Ajay Kumar Bhalla & Ors. v. Prakash Kumar Dixit

10. Compliance with the judgment and order of the High Court be effected within three months from today.”

6. By order dated 8 March 2021, the Union of India reinstated the respondent in service. However, para 35(iv) of the order substituted the penalty of reduction to a lower stage in the scale of pay by one stage for a period not exceeding 3 years, without cumulative effect and adversely affecting pension, but made the penalty effective from 8 March 2021. The paragraph read: “(iv) The penalty of 'reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay by one stage for a period not exceeding three years, or till the date of his superannuation i.e. 31.03.2023, whichever is earlier, without cumulative effect and without adversely affecting pension' is hereby imposed upon Shri Prakash Kumar Dixit, Ex-Assistant Commandant, the Petitioner from the date of issuance of this order.”

7. Pursuant to the above order, the respondent re-joined service with the CRPF on 16 March 2021, as Assistant Commandant.

8. The appellant also filed compliance affidavits before the learned Single Judge, in Cont Cas (C) 198/2020, asserting that, in view of the passing of the order dated 8 March 2021, no case for contempt survived.

9. Before the learned Single Judge, the respondent contended, per contra, that the Division Bench had, in its judgment dated 24 December 2019, specifically directed that the substituted minor penalty of reduction to a lower stage in the scale of pay by one stage for a period not exceeding 3 years, without cumulative effect and without adversely affecting pension would be effective from 10 July

1995. Ergo, it was submitted, in making the penalty effective from the date of issuance of the order dated 8 March 2021, the appellant had committed contempt of this Court. The appellants, in reply, submitted that an order of punishment could never be retrospective and relied, for the purpose, on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State Bank of Patiala v Ram Niwas Bansal[3].

10. More importantly for the present appeal, the respondent also contended that, by making the minor penalty effective from 8 March 2021, the appellants were seeking to deny, to the respondent, promotion to the rank of Additional Director General[4] /Inspector General[5] in the CRPF, which was held by his immediate junior. The appellants, in response to this contention, asserted that, as the minor penalty imposed on the respondent would remain in operation for 3 years from 8 March 2021, he was not entitled to consideration for promotion as ADG till then.

11. During the pendency of Cont Cas (C) 198/2020, the UOI

“ADG” hereinafter amended para 35(iv) of the order dated 8 March 2021 supra, to make the substituted minor penalty of reduction to a lower stage in the scale of pay by one stage for a period not exceeding 3 years, without cumulative effect and without adversely affecting pension effective from 16 October 2018. The substituted para 35(iv) read thus: “The penalty of ‘reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay by one stage for a period not exceeding three years, without cumulative effect and without adversely affecting pension’ is hereby imposed upon Shri Prakash Kumar Dixit, Ex-Assistant Commandant, w.e.f. 16.10.2018.”

12. The respondent contended, before the learned Single Judge, that this amendment continued to remain contemptuous of the judgment dated 24 December 2019, which had specifically made the substituted minor penalty of reduction to a lower stage in the scale of pay by one and without adversely affecting pension effective from 10 July 1995. It was further contended that the respondent would be entitled for consideration for all future promotions after 9 July 1998 (when the period of 3 years’ punishment, reckoned from 10 July 1995, would come to an end), with effect from the dates when his immediate junior secured promotion. Among these would include consideration for promotion to the grade of IG w.e.f. 24 December 2019. Even if the minor penalty were to take effect on 16 October 2018, it was submitted that the respondent would be entitled for consideration for promotion till the rank of IG w.e.f. 2021 till his superannuation on 31 March 2023.

13. Further, during the pendency of Cont Cas (C) 198/2020, a “IG” hereinafter review DPC met on 14 March 2023, to consider the case of the respondent for promotion as Deputy Commandant. Consequent on the recommendations of the review DPC, the UOI passed order dated 22 March 2023, promoting the respondent as Deputy Commandant on notional basis w.e.f. 17 October 2021, when the 3 year period of the minor punishment imposed on him, reckoned from 16 October 2018, came to an end. The order further stated that the respondent was not eligible for consideration for further promotions, as 5 years’ residency period and 2 years’ mandatory field service as well as completion of a pre-promotional course was essential therefor.

