Gurbir Singh Alag & Anr. v. Robinder Singh Alag & Anr.

14. It is the case of the Plaintiffs that once the signatures have been admitted by Defendant No.1, the Plaintiffs are entitled to a decree. It is the case of the Plaintiffs that Defendant No.1 in his written statement and supporting documents has admitted several facts unequivocally.

15. Further, Defendant No.1 in his affidavit of admission/denial of documents filed along with the written statement has admitted his signatures on the Memorandum of Partition dated 14.04.1984, Memorandum of Family Settlement dated 21.06.1991, Deed of Relinquishment dated 21.06.1991. Further, Defendant No.1 has unequivocally admitted the Agreement to Sell dated 29.05.1991 filed in the present Suit.

16. Learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiffs state that Defendant No.1 has also admitted the Sale Deed dated 07.06.1991 executed pursuant to the Agreement to Sell dated 29.05.1991, thereby acknowledging the entire case of the Plaintiffs and leaving Defendant No.1 with no defence in light of the admissions made by him in the present Suit.

17. It is stated that Defendant No.1 has also received movable and immovable assets that came to the share of Defendant No.1 in pursuance of the registered Will dated 21.04.2006. However, even after receiving the said assets, Defendant No.1 has malafidely denied his knowledge of the existence of the registered Will dated 21.04.2006.

18. It is further stated that Defendant No.1 has placed on record an Action Taken Report filed by SI Rakesh Kumar, Police Station Defence Colony on an alleged complaint made in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Saket Court by Defendant No.1. It is the case of the Plaintiffs that Defendant No.1 has admitted to his signatures in the Action Taken Report on the Memorandum of complete Partition dated 14.04.1984, Memorandum of Family Settlement dated 21.06.1991, Relinquishment Deed dated 21.06.1991 and the Agreement to Sell dated 29.05.1991.

19. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs states that in view of the aforementioned admissions made by Defendant No.1 in the present Suit and in light of admissions in various documents including the Action Taken Report filed by Defendant No.1 himself provides sufficient basis to pass a Judgment on the basis of these admissions in favour of the Plaintiffs and against Defendant No.1.

20. Per contra, learned Counsel for Defendant No.1 contends that the blank papers were given on regular intervals and those blank papers have been misused and there was no intention on the part of Defendant No.1 to relinquish any share in the Suit Property. He states that signatures have been admitted. He further contends that that it is only the signatures that are admitted by Defendant No.1 and not the contents of the documents which contain the signatures of Defendant No.1. He states that admitting only to the signatures on these documents do not prove the veracity of the documents and the matter will have to go for trial and will have to be proved in accordance with law. He states that Defendant No.1 has not admitted any of the facts mentioned in the Plaint which would entitle the Plaintiffs a Judgment on admissions. He further contends that the Will dated 21.04.2006 is surrounded by suspicious circumstances and the fact that the Will has not been challenged by Defendant No.1 would not amount to an admission on the part of Defendant No.1 accepting the contents of the Will.

21. Defendant No.1 in its written statement has clearly stated that by virtue of the Conveyance Deed dated 27.12.1995, all the parties along with their mother became the owners of 25% undivided share each in the Suit Property. It is only by virtue of this Conveyance Deed that Defendant No.1 along with the Plaintiffs were finally vested with the title of the Suit Property and before this day, it was not in hands of the parties to sell, transfer, alienate the ownership of the Suit Property.

22. Material on record indicates that Defendant No.1 in its affidavit of admission/denial filed along with the written statement has only admitted the signatures on the Memorandum of complete Partition dated 14.04.1984, Memorandum of Family Settlement dated 21.06.1991, Deed of Relinquishment dated 21.06.1991. Further, Defendant No.1 has admitted the Agreement to Sell executed on 29.05.1991 in favour of Mr. Daljit Singh Shahpuri.

23. Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC which provides for Judgment on admissions is meant for expeditious disposal of appropriate cases where admissions are unconditional, unequivocal and unambiguous or when the admission is based upon undisputed inference. Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC reads as under:-

24. The law on Judgment on admission has been settled by the Apex Court by way of judicial pronouncements. The Apex Court in Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120, has observed as follows: “11. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that Order 12 Rule 6 comes under the heading “Admissions” and a judgment on admission could be given only after due opportunity to the other side to explain the admission, if any, is given; that such admission should have been made only in the course of the pleadings or else the other side will not have an opportunity to explain such admission, that even though the provision reads that the court may at any stage of the suit make such order as it thinks fit, the effect of admission, if any, can be considered only at the time of trial; that the admission even in pleadings will have to be read along with Order 8 Rule 5(1) CPC and the court need not necessarily proceed to pass an order or a judgment on the basis of such admission but call upon the party relying upon such admission to prove its case independently; that during pendency of other suits and the nature of contentions raised in the case, it would not be permissible at all to grant the relief before trial as has been done in the present case; that the expression “admissions” made in the course of the pleadings or otherwise will have to be read together and the expression “otherwise” will have to be interpreted ejusdem generis.

12. As to the object of Order 12 Rule 6, we need not say anything more than what the legislature itself has said when the said provision came to be amended. In the Objects and Reasons set out while amending the said Rule, it is stated that “where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled”. We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. Where the other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed."

25. The Apex Court in Himani Alloys Limited v. Tata Steel Limited, 2011 (15) SCC 273, has observed as follows:

26. The Apex Court in S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj, (2015) 9 SCC 287, has observed that the power under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The Apex Court also held that when Defendant has raised objections which go to the root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise the discretion under Order Order XII Rule 6 of CPC. The Relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under: “8. The words in Order 12 Rule 6 CPC “may” and “make such order …” show that the power under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Judgment on admission is not a matter of right and rather is a matter of discretion of the court. Where the defendants have raised objections which go to the root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise the discretion under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. The said rule is an enabling provision which confers discretion on the court in delivering a quick judgment on admission and to the extent of the claim admitted by one of the parties of his opponent's claim.”

27. The Apex Court in Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC 396, has observed as under:

22. This rule was substituted in place of the old rule by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act,

1976. The Objects and Reasons for this amendment are given below: “Under Rule 6, where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on the admitted claim. The object of the rule is to enable a party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which, according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. The rule is wide enough to cover oral admissions. The rule is being amended to clarify that oral admissions are also covered by the rule.”

28. The Apex Court in Hari Steel & General Industries Limited v. Daljit Singh, 2019 (20) SCC 425, after placing reliance upon Himani Alloys Ltd (supra), S.M. Asif (supra) and Balraj Taneja (supra), has observed as follows:

27. In the judgment in Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan [Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC 396], while considering the scope of Order 8 Rule 10 and Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, this Court has held that the court is not to act blindly upon the admission of a fact made by the defendant in the written statement nor should the court proceed to pass judgment blindly merely because a written statement has not been filed by the defendant traversing the facts set out by the plaintiff in the plaint filed in the court.

28. In the aforesaid judgment, while considering the scope of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, post amendment by amending Act, 1976 this Court has held as under: (Balraj Taneja [Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC 396], SCC p. 408, paras 21-23) “21. There is yet another provision under which it is possible for the court to pronounce judgment on admission. This is contained in Rule 6 of Order 12 which provides as under: „6. Judgment on admissions.—(1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions. (2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1) a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced.‟

22. This rule was substituted in place of the old rule by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976. The Objects and Reasons for this amendment are given below: „Under Rule 6, where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on the admitted claim. The object of the rule is to enable a party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which, according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. The rule is wide enough to cover oral admissions. The rule is being amended to clarify that oral admissions are also covered by the rule.‟

23. Under this rule, the court can, at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings, pass a judgment on the basis of admissions made by the defendant. But before the court can act upon the admission, it has to be shown that the admission is unequivocal, clear and positive. This rule empowers the court to pass judgment and decree in respect of admitted claims pending adjudication of the disputed claims in the suit.”

29. By applying the ratio laid down by this Court in the aforesaid judgments, it is to be held that there are no categorical and unconditional admissions, as claimed by the respondentplaintiffs. In view of the stand of the appellants that, pp. 3 and 4 of the agreement dated 3-5-2005 are tampered and their signatures are fabricated, when specific issue is already framed, it cannot be said that there are categorical and unconditional admissions by the appellants. Mere admission of entering into arrangement/contract on 7-4-2005 and 3-5-2005 itself cannot be considered in isolation, without considering the further objections of the appellants that certain pages in the agreement are fabricated. In case the appellants prove that the agreement is fabricated as claimed, post-trial it goes to the root of the case on the claim of the respondent-plaintiffs. Hence, we are of the view that the aforesaid judgments fully support the case of the appellants.”

