Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 9th December, 2024
SHEOJI KUMAR PATHAK ..... Petitioner
Through: Petitioner in person.
Through: Ms. Gauri, Mr. Rishabh Tehlan, and Mr. Wamic Wasim, Advs.
JUDGMENT
1. This application has been moved on behalf of the applicant/respondent/contemnor under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, 1950, seeking directions for recalling the Judgment dated 21.12.2023 passed by this Court, whereby the applicant/respondent/ contemnor, DAV College & Management Society [“DAVCMC”] was held guilty of committing wilful disobedience of the directions of this Court dated 12.01.2018 in W.P.(C) No. 12071/2016 for noncompliance of the following directions:
is discernable, some of the queries as stated in the application dated 04.09.2014 are ambiguous and do not indicate the precise information sought by the petitioner.
9. In the circumstances, the respondent is, directed to examine the information sought for by him and if necessary reword the same so that the same can be easily comprehended. The respondent shall file a typed application clearly indicating the information sought for by him within a period of two weeks from today. The petitioner shall respond to the same within a period of four weeks of receipt of such application.”
2. In the contempt proceedings, it was inter alia observed by this Court that the applicant/respondent/contemnor failed to appear in the proceedings before the Delhi High Court Mediation and Conciliation Centre [for short “Mediation Centre”] on 05.03.2018 at 03:00 p.m., and since no negotiations took place, the Mediation was a non-starter.
3. Further, this Court, while relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of DAV College Trust and Management Society v. Director of Public Instruction[1] held that applicant/respondent/contemnor was a „public authority‟ and not exempted from Section 8 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 [“RTI Act”]. Accordingly, for non-supply of certain documents which were sought by the non-applicant/petitioner, the applicant/respondent/ contemnor was held guilty and was directed to show cause on 15.02.2024 as to why he should not be punished under Section 2(b) read with Sections 10, 11 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 [“The Act”].
4. As a follow up, the present Review Petition has been moved for recalling of Judgment passed by this Court dated 21.12.2023. Notice 1 2019 (9) SCC 185 was issued to the non-applicant/petitioner and reply has been filed opposing the Review Petition.
5. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties and on perusal of the record, first things first, it was pointed out by the learned counsel for the applicant/respondent/contemnor that all relevant documents which were sought, have been handed over to the nonapplicant/petitioner during the hearing on 09.12.2024 vide letter dated 05.08.2024. In order to substantiate the same, a service report has also been placed on the record whereby the relevant information appears to have been supplied through an email dated 10.12.2024. Copies of the documents supplied have also been placed on the record, which are ordered to be digitized and taken on the judicial record.
6. Although the non-applicant/petitioner has refuted the supply of all the relevant information, it is evident that after supplying the documents on 10.12.2024, no grudge has been espoused by the nonapplicant/petitioner that any relevant information has been amiss.
7. Therefore, insofar as the issue of supply of all the relevant documents sought by the non-applicant/petitioner, the same is set to rest.
8. All said and done, learned counsel for the non applicant/petitioner had submitted that there are certain mistakes in the impugned order dated 21.12.2023 passed by this Court. Firstly, it is submitted that observations made by the Court that, no one appeared for the respondent in the Mediation proceedings and it was a nonstarter, is not correct, inasmuch as learned counsel for the applicant/ respondent/contemnor had appeared before the learned Advocate- Mediator in DHCMCC on different dates viz., 05.03.2018, 17.03.2018, 19.03.2018, 23.04.2018 and 24.05.2018.
9. The said plea cannot be accepted as evidently, no responsible or authorised officer appeared on behalf of the applicant/respondent/ contemnor during the mediation proceedings as also the respondent. The mere appearance of counsels for the respective parties did not yield any result. Thus, in the said circumstances, this Court observed that Mediation was not successful. Although, it may not be technically a non-starter, the fact of the matter is that in the absence of Authorized Representative of the applicant/respondent/ contemnor and the respondent himself, no fruitful negotiations could take place.
10. Another ground which is espoused by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that this Court has wrongly relied on the decision by the Supreme Court in the case of DAV College Trust and Management Society (supra). It is submitted that this Court has overlooked the observations of the Supreme Court contained in paragraph (32) to the effect that “Appellant No.1 is the Society which runs various colleges/ schools but each has an identity of its own, and, in our view, each of the college/school is a public authority within the meaning of the Act.”
