Pradeep Kumar Mittal v. District Magistrate, South East, Delhi

7. In pursuance to the aforesaid order passed by this Court, the District Magistrate/ Appellate Authority vide the impugned order has dismissed the petitioner‟s appeal while affirming the order passed by the Maintenance Tribunal. The petitioner has, therefore, filed the instant petition.

SUBMISSIONS MADE BY THE PARTIES

8. At the outset, Mr. A. K. Panda, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that so far as the maintenance amount to the extent of Rs. 20,000/- per month is concerned, the petitioner has no objection with respect to the same. He is continuously paying the said amount and undertake to do the same. The petitioner, however, assails the direction to return the Rs. 7.15 crores.

9. Mr. Panda also raises the jurisdictional objection on the ground that a claim for return/ eviction of money/ property would fall outside the scope of the Maintenance Tribunal. It is submitted that the provisions of Senior Citizen Act are confined to maintenance of senior citizens who are unable to maintain themselves and those provisions do not empower the Maintenance Tribunal to adjudicate recovery of property or monetary disputes.

10. It is the case of the petitioner that the Maintenance Tribunal failed to consider the provisions of Section 4 to 9 of the Senior Citizen Act and Rule 3(3)(i) of the Delhi Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rule, 2009 (“Rules of 2009”) which unequivocally restrict the Maintenance Tribunal to pass any order of eviction or return of money etc. The reliance is placed to definition of maintenance under Section 2(b) of the Senior Citizen Act to state that “maintenance” includes provisions for food, clothing, residence and medical attendance andtreatment.

11. It is argued that the proceedings were conducted without adhereing to the prescribed procedure of recording evidence on oath. It is also submitted that there is no proof of neglect, harassment or ill-treatment and in absence of there being sufficient pleading and proof, the impugned order is wholly perverse.

12. Mr. Panda submits that with respect to matters of maintenance, the competent authority is the Additional District Magistrate/ Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the Appellate Authoirty would be District Magistrate, however, matters regarding the eviction of property, movable or immovable, on account of non-maintenance of ill-treatment, a senior citizen is required to approach the Deputy Commissioner/ District Magistrate and any appeal, therefrom, would lie before the Divisional Commissioner. Reliance is placed on a decision of this Court in the case of Rakhi Sharma v. State[1] and another decision passed by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Pushpa Sharma v. State of West Bengal and Shyam Sundar Sharma @ Bablu v. State of West Bengal[2].

13. Per Contra, Mr. Akshit Sachdeva, learned counsel for respondent no.3 has opposed the petition and has made various submissions. It is his submission 2021:DHC:855 WPANo.10504/2025 that there are concurrent findings of facts and two authorities have held against the petitioner. This Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has a limited jurisdiction. It is submitted that the impugned orders are well reasoned and speaking.

14. Mr. Sachdeva further submits that the petitioner does not have any right to claim the amount of Rs. 7.15 crores as this amount was transferred only with the condition that the petitioner would keep his parents and take care of their basic needs and requirements for their lifetime including residence, medical expenses etc. Since the gift of transfer to the amount was conditional, the failure of the condition must result in return of the gift amount.

15. The definition of property under Section 2(f) of the Senior Citizen Act is cited to argue that the property would means property of any kind, whether movable or immovable, ancestral or self acquired, tangible or intangible and includes rights or interests in such property. It is submitted that the jurisdiction of the Maintenance Tribunal constituted under Section 7 of the Senior Citizen Act has rightly been invoked and no interference is called for.

16. I have heard the parties and perused the record.

17. The short but seminal question which arises for consideration before this Court is whether the proceedings culminating in the impugned orders, involving an alleged transfer of property by a senior citizen and the consequences flowing therefrom, were required to be adjudicated in accordance with the statutory mechanism contemplated under Rule 22(3) of the Delhi Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2009 or whether the same could have been independently determined by the Maintenance Tribunal.

18. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to Rule 22(3) of the Rules of 2009, which reads as under:-

19. A plain reading of Rule 22(3) would show that the same contemplates a distinct statutory framework in matters concerning protection and restoration of property of senior citizens on account of non-maintenance and ill-treatment. Unlike proceedings under Chapter II of the Act which primarily deal with maintenance, Rule 22(3) specifically addresses disputes where a senior citizen seeks relief in respect of his property and the consequences arising from the conduct of his children or legal heirs. Admittedly the money sought to be recovered falls within the definition of Property under Section 2(f) of the Senior Citizens Act.

20. What assumes significance is that Rule 22(3)(1)(i) specifically stipulates that such proceedings are required to be initiated before the Deputy Commissioner/District Magistrate. The Rule, however, does not merely identify the competent authority. It proceeds to prescribe an elaborate procedure to be followed before any final determination is rendered. Upon receipt of the application, the Deputy Commissioner/District Magistrate is required to forward the matter to the concerned Sub-Divisional Magistrate for verification of the title of the property and the facts of the case. The Sub- Divisional Magistrate is, thereafter, required to submit a report to the Deputy Commissioner/District Magistrate, who alone is empowered to take a final decision.

21. The significance of the aforesaid mechanism lies in the conscious separation between the process of factual inquiry and the process of adjudication. While the Sub-Divisional Magistrate is entrusted with verification of the factual assertions and the material placed by the parties, the ultimate adjudicatory authority is vested in the Deputy Commissioner/District Magistrate. The Rule, thus, incorporates an additional layer of scrutiny before any final determination affecting the proprietary rights of a senior citizen is rendered.

22. It would also be relevant to refer to Rule 22(3)(4) of the Rules of 2009, which reads as under:- “(4) Appeal,-

(i) The appeal against the order of Dy. Commissioner/DM shall lie before

(ii) Provisions regarding disposal of appeal before Appellate Tribunal shall apply mutatis mutandis to the appeals before the Divisional Commissioner, Delhi.”

23. Rule 22(3)(4) assumes equal significance, inasmuch as, it provides that an appeal against an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner/District Magistrate shall lie before the Divisional Commissioner. The Rules, thus, contemplate a distinct appellate hierarchy in matters arising under Rule 22(3).

24. A conjoint reading of Rule 22(3)(1) and Rule 22(3)(4) demonstrates that the Rules of 2009 envisage a self-contained mechanism in matters relating to protection and restoration of property of senior citizens. The statutory scheme contemplates factual verification by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, adjudication by the Deputy Commissioner/District Magistrate and appellate scrutiny by the Divisional Commissioner. Such a framework is evidently intended to ensure that disputes affecting valuable proprietary interests of senior citizens are subjected to adequate scrutiny at multiple levels before attaining finality.

25. This understanding also finds support from the decision of this Court in Rakhi Sharma v. State & Ors.3, wherein while considering Rule 22(3) and Rule 22(3)(4) of the Rules of 2009, this Court recognised that the first forum in matters of eviction and protection of property is the Deputy W.P. 2985/2021; Dated 05.03.2021 Commissioner/District Magistrate and that a challenge to such orders would lie before the Divisional Commissioner. The relevant observations read as under:-

26. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid provisions is that the Rules of 2009 carve out a complete statutory mechanism for adjudication of disputes pertaining to the protection and restoration of property of senior citizens. The Rule not only identifies the competent authority but also prescribes the manner in which disputed questions of fact are to be examined before any final determination is rendered.

27. The significance of the aforesaid framework becomes apparent in the facts of the present case. The controversy herein is not confined to a claim of maintenance simpliciter. The dispute revolves around the transfer of Rs.7.15 crores by the respondent-father to the petitioner-son, the circumstances in which such transfer was effected, the nature of the understanding between the parties, the existence of any assurance or condition attached thereto and the legal consequences allegedly flowing from the breach thereof. Determination of these issues necessarily requires examination of disputed questions of fact and appreciation of the surrounding circumstances in which the transaction came to be entered into.

