the appellant is liable for rash and negligent driving, when it is the respondent no.1 who was driving in a negligent manner, thereby amounting to contributory negligence. Additionally, it also sought that the respondent no.2 to be made liable to pay the compensation amount as he is the registered owner as per the records of the Registering Authority and that no sale transaction has taken place between the appellant and respondent no.2.
78. After due consideration and discussion, this Court is of the view that the learned Tribunal rightly held that the appellant is liable for rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle.
79. It is further held that the respondent no. 2 is a registered owner of the offending vehicle as per Section 2(30) of the Act and as per the settled position of law, the respondent no. 2 is liable to pay the compensation to the claimant. With respect to the extent of liability, this Court has observed that the possession and control of the offending vehicle, at the time of the accident, is with the appellant/driver, and therefore, both the appellant and respondent no. 2 are made jointly and severally liable.
80. Accordingly, the following directions are passed by this Court: a. The learned Tribunal has rightly assessed that the appellant/driver was driving the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and therefore, there arises no scope of contributory negligence on the respondent no. 1‟s/claimant‟s part. b. Further, in terms of the judgment of the even date passed in MAC APPL. 425/2016, it is held that the respondent no.2 along with the respondent no.1/driver are jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation amount of Rs.18,59,466/- to the appellant/victim. c. Accordingly, the appellant and respondent no. 2 i.e., the driver and the registered owner of the offending vehicle respectively, are directed to pay the compensation amount of Rs. 18,59,466/- to the claimant/ respondent no.1 within the period of four (4) weeks from the date of receipt of this order, after deducting/adjusting the amount already paid/deposited.
81. In view of the aforesaid discussions on facts and law, the impugned order dated 20th February, 2016 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, South East District/Saket Court, New Delhi in suit bearing no. 335/14 is modified to the extent indicated above.
82. Accordingly, the instant appeal is hereby partly allowed and stands disposed of along with the pending application(s), if any.
83. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.
JUDGE OCTOBER 8, 2024 rk/mk/ryp