Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 14.11.2024
MUNNA .....Petitioner
Through: None.
Through: None.
JUDGMENT
1. The orders dated 12.12.2022, 19.03.2018, and 27.07.2016 reflect that it is the admitted case of both the parties that the possession of one Shop on the Ground Floor bearing No. B-372, Ashok Nagar, Main Mandoli Road, Shahdara, Delhi-110093 [hereinafter referred to as “subject premises”] has been handed over to the Respondent/landlady through execution proceedings.
2. The issue of whether a Revision Petition is maintainable when the tenanted subject premises has been legally restored to the Respondent/landlady, either during or before the filing of the Revision Petition, has been addressed by the Supreme Court as well as by Coordinate Benches of this Court.
3. The Supreme Court in NC Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh Rana[1], dealt with a similar situation while dismissing a challenge by a tenant to a judgment passed by this Court upholding an order declining leave to defend passed by the learned Trial Court. The facts in the case were that, possession of the tenanted premises had been taken pursuant to an order passed by the Executing Court. The Supreme Court dealt with the similar arguments raised on behalf of the Respondent/landlord that the Petition has become infructuous pursuant to the possession having been taken.
4. After briefly examining the contention of the parties, the Supreme Court in N.C Daga case held that in view of the admitted position of possession being taken in execution proceedings, it was not necessary to go into the further details since such a decision would be a purely an academic question. The Supreme Court in N.C Daga case held as follows:
5. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Verma v. Manmohan Verma[2] where on an averment by the Respondent/landlord that possession of the premises has already been taken over, the Supreme Court held that nothing further survives in the Appeal and disposed the Appeals as being infructuous. The order being brief is extracted below: “Leave granted. Civil Appeal Nos. 5220-5221 of 2008 order dated 19.08.2008 At the time of hearing of these appeals, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the landlord-respondent submits, on instructions, that the possession of the premises in question has already been taken over by the landlord-respondent. That being the position, these appeals have now become infructuous, which have been filed against the final judgment and order dt.25.02.2008 and 28.03.2008 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in RCR No.49 of 2007 and C.M.No.119 of 2008 (Review) in RCR No.49 of 2007, by which the Revision Petition filed by the tenant/appellant was dismissed and order of eviction was affirmed. Since the possession has already been taken over by the landlord-respondent, in our view nothing survives in these appeals and accordingly, the appeals are disposed of as infructuous. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. There will be no order as to costs.”
6. Various Coordinate Benches of this Court have also similarly held that the tenant’s Petition have become infructuous in view of possession being taken. Reliance is placed on Neelam Sharma v. Ekant Rekhan[3] and Bhawani Shankar v Nand Lal and Ors.4. 6.[1] In Om Prakash Ashok Kumar & Sons v. Ajay Khurana[5] while relying on the NC Daga case and several other cases, a Coordinate Bench held as follows:
2024 SCC OnLine Del 5228 5220 -5221/2008 passed by the Supreme Court and in Poonam Bangia v. Harbhagwan Dass Chandiramani in RC. REV no. 16/2021 passed by this Court as mentioned hereinabove also dismissed the revision petition as became infructuous due to the reason that the possession of the subject premises has been restored to the respondent/landlord. The same view was also taken by another Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Ram Avtar v. Anuradha Shukla in RC. Rev. Bearing NO. 104/2021 vide order dated 03.11.2023, the revision petition was ordered to be dismissed as the possession of the tenanted premises has already been taken by the respondent/landlord in accordance with law. xxx
12. In the present case as reflected from the order dated 10.05.2024, the possession of the tenanted premises has already been restored back to the respondent/landlord in execution of warrant of possession in accordance with law. This Court is also of the view that the present petition is not maintainable. Accordingly, the present petition, along with pending applications stands dismissed being infructuous.”
7. This Court has in Ashok Gupta & Anr. v. Deepak Rao[6] has taken the following view:
2024 SCC OnLine Del 7148 Petition has become infructuous and is accordingly dismissed.” 7.[1] In addition, in RC. REV. No. 104/2021 captioned as Ram Avtar v. Anuradha Shukla vide order dated 03.11.2023 this Court has held that once possession was taken over by the Respondent/landlord in accordance with law, the Petition becomes infructuous. The relevant extract of the Ram Avtar case reads as follows: “4.[1] This Court has considered this contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner/tenant. The Revision Petition has been filed challenging the order of the Trial Court which has now gained fruition, and has already been implemented through execution proceedings. In these circumstances, the Revision Petition has become infructuous.
