Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 10.07.2026
38475/2026 and CM APPL. 38476/2026 DELHI HIGH COURT BAR ASSOCIATION & ANR. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. A. S. Chandiok, Mr. Rajiv Mehra, Mr. N. Hariharan, Mr. Sachhin Puri, Mr. Rakesh Tinku and Ms. Prem Lata
Bansal and Mr. Avi Singh, Sr.
Advs. along with Mr. Vikram Singh Panwar, Ms. Kanika Singh, Mr. Kunal Malhotra, Mr. B.S. Dhir, Ms. Kajal Chandra, Ms. Vidhi Gupta, Mr. Amit Choudhary, Ms. Chandrika Gupta, Mr. Lakshay Kaushik, Mr. Nitesh Mehra, Ms. Punya Rekha Angara, Mr. Ashish, Mr. Monu Kumar, Mr. Krishna Shukla, Mr. Tranpreet Gulati, Ms. Purva Kohli, Ms. Archana Sadadeva, Mr. Jaspreet Singh
Kapur, Mr. Shivang Sharma, and Mr. Jitesh P. Gupta, Advs. for Delhi High Court Bar
Association/P-1.
Mr. Kamal Mehta, Adv. for P- 2 along with P-2.
Through: Dr. Amit George, Ms. Rupam Jha, Mr. Vaibhav Gandhi, Ms. Medhavi Bhatia, Advs. for
Delhi High Court.
Mr. Sachin Sangwan, Mr. Gaurav Choudhary, Mr. Harshvardhan Bhardwaj, Ms. Salma Saifi and Ms. Janhvi Singh, Advs.
Mr. D. K. Sharma and Mr. Vijay S. Bishnoi, Advs. for
Secretary General, Co- ordination Committee of All
District Courts Bar Associations of Delhi.
Mr. Rama Krishnan V., Sr.
Adv. along with Mr. D.K.
Sharma, Chairman, Mr. Vijay S. Bishnoi, Secretary General, Mr. Shivam Verma, Mr. Avneesh Rana, Mr. Neeraj, Mr. Mayan Rexwal, Mr. Tarun Rana, Mr. Ashish Khatri, Mr. Dhananjay Kumar, Mr. Sunny Pandey, Mr. Shivam, Mr. Mayur, Mr. Puneet Dhawan, Mr. Anish Singh, Mr. Pradeep Singh, Mr. Ranvijay Singh, Mr. M.M. Khan, Mr. G.S. Mishra, Ms. Abha Singh, Mr. Navneet Panwar, Mr. Jasraj Singh, Mr. Rajiv Telhan, Mr. Nagendra Kumar, Mr. Pradeep Singh, Mr. Ghan Shyam, Mr. Navneet Panwar, Mr. Pradeep Khatri, Mr. Moolchand Verma, Advs. for Coordination Committee.
(2)
38479/2026 ASIAN PATENT ATTORNEY ASSOCIATION (APAA) &
ANR. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Vaibhav Vutts, Mr. Aamna Hasan, Ms. Anupriya Shyam and Ms. Vaibhavi S. G., Advs.
(3)
42961/2026, CM APPL. 42962/2026 INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION (INTA) .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Chander M. Lall, Sr. Adv. along with Ms. Urfee Roomi, Ms. Archana Sahadeva, Mr. Jaskaran Singh, Ms. Suhrita Majumdar, Mr. Debjyoti, and
Mr. Pravin Anand, Ms. Vaishali R. Mittal, Mr. Shivang Sharma and Mr. Jitesh Prakash Gupta, Adv.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA O R D E R (ORAL)
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.:
JUDGMENT
1. While seeking interim relief in these Applications, the Petitioners seek stay of the presentation of the Pecuniary Jurisdiction Report before the Full Court during the pendency of the present Writ Petitions and providing a copy of the same to the Petitioners. Arguments on the prayer for grant of interim relief in these three (03) connected Writ Petitions have been heard together as they raise a common question.
2. The controversy in the present proceedings arises out of a representation dated 23.05.2025 [‘Representation’] from the Coordination Committee of all District Courts Bar Associations of Delhi, which was addressed to the Hon'ble Union Minister of Law and Justice seeking enhancement of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Courts and a copy of the Representation was simultaneously endorsed to Hon'ble the Chief Justice of this Court.