14. The learned Single Judge has, by the impugned judgment dated 2 June 2023, disposed of Cont Cas (C) 198/2020.

15. The learned Single Judge has agreed with the respondent’s contention that he was entitled to have the minor penalty of reduction to a lower stage in the scale of pay by one stage for a period not exceeding 3 years, without cumulative effect and without adversely affecting pension implemented w.e.f. 10 July 1995, and not w.e.f. 16 October 2018. This has been framed, by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment, as “Issue No. 1”.

16. The learned Single Judge proceeds, thereafter, to deal with “Issue No. 2”, which is framed as “Petitioner’s entitlement, if any, to promotion to higher ranks”. This is followed by a detailed discussion of the rival contentions regarding the entitlement of the respondent for further promotion as IG. On this aspect, the discussion and findings of the learned Single Judge, and the resultant conclusions, to the extent relevant, read thus: “47. It is a matter of record that the Petitioner's immediate junior held the post of IG, as on 14.09.2021 when the Respondent(s) first considered the Petitioner's case for promotion in compliance with the judgment of the Division Bench. The Petitioner's immediate junior, was promoted to the post of ADG on 01.02.2023.

49. In the facts of this case, the obstinate denial of the Respondent(s) to give effect to the judgment of the Division Bench in favour of the Petitioner is writ large. The Petitioner was served with a charge sheet on 06.09.1989 and penalty of “removal from service” was imposed on the Petitioner on 10.07.1995. The said order imposing penalty of removal from service, after four (4) rounds of litigation was first set aside on 30.11.2012 by the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Petitioner was directed to be reinstated. The Respondent(s) acted upon the said order dated 30.11.2012 belatedly on 12.08.2015 and while reinstating the Petitioner, the Respondent(s) immediately placed him under deemed suspension w.e.f. 10.07.1995, until further orders.

50. Though the Petitioner made representation against his deemed suspension on 05.10.2015, the Respondent(s) failed to take any further steps in the disciplinary proceedings, which remained pending. It was during the pendency of a writ petition filed before this Court that the Respondent(s) took the final decision on 16.10.2018 reiterating their decision of imposing penalty of “removal from service” on the Petitioner. The said order dated 16.10.2018 was set aside by the Division Bench by its judgment dated 24.12.2019 holding that the Respondent(s) herein had fallen in serious error in the manner in which the Petitioner's case has been dealt with and in these facts and circumstances set aside the order dated 16.10.2018 and directed his reinstatement from 10.07.1995. The Respondent(s) issued the Reinstatement order on 08.03.2021 and the Petitioner re-joined CRPF on 16.03.2021.

51. In the facts and circumstances of this case at this juncture it is pertinent to refer to the decision of a Division Bench of this court in Nb. Subedar (Skt) Jasbir Singh v UOI[6], wherein the court held that, an officer cannot be denied his promotion if he is unable to fulfil the eligibility criteria due to the wrongs committed by the department. Further this court in the case of Satish Kumar Kehtarpal v Director General CISF[7], held that the officer's inability to complete the pre-promotional course on account of the fault of Departmental authorities must not come in the way of officers being granted notional promotion.

52. In the light of decisions discussed above it can be reckoned

2017 SCC OnLine Del 7491 that Petitioner cannot be refused promotions because of the Respondents' failings, for the reason that period from 10.07.1995 till 16.03.2021, wherein the Petitioner was prevented from serving in active duty was solely on account of the acts and omissions of the Respondent(s), as is evident from the judicial record. The inability of the Petitioner, therefore, to render mandatory field service or to complete residency period and pre promotional courses is only on account of circumstances created by the Respondent(s).