29. A perusal of the judgments passed by the Apex Court shows that unless admissions relied on are clear and categorical, Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is a discretionary one and can be exercised only in cases where the admissions relied upon are clear, categorical, unconditional, unequivocal and leave no room for doubt or controversy. The object of the provision is to enable a Court to pronounce judgment without requiring a full-fledged trial in cases where the essential facts stand admitted and no substantial dispute survives between the parties. However, the said provision cannot be invoked merely because an admission exists in some form; rather, the admission must be of such a nature that it entitles the applicant to the relief claimed without the necessity of further evidence or adjudication.

30. It is equally well settled that a judgment on admission cannot be rendered where the alleged admission is capable of more than one interpretation or where the admission itself gives rise to questions requiring examination during trial. The Court, while exercising powers under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, must remain mindful of the fact that the provision is intended to advance the cause of justice and not to foreclose a genuine defence. Consequently, where triable issues arise from the pleadings or where the legal effect of an admitted fact itself remains disputed, the matter must ordinarily proceed to trial.

31. The Defendant No.1 has explained his signatures on the documents by stating that these signatures were taken on blank papers. The Suit is still at a nascent stage and this Court is of the opinion that, at this stage, this Court must not embark on conducting a mini trial and only after the trial is conducted, interference can be drawn and a judgment can be rendered.

32. A perusal of the pleadings reveals that Defendant No. 1 has consistently disputed the contents of the documents in question and has specifically denied the Plaintiffs' interpretation thereof. Defendant No. 1 has further disputed the nature of the rights allegedly created by the said documents and has questioned their efficacy in conferring title or interest in the Suit Property. Therefore, while the signatures on the documents may not be in dispute, the rights and obligations purportedly arising therefrom remain seriously contested between the parties.

33. In the considered view of this Court, the controversy between the parties is not confined to the mere execution of the documents. The real dispute pertains to the nature of the documents, the circumstances in which they came to be executed, the intention of the parties, the legal effect of the recitals contained therein, and the extent of rights, if any, flowing therefrom. These are all matters which necessarily require evidence to be led by the parties and cannot be conclusively determined merely on the basis of admissions contained in the pleadings.

34. This Court is also of the view that the admissions relied upon by the Plaintiffs do not satisfy the threshold contemplated under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The alleged admissions are neither so complete nor so unequivocal as to entitle the Plaintiffs to a decree without trial. On the contrary, the stand taken by Defendant No. 1 demonstrates that substantial and bona fide disputes survive for adjudication. Any determination of the Plaintiffs' entitlement would necessarily require appreciation of documentary and oral evidence and examination of the rival contentions advanced by the parties.

35. In such circumstances, rendering a judgment at this stage would amount to prejudging issues that are required to be adjudicated after a full trial. The Court cannot, under the guise of exercising powers under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, deprive a party of its valuable right to establish its defence through evidence, particularly when the dispute pertains to title, interpretation of documents and the legal consequences flowing therefrom.

36. This Court, therefore, finds that the admissions relied upon by the Plaintiffs fall short of the standard required for the exercise of jurisdiction under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The issues raised in the present proceedings are neither admitted nor free from controversy and consequently warrant adjudication on merits after the parties have been afforded an opportunity to lead evidence.

37. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no merit in the present application. The same is accordingly dismissed. It is clarified that the observations made herein are confined to the adjudication of the present application and shall not be construed as an expression on the merits of the case, which shall be considered independently at the stage of trial. I.A. 16018/2022 in CS(OS) 583/2019

38. This Application under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of CPC has been filed by the Defendant No.1 seeking rejection of the Plaint.

39. It is stated by the Counsel for the Defendant No. 1 that the documents relied upon by the Plaintiffs, namely the Memorandum of Partition, Family Settlement, and Relinquishment Deed, are unregistered documents. The said documents purport to create, extinguish, assign, or declare rights in immovable property and, therefore, were compulsorily registrable under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908. In the absence of registration, the same cannot be received in evidence for proving title or any right in the Suit Property.