3. The Representation was, thereafter, placed before the Full Court of this Court in its meeting held on 02.09.2025. After due deliberation, the Full Court of this Court resolved that a Committee be constituted by Hon'ble the Chief Justice to examine the issue after interacting with all stakeholders and to submit its recommendations. The relevant extract of the Resolution reads as under:-
4. Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Hon'ble the Chief Justice of this Court constituted a Committee comprising seven (07) seniormost Judges of this Court [‘Committee’]. The Committee, while undertaking the consultative exercise entrusted to it, invited the views of various stakeholders. In this regard, communications dated 24.01.2026 and 16.04.2026 were addressed to the Petitioner, Delhi High Court Bar Association [‘DHCBA’]. Representatives of the DHCBA were invited to participate in the meetings of the Committee held on 27.01.2026 and 18.05.2026. Other stakeholders were also invited to place their views and suggestions before the Committee. The Petitioners have sought direction against the proposed placement of the said Report prepared by the Committee before the Full Court of this Court.
5. Mr. A. S. Chandiok, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the DHCBA has, in substance, advanced the following submissions: i. the Full Court of this Court lacked jurisdiction to constitute the Committee, particularly when the Representation was not addressed to Hon'ble the Chief Justice; ii. the Full Court of this Court could not have taken cognizance of the Representation merely because a copy thereof had been marked to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of this Court; iii. Parliament alone possesses the legislative competence to amend the Delhi High Court Act, 1966; iv. if the Full Court of this Court forwards any recommendation, the Petitioners would be deprived of the opportunity of challenging the proposed amendment; v. the DHCBA ought to have been included as a member of the Committee; vi. the Committee's Report ought to have been supplied to the stakeholders before being placed before the Full Court of this Court; and vii. failure to furnish a copy of the Report amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice.
6. Mr. Chander M. Lall, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the International Trademark Association [‘INTA’], further submitted that the Bar constitutes an important stakeholder in the administration of justice. According to him, unless a copy of the Committee's Report is supplied to the stakeholders, the same may not be placed before the Full Court of this Court for consideration of the same.
7. The remaining learned counsel appearing for the respective Petitioners adopted the submissions advanced by Mr. A.S. Chandiok and Mr. Chander M. Lall.
8. Per contra, Dr. Amit George, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the High Court of Delhi submitted that a copy of the Representation had admittedly been marked to Hon'ble the Chief Justice. It was further contended that Parliament alone possesses the legislative competence to amend the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 and that the Committee has merely submitted its Report to the Full Court. Consequently, no actionable cause has arisen in favour of the Petitioners.
9. It was further submitted on behalf of the High Court of Delhi and the Committee that the Petitioners were afforded adequate opportunity to place their views before the Committee and that the representations and suggestions received from various stakeholders formed part of the consultative process undertaken by the Committee.
10. Mr. Rama Krishnan V., learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the Coordination Committee of all District Courts Bar Associations of Delhi, while placing reliance upon Rule 2 of Part A of Chapter IX of Volume V of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, submitted that the High Court, while acting on its administrative side, is competent to express its views and make recommendations on matters directly concerning the administration of justice. He further referred to Article 235 of the Constitution of India to contend that the High Court exercises administrative control over the subordinate judiciary and also drew attention to the communications dated 24.01.2026 and 16.04.2026, whereby the DHCBA was invited to participate in the consultative exercise.
11. This Court has considered the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the respective parties. It is well settled that before granting any interim relief, the Court is required to satisfy itself regarding the existence of the following essential requirements: i. whether the Petitioners have succeeded in making out a prima facie case; ii. whether the balance of convenience lies in their favour; and iii. whether refusal of interim relief would result in irreparable injury incapable of being adequately compensated at a later stage.
12. At the outset, it may be noticed that the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court is governed by the provisions of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, which is a Parliamentary enactment. While examining whether the Petitioners have succeeded in making out a prima facie case warranting grant of interim relief, it deserves to be noticed that the issue pertains to the proposed enhancement of the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court, which can ultimately be brought about only by an amendment to the Delhi High Court Act, 1966. It is not disputed before this Court that the power to amend the said enactment vests exclusively in Parliament. The immediate question, therefore, is considerably narrower, namely, whether this Court, while exercising its judicial jurisdiction, ought to restrain the Committee constituted for the purpose of examining the issue, from placing its Report before the Full Court of this Court for consideration on its administrative side.
13. The issue also requires to be appreciated in its proper constitutional and institutional perspective. The High Court, on its judicial side, is being called upon to prohibit the Committee constituted pursuant to a resolution of the Full Court of this Court from placing the Report for consideration of the Full Court of this Court on its administrative side. The Report itself concerns a Representation submitted by the Coordination Committee of all District Courts Bar Associations of Delhi seeking enhancement of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Courts.
