Kishore Kumar Arora v. Mayank Rastogi

12. The perusal of the Impugned Order shows that this challenge was also placed before the learned Trial Court and has already been dealt with in the Impugned Order.

13. The learned Trial Court has found that the landlord has described, in great detail, the requirement for which vacant possession of the subject premises is necessary, which is for running of a business of crockery items by himself and his mother. It has been further stated that the landlord requires two adjacent shops and that he has simultaneously filed Eviction Petitions for both shops. The learned Trial Court has relied on the judgments passed by Coordinate Benches of this Court and Supreme Court to submit that as per the law, the requirement need not only be for the landlord but also for his dependents. In addition, the learned Trial Court has relied upon the judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Anil Kumar Gupta vs. Deepika Verma in RC. REV. 138/2015 dated 14.10.2015 to give a finding that the word ‘dependent’ may not mean financially dependent but also dependent in other ways. This aspect of another Eviction Petition was also recorded by this Court in paragraphs 7 and 7.[1] of the order dated 06.11.2024 which is set out above.

14. On 06.11.2024, learned Counsel for the Respondent/landlord has also pointed out that the Eviction Petition was filed for the adjoining shop, which include the subject premises. In both Eviction Petitions, the Applications for Leave to Defend/contest had been similarly dismissed by the learned Trial Court. Reliance was placed on an order of a Coordinate Bench of this Court dated 14.08.2024 in RC. Rev. 168/2024 captioned as Des Raj Aneja vs. Mayank Rastogi, where the Revision Petition was also disposed of.

15. As set out above, the Respondent/landlord has in the Eviction Petition contended that his need for the subject premises is to run a business of crockery items by his mother and himself. It is contended in the Eviction Petition that the mother of the Respondent/landlord has been running a business as a proprietor of M/s. Ceramics Home Decoratives from the year 2000 and the business was being run from a residential premises in Greater Kailash, Part - I, New Delhi by the mother. However, in the year 2006, these premises were sealed for “misuser” since commercial activities were being carried out in a residential premises by the MCD. Subsequently, the business was shifted to shop in a mall in Mega Mall, Gurugram in the year 2007. However, on account of the size of the shop and its location, the retail part of the business could not thrive unlike the wholesale part. The Eviction Petition also described in detail about other premises which were taken on lease by the mother of the Respondent/landlord including a farm premises at MG Road, Delhi for this business from time to time, however since the rentals were very high, these had to be vacated. Additionally, it was stated by the Respondent/landlord that now the Respondent/landlord has also gotten actively involved with the business and is assisting his mother in the said business.

16. It is further contended by the Respondent/landlord that the subject premises will be used as a showroom for display of the products of such business and also for the purpose of storage.

17. A review of the Eviction Petition shows that the Respondent/landlord has described in great detail his bona fide need for the subject premises. No document has been shown by the Petitioner/tenant to controvert this finding. Accordingly, the Court finds no infirmity with the Impugned Order on the aspect of bona fide need.

18. So far as concerns the submissions of the Petitioner/tenant that there are other shops available with Respondent/landlord at Greater Kailash, Delhi and Gurugram, Haryana, this contention was also raised by him before the learned Trial Court and the learned Trial Court has found that the premises at Greater Kailash, Delhi is a residential accommodation and cannot be used. So far as concerns the shop at Gurugram, Haryana, it was explained by the landlord that retail part of the crockery business could not thrive at the said place and thus the shop could not be considered as a suitable alternate accommodation. It was further contented by the landlord that at present, the mother of the Respondent is running her business out of a rented accommodation and is paying an exorbitant rent per month, and as such there is no suitable alternative accommodation available with Respondent/landlord.

19. The provisions of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [hereinafter referred to as “the Act”] have been provided with care by the legislature, not only is the accommodation to be ‘alternate’, but it is also required to be suitable. The Supreme Court in the Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta[1] has held that for an Eviction Petition to fail on the ground of availability of alternate suitable accommodation, the availability of another accommodation must be suitable and convenient in all respects as compared to the tenanted accommodation from which the landlord seeks eviction of the tenant. The relevant extract of Shiv Sarup case reads as follows:

20. The Respondent/landlord has explained that the premises in Greater Kailash was sealed by the MCD on account of mis-use of the premises for commercial activities in the year 2006 itself. Thus, there is no question of use of those premises today for commercial activities. The premises at Gurugram, Haryana was not found as suitable for retail and the retail outlet had to be shut down. The Petitioner/tenant has also set out that the Respondent/landlord can use the premises at farm on MG Road, New Delhi available with the Respondent/landlord as an alternate accommodation. The Respondent/landlord had clarified in its Eviction Petition itself that the land being a farm land, the said premises cannot be used for commercial activities. Accordingly, this Court finds no infirmity with the Impugned Order on this aspect of the mater as well.

21. In view of the discussions above, this Court finds no reason to stay the Impugned Order. CM APPL. 211/2025 is accordingly dismissed.

22. The Supreme Court in Abid-ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua[2] has held that the jurisdiction of this Court is only revisionary in nature and limited in scope. The Supreme Court while interpreting the intendment of the legislature in removing two stages of Appeal that were earlier provided in the Act has held that this is a conscious omission. The High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its view with that of the learned Trial Court, its only role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. Thus, the scope of revisionary jurisdiction of this Court has been limited to examine if there is an error apparent on the fact of the record or absence of any adjudication by the learned Trial Court, and it is only then should the High Court interfere. The Supreme Court has also cautioned from converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first Appeal under revisionary jurisdiction. The relevant extract of the Abid-ul-Islam case is as follows: “Scope of revision “22. We are, in fact, more concerned with the scope and ambit of the proviso to Section 25-B(8). The proviso creates a distinct and unequivocal embargo by not providing an appeal against the order passed by the learned Rent Controller over an application filed under sub-section (5). The intendment of the legislature is very clear, which is to remove the appellate remedy and thereafter, a further second appeal. It is a clear omission that is done by the legislature consciously through a covenant removing the right of two stages of appeals.

23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature. xxx

25. The aforesaid decision has been recently considered and approved by this Court in Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal [Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal, (2020) 7 SCC 327: (2020) 4 SCC (Civ) 107]: (SCC pp. 340-41, paras 22-23)

Rent Control Act, 1958 though could not reassess and reappraise the evidence, as if it was exercising appellate jurisdiction, however, it was empowered to reappraise the evidence for the limited purpose so as to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable.” [Emphasis supplied]

23. While examining the Application for Stay, this Court has undertaken a complete examination of the Revision Petition as well including on merits. As set out above, in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Abid-ul-Islam case, the Court has to satisfy itself on the findings in the Impugned Order. In view of the aforegoing discussion, this Court finds no ground to entertain the present Petition.

24. The present Petition and all pending Applications are accordingly dismissed.

25. The next date of hearing i.e. 13.02.2025 stands cancelled.