40. It is argued that since the Plaintiffs' claim of ownership is founded entirely upon the aforesaid unregistered documents, the same are legally inadmissible for the purpose of establishing title in the Suit Property. Consequently, the Plaintiffs have failed to disclose any legally enforceable right in respect of the Suit Property.

41. It is stated by the Counsel for the Defendant No. 1 that the Plaintiffs have not placed on record any registered title document evidencing their ownership. On the contrary, Defendant No. 1 relies upon the registered Conveyance Deed dated 27.12.1995, the execution and existence whereof is not disputed. Therefore, the Plaintiffs seek to defeat a registered title solely on the basis of unregistered and inadmissible documents.

42. He states that the title of the Plaintiffs to the Suit Property is, therefore, seriously disputed and remains unestablished. In such circumstances, the Plaintiffs could not have maintained the present Suit without first seeking an appropriate declaration of title. A bare suit premised upon an unproven title is not maintainable in law.

43. It is therefore the case of Defendant No. 1 that the present Suit is premature and misconceived, as the foundational issue of title remains unresolved. In the absence of a prayer for declaration and in view of the Plaintiffs' inability to establish title through admissible evidence, no enforceable cause of action accrues in favour of the Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as it fails to disclose a cause of action and the reliefs claimed are barred by law.

44. Per Contra, the Counsel for the Plaintiffs states that the contention of Defendant No. 1 that the documents relied upon by the Plaintiffs are inadmissible and cannot be looked into is wholly misconceived. Defendant No. 1 has himself admitted the execution and his signatures on the said documents. Having admitted the existence and execution of the documents, Defendant No. 1 cannot, at the threshold stage, seek rejection of the plaint by selectively disputing their legal effect. Such issues pertain to the evidentiary value and effect of the documents and can only be adjudicated upon after the parties lead evidence. The same cannot constitute a ground for rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

45. He states that it is settled law that while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court is required to confine itself to the averments contained in the plaint and the documents relied upon therein. Questions relating to admissibility, proof, evidentiary value, or the ultimate effect of documents are matters for trial and cannot be conclusively determined at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

46. The Counsel for the Plaintiffs further states without prejudice, the Memorandum of Family Settlement relied upon by the Plaintiffs does not require compulsory registration if it merely records a family arrangement already arrived at between the parties. The law relating to family settlements is well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kale & Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors., (1976) 3 SCC 119, wherein it was held that a bona fide family arrangement intended to preserve family peace and resolve disputes ought to be given full effect and that a memorandum recording an already completed family settlement does not require registration.

47. The Counsel for the Plaintiffs states that a document itself creates rights in immovable property or merely records a pre-existing settlement is a mixed question of fact and law which necessarily requires examination of the document, surrounding circumstances, and conduct of the parties. Such an exercise cannot be undertaken at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

48. He finally submits that the objections raised by Defendant No. 1 raise disputed questions of fact and law which cannot be decided in proceedings under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The application is therefore liable to be dismissed.

49. This Court has considered the submissions advanced by the parties and perused the material placed on record.

50. The principal contention of Defendant No. 1 is that the Plaintiffs derive their title from the Memorandum of Partition, Family Settlement and Relinquishment Deed, which are unregistered documents and, therefore, cannot be relied upon in view of Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act. It is further contended that in the absence of a declaration of title, the present Suit is not maintainable and does not disclose a cause of action.

51. The aforesaid contentions cannot be accepted at this stage.

52. At the outset, it is trite law that while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court is required to confine itself to the averments made in the plaint and the documents relied upon by the Plaintiffs. The defence raised by the Defendants and disputed questions of fact cannot be examined at this stage. The Court is not expected to conduct a mini trial or adjudicate upon issues requiring evidence.