5. Furthermore, this Court in various judgments held that once possession has been taken over by the Respondent/landlord in accordance with law, this petition becomes infructuous and in view thereof, nothing survives in the petition.” [Emphasis supplied]
8. The present Petition has been filed impugning the order and judgment of the learned Trial Court which has directed vacation of the subject premises in issue. The jurisdiction of this Court is only revisionary in nature and limited in scope. The Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua[7] while interpreting the intendment of the legislature in removing two stages of Appeal that were earlier provided in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [hereinafter referred to as the “Act”] has held that this is a conscious omission. It was held that the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its view with that of the learned Trial Court, its only role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. Thus, the scope of revisionary jurisdiction of this Court has been limited to examine if there is an error apparent on the face of the record or absence of any adjudication by the learned Trial Court, and it is only then should the High Court interfere. The Supreme Court has also cautioned from converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first Appeal under revisionary jurisdiction. This has been elucidated at length by Supreme Court in Abid- Ul-Islam case in the following manner: "Scope of revision
22. We are, in fact, more concerned with the scope and ambit of the proviso to Section 25-B(8). The proviso creates a distinct and unequivocal embargo by not providing an appeal against the order passed by the learned Rent Controller over an application filed under sub-section (5). The intendment of the legislature is very clear, which is to remove the appellate remedy and thereafter, a further second appeal. It is a clear omission that is done by the legislature consciously through a covenant removing the right of two stages of appeals.
23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature. xxx
25. The aforesaid decision has been recently considered and approved by this Court in Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal [Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal, (2020) 7 SCC 327: (2020) 4 SCC (Civ) 107]: (SCC pp. 340-41, paras 22-23) “22. This Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119] had an occasion to consider the scope of proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. This Court found, that though the word “revision” was not employed in the said proviso, from the language used therein, the legislative intent was clear that the power conferred was revisional power. This Court observed thus: (SCC p. 124, para 11) ‘11. The learned Single Judge of the High Court in the present case has reassessed and reappraised the evidence afresh to reach a different finding as though it was exercising appellate jurisdiction. No doubt even while exercising revisional jurisdiction, a reappraisal of evidence can be made, but that should be for the limited purpose to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the factfinding court is wholly unreasonable.’ It could thus be seen, that this Court has held, that the High Court while exercising the revisional powers under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 though could not reassess and reappraise the evidence, as if it was exercising appellate jurisdiction, however, it was empowered to reappraise the evidence for the limited purpose so as to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable.
23. Again in Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani [Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani, (1999) 1 SCC 141], this Court had an occasion to consider the aforesaid powers under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. This Court observed thus: (SCC p. 148, para
12) ‘12. It is no doubt true that the scope of a revision petition under Section 25-B(8) proviso of the Delhi Rent Control Act is a very limited one, but even so in examining the legality or propriety of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the High Court could examine the facts available in order to find out whether he had correctly or on a firm legal basis approached the matters on record to decide the case. Pure findings of fact may not be open to be interfered with, but (sic if) in a given case, the finding of fact is given on a wrong premise of law, certainly it would be open to the Revisional Court to interfere with such a matter.’ It was thus held, that though the scope of revisional powers of the High Court was very limited one, but even so in examining the legality or propriety of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the High Court could examine the facts available in order to find out whether he had correctly or on a firm legal basis approached the matters on record to decide the case. It has also been held, that pure findings of fact may not be open to be interfered with, but in a given case, if the finding of fact is given on a wrong premise of law, it would be open to the Revisional Court to interfere with the same.” [Emphasis supplied]
9. The provisions of the Act provide for a remedy of restoration of possession to a Petitioner/tenant in one situation, i.e., under Section 19 of the Act. In cases allowed under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, the recovery of possession by a tenant under Section 19(1) of the Act can be obtained if the landlord re-let the whole or part of the subject premises within three years from the date of obtaining possession from the evicted tenant. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the Act further provides that where such premises are not occupied within two months by landlord or within three years from the date of possession by the person for whose benefit the premises are held, or are re-let to a person without permission of the Rent Controller within three years from the date of possession, the Rent Controller may direct the landlord to put the tenant in possession or pay him such compensation as is deemed fit by the Rent Controller. Section 19 of the Act is set out below:
9.[1] The Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam case has held that Section 19 of the Act gives a right of re-possession to the dispossessed tenant if landlord recovers possession under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and thereafter, the landlord does not use the subject premises for the purpose that it was intended and set out in such Eviction Petition on which basis, an order for eviction was obtained by the landlord. The relevant extract is set out below: “19. Before a presumption is drawn, the landlord is duty-bound to place prima facie material supported by the adequate averments. It is only thereafter, the presumption gets attracted and the onus shifts on the tenant. The object of Section 14(1)(e) vis-à-vis Section 25-B has to be seen in the light of yet another provision contained under Section 19. Section 19 gives a right to the dispossessed tenant for repossession if there is a non-compliance on the part of the landlord albeit after eviction, to put the premises to use for the intended purpose. Such a right is available only to a tenant who stood dispossessed on the application filed by the landlord invoking Section 14(1)(e) being allowed. Thus, Section 19 inter alia throws more light on the legislative objective facilitating a speedy possession. The object is also reflected in the proviso to Section 25-B(8), denying a right of appeal..”
