Full Text
+ CRL.M.C. 466/2011 & Crl.M.A. 1797/2011
SANJEEV CHHABRA & ORS Petitioner
Through: Ms. Seema Gulati and Mr. Rahul
Parashar, Advocates.
Through; Mi'. Mukesh Gupta, APP for llie State.
Jfc'lr. Bhopal Singh, Adv. for R-2.
ORDER
1. By the present petition the Petitioner seeks quashing ofthe order daier] 5^^ Februaiy, 2011 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate taking cognizance of offences under Section 498A, 406 and 34 IPG pursuant to an application for the condonation of delay being filed by Complainant/ Respondent no. 2 Navneet Chhabra.
2. The brief facts of the case are" that the Petitioner no. 1 Sanjeev Chliabra married Respondent no. 2 on 4"' December, 2003. They however separated on 29"" February, 2004 and Respondent no. 2 went to her parental home. That Petitioner no. 1 on November, 2007 filed a petition for a decree of divorce under section 13(l)(a)of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1995 on the grounds CrlM.C. No.466/2011 Page 1 of[6] 2011:DHC:10887 ofphysical and mental cruelty. Thereafter on 13-'' February, 2008 Respondent No. 2 filed a complaint under Section 12 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (in short PWDV Act). On acomplaint dated 22"^* Febmary, 2008, an FIR bearing number 04/2008 was registered on 12'^' April, 2008 against Petitioner No. 1 and his family members. The police on 12* January, 2009 filed a charge sheet against Petitioner no. 1 and Petitioner No. 2 the mother of Petitioner No.l. Since the charge sheet was filed after the period oflimitation, an application for condonation ofdelay was filed on 12"^ October,
2009. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate condoned the delay and took cognizance of the offences by an order dated 5*^^ February, 2010. Hence the present petition.
3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners contends that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the fact that the Prosecution is under a duty to explain the delay ofeach days infiling the charge sheet. However, inthe present case there is a delay ofmore than 9 months infiling the application by the Prosecution for condonation of delay without any proper explanation and is vague and general in nature. Reliance is placed onState ofHimachal Pradesh v. TaraDiitt and another, 2000 (1) SCC 230, Anil Nanda v. State and another, 2008 (104) DRJ 54 and Siidhir Kapur & Others Vs. State & another, Crl. Misc. Number 799/2010 decided by this Court on 10* August, 2010. Crl.M.C. No.466/2011 Page 2 of[6]
4. It was farther contended that the learned Metropolitan Magistrate simply relied on the statement of Complainant about tiying to save her marriage. LeaiTied Counsel states that this statement of Complainant is false and this was just a pretext to get the delay condoned. Even after filing of the charge sheet repeated dates were sought before the application for condonation ofdelay was filed. Learned Counsel therefore contends that the valuable right accrued to the Petitioners should not be set aside without any just cause and reasoning. Reliance is placed on State ofHimachalPradesh Vs. Tara Diitt andAnr. (2000) 1 see 230.
5. Learned APP for the State on the other hand contends that the decision of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate condoning the delay was justified by law. That as per the provisions of Section 473 CrPC in the interest ofjustice Magistrate may condone the delay in filing of the charge sheet. Reliance is placed onArun Vyas andAnother Vs. Anita Vyas (1999) 4SCC 690 and Venka Radha Manohari v. Vanka Venkata Reddyand Ors. (1993) 3 SCC 4.
6. 1have heard learned Counsels for the parties. In Tara Diitt (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that according to Section 473 CrPC if a Magisti-ate is satisfied on the facts ofthe case, then he can accordingly condone the delay. Therefore the only question that has to be considered in the instant case is whether the impugned order dated 5'*^ February, 2011 discloses the Crl.M. C. No. 466/2011 Page 3 of[6] reasoning of the learnedMetropolitan Magistrate in condoningthe delay.
7. It is well settled by a catena ofjudgments by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that a liberal view has to be taken in the interest ofjustice in cases pertaining to Section 498AIPG. In light of this it is observed that while condoning the delay inthe present case the learned Metropolitan Magistrate considered the fact that the Complainant had filed the complaint after a period of 4 years of admitted separation purportedly in a bid to save her marriage. It was also held that the delay onthe part ofthe complainant is selfreflective onrecord and accordingly canbe read at an appropriate stage but to absolve of right to get her grievances legally addressed, considering the settled,principle laid down inthis regard for relaxed and liberal approach in view ofthe peculiar relationship and entire life of parties effected at stake is certainly not warranted. Thus, the delay was condoned.
8. Reliance of learned counsel for the Petitioner on Sudhir Kapur (Supra) is misconceived as in that case the FIR was lodged only after about 15 years of sepai-ation and about 11 years of filing the divorce petition. However in the present case the Complainant filed the complaint unmediately after her written statements were filed in the divorce petition as she realized that there was no hope of reconciliation and that the marriage was beyond saving. Further reliance on Anil Nanda (supra) is also misconceived as the application for Crl.M. C. No.466/2011 Page 4 of[6] condonation of delay had not been decided by the Trial Gourt in that ease whereas in the case in hand, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate has condoned the delayand then taken cognizance thereon.
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arun Vyas and another v. Anita Vyas, (1999) 4 see 690 held-
CrlM.C. No.466/2011 ^ OE,i,p. in fayoui: of a wife who is siibjectqd to SKueltj: if on tlie facts and in the circumstances of the case it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. When the conduct of the accused is such that applying rule of limitation will give an unfair advantage to him or result in miscarriage of justice, the Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of period of limitation in the interests of justice. This is only illustrative not exhaustive."
9. Thus, m view of the law laid down and keeping in view the circumstances of the present case, I find no illegality in the order passed bythe learned Metropolitan Magistrate condoning the delay. No ground to interfere with the impugned order dated 5'*^ Februaiy, 2011 is made out.
10. PetitionandApplication ai-e accordingly dismissed. KTA GUPTA, J. AUGUST 26,2011 'vii' Crl.M. C. No. 466/2011 Page 6 of[6]