Vijay Srivastava v. Roop Darshan Pandey and Ors.

8. Let the notice be also issued to respondent No.2 by all permissible modes, returnable on 30.09.2024.

9. In the meantime, the directions contained in the impugned order for registration of FIR shall remain stayed, if not already acted upon.” The passing of the stay order is stated to have been intimated by HML’s counsel to the Respondents on 22nd July, 2024 itself by two emails, one around 4.45 pm and the second email after 8 pm, when the copy of the order was received by ld. Counsel.

8. In respect of the said petition, various attempts were made by the Respondents raised baseless allegations against the Petitioner. Vide email dated 18th September, 2024 a legal notice was then served upon HML by a law firm called M/s. CPS Legal from its email address info@cfslegal.in. In the said notice, which is undated, various allegations were made by the said law firm representing BLPL to the following effect:

(i) That HML was indulging in forum shopping;

(ii) That the mentioning before DB-II was in defiance of the Roster as mentioning could only be done before the DB-I;

(iii) That allowing the petition to be listed subject to office objections means that all objections were to be cleared but various 18:34 objections were, in fact, not cleared;

(iv) Allegations were made against the Registry that it was manipulated;

(v) That the Registry ignored the endorsement made by DB-II at the time of mentioning and the case was listed as it is which was contrary to the noting which allowed the listing, subject to the office objections;

(vi) That false declaration was made by HML due to which the

(vii) That an email was sent on behalf of HML at 4:48 p.m. whereas the order was uploaded by the Court only at 8:10 p.m.;

9. A perusal of the notice reveals that the notice is undated and is attached to an email dated 18th September, 2024. It does not give the name of the lawyer who has signed the notice. The names of the lawyers who were part of the firm are not reflected on the letter head. The bar council registration numbers of the lawyers are also not mentioned. The e-mail and the attachment are extracted here for perusal: 18:34 The legal notice itself is relevant and is extracted below: 18:34 18:34 18:34 18:34 18:34 18:34 18:34 18:34 18:34 18:34 18:34

10. The notice reveals that allegations were made regarding the mentioning of the matter and the Registry’s clearing of defects and the listing of the matter. Having perused this notice, on 3rd October, 2024, an application was then filed by HML seeking to place on record the said email dated 18th September, 2024 along with the notice. The said application was listed on 23rd September, 2024 and was thereafter taken up by the Court on 3rd October,

2024. On the said date, the Court noticed that Mr. Roop Darshan Pandey has signed every page of the notice. It was also argued that the notice is contemptuous against the High Court and casts aspersions on the Registry. The said notice was also published on the online news media platform ‘The New Indian’ authored by Mr. Atul Krishna on 23rd September, 2024 on the ‘X’ handle (previously known as ‘Twitter’) of ‘The New Indian’. It was urged on behalf of the Company that the publication of this legal notice was also an attempt to scandalize the Court. The Court on the said date came to the prima facie conclusion that the allegations were malicious and contemptuous. The 18:34 observations of the Court are as under:

18:34

11. Notice was issued to ‘The New Indian’ and ‘X’ platform. Thereafter on 28th October, 2024, the Court after hearing parties observed that the aforesaid act of Respondent No.2-Brain Logistics Pvt. Ltd. is contemptuous and malicious in intention and therefore action for criminal contempt be initiated against the Respondent No.2, The New Indian and its correspondent, Mr. Atul Krishnan. The relevant portion of the said order is as under:

12. The present matter i.e., CONT. CAS. (CRL.)13/2024 was then listed before this Bench on 5th November, 2024 and after considering the matter as 18:34 also the fact that the dispute was primarily a contractual dispute, the matter was sent to mediation on 6th November, 2024. The relevant paragraphs of the said order are listed below:

18:34

13. On 7th November, 2024, after considering the fact that unnecessary allegations were made in the legal notice, the Court directed the counsels to file an appropriate affidavit explaining their understanding of the terms “subject to office objections”. On the said date, Mr. Roop Darshan Pandey also informed the Court that the allegations of forum shopping were made by him in the legal notice on the advice of his two Counsels - Mr. Deepak Dahiya and Mr. Mohit Yadav. In view of the same, the Court directed as under: “4. Further, in pursuance to the direction issued by the Court yesterday in the present matter, Mr. Mohit Yadav, Advocate who had addressed the legal notice along with e-mail dated 18th September, 2024 is present today. He tenders an apology to the Court.

5. The language in the legal notice compels this Court to direct Mr. Dahiya and Mr. Yadav to file an affidavit explaining the meaning of the terms “subject to office objections”, qua which in the legal notice allegations have been made against the Registry of this Court as well.

6. Mr. Dayan Krishnan, learned Senior Advocate has further pointed out the allegations made in the said legal notice in paragraph nos. 3 and 4. Petitioner no.1- Mr. Roop Darshan Pandey, who is present in Court states upon being queried as to how he acquired knowledge of the Roster and why he made allegations of forum shopping, he states that he consulted with the lawyers Mr. Dahiya and Mr. Yadav. Let both the Counsels file an affidavit in this regard.

