Rajiya Begum v. Rekha & Anr.

2024 SCC OnLine Del47 means absolute ownership in the land as well as of the structure standing thereupon. Ordinarily, the concept of ownership may be what is contended by the counsel for the appellant but in the modern context where it is more or less admitted that all lands belong to the State, the persons who hold properties will only be lessees or the persons holding the land on some term from the government or the authorities constituted by the State and in this view of the matter it could not be thought of that the legislature when it used the term “owner” in the provision of Section 14(1)(e) it thought of ownership as absolute ownership. It must be presumed that the concept of ownership only will be as it is understood at present. It could not be doubted that the term “owner” has to be understood in the context of the background of the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act. This Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But at the same time it has provided that the landlord under certain circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bona fide requirement is one of such grounds on the basis of which landlords have been permitted to have eviction of a tenant. In this context, the phrase “owner” thereof has to be understood, and it is clear that what is contemplated is that where the person builds up his property and lets out to the tenant and subsequently needs it for his own use, he should be entitled to an order or decree for eviction the only thing necessary for him to prove is bona fide requirement and that he is the owner thereof. In this context, what appears to be the meaning of the term “owner” is vis-a-vis the tenant i.e. the owner should be something more than the tenant. Admittedly in these cases where the plot of land is taken on lease the structure is built by the landlord and admittedly he is the owner of the structure…”

8. The submissions made by the Petitioner are those very submissions which he made before the learned Trial Court and have already been dealt with. The learned Trial Court has held that a better title has been established by the Respondent/landlord. This Court finds no infirmity in the findings of the learned Trial Court which have been impugned by the Petitioner.

9. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/tenant, in his application for Leave to Defend, averred that the Respondents/landlords have sold the ‘malba’ of the Jhuggi bearing no. 47, Dayal Singh Colony, Okhla, New Delhi-110065 by way of GPA, Agreement to Sell etc. all dated 22.02.2021 for a sale consideration of Rs. 4,50,000/-. The relevant extract of Leave to Defend is reproduced below:- “3. That the grounds on which the leave of the court is being prayed for are as follows: … C) Because the petitioner herein is neither the owner of the premises nor the landlord of the respondent. It is submitted that the petitioner has sold the Malba of Jhuggi bearing no. 47. Dayal Singh Colony, Okhla, New Delhi-110065 admeasuring 25 sq. yards to the respondent by way of GPA, Agreement to Sell. Affidavit, Will. Receipt and Possession Letter all dated 22.2.2021 for total sale consideration of Rs.4,50,000/- and the peaceful vacant physical possession of the said Jhuggi was also handed over to the respondent. It is submitted that the respondent is in possession of the said Jhuggi since the date of its purchase i.e. 22.2.2021. It is submitted that prior to the execution of the aforesaid title documents, the petitioner has also executed a Bayana Receipt dated 19.11.2020 towards the part payment of Rs.3,00,000/- and thereafter executed the aforesaid title documents on receiving the balance payment. It is further submitted that the respondent is the actual /absolute owner in possession of the jhuggi/property in question and not the tenant as alleged by the petitioner.” 9.[1] Concededly, the originals of these documents were not produced before the learned Trial Court stating that the documents were with the Respondents/landlords. It is not disputed that no legal proceedings have been initiated in respect of the claim of ownership of Petitioner/tenant before any Court of Law. In addition, by his own admission in the application for Leave to Defend, all that has been purchased by the Petitioner/tenant is ‘malba’ or ‘debris/rubbish that is lying around’ in the tenanted premises. The purchase of ‘debris/rubbish’ cannot be equated with the purchase of a property. Thus, the claim of the Petitioner/tenant is without any merit. In any event, this issue is put at rest in view of the fact that the documents of title/ownership were placed on record by the Respondents/landlords.

10. The Respondents/landlords have contended that he has placed documents of title in his favour and other documents before the Trial Court. The same finds mention in the Impugned Order as well. The Respondents/landlords have also clarified that the Respondent inducted the Petitioner as a tenant and nothing more. So far as the claims of the ownership of the Petitioner/tenant and the documents executed are concerned, it is the contention of the Respondents/landlords that these have been obtained fraudulently and are subject matter of a criminal complaint which is pending adjudication before the appropriate forum.

11. In any event, it is the settled law that the eviction proceedings cannot be utilized to settle title dispute between the parties. A Coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Puran Chand Aggarwal v. Lekh Raj[3] has held that the imperfectness of the title of the premises cannot stand in the way of an Eviction Petition and the tenant cannot be allowed to raise the plea of imperfect title or title not vesting in the landlord. The Court further held that the tenant is estopped and cannot dispute the title of the landlord in the view of the provision of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 with any change in the subsequent change in the situation.

“ownership” of the landlord for the purpose of maintaining a petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act is not required to be an absolute ownership of the property, and that it is sufficient if the landlord is a person who is collecting the rent on his own behalf. The imperfectness of the title of the premises can neither stand in the way of an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, nor can the tenant be allowed to raise the plea of imperfect title or title not vesting in the landlord and that too when the tenant has been paying the rent to the landlord. The tenant inducted by landlord is estopped and cannot dispute the title of his landlord in view of the provisions of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act without there being any subsequent change in the situation…”

12. The scope of examination by this Court in a Revision Petition filed under Section 25(B)(8) of the Act is well settled. The Supreme Court Abidul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua[4] has held that the jurisdiction of this Court is only revisionary in nature and limited in scope. The Supreme Court while interpreting the intendment of the legislature in removing two stages of Appeal that were earlier provided in the said Act has held that this is a conscious omission. The High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its view with that of the learned Trial Court, its only role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. Thus, the scope of revisionary jurisdiction of this Court has been limited to examine if there is an error apparent on the fact of the record or absence of any adjudication by the learned Trial Court, and it is only then should the High Court interfere. The Supreme Court has also cautioned from converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first Appeal under revisionary jurisdiction. The relevant extract of the Abid-ul-Islam case is as follows: “Scope of revision “22. We are, in fact, more concerned with the scope and ambit of the proviso to Section 25-B(8). The proviso creates a distinct and unequivocal embargo by not providing an appeal against the order passed by the learned Rent Controller over an application filed under sub-section (5). The intendment of the legislature is very clear, which is to remove the appellate remedy and thereafter, a further second appeal. It is a clear omission that is done by the legislature consciously through a covenant removing the right of two stages of appeals.

23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature. xxx It could thus be seen, that this Court has held, that the High Court while exercising the revisional powers under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 though could not reassess and reappraise the evidence, as if it was exercising appellate jurisdiction, however, it was empowered to reappraise the evidence for the limited purpose so as to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable.”

13. In view of the aforegoing discussion, this Court finds no merit in the present Petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. Pending Application stands closed.