53. The Petitioner has rightly contended that the Reinstatement order at paragraph 35 (v) expressly states that for the purpose of promotion the intervening period, i.e. 10.07.1995 to 23.12.2021, shall be treated as period ‘On Duty’. Thus, for the purposes of granting notional promotion to the Petitioner, the Respondent(s) were bound to consider the Petitioner ‘on duty’ for the said period and therefore, the reasons cited in the order dated 22.03.2023 for denying promotion is contrary to paragraph 35 (v) of the Reinstatement order and the unequivocal direction issued by the Division Bench vide judgment dated 24.12.2019. The paragraph 35(v) of the Reinstatement order reads as under: “The intervening period w.e.f. 10.07.1995 to 23.12.2019 (i.e. one day before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi order dated 24.12.2019 in WPC No. 1525/2019) will be treated as ‘period not spent on duty’ under the provisions of FR- 54-A, except for the purpose of pension, pay fixation, seniority and other consequential benefits including promotions, as per the directions passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi vide order dated 24.12.2019 and upheld by the Hon'ble Apex Court vide order dated 07.12.2020.” (Emphasis supplied)

54. The learned ASG has, however, sought to explain the said direction at paragraph 35 (v), by merely stating that promotion is not a matter of right.

55. This Court is unable to accept the said submission of the learned ASG and is of the opinion that considering the fact that the promotion which was being offered to the Petitioner was notional and not actual, the Respondent(s) in light of the judgment dated 24.12.2019 are obligated to grant notional promotion to the Petitioner to the post held by his immediate junior, Mr. R.D.S. Sahi.

56. The judgment of the Division Bench was passed on 24.12.2019, however, the record of this contempt petition would evidence that the Respondent(s) made piecemeal compliance of the judgment under the pain of the orders passed in this petition. This would be evident from the fact that (i) the Reinstatement order was passed on 08.03.2021 and the Petitioner rejoined on 16.03.2021;

(ii) the Respondent(s) sought to impose the minor penalty w.e.f.,

08.03.2021 despite the fact that the Division Bench had unequivocally directed that the Petitioner is to be reinstated w.e.f., 10.07.1995. In the bargain, the Respondent(s) contested these proceedings to deny the relief of promotion; (iii) The Respondent(s) after many a flip-flop amended its stand to impose the minor penalty w.e.f., 16.10.2018 and consequently, on 22.03.2023 granted promotion for one rank to the post of Deputy Commandant; and (iv) the issue surviving for compliance is the notional promotion of the Petitioner to the posts of Second-in- Command, Commandant, DIG, IG and ADG, since the Petitioner's immediate junior Mr. R.D.S. Sahi held the post of IG since 29.07.2016 and as on the date (12.08.2021) when the Petitioner was considered for promotion to give effect to the directions issued in the judgment dated 24.12.2019.

57. This Court is of the opinion that learned ASG, appearing on behalf of the Respondent(s) has sought to explain the denial of promotion to the Respondent(s) on the facts enumerated in the written note handed over to the Court during the course of hearing on 28.03.2023 to contend that the Petitioner herein cannot be compared in view of the service rendered by his immediate junior, who served on actual duty for more than thirty-seven (37) years whereas the Petitioner herein spent approximately, eight (8) years in physical duty.

58. This Court is of the opinion that neither the Respondent(s) nor this Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction in the contempt petition can evaluate the right of the Petitioner to be granted the notional promotion, which has already been directed to be granted by the Division Bench vide judgment dated 24.12.2019. The Respondent(s) do not have any discretion in this matter and as directed by the Division Bench at paragraph 35 of the judgment dated 24.12.2019, the Respondent(s) only had to issue consequential directions to implement the judgment. Even, presently, since the Petitioner has superannuated on 31.03.2023, the grant of promotion to the Petitioner would only be notional and would have bearing on his rank, the pay fixation, seniority, subsistence allowance and the consequential benefits.