28. Significantly, Rule 22(3) specifically envisages that such factual disputes would first be verified by the concerned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, who is required to submit a report regarding the title and facts of the case. The final decision is, thereafter, required to be taken by the Deputy Commissioner/District Magistrate. The legislative design is, therefore, not accidental. The rule-making authority has consciously separated the process of factual inquiry from the process of adjudication. Such a mechanism provides an additional safeguard before any final determination affecting valuable proprietary rights is rendered.

29. Equally important is the appellate structure contemplated under Rule 22(3)(4), whereby an appeal lies before the Divisional Commissioner. Thus, the statutory framework envisages scrutiny at three distinct stages, namely, verification by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, adjudication by the Deputy Commissioner/District Magistrate and appellate review by the Divisional Commissioner. Such safeguards assume even greater significance where the dispute concerns a substantial monetary transfer and contested factual assertions relating to the nature and purpose of such transfer.

30. This Court is conscious of the decision of the Division Bench in Sunny Paul v. State & Ors.,[4] However, paragraph 13 of the said judgment itself records that Rule 22 was incorporated to give effect to Section 23 of the Act. Far from diluting the significance of Rule 22, the Division Bench recognised the close nexus between the substantive rights contemplated under Section 23 and the procedural mechanism prescribed under Rule 22.

31. The said decision, however, arose in an altogether different factual backdrop. The controversy before the Division Bench was whether the authorities functioning under the Senior Citizens Act possessed the power to direct eviction of children from the property of senior citizens and whether such jurisdiction could be exercised under the provisions of the Act. The Court was not called upon to examine a dispute involving transfer of a substantial monetary amount, determination of the nature and character of such transfer, existence of conditions allegedly attached thereto and the consequential question whether the same was liable to be restored.

32. The observations contained in Sunny Paul (supra) must, therefore, be appreciated in the context of the issue which arose for consideration before the Division Bench. The judgment cannot be read as dispensing with the statutory framework expressly engrafted under Rule 22(3) nor can it be construed as rendering the procedure prescribed therein otiose. On the contrary, once Rule 22 is recognised as a provision introduced to give effect to Section 23, the procedural safeguards incorporated therein must receive their full meaning and effect.

33. In the considered opinion of this Court, once the dispute pertains to return of property, which includes money, the same requires adjudication of contested factual issues. The procedure specifically contemplated under Rule 22(3) of Rules of 2009, thus, assumes relevance. The statutory framework consciously entrusts factual verification to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, final adjudication to the Deputy Commissioner/District Magistrate and appellate scrutiny to the Divisional Commissioner. Adherence to such procedure not only gives full effect to the legislative scheme but also better advances the object of the enactment by ensuring that disputes concerning valuable rights of senior citizens are adjudicated through the mechanism specifically devised by the rule-making authority for that purpose.

34. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the dispute raised by respondent no.3, involving the alleged transfer of Rs.7.15 crores and the consequences flowing therefrom, ought to have been examined in accordance with the statutory framework contemplated under Rule 22(3) of the Rules of 2009. The impugned orders, having been rendered dehors the procedure specifically envisaged under the said Rules, cannot be sustained and are accordingly set aside.

35. Consequently, the matter is remanded to the concerned Deputy Commissioner/District Magistrate for fresh consideration in accordance with law. The Deputy Commissioner/District Magistrate shall proceed in terms of the mechanism contemplated under Rule 22(3) of the Rules of 2009.

36. It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the rival claims and contentions of the parties.The proceedings shall be decided independently and uninfluenced by any observations contained in the impugned orders or in the present judgment except to the extent of the conclusions rendered on the issue of the appropriate forum and procedure.

37. Since the petitioner has already undertaken to continue paying maintenance at the rate of Rs.20,000/- per month and has raised no challenge to that part of the impugned orders, the said arrangement shall continue during the pendency of the proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner/District Magistrate, subject to any further orders that may be passed by the competent authority in accordance with law.

38. The writ petition is accordingly allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV (JUDGE) JULY 6, 2026 SA