7. In addition, Mr. Dahiya and Mr. Yadav shall also state in their affidavit as to what are the compliances that have been undertaken in view of yesterday’s order, which require the full name, the Bar Council registration number, website details etc. to be mentioned in every notice. Let the said affidavit be filed by Monday i.e., 11th November, 2024. 18:34

8. Parties shall bring a list of all the proceedings pending between them on the next date of hearing.”

14. As can be seen from the above, the Counsels were directed to file affidavits and the list of all the litigations pending between the parties. On 17th December, 2024, arguments were heard. As per the said order, Mr. Mohit Yadav and Mr. Deepak Dahiya had both filed affidavits. Mr. Roop Darshan Pandey had also filed an affidavit. He however did not engage any counsel to represent him. After hearing the arguments on behalf of the HML, the two lawyers and Mr. Pandey himself, the hearing was concluded and the matter was listed for orders. Submissions

15. The submissions on behalf of HML is as under: i. Mr. Pandey has abused the process of the Courts repeatedly. He has converted a contractual dispute into multiple criminal cases. ii. It is highlighted that both the matters arise out of the same contract and the same arbitration proceedings. The allegations are also similar, i.e., use of Hero MotoCorp Limited seal for attesting the true copy of documents which were belonging to Hero Honda Motors Limited, the predecessor in the interest company. The use of the said seal is stated to be only due to a name change which took place and all the allegations in the criminal complaint being filed are on the basis of the said true copy attestation. iii. Mr. Dayan Krishnan, ld. Counsel also points out that even recently another notice has been issued by Mr. Pandey on 15th 18:34 December, 2024 to the entire board of directors of HML, making allegations of forgery of the Board Resolution. In this manner, Mr. Pandey continues to harass the company as also all its officials. iv. The ld. Senior Counsel has also brought to the notice of the Court, the order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 11th September, 2024, which again notes all the proceedings which are pending and the manner in which multiple applications, petitions, criminal complaints are being filed against the company and its officials. The observations in the said order are referred to. v. It is further submitted that the entire attempt of Mr. Pandey is to merely extort a substantial sum of money. Though, the company is willing to pay the amount as per the Arbitral award along with the interest, he is unwilling to take the same and is subjecting the company and its officials to continuous harassment in this manner.

16. Mr. Deepak Dahiya submits that he has not issued the notice and that he is not a part of CPS Legal. It is submitted that the notice was signed by Mr. Mohit Yadav, though, his name does not appear in the legal notice. Mr. Dahiya submitted that from the signature, it can be deciphered that Mr. Yadav has signed the legal notice. Mr. Dahiya submits that the unconditional apologies have been submitted both on behalf of himself and Mr. Mohit Yadav and the legal notice which was given has also been withdrawn.

17. Mr. Pandey himself submits that he has filed his affidavit and he does not wish to say anything more. He further seeks to defend the email dated 15th 18:34 December, 2024 to the Board of Directors on the ground that since the Board Resolution is forged, the Board of Directors ought to have been aware of the same.

18. On behalf of New Indian, Mr. Atul Krishnan- the journalist, and Mr. Advait, ld. Counsel submit that the legal notice was published on the Journalist’s Twitter account. On a query from the Court as to whether any verification relating to the contents was done, Mr. Atul Krishnan submits that except calling the company, no other steps was taken. He specifically states that no checking and verification was done from the High Court Registry in respect of allegations in the said legal notice. He also informs the Court that he does not wish to disclose the source of the legal notice, which he wished to keep as confidential. Finally, he submits that he unconditionally apologies to the Court and undertakes to be careful in future whenever such publishing is done by him. Analysis and Conclusions

19. The Court has perused the record. It is seen that Mr. Pandey and his company - BLPL have filed multifarious cases in various forums including criminal complaints against HML, its directors and its promoters. The details of the said cases are as under: 18:34 18:34 18:34 18:34 18:34 18:34 18:34 18:34 18:34

20. Coming to the present contempt, even after the contempt reference was made, Mr. Pandey continued to insist on the allegations that the matter was wrongly entertained for mentioning in DB-II and has placed on record the Rosters of the Delhi High Court for the relevant period with an intention to completely scandalize the Court further. There are primarily three allegations made by BLPL and Mr. Pandey in the legal notice against the Court: i) That the mentioning could not have been done in DB-II; ii) That the mentioning was allowed “subject to office objections” and therefore the Registry ought to have ensured that all objections are 18:34 cleared and could not have listed the matter without the clearance of all objections; iii) That the Registry could not have listed the matter in Court No.30 by presuming that the matter was connected to CRL.M.C. 5587/2024.

21. In the opinion of this Court, all the three allegations made by Mr. Pandey and BLPL as also his Counsels, are completely incorrect. Firstly, as per the usual practice in the Delhi High Court mentioning of all urgent matters is before DB-I. However, owing to the Counsel on record in this case who has been appearing, and who could not have appeared before DB-I, the matter had to be mentioned before DB-II. There was nothing wrong in this procedure.

22. Insofar as the expression ‘subject to office objections’ is concerned, the clear understanding and practice of the Court is that due to urgency, if there are any objections raised in the scrutiny of the papers by the Registry, the matter would be listed before the Court “subject to office objections” and the Court would then pass directions regarding the objections or clearing of the objections in its order. In effect, therefore, the matter would be listed despite the objections raised by the Registry. This understanding of “subject to office objections” is known generally to all Counsels and the Registry of this Court. The Court had directed both the lawyers to file an affidavit explaining this expression and in response thereto in the affidavit of Mr. Dahiya, it is stated as under:

18:34 the Hon’ble court with a condition that the ‘office objections’, if any, shall be cleared in the due course as per applicable rules, or as directed by the Hon’ble court before which the matter is listed.”