59. According to paragraph 4 of the Office Memorandum (‘OM’) dated 14.09.1992 filed by the Respondent(s) along with the reply dated 03.03.2023, it is necessary for the authorities to ensure that the disciplinary case/criminal prosecution instituted against any Government servant is not unduly prolonged and that all efforts should be made to conclude the proceedings expeditiously so that the need for keeping the case of a Government servant in a sealed cover is limited. However, in the facts of this case, it can be seen that the findings of the DPCs from 1995 have been kept in sealed cover and have not been acted upon due to the ongoing inquiry since the year 1995. The Respondent(s) action in this case plainly demonstrates non-compliance of the OM dated 14.09.1992 and the flagrant disregard for Division Bench's judgment dated 24.12.2019.

60. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that the Respondent(s) order dated 22.03.2023 declining to grant further promotions to the Petitioner beyond the rank of Deputy Commandant is in violation of the unequivocal directions issued by the Division Bench vide judgment dated 24.12.2019.

61. The issuance of the Reinstatement order dated 08.03.2021 seeking to initially impose the minor penalty w.e.f., 08.03.2021; its modification on 10.03.2023 to impose the minor penalty w.e.f., 16.10.2018; the order dated 14.09.2021 declining to grant promotion to the Petitioner to the rank of Deputy Commandant; a fresh review on the issue of promotion and the grant to the rank of Deputy Commandant vide order dated 22.03.2023, all the aforesaid orders while evidencing a flip-flop on the stands taken by the Respondent(s) also evince the lack of willingness to comply with the judgment dated 24.12.2019 in its letter and spirit. The unwillingness of the Respondent(s) to grant the benefit of reliefs directed by the Division Bench vide judgment dated 24.12.2019 is writ large on the face of the record.

62. The contention of the learned ASG that the Petitioner must assail the order dated 22.03.2023 in an independent writ petition or seek clarification of the judgment dated 24.12.2019 in the disposed of writ petition is not persuasive as in the opinion of this Court, the intent and directions issued by the Division Bench with respect to the promotion are clear and unambiguous. Further, directing the Petitioner herein to start a fresh proceeding would be a travesty of justice and a mockery of the legal proceedings which culminated with the passing of the final judgment dated 24.12.2019 and which has been further upheld by the Supreme Court by its order dated 07.12.2020.

63. The Petitioner in his written submissions dated 02.03.2023 had stated that even if the date of implementation of minor penalty is considered to take effect from 16.10.2018, he would be entitled to all promotions till the rank of IG from the year 2021, till his date of retirement, i.e. on 31.03.2023. The learned counsel for the Petitioner had relied upon the said submission during the course of hearing dated 03.03.2023 and submitted that the Petitioner would be satisfied if he is granted the rank of IG as on the date of his retirement.

64. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that there is willful disobedience by the Respondent(s) of the directions issued by the Division Bench with respect to the implementation of the directions issued at paragraph 35 of the judgment dated 24.12.2019 with respect to pay fixation, seniority and all other consequential benefits including promotion.

65. This Court accordingly holds the Inspector General of Police (Pers.) and DIG (Pers), who held office as on 22.03.2023, guilty of Contempt of Court under Section 2 (b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 for willful disobedience of the directions issued by the Division Bench at paragraph 34 and 35 in judgment dated

66. This Court, however, grants an opportunity of six (6) weeks to the aforesaid Contemnors to issue a fresh order granting promotion to the Petitioner to the rank of IG to bring him at par with his immediate junior as per the merit cum seniority list at the time of the appointment.

67. In case, the Contemnors do not issue appropriate orders granting promotion to the Petitioner to the rank of IG within the time granted by this Court, the matter will be heard for sentencing on the next date of hearing.” (Emphasis supplied throughout except in extract of para 35(v) in para 53)

17. The appellants filed Cont App (C) 35/2023, under Section 19(1)8 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, assailing the impugned judgment dated 2 June 2023 of the learned Single Judge.