53. The law relating to rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 is crystallised through various judgments of the Apex Court. The Apex Court in Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510, has held as under:

54. The learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs has relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in Kale & Ors (supra) wherein the Apex Court has observed as under: “9. Before dealing with the respective contentions put forward by the parties, we would like to discuss in general the effect and value of family arrangements entered into between the parties with a view to resolving disputes once for all. By virtue of a family settlement or arrangement members of a family descending from a common ancestor or a near relation seek to sink their differences and disputes, settle and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed titles once for all in order to buy peace of mind and bring about complete harmony and goodwill in the family. The family arrangements are governed by a special equity peculiar to themselves and would be enforced if honestly made. In this connection, Kerr in his valuable treatise Kerr on Fraud at p. 364 makes the following pertinent observations regarding the nature of the family arrangement which may be extracted thus: “The principles which apply to the case of ordinary compromise between strangers do not equally apply to the case of compromises in the nature of family arrangements. Family arrangements are governed by a special equity peculiar to themselves, and will be enforced if honestly made, although they have not been meant as a compromise, but have proceeded from an error of all parties, originating in mistake or ignorance of fact as to what their rights actually are, or of the points on which their rights actually depend.” The object of the arrangement is to protect the family from long-drawn litigation or perpetual strifes which mar the unity and solidarity of the family and create hatred and bad blood between the various members of the family. Today when we are striving to build up an egalitarian society and are trying for a complete reconstruction of the society, to maintain.and uphold the unity and homogeneity of the family which ultimately results in the unification of the society and, therefore, of the entire country, is the prime need of the hour. A family arrangement by which the property is equitably divided between the various contenders so as to achieve an equal distribution of wealth instead of concentrating the same in the hands of a few is undoubtedly a milestone in the administration of social justice. That is why the term “family” has to be understood in a wider sense so as to include within its fold not only close relations or legal heirs but even those persons who may have some sort of antecedent title, a semblance of a claim or even if they have a spes successionis so that future disputes are sealed for ever and the family instead of fighting claims inter se and wasting time, money and energy on such fruitless or futile litigation is able to devote its attention to more constructive work in the larger interest of the country. The courts have, therefore, leaned in favour of upholding a family arrangement instead of disturbing the same on technical or trivial grounds. Where the courts find that the family arrangement suffers from a legal lacuna or a formal defect the rule of estoppel is pressed into service and is applied to shut out plea of the person who being a party to family arrangement seeks to unsettle a settled dispute and claims to revoke the family arrangement under which he has himself enjoyed some material benefits. The law in England on this point is almost the same. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 17, Third Edition, at pp. 215-216, the following apt observations regarding the essentials of the family settlement and the principles governing the existence of the same are made: “A family arrangement is an agreement between members of the same family, intended to be generally and reasonably for the benefit of the family either by compromising doubtful or disputed rights or by preserving the family property or the peace and security of the family by avoiding litigation or by saving its honour. The agreement may be implied from a long course of dealing, but it is more usual to embody or to effectuate the agreement in a deed to which the term “family arrangement” is applied. Family arrangements are governed by principles which are not applicable to dealings between strangers. The court, when deciding the rights of parties under family arrangements or claims to upset such arrangements, considers what in the broadest view of the matter is most for the interest of families, and has regard to considerations which, in dealing with transactions between persons not members of the same family, would not be taken into account. Matters which would be fatal to the validity of similar transactions between strangers are not objections to the binding effect of family arrangements.”

10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concretised form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions: “(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family; (2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence; (3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary; (4) It is well settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable; (5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same; (6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the settlement.” xxx

25. It would be seen that when the name of Appellant 1 Kale was mutated in respect of the khatas by the Naib Tahsildar by his order dated December 5, 1955 which is mentioned at p. 4 of the paper-book Respondents 4 & 5 filed an application for setting aside that order on the ground that they had no knowledge of the proceedings. Subsequently a compromise was entered into between the parties a reference to which was made in the compromise petition filed before the revenue court on August 7,

