Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
LPA 1198/2024, CM APPLs. 72587/2024, 72588/2024 &
72589/2024 PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK & ORS. .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Rajesh Kumar Gautam, Adv.
Through: Mr. Shanker Raju, Adv.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN
JUDGMENT
11.12.2024 C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
1. This letters patent appeal is directed against judgment dated 29 August 2024 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in WP (C) 4011/2012.
2. The respondent, who was working as Chief Manager in the Punjab National Bank[1], was issued a Memorandum of Charge[2] on 11 April 2009. The charge sheet contained only one article of charge against the respondent. It alleged that the respondent had, without conducting proper pre-sanction appraisal, sanctioned and enhanced “the Bank”, hereinafter “the charge sheet” hereinafter credit facilities in various borrowal accounts and that he had failed to observe post-sanction follow up. His actions were alleged to have jeopardized the interests of the bank, as a result of which considerable amounts had become irrecoverable.
3. The aforesaid charge sheet was followed by supplementary charge sheets on 29 June 2009 and 23 July 2009. They did not contain any additional charges against the respondent.
4. Annexure III to the charge sheet contained a list of documents on the basis of which the allegations in the charge sheet were proposed to be proved. However, there was no accompanying list of witnesses, as envisaged by Rule 6(3) of the Punjab National Bank Officers Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations 1977[3], which read thus:
“the 1997 Regulations”, hereinafter the copies of documents, disciplinary authority shall allow the officer employee inspection of such documents within a time specified in this behalf.”
5. By order dated 30 May 2009 of the Disciplinary Authority[4], an Inquiry Officer[5] was appointed to inquire into the allegation contained against the respondent in the charge-sheet dated 11 April 2009.
6. The proceedings of the inquiry are forthcoming on the record. It is not necessary to advert in detail to the proceedings before the IO. Suffice it to state that, during the proceedings which took place before the IO on 4 March 2010, the specific submission, of the respondent, that documents enlisted in Annexure-III to the charge-sheet were not reliable, has been recorded. Additionally, the perusal of the record of the inquiry reveals that the appellant did not lead the evidence of even a single witness to prove the documents relied upon by it.
7. Consequent to conclusion of the inquiry, the IO submitted his inquiry report to the DA, under cover of letter dated 23 May 2011. The inquiry report disclosed that the allegation against him was specifically denied by the respondent. Though the inquiry report is extremely detailed, it is apparent that the IO, without referring to a single witness who proved any of the documents on which the charge sheet placed reliance, treated the documents as correct and, on the basis thereof, held the allegation against the respondent to stand proved. “DA” hereinafter “IO” hereinafter
8. A copy of the inquiry report was provided to the respondent under cover of letter dated 28 May 2011. The respondent, by communication dated 9 July 2011, addressed to the Chief Manager, as the DA, refuted the findings of the IO.
9. The DA, however, agreed with the findings of the IO and, by order dated 22 September 2011, awarded, to the respondent, the punishment of “removal from service which would not be a disqualification for future employment”, in terms of Regulation 4 (i) of the 1977 Regulations.
10. The respondent appealed, against the aforesaid decision of the DA, to the Appellate Authority, who dismissed the appeal vide order dated 30 April 2012.
11. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent approached this Court by means of WP (C) 4011/2012[6].
12. By the impugned judgment dated 29 August 2024, a learned Single Judge of this Court has allowed the aforesaid writ petition. The impugned judgement
13. The learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition on two grounds. S.K Jain v Punjab National Bank & Ors.
14. The first is that a charge sheet under Regulation 6 of the 1977 Regulations was necessarily required to be accompanied by a list of witnesses who would prove the documents on which reliance was placed. The charge sheet dated 11 April 2009, as well as the supplementary charge sheets dated 29 June 2009 and 23 July 2009 have been held by the learned Single Judge to stand ipso facto vitiated as no witnesses, to prove the documents enlisted in Annexure-III to the charge sheet, were cited. The learned Single Judge has observed that, by virtue of Regulation 6(3), a charge sheet, unaccompanied by a list of documents, was unsustainable in law.
15. The second ground on which the learned Single Judge has proceeded is that the IO, as well as the DA, could not have relied upon the documents which were not proved through witnesses. Though the strict principles of evidence do not apply to disciplinary proceedings, the learned Single Judge has held that the requirement of any document, on which reliance was being placed against the charged officer, being proved through witnesses, was non-negotiable, especially where the charged officer had denied the documents.
16. Proceeding from the above findings, the learned Single Judge has set aside the charge sheets dated 11 April 2009, 29 June 2009 and 23 July 2009, as well as the order of punishment dated 22 September 2011 passed by the DA, reserving liberty, however, with the appellant to take recourse to a de novo inquiry, if so advised, in accordance with law, from the stage of issuance of charge sheet. The said liberty is however, hedged in with a caveat, which would be apparent from the penultimate para 21 of the impugned judgment, which may be reproduced thus:
17. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge, the PNB has filed the present Letters Patent Appeal.