18. On 13 February 2024, the appellant withdrew Cont App (C) 35/2023 with liberty to seek appropriate remedies available in law.

19. The appellants, thereafter, filed the present LPA, assailing the impugned judgment dated 2 June 2023 of the learned Single Judge.

19. Appeals.—(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt— (a) where the order or decision is that of a single judge, to a Bench of not less than two judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.

20. By order dated 10 May 2024[9], a Division Bench of this Court dismissed the present LPA, holding that an appeal lay, under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, only an against an order imposing punishment for contempt, and as the learned Single Judge had, in the impugned order dated 2 June 2023, not done so, despite finding the appellants to be guilty of contempt, no appeal lay. The submission of the appellants that the learned Single Judge had also proceeded to find, on merits, that the respondent was eligible for promotion as IG and that, therefore, the said finding was amenable to challenge in appeal, was rejected. The Division Bench expressed the view, in this regard, that the findings of the learned Single Judge, in the impugned order dated 2 June 2023, apropos the entitlement of the respondent to promotion as IG, were only rendered in the context of the finding of contempt, and could not be regarded as independent findings. We deem it appropriate to reproduce the following paragraphs from the order dated 10 May 2024:

Ajay Kumar Bhalla v Prakash Kumar Dixit, 311 (2024) DLT 724 (DB)

36. The learned Single Judge considered the rival contentions and held that the appellants were obligated to grant notional promotion to the respondent to the post held by his immediate junior. The learned Single Judge further observed that neither the appellants nor the court in exercise of jurisdiction in contempt could evaluate the right of the respondent to be granted notional promotion. Paragraph 33 of the impugned judgment is relevant and is reproduced herein below:—

37. In view of the above, we are unable to accept the contention that the learned Single Judge has embarked upon a fresh adjudication of a dispute that was not central to the question whether the appellants had wilfully disobeyed the judgment dated 24.12.2019 passed by the Division Bench of this Court. The learned Single Judge's analysis of the rival contentions is in the context of ascertaining whether the appellants had wilfully disobeyed the directions issued by the Division Bench on

38. Insofar as the reference to Paragraph no. 41 is concerned, it is apparent that the Court has granted an opportunity to the appellants to take steps to mitigate their offending acts, by issuing a fresh order, granting promotion. Paragraph 41 of the impugned judgment must necessarily be read in context of Paragraph 40 of the said decision. The same are set out below:—

Division Bench at paragraph 34 and 35 in judgment dated

41. This Court, however, grants an opportunity of six (6) weeks to the aforesaid Contemnors to issue a fresh order granting promotion to the Petitioner to the rank of IG to bring him at par with his immediate junior as per the merit cum seniority list at the time of the appointment”

39. In our view, Paragraph No. 41 of the impugned judgment cannot be read in isolation as deciding any additional issue or issuing any further directions. It only grants the appellants/contemnors an opportunity to issue fresh orders after the Court had concluded that the appellants were guilty of wilful disobedience of the order dated 24.12.2019.

40. The appellants’ contention that an additional matter has been decided by the learned Single Judge and therefore, an appeal is maintainable in terms of Paragraph No. 11(V) of the decision of the Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperation Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda10 is addressed by the aforesaid clarification that the learned Single Judge has not decided - and it could not decide - any issue outside the scope of the contempt petition.

41. The second question to be considered is whether an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable in respect of an order passed in contempt proceedings notwithstanding, the remedy under the Contempt of Courts Act,

1971. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides the statutory remedy from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is set out below:— *****

42. Concededly, an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is not maintainable against the impugned judgment. As discussed above, the learned Single Judge has not passed any order adjudicating the merits of any dispute between the parties, which would entitle the appellants additional remedies as contemplated under Paragraph no. 11(V) of the decision in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperation Bank Ltd. v Chunilal Nanda.