23. Even in the affidavit of Mr. Yadav, it is stated as under:

24. Mr. Pandey has also filed an affidavit as under:

18:34 Hon’ble Court. However, the Deponent sincerely tenders bona fide, unconditional apology before this Hon'ble Court.”

25. In the above affidavits it is clearly admitted by Mr. Pandey as also his counsels that the term “subject to office objections” means that the matter can be listed before the Court despite the objections. It is thus clear that the allegation made in the legal notice to the contrary, that all objections had to be removed prior to listing, was completely false to the knowledge of both the lawyers and the client. The allegation in the legal notice was clearly to scandalize the Court and the Registry as also to raise unnecessary doubts as to the functioning of the Court. Moreover, even if the allegations are not direct, allusions to wrong doing by the Court or the Registry, which is clear from the legal notice, would also not be permissible.

26. Insofar as the third allegation is concerned i.e., that the two matters were not connected and the Registry could not have listed the matter before the same Bench which was hearing CRL.M.C. 5587/2024 is concerned, even the said allegation is completely bereft of any merit. On behalf of the Petitioners, a note has also been filed along with the comparative chart giving the similarities between the two cases, i.e., CRL.M.Cs. 7840/2023 and 5587/2024. The Court has also perused the two petitions. A perusal of the same would show: i) That they arise out of the same contractual dispute between the parties i.e., HML and BLPL; ii) That the allegation is in respect of certain documents produced by HML; iii) That the allegation is about putting of a stamp of Hero Moto Corp 18:34 instead of Hero Honda Motors Ltd. which is alleged to be a forgery; iv) In CRL.M.C. 7480/2023, the allegations is in respect of summary sheets for the year 2009-10 and in CC 187/2024 which is the subject matter of CRL.M.C. 5587/2024. The allegations are in respect of PF Challans for the year 2009-10. v) The contesting parties in both the matters are the same.

27. The endorsement made by HML that CRL.M.C. 5587/2024 is connected to the pending petition CRL.M.C. 7480/2023 which is pending before a particular Court, is thus not a wrong statement. It does not amount to forum shopping. In fact there is a duty cast upon any litigant to inform the Registry of any dispute between the same parties arising out of the same contract which may be pending. This is in order to ensure that contradictory orders or multiple litigations are not heard on similar subject matter by different Courts. This is also expedient in the interest of conservation of judicial time. The allegations that there was wrong-doing by the Registry is also thus baseless.

28. In Krishna Lal Chawla and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2021) 5 SCC 435 the Court emphasised on the importance of judicial time and the responsibility of clients and counsels. The Court also frowned upon filing of multiple cases relating to the same issue which leads to resource crunch of the opposing party. The relevant portion of the judgment has been extracted below:

18:34 whether it involves a cognizable or private complaint offence, will lead to the accused being entangled in numerous criminal proceedings. As such, he would be forced to keep surrendering his liberty and precious time before the police and the courts, as and when required in each case. As this Court has held in Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah [Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI, (2013) 6 SCC 348: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 309], such an absurd and mischievous interpretation of the provisions of the CrPC will not stand the test of constitutional scrutiny, and therefore cannot be adopted by us. xxx

22. Frivolous litigation should not become the order of the day in India. From misusing the public interest litigation jurisdiction of the Indian courts to abusing the criminal procedure for harassing their adversaries, the justice delivery system should not be used as a tool to fulfil personal vendetta. The Indian judiciary has taken cognizance of this issue. In 2014, this Court elucidated as follows, the plight of a litigant caught in the cobweb of frivolous proceedings in Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India [Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India, (2014) 8 SCC 470: (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 424: (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 712]: (SCC p. 642, para 191)

18:34 While the Court's ruling pertained to civil proceedings, these observations ring true for the criminal justice machinery as well. We note, with regret, that 7 years hence, and there has still been no reduction in such plight. A falsely accused person not only suffers monetary damages but is exposed to disrepute and stigma from society. While running from pillar to post to find a lawyer to represent his case and arranging finances to defend himself before the court of law, he loses a part of himself.”

29. The Court in Buddhi Kota Subbarao v. K. Parasaran, (1996) 5 SCC 530 also observed that litigants cannot file frivolous petitions to satisfy their whims. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:

30. Therefore the said endorsement by HML can hardly be termed as forum shopping and the Registry cannot be blamed in any manner for having listed the matter before the same Bench where CRL.M.C. 7480/2023 was 18:34 pending. The allegations against HML and its counsels as also the Registry was therefore completely baseless. In fact, in the affidavit of Mr. Pandey, he continues to insist that the two matters are not connected. The relevant paragraph of the affidavit is set out below:

31. The language in the legal notice completely scandalises the Court and raises baseless allegations and aspersions against the administration of justice by the Court by raising doubts about the functioning of the Registry of this Court. In any case, after issuance of the legal notice, special and deliberate attempt has been made either by the lawyers or the litigant to get it published in online platforms. The Journalist - Mr. Atul Krishna who is present has tendered an unconditional apology. However, the fact remains that the said notice was published on the ‘X’ (former Twitter) platform of the media handle. Without any verification of facts, the notice was clearly leaked by Mr. 18:34 Pandey/BLPL not only with an intent to cause damage and harm to the reputation of HML but with a clear intent to also lower the dignity of the Court amongst the public. The habit of releasing pleadings and documents to the media even before Courts have had the opportunity to consider the same is also not acceptable as it tends to prejudice the parties and influence independent decision-making by Courts.