1956. A perusal of this compromise petition which appears at pp. 15 to 18 of the paper-book would clearly show two things — (1) that the petition clearly and explicitly mentioned that a compromise had already been made earlier; and (2) that after the allotment of the khatas to the respective parties the parties shall be permanent owners thereof. The opening words of the petition may be extracted thus: “It is submitted that in the above suit a compromise has been made mutually between the parties. It would appear from the order of the Assistant Commissioner, First Class, being Annexure 4 in writ petition before the High Court, appearing at p. 19 of the paper-book that the parties sought adjournment from the Court on the ground that a compromise was being made. In this connection the Assistant Commissioner, First Class, observed as follows: “On January 11, 1956 Mst Har Pyari and Ram Pyari gave an application for restoration in the court of Naib Tahsildar on the ground that they were not informed of the case and they were aggrieved of his order passed on December 5, 1955. On this application he summoned the parties and an objection was filed against the restoration application. The parties sought adjournment on the ground that a compromise was being made. The parties filed compromise before the Naib Tahsildar according to which two lists were drawn, one of these is to be entered in the name of Kale and the other in the name of Har Pyari and Ram Pyari.” This shows that even before the petition was filed before the Assistant Commissioner informing him that a compromise was being made, the parties had a clear compromise or a family arrangement in contemplation for which purpose an adjournment was taken. These facts coupled together unmistakably show that the compromise or family arrangement must have taken place orally before the petition was filed before the Assistant Commissioner for mutation of the names of the parties in pursuance of the compromise. The facts of the present case are therefore clearly covered by the authorities of this Court and the other High Courts which laid down that a document which is in the nature of a memorandum of an earlier family arrangement and which is filed before the court for its information for mutation of names is not compulsorily registrable and therefore can be used in evidence of the family arrangement and is final and binding on the parties. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, Respondent 1 as also the High Court were, therefore, wrong in taking the view that in absence of registration the family arrangement could not be sustained. We might mention here that in taking this view, the High Court of Allahabad completely overlooked its own previous decisions on this point which were definitely binding on it. This, therefore, disposes of the first contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that as the family arrangement having been reduced into the form of a document which was presented before the Assistant Commissioner was unregistered it is not admissible and should be excluded from consideration.”

55. The Family Agreement was not required to be compulsorily registered. The effect of the Family Agreement or whether such an arrangement was actually entered into between the Parties or not will have to be seen in trial. The Plaint can sustain only on the basis of Family Agreement.

56. A perusal of the plaint demonstrates that the Plaintiffs have asserted rights in the Suit Property on the basis of a family arrangement, the documents executed pursuant thereto, and the conduct of the parties. The plaint discloses a complete bundle of facts constituting a cause of action. Whether the Plaintiffs ultimately succeed in establishing such rights is a matter to be determined upon trial.

57. It is also pertinent to note that Defendant No. 1 does not dispute the execution of the documents relied upon by the Plaintiffs and has admitted his signatures thereon. Once the execution of the documents is admitted, the questions as to their nature, effect, admissibility, and the rights flowing therefrom become matters requiring adjudication on evidence. Such issues cannot be conclusively determined in proceedings under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

58. Whether the documents in question themselves create rights in immovable property requiring compulsory registration, or merely record a pre-existing family arrangement, is a mixed question of fact and law which cannot be decided without examining the documents in their entirety and the surrounding circumstances.

59. Equally untenable is the contention that the Suit is liable to be rejected for want of a prayer seeking declaration of title. The Plaintiffs have asserted an existing right in the Suit Property and have sought reliefs founded thereon. Whether the Plaintiffs possess a better title than Defendant No. 1 and whether a declaration was necessary in the facts of the case are matters which can only be decided after the parties have led evidence. At this stage, it cannot be held that the plaint is barred by law or that it fails to disclose a cause of action.

60. The objections raised by Defendant No. 1 essentially require this Court to determine the validity, admissibility, legal effect and evidentiary value of the documents relied upon by the Plaintiffs. Such an exercise falls squarely within the domain of trial and lies beyond the limited scope of an enquiry under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

61. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the plaint discloses a cause of action and that no ground for rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) or Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC is made out.

62. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the application filed by Defendant No. 1 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is dismissed.

63. It is clarified that the observations made herein are confined solely to the adjudication of the present application and shall not be construed as an expression on the merits of the disputes between the parties. CS(OS) 583/2019 & I.A. 11150/2020, I.A. 4809/2021, I.A. 11450/2021, I.A. 14309/2021, I.A. 14381/2021, I.A. 14382/2021, I.A. 3204/2022, I.A. 5374/2022, I.A. 5378/2022, I.A. 6672/2023, I.A. 19622/2023 CS(OS) 39/2022 & I.A. 1317/2022, I.A. 8437/2022, I.A. 8453/2022, I.A. 10545/2022, I.A. 13478/2022, I.A. 13537/2022 List on 08.09.2026.

SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J JULY 01, 2026 hsk/mt