43. It is also apparent that Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 does not make any distinction between a ‘civil contempt’ or a ‘criminal contempt’.

44. We are unable to accept that the appellants have an additional remedy under the Letters Patent Appeal in respect of matters in regard to which statutory remedies are provided. It is settled law that there is no inherent right of appeal. The same is a matter of statutory prescription. If a statute circumscribes the scope of an appeal, the appellate remedies must necessarily be exercised within the said contours. The appellants have a statutory right of an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 albeit only in respect of an order imposing punishment. Thus, the present appeal is premature. *****

50. It is also well settled that in such proceedings an order finding a person guilty is inchoate till a punishment is awarded. The provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are structured to provide the consequences for committing contempt of court. The orders passed in that sense would be complete only after the final decision is rendered, which would be after the court decides on the sentencing, having found the party guilty of contempt.

51. Before concluding, we may also note that during the course of proceedings, Mr. Vaidyanathan has sought time to take instructions whether a clarification to the effect that the observation made in the impugned judgment are not to be construed as adjudicating any rights of the respondent other than examining whether there has been any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, would suffice.

52. He submitted that if the observations made by the Court in the impugned judgment are not construed as crystalising any rights in favour of the respondent and are only read as confined to the question whether the appellants have committed any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, the appellants would be satisfied.

53. In view of our understanding of the impugned judgment as noted above, the learned Single Judge has not decided any dispute regarding the rights and obligations of the parties other than whether the appellants had committed contempt of court. All observations made by the learned Single Judge must be read only for the purposes of determining whether the appellants had wilfully violated the judgment dated 24.12.2019 issued by this Court.”

21. The observations contained in this order are of stellar significance, insofar as the present appeal is concerned. The Division Bench acknowledged the legal position that the learned Single Judge could not have decided any substantive issue regarding the entitlement of the respondent to promotion while adjudicating the Contempt Petition. The LPA was dismissed as, in the view of the Division Bench, the learned Single Judge had not done so. We say that these observations are of stellar significance because the Supreme Court, subsequently, went on to hold that the learned Single Judge has, in fact, in the impugned order dated 2 June 2023, decided the substantive entitlement of the respondent for promotion as IG – which, as the Division Bench correctly held, could not have been done while adjudicating the Contempt Petition.

22. The appellants challenged the above judgment, dated 10 May 2024, of the Division Bench in the present LPA, before the Supreme Court by way of Civil Appeal 8129-8130/2024. The Supreme Court, by judgment dated 29 July 202411, disposed of the Civil Appeals, and we deem it appropriate to reproduce the relevant paragraphs from the judgment thus:

Ajay Kumar Bhalla v Prakash Kumar Dixit, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1874

II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution.

III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High

Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties.

IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of “jurisdiction to punish for contempt” and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions.

V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases). The first point is answered accordingly.”

14. Following the decision in Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd., it is a settled principle that an appeal under Section 19 lies only against an order imposing punishment for contempt.

15. In the order dated 2 June 2023, it has been held that the respondents before the Court, namely, the appellants to these proceedings are guilty of contempt. A Letters Patent Appeal would not be maintainable under Section 19, if the matter were to only rest there. However, from the extracts which have been reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment, it is evident that the Single Judge:

(i) Recorded the submission of the respondent herein

(as set out in the written submissions dated 2 March 2023) that even if the implementation of the minor penalty was to take effect from 16 October 2018, he would be entitled to all promotions till the rank of IG from 2021 till the date of his retirement on 31 March 2023; and

(ii) Held that there was willful disobedience of the directions issued by the Division Bench on 24 December 2019 with respect to pay fixation, seniority and all other consequential benefits including promotion.

16. The Single Judge, after recording the submissions as adverted to above, entered a specific finding in paragraph 39 that “this court is therefore, of the opinion that there is willful disobedience” (emphasis supplied). The above finding follows immediately upon the previous paragraph of the order which records the contention of the respondent herein that he was entitled to promotion to the rank of IG, in any event with effect from 2021.

