Rajinder Kumar Gupta v. Sushila Devi Jain

1963. v) It is further the case of the petitioner that he preferred an appeal, RCT ARCT 13/2025, under Section 38(1) of the DRCA against order dated 25.09.2025, whereby, his application seeking review under Order XLVII of the CPC of judgment dated 06.07.2020 was dismissed. During the pendency of said appeal, issue with respect to maintainability had transpired, and the petitioner withdraw the appeal with liberty to avail appropriate remedy as available under law vide order dated 27.03.2026. It is submitted that the petitioner was pursuing the appeal under bonafide mistake before Rent Tribunal, and therefore, he being a lay man cannot be penalised for pursuing wrong remedy and cannot be rendered remediless. Thus, the petitioner is entitled for exemption of limitation period till 27.03.2026 while he was pursuing appeal filed under Section 38(1) of the DRCA. vi) It is further submitted that the present revision petition was filed on 24.03.2026, and there is delay of 1 year 23 days, i.e., 01.03.2025 to 23.03.2026, in filing the same. It is further submitted that the application seeking review of judgement dated 06.07.2020 was filed by the petitioner within limitation period, and same was pending and was finally decided on 25.09.2025. The delay which has occasioned in filing of the captioned petition was owing to various reasons including restrictions of COVID-19, demise of 2025 SCC OnLine Del 939 original respondent, delay in disposal of review application by learned RC, which were beyond the control of the petitioner. Thus, the delay occasioned was not attributable to the petitioner in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case. vii) It is further submitted that the petitioner was pursuing his remedies before Rent Tribunal on the basis of legal advice and was diligently pursuing the appeal filed before the Tribunal. Thus, the petitioner is entitled to exemption under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as he was under belief of bonafide mistake was pursuing his appeal. It is further submitted that the delay in filing the present petition was neither deliberate nor intentional, and the time spent was due to overlapping and parallel pending proceedings before wrong forum, i.e., Rent Appellate Tribunal. It is further submitted that the petitioner has good prima facie case on merits, and will suffer an irreparable injury if the delay is not condoned, and the present petition is dismissed on the basis of this technicality. viii) Reliance has been placed on the judgment passed by learned Coordinate Benches of this Court in Bata India Limited v. Smt. Sarla Sharma Through Lrs. & Ors.4, particularly on paragraphs 14, 15, 27, and 29 thereof, and Mohd. Arshad & Ors. v. Syed Mohd Yahaya Nizami 5, particularly on paragraphs 2, 7, and 55 thereof, to contend that the present petition is maintainable against the impugned order dated 25.09.2025 whereby, the review application filed by the petitioner was dismissed.

2024 SCC OnLine Del 7173 ix) Reliance has also been placed on judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karnataka State Electronics Developments Corporation Ltd v. Kumaon Entertainment and Hospital Pvt. Ltd.[6] particularly on paragraph 25 thereof, to contend that the time spent by the petitioner in diligently pursuing review proceedings before learned RC and appeal before learned Rent Appellate Tribunal bonafidely should be excluded, and benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, should be extended to the petitioner. x) Reliance has also been placed on judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in DSR Steel Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.7, particularly on paragraph 25.[3] thereof, to contend that the time spent by the petitioner in diligently pursuing the remedy by way of review may in appropriate cases be excluded from consideration while condoning the delay in fling the appeal/revision.

11. Reliance has also been placed on following precedents by learned Senior Counsel in support of aforesaid contentions: a) Rahimal Bathu and Ors v. Ashyal Beevi[8]; b) Bhivchandra Shankar More v. Balu Gangaram More and Ors.9; c) Hasmat Rai and another v. Raghunath Prasad10; d) Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram11; e) Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal12; f) Sheshambal thr LRs v. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building and Ors.13; g) S.P. Chelgal Varata Naidu v. Jagannath and Ors.14; h) Mangat Ram and Anr. v. Sardar Meharban Singh and Ors.15; i) D. Satyanarayan v. P. Jagdish16; j) Munisami v. Raghunatha17; k) Kundan v. Gurudutta18; l) Navin Chander v. Union of India19; m) Sh. Ranbir Yadav v. Life Insurance Corporation of India20; n) M/s Narain Jewlers v. Col Sohan Singh & Ors.21.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT/NON- APPLICANT

12. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/non-applicant, while refuting the case of the petitioner/applicant has made the following submissions in support of the respondent’s case: i) The petitioner has misused the process by adopting dilatory tactics and had successfully delayed the disposal of the review application despite being well aware of the fact that properties were maintained by the respondent. It is further submitted that the petitioner has been enjoying the demised premises even after passing of an eviction judgment/order against him and even without paying market rent after expiry of six months from the passing of impugned eviction judgement. It is further submitted that during the review proceedings, there was no stay on the operation of eviction judgment dated 06.07.2020, and execution proceedings initiated on behalf of the respondent(s) were also pending. It is further submitted that the petitioner had delayed the disposal of execution proceedings as objections under Order XXI Rule 47 of the CPC against the said judgment were filed by the petitioner through one Amit Dhankard on 04.12.2021. It is further submitted that the petitioner was neither diligently pursuing the review proceedings, nor the execution proceedings. Learned Senior Counsel during the course of arguments had handed over a table of list of dates of events to demonstrate that the proceedings were delayed on account of petitioner’s conduct. The relevant dates and events from the said table read thus: - 28.07.2020 Review application filed. Notice issued to the petitioner, i.e., Sushila Devi. 27.11.2020 Another application filed under Order VIII Rule 1A CPC read with Order VII Rule 14 CPC by the non-applicant. 31.03.2021 to 02.07.2021 Covid Protocol and en-bloc dates were given. 04.08.2021 It was intimated to the Hon’ble Court that Smt. Sushila Devi died. The review applicant sought time to implead the legal heirs of the deceased Smt. Sushila Devi Jain. 17.08.2021 Application under Order 22 Rule 3 CPC was filed. 04.12.2021 Non-applicant filed yet another application to bring on record subsequent development. Arguments on application under Order 22 Rule 3 CPC were heard and the matter was posted for orders on 07.01.2022. 07.01.2022 Matter was at the stage of Order on application under Order