11. It was sought to be contended by the learned counsel for the applicant/ respondent/contemnor that while each of the college/school may be a „public authority‟, DAVCMC is not a „public authority‟ within the ambit of RTI Act. I am afraid that this plea cannot be sustained in law. This Court vide judgment dated 21.12.2023 had an occasion to observe as under: “7. Having heard the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent and on perusal of the record, it is pertinent to mention that the Supreme Court in the case of DAV College Trust and Management Society v. Director of Public Instruction[2], has held that DAV CMC qualifies as a „public authority‟ within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act. It would be relevant to extract the following paragraphs from the judgment, which read as under: “29. While interpreting the provisions of the Act and while deciding what is substantial finance one has to keep in mind the provisions of the Act. This Act was enacted with the purpose of bringing transparency in public dealings and probity in public life. If NGOs or other bodies get substantial finance from the Government, we find no reason why any citizen cannot ask for information to find out whether his/her money which has been given to an NGO or any other body is being used for the requisite purpose or not.
30. It is in the light of the aforesaid proposition of law that we now propose to examine the cases individually. Civil Appeal No. 9828 of 2013
31. This has been filed by D.A.V. College Trust and Management Society, New Delhi; D.A.V. College, Chandigarh; M.C.M.D.A.V. College, Chandigarh and D.A.V. Senior Secondary School, Chandigarh.
32. Appellant No. 1 is the Society which runs various colleges/schools but each has an identity of its own and, in our view, each of the college/school is a public authority within the meaning of the Act. It has been urged that these colleges/schools are not being substantially financed by the Government in as much as that they do not receive more than 50% of the finance from the Government. Even the documents filed by the Appellants themselves show that M.C.M.D.A.V. College, Chandigarh, in the years 2004-05, 2005-06 and 2006-07, has received grants in excess of 1.[5] crores each year which constituted about 44% of the expenditure of the College. As far as D.A.V. College, Chandigarh is concerned the grant for these three years ranged from more than 3.[6] crores to 4.[5] crores and in percentage terms it is more than 40% of the total financial outlay for each year. Similar is the situation with D.A.V. Senior Secondary School, Chandigarh, where the contribution of the State is more 2 2019/INSC/1042 than 44%.
33. Another important aspect, as far as the colleges are concerned, is that 95% of the salary of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the College is borne by the State Government. A major portion of the remaining expenses shown by the College is with regard to the hostels, etc. It is teaching which is the essential part of the College and not the hostels or other infrastructure like auditorium, etc. The State has placed on record material to show that now these grants have increased substantially and in the years 2013-14, 2014-15 and 2015-16, the D.A.V. College, Chandigarh received amounts more than Rs. 15 crores yearly, M.C.M.D.A.V. College, Chandigarh received amounts more than Rs. 10 crores yearly and the D.A.V. Senior Secondary School, Chandigarh received grant of more than Rs. 4 crores yearly. It can be safely said that they are substantially financed by the Government.
35. These are substantial payments and amount to almost half the expenditure of the Colleges/School and more than 95% of the expenditure as far as the teaching and other staff is concerned. Therefore, in our opinion, these Colleges/School are substantially financed and are public authority within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Act.”
8. Alluding to the letter dated 27.02.2018, at the cost of repetition, the respondent has reiterated its earlier stand and has refused to supply the information on the ground that their institution is not covered under Section 2(h) of RTI Act and that information sought does not serve larger „public interest‟. Suffice to point out that the said letter makes reference to decisions by CIC and various High Courts to illustrate that DAV CMC is not a public authority.
9. Ex-facie, it is apparent that despite categorical directions of this Court that the information sought is not exempted from Section 8 of the RTI Act and that DAV CMC is a „public authority‟, which view has been fortified by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in DAV College Trust and Management Society v. Director of Public Instruction (supra), the respondent is guilty of committing patent breach of the directions passed by this Court. Therefore, this Court holds the respondent guilty for committing civil contempt under Section 2(b) read with Section 10, 11 and 12 of the CC Act. Since, the deceased respondent was not sued in his individual capacity but as the General Secretary of the DAV CMC, his successor in office remains accountable.”
12. In my considered opinion, there is no error apparent on the face of the record, so as to recall the aforesaid observations made by this Court.
13. In the end, since the non-applicant/petitioner has been supplied with all the relevant documents, and the applicant/respondent/ contemnor has purged itself of the contempt committed by it, this Court finds that no useful purpose would be served by proceeding for further action against the DAVCMC, be its initial General Secretary or his successor in the office.
14. The CM APPL. 4500/2024 stands disposed of.
DHARMESH SHARMA, J. DECEMBER 09, 2024