17. Bearing in mind the above finding, the Single Judge gave an opportunity to the appellants “to issue a fresh order granting promotion to the petitioner to the rank of IG” to bring him at par with his immediate junior. Reading the entirety of the order of the Single Judge, it is clear that besides holding that the appellants (who we the respondents before the Single Judge) were guilty of contempt of court, there is a crystallized finding that the respondent herein was entitled to promotion as IG, in any event with effect from 2021.

18. The Division Bench has lost sight of this aspect. The Division Bench, in paragraph 52, noted the submission of the respondent that the judgment of the Single Judge should not be construed as crystallizing any right in favour of the respondent and should only be confined to the question as to whether the appellants herein had committed a willful disobedience of the order of the Division Bench dated 24 December 2019. The Division Bench accepted this submission and observed that “in view of our understanding of the impugned judgment, as noted above, the learned Single Judge has not decided any dispute regarding the rights and obligations of the parties” other than adjudicating on the issue of contempt. The judgment of the Division Bench lost sight of the fact that whether the appeal was maintainable would have to be construed on a plain reading of the judgment of the Single Judge. Two aspects were covered by the judgment of the Single Judge: Firstly, a finding that the appellants were guilty of contempt of the order dated 24 December 2019; and Secondly, that the respondent was entitled to promotion to the rank of IG. The first aspect is not amenable to an appeal under Section 19 at the present stage. The finding that the respondent was entitled to promotion to the rank of IG would be amenable to an appeal in terms of the law laid down by this Court in Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. (supra), more particularly in paragraph 11(V) which has been extracted above.

19. For the above reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench dated 10 May 2024 and restore Letters Patent Appeal 157 of 2024 in Contempt Case No 198 of 2020 together with the associated interlocutory applications to the file of the Division Bench for consideration on merits in terms of the above directions.

23. It is thus that the present LPA is back before us, as the successors of the earlier Division Bench.

24. We have heard Mr Ruchir Mishra, learned Counsel for the appellants, and Mr Sanjoy Ghose, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent.

25. The judgment of the Supreme Court leaves us with a limited remit. We cannot examine the correctness of the finding of the learned Single Judge, in the impugned judgment dated 2 June 2023, that the appellants are guilty of contempt, as no order on sentence has been passed thereafter. We are, therefore, only concerned with the finding of the learned Single Judge that the respondent was entitled to promotion as IG.

26. The predecessor Division Bench has already observed, in para 40 of the order dated 10 May 2024, that the learned Single Judge could not have returned any substantive findings regarding the entitlement of the respondent to promotion as IG in a contempt petition. The Division Bench was, however, of the view that the learned Single Judge had not, in fact, returned any such finding in the impugned order dated 2 June 2023. The Supreme Court has, in its judgment dated 29 July 2024, reversed this finding and held that the learned Single Judge has, in fact, in the impugned order dated 2 June 2023, returned a positive finding that the respondent was entitled to be promoted as IG. As held by the Division Bench in the order dated 10 May 2024, the learned Single Judge obviously could not have done so.

27. This appeal must, therefore, succeed.

28. As one may say, Q.E.D.12

29. Though the predecessor Division Bench has already, in para 40 of the order dated 10 May 2024, observed that the learned Single Judge could not have found the respondent entitled to promotion as IG while adjudicating a contempt petition, we may note that this position is, by now, fossilized in the law.

