Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 09.12.2024
35611/2023-Delay 166 days in filing appeal.
DELHI STATE INDUSTRIAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. .....Appellant
Through: Ms. Firdouse Qutb Wani, Mr. Md.
Zaryab Jamal Rizvi and Ms. Subia Naaz, Advocates
Through: Mr. Rajiv Aneja, Advocate for Respondent no.1
Mr. Anuj Aggarwal, ASC, GNCTD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAURABH BANERJEE
JUDGMENT
1. By way of the present appeal under Clause X of the Letters Patent Act, the appellant seeks to assail the impugned judgment dated 01.11.2022 whereby the learned Single Judge of this Court has allowed the writ petition instituted by the respondent no.1/ petitioner by holding that he was entitled to an alternate industrial plot earmarked for him vide allotment letter dated 07.05.2004 issued by the appellant.
SAURABH BANERJEE, J (ORAL)
2. Prior to venturing into the merits involved, we like to note that the present appeal is accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Act) wherein the appellant is seeking condonation of delay of 166 days in filing the present Letters Patent Appeal.
3. As per the appellant, the said delay of 166 days was on account of departmental and administrative action involved. It is the appellant’s case that even though the day the impugned judgment was uploaded on the website of this Court, it was sent to the concerned division the very same day. As per appellant, the concerned division examined the same and sent it to the higher authorities for approval with regards to challenging the same, which exercise took some time whereafter the file was sent to the legal counsel of the DSIIDC. It was after obtaining the opinion of the counsel that the present appeal was then prepared and forwarded to the concerned division (DSIIDC) and was eventually filed by, which time a delay of 166 days had been occasioned.
4. Per-contra, learned counsel for the respondent no.1 opposes the long gap of which the appellant seeks condonation of delay by urging that the reasons furnished by the appellant cannot be treated as sufficient cause. He, therefore, prays that the appeal along with the application be dismissed at the outset itself.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record as well.
6. In our considered view, the application seeking condonation of delay has been filed in a routine, casual manner and is completely bereft of any material particulars required for the appellant to seek condonation of 166 days of inordinate delay in filing the present appeal. The appellant has to both plead and show substantive reasons which prevented it from filing the present appeal within the allotted time frame to seek the benefit of Section 5 of the Act. The appellant in our view was required to show ‘sufficient cause’ for such an inordinate delay, especially when there is a substantive lapse of time on the part of the appellant. Merely because the appellant is an organisation of the government, cannot in itself be a ground to give/ extend any special benefit. The law and guidelines qua applicability of Section 5 of the Act is the same for one and other all across the country. There cannot be and should not be any differentiation and/ or difference between the common man and the government.
7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Basawaraj vs. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, while dealing with the expression ‘sufficient cause’ as provided under Section 5 of the Act held as under:-
expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510], Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705: AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448: (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907].) xxxx
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
8. Reliance is also placed upon the dictum of the Hon’be Supreme Court in Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields., 1961 SCC OnLine SC 39, wherein it has held as under:-
excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan [(1890) ILR 13 Mad 269] “Section 5 gives the court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words „sufficient cause‟ receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant.”
9. Reliance is further placed upon the dictum of the Hon’be Supreme Court in Mool Chandra vs Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1878, wherein it has been held as under:-
10. Interestingly, this Court has also, recently reiterating the same stand of the Hon’ble Supreme Court since long in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Sharp Mint Ltd.2024:DHC:8833-DB also in Union of India & Ors. vs Capt Munish Chaudhary2024:DHC:9218-DB recently held that any party like the appellant herein cannot be allowed to avail the benefit of condonation casually, especially wherein such party like the appellant fails to show any ‘sufficient cause’ for delay in filing the appeal before any Court.
11. Lastly, de hors the above, in view of the aforesaid factual position, even while delving into the merits of the present appeal, we find it hard to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. This is primarily since the appellant has had itself issued the allotment letter with respect to the plot of land to the respondent no.1 in 2004, after which, it had accepted the full payment of more than Rs.[9] lakhs for the same, only to retract therefrom and cancel the allotment after a lapse of more than six years i.e. 2011.
12. In our opinion, there could have been no plausible reason for the appellant to belatedly act in such a manner, more so, whence there was no fault on the part of the respondent no.1.
13. Accordingly, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgement passed by the learned Single Judge, the present appeal alongwith applications is dismissed in liminie.
(SAURABH BANERJEE) JUDGE (REKHA PALLI)
JUDGE DECEMBER 9, 2024