32. While trying to justify the conduct in the affidavit dated 28th November, 2024, Mr. Pandey has also tendered an apology in the following terms:

33. Mr. Atul Krishna has also filed an affidavit tendering an apology in the following terms: “xxx xxx xxx

4. That I hold this Hon’ble Court in the highest esteem and regard the institution of the judiciary as the 18:34 cornerstone of justice, fairness, and democracy.

5. That I submit my unconditional apology for publication or action on my part or on behalf of "New Indian" that may have been construed as contemptuous or disrespectful to this Hon’ble Court. It is submitted that in great regard to this Hon’ble Court, the Published contemptuous material has been immediately taken down from the Platform.

6. That it was never my intention to undermine the authority, dignity, or majesty of this Hon’ble Court, and I deeply regret any inconvenience or harm caused due to my actions.

7. That I assure this Hon’ble Court that I have taken all necessary steps to rectify the error and ensure that no such incident occurs in the future. Further, I shall remain vigilant and cautious in the discharge of my professional duties as a publisher.

8. That I solemnly undertake to exercise the utmost caution and due diligence in the future to ensure that no such act or omission occurs and that the integrity and dignity of this Hon’ble Court remain intact at all times.

9. That this unconditional apology is tendered with utmost sincerity, bona fide intention, and without any reservation whatsoever. I humbly pray for the forgiveness and indulgence of this Hon’ble Court.”

34. Even the counsel - Mr. Dahiya has stated in his affidavit as under:

18:34 etc. and as per applicable law.”

35. Mr. Yadav, ld. Counsel in his affidavit dated 12th November, 2024 has also stated as under:

36. Having heard the parties and having seen the record and also having perused the affidavits filed on behalf of the Respondents and lawyers and the Journalist, this Court is at pains to observe that every lawyer and litigant who is before the Court has a responsibility to ensure that any conduct which lowers the faith in the judicial system ought not to be resorted to. Over the course of various hearings, it has become clear to the Court that while Mr. Pandey himself has become a habitual litigant indulging in various practices which would constitute abuse of process, the advice being given to him by his lawyers is also clearly far from bona fide. Mr. Pandey has categorically made a statement before the Court that the content of the legal notice were based on the advice given to him by his lawyers.

37. All three i.e., Mr. Dahiya, Mr. Yadav and Mr. Pandey have admitted that insofar as the term ‘subject to office objection’ is concerned, they had clearly made a wrong allegation in the notice. This Court is also clear that insofar as the mentioning before the DB-II and the listing of the matter before 18:34 the Bench where CRL.M.Cs. 7840/2023 was pending, there is no irregularity whatsoever. Even Mr. Atul Krishan had a duty to verify the allegations before bringing the notice in public domain.

38. Responsible journalism has been emphasised by the Court in In Re: Harijai Singh and Anr., In Re: Vijay Kumar, (1999) 6 SCC 466 where the Court observed that not verifying and evaluating the correctness and credibility of the information being published is an irresponsible conduct and attitude on the part of editor, publisher and reporter. The relevant portion of the judgment has been extracted below:

18:34

12. But it may be pointed out that various judgments and pronouncements of this Court bear testimony to the fact that this Court is not hypersensitive in matters relating to contempt of courts and has always shown magnanimity in accepting the apology on being satisfied that the error made in the publication was without any malice or without any intention of disrespect towards the courts or towards any member of the judiciary. This Court has always entertained fair criticism of the judgments and orders or about the person of a Judge. Fair criticism within the parameters of law is always welcome in a democratic system. But the news items with which we are concerned can neither be said to be fair or made in good faith but wholly false and the explanation given is far from satisfactory. Shri Hari Jaisingh, editor of The Sunday Tribune and Lt. Col. H.L. Dheer, publisher as well as Vijay Kumar Chopra, editor and publisher of daily Punjab Kesari have taken the stand that they had taken the news items to be correct on the basis of the information supplied by a very senior journalist of long standing, Dina Nath Misra. But this cannot be accepted as a valid excuse. It may be stated that at common law, absence of intention or knowledge about the correctness of the contents of the matter published (for example as in the present case, on the basis of information received from the journalist/reporter) will be of no avail for the editors and publishers for contempt of court but for determining the quantum of punishment which may be awarded. Thus they cannot escape the responsibility for being careless in publishing it without caring to verify the correctness. However, since they have not only expressed repentance on the incident but have expressed their sincere written unconditional apology, we accept the same with the warning that they should be very careful in future. As regards the case of Dina Nath Misra, we find he acted in gross carelessness. Being a very experienced journalist of long standing it was his 18:34 duty while publishing the news item relating to the members of the Apex Court, to have taken extra care to verify the correctness and if he had done so, we are sure there would not have been any difficulty in coming to know that the information supplied to him had absolutely no legs to stand and was patently false and the publication would have been avoided which not only caused great embarrassment to this Court but conveyed a wrong message to the public at large jeopardizing the faith of the illiterate masses in our judiciary. Shri Dina Nath Misra has no doubt committed a serious mistake but he has realised his mistake and expressed sincere repentance and has tendered unconditional apology for the same. He was present in the Court and virtually looked to be gloomy and felt repentant of what he had done. We think this sufferance itself is sufficient punishment for him. He being a senior journalist and an aged person and, therefore, taking a lenient view of the matter, we accept his apology also. We, however, direct that the contemners will publish in the front page of their respective newspapers within a box their respective apologies specifically mentioning that the said news items were absolutely incorrect and false. This may be done within two weeks. The Contempt Petitions Nos. 206-207 of 1996 are disposed of accordingly.