10. The proceedings were contested by the Petitioner/tenant, and an Eviction Order was passed by the learned Trial Court dated 03.10.2015 [hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Order”] after addressing all the issues raised, and dismissing the Leave to Defend filed by the Petitioner/tenant. The learned Trial Court noted that the claims of Petitioner/tenant about the bonafide need and alternate accommodations lacked merit. The Respondent/landlady had stated in her Eviction Petition subject premises is required for herself, her husband for running a tailoring shop and supplementing their income. 10.[1] The Petitioner/tenant contested that the son of the Respondent/landlady is already running a business. The learned Trial Court found that the bonafide need of the Respondent/landlady and her husband was not disputed. Further, on the ground for the shop allegedly being used by the son of the Respondent/landlady, it was clarified by the Respondent/landlady that a signboard bearing "Tarun Computers" had been fixed without the consent of the Respondent/landlady and was misused to dispute the bona fide requirement. The Respondent/landlady provided documentary evidence, including complaints to the police, denying running of a computer shop on that premises. 10.[2] Regarding the alternative shop allegedly lying vacant, the learned Trial Court held that its location was not suitable for business purposes as it lacked accessibility and visibility from the main road, which are essential for attracting customers. The subject premises is located on the main road, and thus was found to be ideal for the intended business of the Respondent/landlady. 10.[3] The learned Trial Court found that the Respondent/landlady had a genuine need to establish a proper business in the subject premises to support their large family and meet their financial needs, particularly given the advanced ages of their three unmarried daughters. 10.[4] On the aspect of the landlord-tenant relationship and the ownership of the subject premises by the Respondent/landlady it was held by the learned Trial Court, that as per settled law the Respondent/landlady was able to show a better title than the Petitioner/tenant and hence was able to establish the ownership of the subject premises as well as the existence of landlordtenant relationship between the parties. In light of the discussion, the three ingredients, landlord-tenant relationship/ownership, no suitable alternative accommodation being available and bona fide requirement was established by the Respondent/landlady and the Petitioner/tenant's application for leave to defend was dismissed. 10.[5] Notice in the present Petition was issued on 23.12.2015 and since process fee was not filed, fresh Notice was issued by the Court on 29.02.2016. In the interregnum period, possession of the subject premises was received by the Respondent/landlady.
11. This Court has examined the Impugned Order. The issue of the landlord and tenant relationship is not challenged by the Petitioner/tenant and the ownership of the Respondent/landlady has not been disputed by the Petitioner/tenant. The only other contention raised by the Petitioner/tenant is that there are other properties available as alternate accommodation to the Respondent/landlady which include properties stated in their Leave to Defend, and the bonafide need is disputed. 11.[1] As discussed above, learned Trial Court has adequately addressed both these issues. Accordingly, no ground to interfere with the Impugned Order has been made out by the Petitioner/tenant before this Court in the Revision Petition.
12. In any event as discussed above, after the passing of the Impugned Order, the Respondent/landlady recovered possession of the subject premises in accordance with law. As such the Revision Petition has been filed challenging the order of the learned Trial Court which has now gained fruition as was executed and has already been implemented through execution proceedings. This was recorded by the Court in its orders dated 27.07.2016, 19.03.2018 and thereafter on 12.12.2022. In these circumstances, the Revision Petition has become infructuous.
13. As stated above, the jurisdiction of this Court exercising revisionary powers is limited and circumspect. The Petitioner/tenant did not initiate appropriate civil proceedings for recovery of possession of the tenanted premises, as per the records. The Petitioner/tenant has also not contended that Section 19 of Act has been violated. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the NC Daga case and Vinod Kumar Verma case, this Court finds that this Petition has become infructuous and is accordingly dismissed.
TARA VITASTA GANJU, J NOVEMBER 14, 2024