14. It is apposite to notice that the Chartered High Courts established in the Presidency Towns inherited original civil jurisdiction in respect of civil disputes of specified valuation. Although the High Court of Delhi is not one of the Chartered High Courts, Parliament, while enacting the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, conferred ordinary original civil jurisdiction upon this Court in respect of civil suits exceeding the pecuniary limit prescribed under the Act. That pecuniary threshold has undergone revision from time to time in accordance with changing circumstances and presently stands at Rs. 2,00,00,000/-, as substituted by the Delhi High Court (Amendment) Act, 2015 with effect from 10.08.2015.
15. Courts exist for the benefit of citizens, who approach them in search of justice. Access to justice remains one of the foundational aspirations of our constitutional system. Judges, members of the Bar and the ministerial establishment are merely facilitators in the administration of justice, whose collective endeavour must always be directed towards ensuring that justice is delivered efficiently, effectively and as close to the citizens as practicable.
16. It also cannot be ignored that, owing to the substantial increase in the value of immovable properties in Delhi, even disputes concerning comparatively modest residential properties frequently exceed the existing pecuniary threshold of Rs. 2,00,00,000/-. Consequently, civil suits seeking reliefs such as specific performance, possession, partition, declaration or injunction, which otherwise arise from local disputes within different parts of Delhi, are presently required to be instituted before this Court. Such an arrangement inevitably requires litigants from all parts of the National Capital Territory to approach this Court, thereby increasing the inconvenience and cost associated with litigation.
17. Simultaneously, the National Capital Territory of Delhi is presently served by eleven (11) judicial districts, where an adequate judicial infrastructure comprising District Judges and Civil Judges has been established. The Representation submitted by the Coordination Committee, which ultimately led to the constitution of the Committee, seeks reconsideration of the existing pecuniary limits in the light of these changed circumstances. The Petitioners apprehend that, once the Committee's Report is placed before the Full Court of this Court, it may forward its recommendations to the competent authority. However, any such recommendation, by itself, neither amends the law nor alters the existing jurisdiction of any Court.
18. It is equally significant to bear in mind that the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, having been enacted by Parliament for establishing the High Court of Delhi and defining, inter alia, its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, can be amended only through Parliamentary legislation. During nearly six (06) decades since the enactment of the statute, the population of Delhi has increased manifold and commercial activity has expanded substantially, making Delhi one of the foremost commercial centres of the country. Whether these changed circumstances justify a further revision of the pecuniary jurisdiction is a matter which Parliament alone may ultimately determine. The present exercise undertaken by the Committee is confined only to examining the issue and placing its views before the Full Court of this Court.
19. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to notice the constitutional scheme governing the establishment, jurisdiction and supervisory powers of the High Courts. Chapter V of Part VI of the Constitution of India provides for the establishment and jurisdiction of the High Courts. Article 225 of the Constitution of India preserves the jurisdiction of the existing High Courts. However, the said provision does not have application to the present controversy since the High Court of Delhi owes its existence to the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 enacted by Parliament.
20. Article 226 of the Constitution confers upon every High Court the power to issue appropriate writs for enforcement of fundamental rights as well as for any other purpose. Article 227 vests in every High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. Chapter VI of Part VI further provides for subordinate courts, while Article 235 vests the control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto in the High Court. The expression "control" occurring in Article 235 has consistently received an expansive interpretation and has been understood to comprehend comprehensive administrative control over the subordinate judiciary.
21. It is not in dispute that the power to amend the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 vests exclusively in Parliament. The High Court, in its Short Response, has unequivocally accepted this position. Nevertheless, the mere fact that Parliament alone possesses legislative competence to amend the statute does not imply that another constitutional institution is denuded of the authority to examine issues affecting the administration of justice or to express its opinion, views or recommendations thereon. In a constitutional democracy founded upon separation of powers, dialogue and institutional interaction amongst constitutional authorities cannot, by themselves, be regarded as impermissible.
22. The judiciary constitutes one of the foundational pillars of the constitutional framework, while Parliament represents the will of the people through their elected representatives. In the functioning of a constitutional democracy, exchange of views, institutional inputs and recommendations amongst constitutional authorities have an important role to play, particularly where the subject under consideration directly concerns the administration of justice. Such opinions or recommendations do not possess any binding legislative force; they merely assist the competent authority in taking an informed decision.
23. It was in the aforesaid backdrop that, upon receipt of a copy of the Representation submitted by the Coordination Committee of all District Courts Bar Associations of Delhi to the Hon'ble Union Minister of Law and Justice, the Full Court of this Court resolved to constitute a Committee for examining the issue in a comprehensive manner after interacting with all concerned stakeholders. Prima facie, therefore, merely because the original Representation had not been addressed to Hon'ble the Chief Justice would not denude the Full Court of this Court of its authority to take cognizance of a matter concerning the administration of justice and to constitute an internal committee for examining the same.