39. Similarly in Suit (L) No.398/2024 bearing title Khanjan Jagadishkumar Thakkar v. Waahiid Ali khan & Ors., the Court observed that a journalist or a reporter cannot transgress their limits of right of speech and expression, without justifying the publication on the basis of its truthfulness. The relevant portion of the judgment has been extracted below: “25] As a result of position of Law which has evolved in India, the truth of defamatory words is a complete defence to an action of libel and slander, but a Journalist or Reporter is not expected to transgress the limits of his right of speech and expression and cannot 18:34 claim protection by simply stating that the information, was provided to him by someone and it is in public interest to divulge the same, on the pretext that duty lies in giving out that information to the public. Investigative Journalism definitely does not enjoy any special protection and the umbrage of public interest definitely do not permit a publication, which would amount to lowering down the reputation of any person, in any manner particularly without justifying the publication on the basis of its truthfulness. Just because, the Defendant No.1 is interested in ascertaining the truth or is interested in going to roots of the complaint that is filed, resulting into an FIR, do not necessarily mean that the publication is in public interest and particularly when the complaint is under investigation.”

40. In this background, it deserves to be noted that, after the ld. Single Judge came to a prima facie conclusion that the notice was contemptuous, the same has been taken down from the online platforms. The Court after having heard Mr. Atul who was present in Court during all the hearings also feels that the apology tendered by him is bona fide and therefore the contempt notice against Mr. Atul Krishna is discharged with the direction that he ought to exercise caution in future and continue his journalism with a greater sense of responsibility.

41. Insofar as the two Counsels are concerned, both have not merely misadvised their client but have also expressed least remorse even during the hearings. Their legal notice did not comply with the required conditions of giving the name of the counsel, the bar council registration number, the date of the notice, the website, the name of the other lawyers working in the firm, etc., none of it is mentioned in the legal notice. Such strategies are usually adopted by lawyers in order to insulate themselves from any action while 18:34 shooting in the dark and make wild allegations.

42. The Bar Council of India has also prescribed certain rules with respect to the duties of the Advocates towards the Court and their Client. The said Rules are been extracted below: “Rules on an Advocate’s Duty Towards the Court

4. Refuse to act in an illegal manner towards the opposition An advocate should refuse to act in an illegal or improper manner towards the opposing counsel or the opposing parties. He shall also use his best efforts to restrain and prevent his client from acting in any illegal, improper manner or use unfair practices in any mater towards the judiciary, opposing counsel or the opposing parties.

5. Refuse to represent clients who insist on unfair means An advocate shall refuse to represent any client who insists on using unfair or improper means. An advocate shall excise his own judgment in such matters. He shall not blindly follow the instructions of the client. He shall be dignified in use of his language in correspondence and during arguments in court. He shall not scandalously damage the reputation of the parties on false grounds during pleadings. He shall not use unparliamentary language during arguments in the court.”

43. A perusal of the above rules would shows that the Bar Council of India casts responsibility upon the Advocates to prevent their clients from acting in an illegal manner not only towards judiciary but also opposing counsel and parties. The counsels in the present case should have advised their clients with respect to the procedure of listing of cases in Delhi High Court and should not have raised such baseless allegations, functioning of the Court. 18:34

44. During the hearings in the Court also, it was clearly felt that they continued to justify their conduct rather than express any sense of remorse. The non-reflection of names of counsels, their bar council registrations is also contrary to the practice directions notified by the Delhi High Court. As per the Circular No. STBC/Cir/No.18/2006 dated 5th July, 2006, issued by the High Court of Delhi it has been made compulsory for the Advocates to mention their enrolment number on their letter heads. The said circular is extracted below: “It has come to notice that Bar Council of India, in the year 2006, had issued a Circular No.STBC/Cir/No.18/2006 dated 5.7.2006 to all the State Bar Councils, communicating its approval to the new Rule 105A, framed by the Bar Council of Delhi, whereby it was made compulsory for the Advocates to mention enrolment number on their letter heads and vakalatnamas. All the Officers and Dealing Assistants of the Filing Counter are requested to ensure that the Vakalatnamas, filed by the Advocates, must contain their enrolment numbers as well, in addition to other requirements of the Vakalatnama.”

45. The above stated Rule 105 A has been extracted below: Rule 105A: Every advocate shall mention his/her enrollment number on every visible representation (wherever the letter “Advocate”/“Attorney”/ “Counsel” is mentioned after or before the same) including visiting card, letter head, vakalatnama etc.

46. A perusal of the above stated rule shows that the enrolment number needs to be mandatorily added at all places in the letter where “Advocate”/“Attorney”/ “Counsel” is mentioned. It can be seen that in the 18:34 present case neither the letterhead mentions the details of the Advocate and the enrolment number. The same is also not mentioned in the end salutation. It’s a prescribed practice to write the name and enrolment number of the Advocate sending the legal notice to verify the authenticity of said notice. Moreover, legal notices are made on the letterhead of the concerned advocate/firm/chamber who is sending the notice and absence of such details questions the validity of the said notices.

47. The Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 172/2014 titled Shaikh Farooq v. Shaikh Rafiq and Ors. also observed that without any signature a typed document in the form of a notice cannot be considered as a legal notice as nobody would own up to the correctness of its contents.

