Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 11.12.2024
DALJEET AUTO CENTRE .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Ram Anugrah Singh, Mr. Vivek Singh Somanshi and Ms. Alpana Kiran, Advocates.
Through: None.
JUDGMENT
1. Allowed, subject to the Petitioner filing typed copies/dim documents/ vernacular/not legible documents within a period of three weeks.
2. The Application stands disposed of. CM APPL. 72670/2024 [Delay in filing Petition]
3. This is an Application seeking condonation of 65 days in filing the present Petition.
4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Application has been filed by way of abundant caution, however, the Petition has not been filed with any delay. He submits that the Impugned Order was passed on 05.06.2024 and the certified copy was applied for thereafter and that the Petition has been filed on 30.11.2024.
5. The question of limitation for filing a Petition under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was decided by a Coordinate Bench in Jai Prakash v. Jean Conea[1]. It was held therein that Revision Petition shall be governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which provides for a period of three years to file a Petition. This position holds good even today. In these circumstances, the Petition filed within six months of the Impugned Order is within time.
6. The Application is, accordingly, disposed of. CM APPL. 72669/2024 [Stay]
7. The present Petition has been filed seeking to impugn the order dated 05.06.2024 [hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Order”] passed by the learned ACJ/CCJ/ARC (West), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi. By the Impugned Order, the Leave to Defend/Contest Application filed by the Petitioner has been dismissed by the learned Trial Court with a finding that no triable issue has been raised by the Petitioner/tenant. The premises in issue are shop No.2 at WZ-115, Meenakshi Garden, New Delhi – 110018 [hereinafter referred to as “subject premises”].
8. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/tenant has raised two issues before this Court. He submits that in the first instance, that the requirement is not bona fide since there are 6 rooms along with the subject premises within the same property which are already available to Respondent/landlord. In the second instance, he submits that Annexure A of the Eviction Petition sets out that the Respondent/landlord for the purposes of marriage of her daughter has to correct the symmetry of the subject property, thus the Petition is not maintainable under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [hereinafter referred to as “DRC Act”] but lies under Section 1981 RLR 152 14(1)(g) of the DRC Act. He seeks to rely upon Paragraphs 18 and 19 of his Application for Leave to Defend.
9. Additionally, learned Counsel for the Petitioner/tenant states that the site plan filed by him in his Rejoinder, was not looked at by the learned Trial Court.
10. This Court has examined the Impugned Order. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/tenant has relied upon one sub para of the Eviction Petition to state that the Petition has been filed under Section 14(1)(g) and not Section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act. The relevant extract of the Eviction Petition is below: “xii. That the daughter of the petitioner is of marriageable age. For the purpose of marriage of her daughter, the petitioner has to make some alternation in the property to correct the symmetry of property. Therefore, the petitioner is in bonafide need of premise in question.” 10.[1] Section 14(1)(g) of the DRC Act reads as follows:
11. The contentions of the Petitioner/tenant are without merit. The Petition has been filed by the Respondent/landlord under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act and for the bona fide requirement of the Respondent/landlord for his family members. It has been stated therein that the Respondent/landlord is facing acute shortage of space for his children who are now adults and of marriageable age. It is further stated by the Respondent/landlord that the front of the building was being used as shops and the rear as the residence and that hence the shops were vacated and merged with the residence. It is in this context that averment has been made by the Respondent/landlord in his Petition. The word ‘alteration’ is not being used to make any substantial alterations or for the purposes of ‘rebuilding’ as is the requirement of Section 14(1)(g) of DRC Act.
12. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in Vijay Kumar Farshwal v. Kishan Lal,2, while relying on a line of judgements of this Court, sets out that the distinction between 14(1)(e) and 14(1)(g) of DRC Act, lies in its purpose, and once it is material that premises are required by the landlord for his use or for the use of any of his family member dependent on him, the petition would be covered under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. As such, the challenge on this aspect by Petitioner/tenant is untenable.
13. It is further contended that subject premises is lying locked and not being used by the Petitioner/tenant and no rental payment is being made since 1996. Thus, an examination of the Eviction Petition shows that it is for bona fide need and not for construction/alteration.