30. A finding that the respondent was entitled to promotion as IG, followed by a direction to the respondent to act accordingly and grant of time to do so, could not have been returned by the Single Judge while adjudicating the contempt petition. A court seized of contempt Quod erat demonstrandum, meaning “what was to be demonstrated” and signifying that the demonstration, or proof, is complete. proceedings can find the alleged contemnor guilty, or not guilty, of having committed contempt, and proceed accordingly. It cannot issue substantive directions, or grant substantive relief to the applicants before it. Any such directions would be manifestly in exercise of jurisdiction. In V.M. Manohar Prasad v N. Ratnam Raju13, the proposition was thus stated:

31. It requires to be remembered that a contempt proceeding is a lis between the court and the alleged contemnor. The contempt petitioner is a mere informer. He gets no substantive relief by moving for contempt; except, perhaps, the spiritual satisfaction in seeing his perceived oppressor brought to book. Contempt is an affront on the authority of the Court, and if anyone can justifiably take umbrage at it, it is the Court alone, and no one else.

32. This position stands underscored in the following passage from D.N. Taneja v Bhajan Lal16:

33. Contempt is not a means to secure execution. In R.N. Dey v Bhagyabati Pramanik17, it was held:

34. In Rama Narang v Ramesh Narang18, the Supreme Court has further held that a contempt petition is not an execution proceeding.

35. The learned Single Judge has, at various points in the impugned judgment, regarded the judgment, dated 24 December 2019, as inexorably requiring the appellants to promote the respondent as IG. We regret our inability to agree. No categorical direction, to promote the respondent as IG, plainly, is to be found in the judgment dated 24

December 2019. The only clear direction is to substitute the punishment of removal from service, imposed on the respondent, with the punishment of reduction to a lower stage in the scale of pay by one and adversely affecting pension, and to reinstate the respondent as Assistant Commandant retrospectively from 10 July 1995, when he was removed from service.

36. The further direction for consequential benefits, including promotions, cannot be regarded as guaranteeing, to the respondent all further promotions, including promotion to the grade of IG. At the highest, it can only be regarded as entitling the respondent to consideration for promotion to higher grades, including IG, if he is eligible and entitled to such promotion in law. The learned Single Judge was not, in our respectful view, correct in her finding that the order dated 24 December 2019 unequivocally directed the appellants to promote the respondent as IG.

37. The issue of whether the respondent was, or was not, entitled to be promoted as IG from the date when his junior was so promoted, would depend on several factors. The appellants had sought to contend, in this regard, that the IG did not possess the actual qualifying service for such promotion, which was 5 years residency period in the rank of Deputy Commandant with 2 years mandatory field service and completion of pre-promotional course. That the respondent did not, in fact, possess the said experience, is not in dispute. The issue of whether, despite this, he was entitled to promotion as IG, was, in our view, not an aspect which could have been examined by the learned Single Judge while adjudicating the contempt petition especially, at the cost of reiteration, as the judgment dated 24 December 2019 did not contain any specific direction to promote the respondent as IG. It constituted a substantive and separate cause of action, which the respondent would necessarily have to agitate separately.

38. We may also observe, in this context, that it may also arise for consideration, in such an eventuality, as to whether such a dispute could be decided without impleading Mr R.D.S. Sahi, allegedly the “immediate junior” of the respondent, as a party, as one of the possible fallouts of such a decision would be that the respondent would become senior to Mr Sahi. This affords yet another reason why the learned Single Judge could not, as she has, pronounced on the entitlement of the respondent to promotion as IG with effect from the date of grant of such promotion to Mr Sahi, while adjudicating on the Contempt Petition filed by the respondent.

39. Resultantly, in our opinion, the Single Judge could not, while adjudicating Cont Cas (C) 198/2020, have pronounced on the entitlement of the respondent to promotion as IG, much less direct such promotion to be granted to the respondent. To that extent, therefore, the impugned judgment stands quashed and set aside.

40. Mr. Mishra, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the finding of the Single Judge qua contempt is predicated on the respondent’s entitlement to promotion as IG and relies, for this purpose, on para 16 of the judgment of the Supreme Court. Mr Ghosh contests this submission. As already noted, we cannot return any finding in that regard as the Supreme Court has clarified that the findings of the learned Single Judge on the aspect of contempt are not amenable to appeal in LPA.

41. The appeal stands allowed to the aforesaid extent.

42. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, stand disposed of.

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.