48. Under these circumstances, both the lawyers have violated the Bar Council Rules and the practice directions of this Court. This Court is of the opinion that the Counsels have indulged in unprofessional conduct. The matter is accordingly referred to Bar Council of Delhi for initiating disciplinary proceedings which shall be decided in accordance with law. In addition, they shall henceforth comply with the said Rules and modify their letterheads and all other communications in accordance with the said Rules.

49. Insofar as Mr. Roop Darshan Pandey is concerned, his conduct has been totally defiant even during Court proceedings. The apology is completely conditional and the intent has been to justify all the allegations which have been made. The allegations are clearly false to the knowledge of Mr. Pandey who is a habitual litigant in the Court. The attempt of Mr. Pandey appears to be somehow continue to harass the company HML, its officials and its Counsels while making wild allegations against them. Mr. Pandey has also not spared the Court or the Registry of this Court when clearly there was no 18:34 fault of the Registry of the Delhi High Court in the clearing of the matter for listing and also listing of the matter on an urgent basis.

50. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik (Smt.) and Ors., (2007)14 SCC 1 observed that anyone who tends to tarnish the image of the judiciary should not be allowed to go unpunished. In such cases the ultimate victim is the institution. The Court in the said case also observed that the apology of the Contemnor was not genuine and instead he tried justifying the malicious statement given by them, therefore the Court sentenced the Contemnor to two months of imprisonment. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under: “1.“Judge bashing” and using derogatory and contemptuous language against Judges has become a favourite pastime of some people. These statements tend to scandalise and lower the authority of the courts and cannot be permitted because, for functioning of democracy, an independent judiciary to dispense justice without fear and favour is paramount. Its strength is the faith and confidence of the people in that institution. That cannot be permitted to be undermined because that will be against the public interest.

2. Judiciary should not be reduced to the position of flies in the hands of wanton boys. Judge bashing is not and cannot be a substitute for constructive criticism. xxxx

12. There is guarantee of the Constitution of India that there will be freedom of speech and writing, but reasonable restrictions can be imposed. It will be of relevance to compare the various suggestions as prevalent in America and India. It is worthwhile to note that all utterances against a Judge or concerning a pending case do not in America amount to contempt of Court. In Article 19 the expression “reasonable restrictions” is used which is almost on a par with the 18:34 American phraseology “inherent tendency” or “reasonable tendency”. The Supreme Court of America in Bridges v. California [314 US 252: 86 L Ed 192 (1941)] said: (L Ed p. 203) “What finally emerges from the ‘clear and present danger’ cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished.”

13. The vehemence of the language used is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt of court. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The stream of administration of justice has to remain unpolluted so that purity of court's atmosphere may give vitality to all the organs of the State. Polluters of judicial firmament are, therefore required to be well taken care of to maintain the sublimity of court's environment; so also to enable it to administer justice fairly and to the satisfaction of all concerned. To similar effect were the observations of Lord Morris in Attorney General v. Times Newspapers [1974 AC 273: (1973) 3 WLR 298: (1973) 3 All ER 54 (HL)], AC at p. 302. It was observed that when “unjustifiable interference is suppressed it is not because those charged with the responsibilities of administering justice are concerned for their own dignity: it is because the very structure of ordered life is at risk if the recognised courts of the land are so flouted that their authority wanes and is supplanted.” (All ER p. 66f) xxxx

29. Considered in the light of the aforesaid position in law, a bare reading of the statements makes it clear that those amount to a scurrilous attack on the integrity, honesty and judicial competence and impartiality of Judges. It is offensive and intimidating. The contemnor 18:34 by making such scandalising statements and invective remarks has interfered and seriously shaken the system of administration of justice by bringing it down to disrespect and disrepute. It impairs confidence of the people in the court. Once door is opened to this kind of allegations, aspersions and imputations, it may provide a handle to the disgruntled litigants to malign the Judges, leading to character assassination. A good name is better than good riches. Immediately comes to one's mind Shakespeare's Othello, Act II, Scene iii, 167: “Good name in man and woman, dear my Lord is the immediate jewel of their souls; who steals my purse, steals trash; its something, nothing; 'T was mine, its his, and has been slate to thousands; But he that filches from me my good name, Robs me of that which not enriches him And makes me poor indeed.”

30. Majesty of law continues to hold its head high notwithstanding such scurrilous attacks made by persons who feel that the law courts will absorb anything and everything, including attacks on their honesty, integrity and impartiality. But it has to be borne in mind that such divinity and magnanimity is not its weakness but its strength. It generally ignores irresponsible statements which are anything but legitimate criticism. It is to be noted that what is permissible is legitimate criticism and not illegitimate insinuation. No court can brook with equanimity something which may have tendency to interfere with the administration of justice. Some people find judiciary a soft target because it has neither the power of the purse nor the sword, which other wings of democracy possess. It needs no reiteration that on judiciary millions pin their hopes, for protecting their life, liberty, property and the like. Judges do not have an easy job. They repeatedly do what rest of us (the people) seek to avoid, make decisions, said David Pannick in his book Judges. 18:34 Judges are mere mortals, but they are asked to perform a function which is truly divine. xxxx

34. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that anyone who intends to tarnish the image of judiciary should not be allowed to go unpunished. By attacking the reputation of Judges, the ultimate victim is the institution. The day the consumers of justice lose faith in the institution that would be the darkest day for mankind. The importance of judiciary needs no reiteration.