14. On the aspect of landlord-tenant relationship and ownership of the Respondent/landlord, the same is not under challenge. The record shows that the need as set out by the Respondent/landlord is for his need and his family members. The learned Trial Court has taken into consideration, the challenge laid by the Petitioner/tenant on the aspect of both, of the site plan and of availability of the additional accommodation that has been dealt with by the learned Trial Court.
15. The learned Trial Court has also found that the copy of the site plan placed on record by the Petitioner/tenant was an old site plan and also not certified nor clearly legible. The Impugned Order gives a finding that the shop Nos.[1] and 3, which are stated to have been available, were vacated in the year 1998 and 2015 and the site plan placed on record is prior to that date. Thus, this site plan cannot be looked at. 15.[1] In any event, it is a settled law that if a certified site plan is not filed by the tenant, the site plan given by the landlord will have to be taken into consideration. [See: Anita Jain v. Parveen Kumar Jain[3] ]
16. The learned Trial Court has also found that the Respondent/landlord is currently in possession of two bedrooms and one small room and given the fact that there are four adult family members, the space is limited. The learned Trial Court has, after discussing the law on this aspect, as laid down by the Supreme Court and Coordinate Benches of this Court, has held that this contention does not have any merit since, if the alternate accommodation available does not satisfy the need of the landlord or the convenience or safety of the landlord and their family members, the same cannot be held to be either alternate or reasonable suitable accommodation [See Swaranjit Singh and Another v. Saroj Kapoor[4] ].
17. The Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta[5] has stated that is not for the Court to dictate to the landlord as to how the landlord should live or in how many rooms. The landlord has a right to live comfortably in his own property.
18. On the aspect of the fact that the hardship will be caused to the
Petitioner, if he is asked to vacate the subject premises, the attention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner was drawn to the judgment passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the matter of Bosco Joseph v. Raj Kumar[6]. The relevant extract of the Bosco Joseph case is set out below:
19. The Supreme Court Abid-ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua[7] has held that the jurisdiction of this Court is only revisionary in nature and limited in scope. The Supreme Court while interpreting the intendment of the legislature in removing two stages of Appeal that were earlier provided in the said Act has held that this is a conscious omission. The High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its view with that of the learned Trial Court, its only role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. Thus, the scope of revisionary jurisdiction of this Court has been limited to examine if there is an error apparent on the fact of the record or absence of any adjudication by the learned Trial Court, and it is only then should the High Court interfere. The Supreme Court has also cautioned from converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first Appeal under revisionary jurisdiction. The relevant extract of the Abid-ul-Islam case is as follows: “Scope of revision “22. We are, in fact, more concerned with the scope and ambit of the proviso to Section 25-B(8). The proviso creates a distinct and unequivocal embargo by not providing an appeal against the order passed by the learned Rent Controller over an application filed under sub-section (5). The intendment of the legislature is very clear, which is to remove the appellate remedy and thereafter, a further second appeal. It is a clear omission that is done by the legislature consciously through a covenant removing the right of two stages of appeals.
23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature. xxx
25. The aforesaid decision has been recently considered and approved by this Court in Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal [Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal, (2020) 7 SCC 327: (2020) 4 SCC (Civ) 107]: (SCC pp. 340-41, paras 22-23)
Court while exercising the revisional powers under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 though could not reassess and reappraise the evidence, as if it was exercising appellate jurisdiction, however, it was empowered to reappraise the evidence for the limited purpose so as to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable. [Emphasis supplied]
20. In view of the aforegoing submissions, this Court finds no infirmity in the Impugned Order. CM APPL. 72669/2024 is accordingly dismissed.
21. At this stage, learned Counsel for the Petitioner/tenant requests for additional six months’ time to vacate the subject premises. On this limited aspect, let dasti Notice be issued to the Respondent. Affidavit of service be filed within one week. 21.[1] Let one set of the paper book be supplied to the Respondent. One set of the paper book be also supplied to the learned Counsel for the Respondent who appeared before the learned Trial Court.
22. The parties shall be present in Court on the next date of hearing.
23. List on 23.12.2024 in the Supplementary List.