The Office In Charge Naval Officers Mess Annex NOMA v. Shri Surya Bhan Singh and Anr

7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221: 22 WR 492] (LR PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 117: AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service [Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 54: (1969) 1 SCR 808: AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated: (Lindsay Petroleum case [Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221: 22 WR 492], LR pp. 239-40) ‘Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.’

8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 84] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.

14. Reiterating the aspect of delay and laches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu [Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108: (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 38] has held: (SCC p. 117, para It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.”

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10. The petitioner before this Court vide an additional affidavit dated 17.02.2026 attributed delay in filing of the present petition to administrative delays/lapses and inadvertent misplacement of documents required to be annexed thereto. The relevant portion of the said affidavit reads as under: -

11. The explanation offered by the petitioner for filing the present petition after 15 months of passing of the impugned order does not bear any merit so as to condone the same. Administrative delays/inefficiencies, unavailability of files due to relocation of government offices, alleged misplacement of documentation by counsel, in opinion of this Court cannot be a plausible or reasonable rationale to condone delay in filing of the present petition. The said view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court time and again including in Shivamma vs. Karnataka Housing Board and Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969 as under: –

214. What has been conveyed in so many words, by the decision of Postmaster General (supra) is that while excuses premised solely on bureaucratic lethargy cannot, by themselves, constitute sufficient cause, there may nonetheless be circumstances where the explanation offered, though involving bureaucratic procedures, reflects a genuine and bona fide cause for the delay. In such instances, the true test is whether the explanation demonstrates that the State acted with reasonable diligence and whether the delay occurred despite efforts to act within time. Where such bona fides are established, the Court retains the discretion to condone the delay..

215. In other words, Postmaster General (supra) does not shut the door on condonation of delay by the State in all cases involving bureaucratic processes. The real distinction lies between a case where delay is the result of gross negligence, inaction, or casual indifference on the part of the State, and a case where delay has occurred despite sincere efforts, owing to the inherent complexities of governmental decision-making. While the former category must necessarily be rejected to uphold the discipline of limitation, the latter can still attract judicial indulgence where public interest is at stake and the cause is shown to be reasonable.

217. As illustrated in Sheo Raj Singh (supra) an “excuse” is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an “excuse” would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. An “explanation” on the other hand would demonstrate genuineness in actions and reasons assigned, and would other wise be devoid of any gross negligence, deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, or indifference or casualness in conduct. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts.

216. In this regard, the vital test that has to be employed, wherever “sufficient cause” is sought to be demonstrated on the ground of bureaucratic inefficiencies is to distinguish between whether the same is an “explanation” or an “excuse”. Although the two may appear to be one and the same, yet there exists a fine but pertinent distinction between an “excuse” and an “explanation”.

218. However, equally important to note is that wherever, any explanation is sought to be given on account of bureaucratic lethargy and inherent complexities of governmental decision-making, the same more often than not would invariably always is an “excuse”, as experience has shown us, depicted from a long line of decisions of this Court. It is at this stage, where the decision of Postmaster General,(supra) assumes significance. It seeks to convey the messages, that court should not be agnostic, to how the State or its instrumentalities, often tend to take the recourse of condonation of delay in a casual manner.

219. (Emphasis supplied) Which is why, as per the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) and a plethora of other subsequent decision, the ordinary approach of the courts, in cases where delay is sought to be condoned by offering the explanation of bureaucratic lethargy or red-tapism, must be one of circumspection and reluctance. The courts ought to loathe in accepting such explanations as “sufficient cause”. They should apply their minds carefully, be slow in condoning delays on such reasons, and exceptional instances, where the explanation is found to be genuine, reflective of reasonable vigilance and promptitude in conduct, and free from gross negligence, deliberate inaction, lack of bona fides, or casual indifference, should such an explanation be accepted.

12. The aforesaid position is more so in light of the fact that the petitioner before the Authority in its reply to claim of the respondent no.1/claimant, particularly in terms of paragraph 6, acceded to entitlement of the respondent no.1 to minimum wages as per the rates prescribed by the Central Government and stated that extra budget would be sought to defray the same. Relevant portion of the said reply reads as under: -

13. However, the Authority noting inaction on part of the petitioner despite the aforesaid undertaking given before it, directed the petitioner to pay a total sum of Rs. 1,62,951/- to the respondent no.1/claimant towards difference in minimum wages and compensation at the rate of, double of the prescribed minimum wage. The said order reads as under: - “The applicant was working with opponents as Security Guard. It is falling under Scheduled Employment for the purpose of Minimum. Wages Act 1948. There is no dispute regarding Employee Employer relationship or Jurisdiction. Op[2] (PE) has agreed that they have not pad Minimum wage of central government during the proceedings and submitted in writing. They have followed the Minimum wage of NCT of Delhi, though the central government is the appropriate government. Op l has entered into a contract to pay Minimum wage of NCT of Delhi with Op[2]. Op[2] has submitted that difference in wages will be paid after getting approval from competent financial authority But no action has been taken till date.” Under these circumstances, the following order is being issued: ORDER

1. The application is allowed.

2. Op[1] and Op[2] are liable to pay the difference in minimum wages amounting to Rs. 54,317 (Rupees Fifty four thousand three hundred seventeen only) along with two times compensation. Total amount to be paid is Rs.1,62,951 (Rupees one lakh sixty two thousand nine hundred fifty one).

3. Above amount is to be paid in the name of employee to the authority in the form of Demand Draft within fifteen days from the date of receipt of this order.

4. Any failure to comply with this order may result in initiation of recovery proceedings without any further notice.

5. No costs are awarded in this matter.

6. The claim application is hereby resolved and dispose of.”

14. Despite the aforesaid, the petitioner instead of complying with the unequivocal undertaking given before the Authority preferred the present proceeding to assail the directions issued by the Authority alleging that despite respondent no.1 being eligible for minimum wage rates prescribed by the GNCTD, the Authority has passed the impugned directions on an erroneous finding that respondent no.1 is eligible for minimum wage rates prescribed by the Central Government. The said conduct of the petitioner is untenable. The petitioner cannot be permitted to retract/resile its unequivocal stand/submissions made before the Authority in a subsequent appeal/challenge.

15. In the aforesaid conspectus, this Court finds no occasion to interfere with the impugned award and accordingly, the present petition stands dismissed. Pending applications also stands disposed of.

SACHIN DATTA, J JULY 1, 2026