35. When the background facts highlighted above are considered in the background of the principles set out above, the inevitable conclusion is that the contemnor deserves no sympathy. In fact, the lenient approach of the Gauhati High Court seems to have encouraged him to make statements on oath tarnishing the image of the Judges of the highest judiciary. His apology seems to be not genuine. This is more so because he wanted to justify the statements made in Para 4.

36. Therefore, we find the contemnor guilty of contempt. He is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of two months. He shall be taken into custody and sent to Tihar Jail, New Delhi, forthwith to serve the sentence awarded.”

51. The Court in Ram Niranjan Roy v. State of Bihar and Ors., (2014) 12 SCC 11, observed that contempt matters are committed in the face of the High Court and these matters not only humiliate Judges but scandalise the institution by lowering its dignity in the eyes of the public. The relevant portion of the said judgment has been extracted below:

16. Thus, when contempt is committed in the face of the High Court or the Supreme Court to scandalise or humiliate the Judge, instant action may be necessary. If the courts do not deal with such contempt with strong 18:34 hand, that may result in scandalising the institution thereby lowering its dignity in the eyes of the public. The courts exist for the people. The courts cherish the faith reposed in them by people. To prevent erosion of that faith, contempt committed in the face of the court need a strict treatment. The appellant, as observed by the High Court was not remorseful. He did not file any affidavit tendering apology nor did he orally tell the High Court that he was remorseful and he wanted to tender apology. Even in this Court he has not tendered apology. Therefore, since the contempt was gross and it was committed in the face of the High Court, the learned Judges had to take immediate action to maintain honour and dignity of the High Court. There was no question of giving the appellant any opportunity to make his defence. This submission of the appellant must, therefore, be rejected. xxxxx

19. In Bineet Kumar Singh, In re [(2001) 5 SCC 501: 2001 SCC (Cri) 908] a forged/fabricated order of this Court was used for the purpose of conferring some benefits on a group of persons. This Court took a strict view of the matter and observed as under: (SCC pp. 506- 07, para 6)

18:34 tribunals, it is inherently deemed to have been entrusted with the power to see that the stream of justice in the country remains pure, that its course is not hindered or obstructed in any manner, that justice is delivered without fear or favour. To discharge this obligation, the Supreme Court has to take cognizance of the deviation from the path of justice. The sole object of the court wielding its power to punish for contempt is always for the course of administration of justice. Nothing is more incumbent upon the courts of justice than to preserve their proceedings from being misrepresented, nor is there anything more pernicious when the order of the court is forged and produced to gain undue advantage. Criminal contempt has been defined in Section 2(c) to mean interference with the administration of justice in any manner. A false or misleading or a wrong statement deliberately and wilfully made by a party to the proceedings to obtain a favourable order would undoubtedly tantamount to interference with the due course of judicial proceedings. When a person is found to have utilised an order of a court which he or she knows to be incorrect for conferring benefit on persons who are not entitled to the same, the very utilisation of the fabricated order by the person concerned would be sufficient to hold him/her guilty of contempt, irrespective of the fact whether he or she himself or herself is the author of fabrication.” We respectfully concur with these observations.”

52. In the case of National Lawyers Campaign for Judicial Transparency and Reforms and Ors. v. Union of India [W.P.(C) No.191/2010 decision dated 12th March, 2019], the Supreme Court observed as under: “13. When contempt is committed in the face of the Court, judges‟ hands are not tied behind their back” 18:34

53. In Court on its own Motion v. Virendra Singh Advocate, 2024:DHC:174-DB, an advocate raised allegations against several judges with respect to unreasonable and flimsy proceedings before the Trial Court. The Advocate asked for a stay of the Trial Court proceedings. The Division Bench of this Court, then observed that there is a direct attack on the reputation and functioning of not only one judge but several judges and it also affects the administration of justice. The Court observed that the scandalous allegations, imputation against a Judge, discharging his judicial function are more serious in nature and it’s the Courts responsibility to deal such actions with firm hands. Thereafter, the concerned advocate was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment of 6 months along with fine. The relevant portion of the judgment is as under:

18:34

54. In Sanjeev Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors., 2024:DHC:8705- DB, the Appellant had filed several complaints against his in-laws, close associates of his wife, police officials, judicial officers, Judges of this Court and had also misbehaved with judges in Court. The Court observed that he has changed a matrimonial dispute into multifarious criminal complaints thereby occupying substantial judicial time. The Court then sentenced him to 4 months simple imprisonment.

55. Considering the settled law, as contained in the above judgments, there is no doubt that Mr. Roop Darshan Pandey is liable to be punished for Contempt of Court. His frivolous allegations against the Court as also the Registry of the Delhi High Court with respect to listing matters is completely baseless. Such allegations if ignored, would over a period of time lead to erosion of faith in the well-established and fair systems and procedures of the Court. The clear allusions are that there was some wrong-doing, when clearly no such needle of suspicion could have been raised. Under these circumstances, Mr. Pandey is held guilty of criminal contempt as per Sections 11 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

56. This is the second instance when allegations of contempt have been raised against Mr. Pandey. Earlier, on 10th February, 2016, Mr. Pandey had filed a complaint to the Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Justice, against the Senior Advocate representing HML and one of the Judges of this Court alleging that they are “known to each other”, amongst other allegations. The said complaint requested the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of this Court for a fair enquiry against such conspiracies. Thereafter several applications were filed against Mr. Roop Darshan Pandey in CRL.MC.2451/2013 titled Hero Motocorp Ltd. & Anr v. State & Anr. and 18:34 other connected matters with respect to the said complaint on 4th March, 2017.