18. We have heard Mr Rajesh Kumar Gautam, learned Counsel for the appellants and Mr. Shanker Raju, learned Counsel for the respondent, at length. Rival Submissions
19. Apropos the two grounds on which the learned Single Judge has proceeded, Mr. Gautam submits as under.
20. In the first place, submits Mr. Gautam, the learned Single Judge was not correct in her finding that a charge sheet unaccompanied by a list of witnesses was ipso facto vitiated on that sole ground. He submits that the requirement of a list of witnesses accompanying the charge sheet, though envisaged by Regulation 6 of the 1977 Regulations, could not be regarded as mandatory. The charge sheet could not be said to be illegal merely because it was not accompanied by a list of witnesses.
21. The second submission of Mr. Gautam, apropos the second ground on which the learned Single Judge has proceeded, is that, in fact, in the present case, the respondent had not denied the documents on which the appellant was seeking to place reliance, enlisted in Annexure-III to the charge sheet dated 11 April 2009. He submits that a mere statement that the documents were unreliable does not constitute a denial thereof. As such, he submits that the learned Single Judge erred in holding that the IO was not entitled to rely on the said documents as they had not been proved by oral evidence.
22. Mr Raju has, broadly, adopted the findings of the learned Single Judge which, he submits, were sufficient to set aside the entire proceedings, from the stage of issuance of the charge sheets. The impugned judgment, therefore, in his submission, does not justify interference.
23. We find ourselves in agreement with Mr. Gautam on his first submission, but not on the second.
24. We agree that a list of witnesses is not a necessary adjunct in every case to a memorandum of charges and it is open to an authority issuing a charge sheet to, if the authority so chooses, not lead the evidence of any witness. One may, for example, simply envisage a case in which the DA alleges that the alleged misconduct, as committed by the charged officer, breaches some mandatory executive directive. In such an event, if the directive that is alleged to be breached is a public document, which cannot be denied, there may be no need to lead the oral evidence of any witness. No list of witnesses would, in such a case, accompany the charge sheet, but the proceedings would nonetheless be maintainable.
25. However, if the authority decides not to cite any witness, it does so at its peril, and, if, as in the present case, the documentary evidence on which the authority desires to rely required to be proved by oral evidence, it runs the risk of the case being rendered one of no evidence.
26. We, however, concur with the submission of Mr. Gautam that a charge sheet unaccompanied by a list of witnesses is not, merely for that reason, invalidated in law.
27. We find this view supported by para 20 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v Narendra Kumar Pandey[7] which reads thus:
28. On the second ground, however, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge has correctly held that, in the absence of evidence having been led of any witnesses who would support the documents on which the appellants proposed to confirm the charges against the respondent, the IO was in error in holding the charges to be proved and, consequently, the DA was also in error in agreeing with the IO and penalizing the respondent.
29. We cannot accept Mr. Gautam’s submission that the respondent had not denied the documents enlisted in Annexure-III to the charge sheet dated 11 April 2009. As has already been noted by us earlier in this judgment, the respondent had, during the course of inquiry on 23 May 2011, specifically submitted that the said documents were unreliable. We fail to understand what more was required to constitute denial of the said documents. The submission of the respondent that the documents were unreliable, plainly, constitutes a clear denial of their reliability in the inquiry proceedings. This necessitated proving of the documents through oral evidence, before the IO could proceed to rely upon them.
30. We, therefore, agree with the learned Single Judge that, as the documents were not proved through oral evidence, the IO could not have relied on the documents and that, therefore, the finding that charges against the respondent stood proved, was unsustainable in law.
31. The learned Single Judge has also relied on several judicial pronouncements which cover the issue. We deem it appropriate to reproduce the following passages from some of the said decisions: Roop Singh Negi v Punjab National Bank[8]
17. In Moni Shankar v UOI[9], this Court held: ‘17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that the evidence adduced by the Department, even if it is taken on its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof, namely, preponderance of probability. If on such evidences, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality.” (Emphasis supplied) State of UP v Saroj Kumar Sinha 10
be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the Department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents.
29. Apart from the above, by virtue of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India the departmental enquiry had to be conducted in accordance with the rules of natural justice. It is a basic requirement of the rules of natural justice that an employee be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in any proceedings which may culminate in punishment being imposed on the employee.” UOI v Ritu Chaudhary11 “16. Although, as pointed out by learned counsel for the Petitioners, in disciplinary inquiry proceedings the rules of the CPC and the Evidence Act may not strictly apply, it is basic that the mere production of a document is not sufficient even in a disciplinary inquiry. There has to be some witness to prove such a document. Without a witness to prove the documents, the Enquiry Officer cannot take it on record as a genuine document. In the present case in the absence of any list of witnesses, there was no means by which the documents could have been proved by the Department in the inquiry proceedings.”
32. The principle that documents on which reliance is sought to be placed in disciplinary proceedings have to be proved through oral evidence also stands reiterated by Division Benches of this Court in A.K. Saxena v UOI12 and UOI v Shameem Akhtar13. In the latter decision, the Division Bench has also observed that the requirement of
MANU/DE/3458/2016 MANU/DE/3867/2015 the documents, on which the management seeks to place reliance against an employee, having to be proved through oral evidence is also essential so that the employee gets an opportunity to rebut the evidence by cross-examining the witnesses through whom the documents are sought to be proved. If no witnesses are cited, the employee losses the opportunity of cross-examination and, thereby, rebutting the evidence against her, or him. Conclusion
33. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge.
34. The appeal accordingly stands dismissed, with no orders as to costs.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.