Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
W.P.(C) 4869/2021 & CM APPL. 15021/2021
AVNIT .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Gaurav Sarwat and Mr. V.
Srivastava, Advocates.
Through: Mr. Naginder Benipal, Sr. Panel Counsel
Ms. Anjali, Advocates.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT SHARMA
JUDGMENT
20.11.2024 C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
1. The petitioner applied for appointment to the post of Postman/Mail Guard in the Department of Posts, consequent to an advertisement issued in 2014. He underwent a written test on 17 May
2017. The results of the test were published on 5 January 2018. 740 candidates were selected. The petitioner’s name did not figure in the list.
2. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner approached the Central Administrative Tribunal[1] by way of OA 3516/2018[2]. “the Tribunal” hereinafter Avnit v UOI
3. By means of the present petition, the petitioner has challenged the judgment dated 17March 2021, whereby the Tribunal has dismissed the aforesaid OA. Dissatisfied with the decision, the petitioner has approached this Court, invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
4. The petitioner belongs to the unreserved category. He had secured 79 marks. The last candidate who was appointed to the abovementioned post in the original list in the unreserved category had secured 81 marks. Thereafter, the respondents operated the waiting list in accordance with para 15 of Circular No. 60-2/2014-SPB-I, dated 21 February 2014, issued by the Department of Posts, which reads thus:
5. We may note, here, that the results of the examination had been declared on 5 January 2018 and the petitioner had filed the OA before the Tribunal on 11 September 2018, which was withing the period of one year as envisaged by aforementioned para 15 of the circular dated 21 February 2014.
6. Admittedly, as vacancies were remaining unfilled, the respondents, in terms of para 15 of circular dated 21 February 2014, operated the wait list. The wait list, we may note, consisted of 50 candidates which included the petitioner. The first list of candidates from the wait list who were selected against the unfilled vacancies was released on 12 October 2018.
7. Admittedly, the last candidate who was selected from the wait list in the said list had scored 79 marks, which was equal to marks scored by the petitioner. However, as there were several candidates who had secured 79 marks, the respondents selected the candidates on the basis of their date of birth. As the petitioner was younger than the last candidate selected as per the wait list on 12 October 2018, he was not selected.
8. To that extent, the Tribunal upholds the decision of the respondents and we, too, find no fault with it. Where the number of vacancies remaining unfilled are specified, and operating the wait list would result in several candidates who may have secured the same marks aspiring for the last vacant position, the respondents are entitled to limit the number of candidates on the basis of date of birth.
9. However, where we cannot agree with the Tribunal is with the following finding in para 7 of the impugned order:
10. We do not see any basis for the above finding in para 7 of the impugned order. Para 15 of the circular dated 21 February 2014 required the wait list to be operated to fill the number of unfilled vacancies. It does not stipulate, anywhere, that the wait list could be operated only once. All that is stated is that the wait list would remain alive only for six months extendable by a further period of six months. Within that period of one year, the clause clearly envisages operation of the wait list till the number of vacancies advertised were filled up, of course, subject to the outer limit of one year. Inasmuch as the first list of candidates selected from the wait list was issued on 12 October 2018, within a year of the publication of the results on 5 January 2018, and the petitioner had approached the Tribunal even prior to the said date, the respondents were required to further operate the wait list and fill in the remaining vacancies.
11. Mr. Ankit, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, submits that the period of one year stipulated in para 15 of the circular dated 21 February 2014 was over even at the time when the impugned order was passed. We cannot treat this as a ground to nonsuit the petitioner. The petitioner had approached the Tribunal much before the said period was over. It was for the respondents to take the steps to operate para 15 of the circular dated 21 February 2014 upto a period of one year.
12. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order to the extent it holds that the respondents could not be directed to operate the wait list twice. It is also not in dispute that if the wait list is to be operated for the second time to fill the vacancies, the petitioner would fall within the 11 remaining vacancies. This position is not disputed by the respondents either.
13. In fact, the concept of “operating” the wait list twice needlessly confuses the issue. The simple position is that the life of the wait list was not yet over, and posts were still remaining unfilled. The Tribunal was not correct, therefore, in holding that it could not direct the respondents to fill in the remaining vacancies from the surviving wait listed candidates.
14. We also note that there is no specific assertion by the respondents that the aforesaid 11 vacancies were since filled up. Though Mr. Ankit, learned Counsel for the respondents submits that, thereafter, the vacancies were diverted to the direct recruitment quota, there is no assertion in the counter-affidavit before this Court that those vacancies stand exhausted. The diversion of the unfilled vacancies to the direct recruit quota, which itself took place even while the petitioner and other wait listed candidates continued to be available to fill up the remaining vacancies, was itself unjustified.
15. In view thereof, we set aside the impugned judgment of the Tribunal to the extent it holds that the respondents could not be directed to operate the wait list a second time.
16. It is not in dispute that, had the wait list had been operated a second time, the petitioner, among others, would be entitled to appointment. We therefore direct that the petitioner be appointed to the post of Postman/Mail Guard in the Department of Posts, within a period of four weeks, with effect from the date when other candidates were appointed on the basis of the selection in which the petitioner, too, participated. The petitioner would not be entitled to any back wages but would be entitled to notional seniority.
17. The petition succeeds to the aforesaid extent.
18. No costs.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.