24. Insofar as submission (iii) is concerned, there is no dispute whatsoever between the parties. Indeed, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the High Court has fairly accepted that the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 can be amended only by Parliament. However, that position does not advance the Petitioners' case. The Committee constituted by the Full Court of this Court has neither undertaken nor claimed any legislative function. The Committee has merely examined the issue placed before it and submitted its Report for consideration of the Full Court. Even if the Full Court ultimately resolves to forward its views or recommendations to the appropriate authority, such recommendation would, by itself, neither amends the statute nor have the effect of altering the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court or the District Courts. The legislative field continues to remain exclusively within the domain of Parliament.
25. Submission (iv), namely, that any recommendation made by the High Court would deprive the Petitioners of the opportunity to challenge a future amendment, is equally devoid of merit. A recommendation made by the High Court on its administrative side is merely consultative in character and does not culminate in any enforceable legal consequence. If, at a subsequent stage, Parliament chooses to amend the statute, the validity of such legislation, if otherwise amenable to judicial review, would always remain open to challenge in accordance with law. Thus, no legal prejudice is shown to have been caused, or likely to be caused, to the Petitioners merely because the Full Court may consider the Committee's Report.
26. Submission (v), namely, that the DHCBA ought to have been included as a member of the Committee, also does not merit acceptance. The material placed before this Court prima facie establishes that the Committee invited the DHCBA to participate in the consultative process. Communications dated 24.01.2026 and 16.04.2026 were addressed to it, and representatives of the DHCBA were afforded an opportunity to place their views before the Committee. The Petitioners do not dispute that their representations and suggestions were received and considered. The Committee was constituted as an internal mechanism by the Full Court of this Court to assist itself in examination of the issue. The Petitioners have not been able to point out any statutory provision, constitutional mandate or binding rule requiring the inclusion of the DHCBA as a constituent member of such a Committee.
27. Submission (vi), seeking a direction that a copy of the Committee's Report be furnished to the Petitioners before it is placed before the Full Court of this Court, also does not persuade this Court to grant the said interim relief. The Report is intended only to assist the Full Court of this Court in considering whether any recommendation ought to be made to the competent authority. At this stage, therefore, no enforceable legal right of the Petitioners can be said to have been affected merely because a copy of the Report has not been supplied to them.
28. The challenge founded upon the alleged violation of the principles of natural justice is, in substance, an extension of the aforesaid submission. The record, prima facie, demonstrate that DHCBA, as well as other stakeholders, were specifically invited to participate in the consultative exercise and were afforded an opportunity to place their views and suggestions before the Committee. Some of the members also submitted written responses, which form part of the material considered by the Committee. In these circumstances, the plea that the consultative process stands vitiated for breach of the principles of natural justice does not, at least at this stage, merit acceptance.
29. The submission advanced by Mr. Chander M. Lall, learned senior counsel, that the Petitioners being major stakeholders, ought to be supplied with a copy of the Committee's Report before the same is placed before the Full Court, substantially overlaps with submissions
(iv) and (vi) dealt with hereinabove. For the reasons already recorded, this contention also does not persuade this Court to grant the interim relief sought.
30. Consequently, this Court is of the prima facie opinion that none of the submissions advanced on behalf of the Petitioners discloses any legal infirmity in the decision of the Full Court to constitute the Committee, to consult the stakeholders, and prepare the Report. At this stage, the Petitioners have failed to establish the existence of a prima facie case warranting interdiction of the submission of the Report before the Full Court of this Court.
31. Apart from the Petitioners having failed to establish a prima facie case, the balance of convenience also does not lie in favour of interdicting the outcome of the interactive consultative process undertaken by the Committee appointed by a constitutional institution in the discharge of its administrative functions from being placed before the Full Court of this Court. Furthermore, no irreparable loss or prejudice is shown to be likely to ensue to the Petitioners merely because the Report prepared by the Committee is submitted before the Full Court of this Court or a copy of the same is not provided to the Petitioners.
32. Accordingly, no ground is made out for grant of any interim relief. The present Applications stand dismissed. W.P.(C) 7752/2026 W.P.(C) 8029/2026 W.P.(C) 9165/2026
33. List for further hearing on 24.07.2026.
34. A photocopy of the order passed today be kept in the connected matters. ANIL KSHETARPAL, J. TEJAS KARIA, J. JULY 10, 2026 s.godara/pal