School Management of Ring Midways Senior Secondary Public School v. Azad Devi

“DOE” hereinafter

(c) a responsible officer of the level of Deputy Director in DoE, under the supervision and guidance of the Director of Education, shall withdraw the amounts, save and except, an amount of Rs.30 lacs which will be retained in the account for day-to-day expenses required to run the School smoothly and disburse the same on a pro-rata basis amongst the School teachers and staff.

5. List the application on 26.11.2024 for further consideration.”

8. Clearly, therefore, the learned Single Judge has not disposed of the application but has merely passed an ad interim directions so as to protect the interests of the teachers and staff employed in the school. The application has been listed for further consideration on 26 November 2024.

9. We have our reservations on whether Letters Patent Appeal would at all be maintainable against such an order. The Supreme Court has, in its judgment in Shah Babulal Khimji v Jayaben D Kania[2], held that “whenever a trial Judge decides a controversy which affects valuable rights of one of the parties, it must be treated to be a judgment within the meaning of the letters patent.”

10. This Court has also recently examined the aspect of when an LPA could be maintained against such an ad interim order in its decision in Shiv Prakash Katiyar v Jawahar Lal University[3], the relevant paragraphs of which we deem it appropriate to reproduce:

13. In Krishan Avtar v Om Prakash Gupta[4], the expression “judgment” within the meaning of Clause XII of the Letters Patent applicable to State of Jammu and Kashmir was held as implying “an order which effectively decide some right or liability in controversy between the parties to the main proceedings, irrespective of the fact whether such an order is final or made at any interlocutory stage”. In the context of Clause X of the Letters Patent, applicable to Nagpur, a Division Bench of High Court of Madhya Pradesh, in Jagatguru Shri Shankaracharya Jyotish Peethadhiswar Shri Swaroopanand Saraswati v Ramji Tripathi[5] defined “judgment” thus: “A ‘judgment’ within the meaning of clause 10 of the Letters Patent would have to satisfy two tests: First, the judgment must be the final pronouncement which puts an end to the proceeding so far as the Court dealing with it is concerned. Second, the judgment must involve the determination of some right or liability, though it may not be necessary that there must be a decision on the merits. But the adjudication of an application which is nothing more than a step towards obtaining a final adjudication in the suit, is not a judgment within the meaning of clause 10 of the Letters Patent. An order transferring a suit from one Court to another is not a ‘judgment, as it neither affects the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit itself, nor does it terminate or dispose of the suit on any ground. It is only an application in a suit as a step towards determination of the controversy between the parties in the suit.”

14. Not all interlocutory orders are excepted from the category of “judgment” for the purposes of appeal under the Letters Patent. In the context of Clause XV of the Letters Patent of the Madras High Court, the Supreme Court held, in Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association v S.C. Sekar[6] that “an interim injunction granted till disposal of the contempt petition would come within the ambit of the expression “judgment” for the purpose of Clause XV of the Letters Patent of the Madras High Court”.

15. In Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v Saraswati Bai[7], a Full Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh held that “the word ‘judgment’ as used in Clause X of Letters Patent means a decision in an action whether final, preliminary or interlocutory which decides either wholly or partially, but conclusively insofar as Court is concerned, the controversy which is the subject of action”. In Life Insurance Corporation of AIR 1979 MP 50

1994 SCC Online MP 199 India v Sanjeev Builders Pvt. Ltd.8, it was held that, for an order to be a “judgment”, it was not always necessary that it should put an end to the controversy or terminate the suit. An interlocutory order determining the rights of the parties in one way or the other would also be a “judgment”.

11. Nonetheless, we have heard Mr. Kartik Jha, learned counsel for the appellants on the merits of the challenge in this appeal. Mr. Jha’s main contention is that his client was not present when the application was taken up for hearing and that the observations in para 4 that all parties were sanguine regarding the order which came to be passed is not correct, as the management of the school whom he represents was never present when the case was listed. He is, however, unable to enlighten the Court as to whether notice on this application was received by his client.

12. We have, however, queried of Mr. Jha as to whether there is any error in the order passed by the learned Single Judge as would justify this Court interfering in the matter. In our opinion, the test which is to be applied while dealing with an interlocutory order passed by a learned Single Judge when it is carried in appeal to the Division Bench, has to abide by the following passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Wander Ltd. v Antox India (P) Ltd.[9]

1990 Supp SCC 727 is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion.”

13. The discretionary order passed by the learned Single Judge is, therefore, ordinarily impervious to interference in appeal, unless manifests perversity or irreparable prejudice is shown to result as a consequence of the order.

14. In the present case, the learned Single Judge has kept the interim application filed by the School listed for further consideration on 26 November 2024, a mere five days hence. The interim directions which have been issued have only been issued so as to protect the interest of the teachers and staff of the school.

15. Mr. Jha, on being queried by the Court, does not dispute the position that the source of the funds from which the teachers and the staff of the school are to be paid is, indeed the bank accounts of the school, of which the impugned order directs defreezing.

16. It goes without saying that teachers and staff cannot be expected to work in school without pay. Any such exercise would partake of the character of unfair labour practice.

17. We do not wish to make any further observations, as the learned Single Judge has listed this application for further consideration on 26 November 2024.

18. We see no reason to interfere with the impugned order which, according to us, is eminently wholesome and in the interests of the teachers and staff who are entitled to full protection of the law.

19. We, therefore, direct compliance, forthwith, with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. However, the compliance would abide by further orders to be passed by the learned Single Judge on the application when it is taken up for hearing.

20. Subject to the aforesaid limited caveat, the LPA is dismissed.

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.