57. The Court noticed that such a complaint would fall under the list of “Subject/Topics which cannot be treated as grievances” as per the Centralised Public Grievance Redress and Monitoring system portal. However, the Ministry of Law and Justice sent an Office Memorandum dated 23rd March, 2016, forwarding the complaint to the Secretary General of the Supreme Court of India, who in turn forwarded it to the Secretary, Bar Council of India by a communication dated 24th March, 2016.

58. The question that arose in the said case was whether the contempt petition is barred by limitation in terms of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1972, which clearly states that the complaint has to be filed within one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. Therefore, the above said applications were dismissed as time barred considering the contemptuous act took place on 10th February, 2016 and the application has been filed on 4th March, 2017. The relevant portion of the said order has been extracted below for a bare perusal: “11. The present applications were filed on 4th March

2017. The trigger was a complaint dated 10th February, 2016 filed by Mr. Roop Darshan Pandey with the Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Justice, Government of India under the Centralized Public Grievance Redressal and Monitoring System (“CPGRAM”). A copy of the said complaint filed online by Mr. Pandey has been enclosed with the present applications as Annexure-C. The complaint is, inter alia, to the effect that the Senior Advocate representing HML and one of the Judges of this Court “are known to each other” and that the Senior Advocate “openly claims that he has all his following high profile cases involving rich and powerful people managed” with the 18:34 said learned Judge and that “date after date are contained by the senior advocate to drag and frustrate the cases”. The details of two of the main cases i.e. Crl. Misc Nos. 2451/2013 and 2525/2013 were mentioned in the complaint. It was further requested that the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of this Court “be informed for fair enquiry” about this conspiracy immediately to meet the ends of justice. Certain documents were purportedly enclosed with the complaint.

12. The CPGRAM portal lays down a list of “Subjects/Topics which cannot be treated as grievances‟. One of these categories is „Court related/subjudice matters”. There is a declaration by the Respondent No.2 to the effect that “I agree that my grievance does not fall within the above listed categories”. The Applicants/Petitioners point out that this was a false declaration.

13. The grievance of the Applicants/Petitioners is that acting on the said online complaint, the Ministry of Law and Justice sent an Office Memorandum („OM‟) dated 23rd March 2016 forwarding the complaint to the Secretary General of the Supreme Court of India, who in turn forwarded it to the Secretary, Bar Council of India by a communication dated 24 th March, 2016. Copies of these communications have also been enclosed. It was further forwarded by the Deputy Council of India („BCI‟). The BCI took up the matter and sent a copy of the OM dated 23rd March, 2016 to the concerned senior counsel for his comments. xxx

23. On the first question whether the contempt petition is barred by limitation in terms of Section 20 of the Act, the reply of Mr Tiku on behalf of the Applicants is that although the complaint was filed online on 10th February 2016, action was taken on the said complaint by the Ministry only on 23rd March, 2016 and it was 18:34 only then that the actual scandalizing of the judiciary took place.

24. The Court is unable to agree with the above submission. When the complaint was filed online on 10th February 2016, it was already available to be seen by anyone in the Ministry dealing with such complaints. If it is the contention of the Petitioner that this act itself constituted contempt, then clearly the date of the commission of the contempt was 10th February, 2016 and not 23rd March, 2016. In any event, as far as the Petitioners are concerned, Respondent No.2 committed contempt on 10th February, 2016 when he filed the complaint containing the allegedly scandalous allegations on line on the CPGRAM.. That date cannot be postponed only because the Ministry took more than a month to actually send a further communication to the Secretary General, Supreme Court of India.

25. There is no scope for condoning the delay in filing the present applications seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 15 of the Act. Section 20 of the Act makes it clear that the complaint has to be filed within one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. The jurisdiction of the Court to initiate any proceedings for contempt thereafter “either on its own motion or otherwise” is taken away. With the present applications having been filed on 4th March, 2017 i.e. more than one year after 10th February 2016, the question of entertaining them on the basis of the complaint made by the Respondent No.2 on the CPGRAM on 10th February, 2016 does not arise. xxx

27. The consequence of accepting the above submission would be for this Court to direct these petitions to be placed on the administrative side before the Chief Justice. However, in view of its decision that these applications are time barred in terms of Section 20 of the Act, there is no point in adopting that course. 18:34

28. The applications are accordingly dismissed as time barred.”

59. It is clear from the above order that Mr. Pandey is in the habit of making allegations against Courts, judges and counsels. The offending conduct is therefore not an inadvertent error or by mistaken advice. It is done with deliberate and with ulterior motives. The apology is thus not bonafide. Mr. Pandey is accordingly sentenced to two weeks of simple imprisonment with fine of Rs. 2,000/- and in default of payment of fine, further simple imprisonment for 07 days.

60. It is directed that the police authorities shall take the Contemnor into custody from the Court itself and the Contemnor be sent to Jail.

61. The Contempt Reference is accordingly disposed of in these terms.

62. A copy of this judgment be given Dasti to ld. Counsels for the parties under the signatures of Court Master.

PRATHIBA M. SINGH JUDGE AMIT SHARMA JUDGE JANUARY 23, 2025 Rahul/dk/ks 18:34