22 Rule 3 CPC. However, on submission of the parties, the application was treated under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC. Review applicant raised objection with regard to the issuance of notice to all the legal heirs. The Ld. Court observed that objections by all the legal heirs has been filed in the execution petition to cut short the controversy of the Ld. Court and asked all the legal heirs to appear through VC. 13.01.2022 Statement of legal heirs were recorded. 26.02.2022 Ld. Court allowed application under Order 22 Rule 3 CPC. 09.09.2022 Application for recall of order dated 26.02.2022 was filed and was dismissed. 28.04.2023 Matter was listed for arguments. However, the review applicant took the date on the ground that RC Rev. NO. 210/2020 titled as “Sushila Devi Vs. Adesh Kumar Gupta” is pending before the Hon’ble High Court. The respondent did not argue the matter, but the petitioner i.e., Smt. Sushila Devi Jain was ready to argue the matter. Copy of the order dated 28.04.2023 passed by the Ld. Court is annexed herewith as Annexure R-2. 01.07.2023 Again time was sought by the review applicant for placing on record the subsequent documents and the matter was adjourned for 15.07.2023. Copy of the order dated 01.07.2023 passed by the Ld. Court is annexed herewith as Annexure R-3. 15.07.2023 Put up for order on 19.08.2023. ii) It is submitted that notice in the review application was issued on 15.09.2020, and an application under Order VIII Rule 1A of the CPC as an attempt to delay the disposal of review application was filed by the petitioner on 19.12.2020. It is further submitted that the original respondent had passed away on 18.05.2021 and time was taken by the petitioner on several occasions to address arguments in the application under Order XXII Rule 3 of the CPC for impleading the LRs of original respondent-Sushila Devi Jain. It is further submitted that another application for placing on record subsequent events during the review proceedings was filed by the petitioner on 28.11.2022. Said application was dismissed by learned RC vide order dated 27.07.2024. It is pointed out that during review proceedings, petitioner filed an appeal under Section 38(1) of the DRCA against the order dated 27.07.2024 passed by learned RC which was dismissed by learned Rent Tribunal on 16.10.2024. Thereafter, new counsel was engaged by the petitioner to address arguments in review application. Learned RC closed the right of the petitioner to address oral arguments on 07.12.2024 and reserved the order in view of written submissions already placed on record. Said order was challenged by learned RC in appeal before learned Rent Tribunal, which was dismissed vide judgment dated 20.12.2024 passed by learned District Judge. It is further submitted that the petitioner was not diligent in pursuing his case, and therefore, the application seeking condonation of delay is liable to be dismissed. iii) It is further submitted that the petitioner is seeking condonation of period spent before learned Rent Tribunal in appeal preferred against order 25.09.2025; however, learned Rent Tribunal on the very first hearing, i.e., 04.12.2025, had put the petitioner to notice that the said appeal is not maintainable and the appropriate remedy to be exercised is revision. It is further submitted that the petitioner himself chose to proceed with the said appeal and therefore is not entitled to benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It is the case of the respondent that the period of limitation to file the present revision petition had expired on 06.07.2023, and the conditions prevailing during COVID-19 pandemic did not prevent the petitioner from interacting with his counsel and taking recourse to appropriate remedies in accordance with law, and therefore, the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in In Re- Cognizance on Extension of Limitation22 (supra), would not be applicable to the present case. Reliance has been placed on a judgment passed learned Coordinate Bench of this Court in HT Media Limited & Anr. v. Barinlink International, Inc. & Anr.23, in support of this contention. iv) Reliance has been placed on the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme

2021 SCC OnLine Del 5398 Court in Rabinder Nath Samuel, Dawson v. Sivakasi & Ors.24, to contend that benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to a party, who persisted in earlier proceedings, despite repeated objections being taken by the opposite party cannot be granted. It is submitted that in the present case, on the very first date of hearing before learned Rent Tribunal objection with respect to maintainability of the appeal assailing order dated 25.09.2025 was taken and despite being the same, it was withdrawn belatedly after arguments were addressed by the petitioner. v) In these circumstances, it is submitted that the present application is to be dismissed and the petitioner is not entitled to benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for condonation of delay in filing the captioned revision petition.

13. Reliance has also been placed on following precedents by learned Senior Counsel in support of aforesaid contentions: a) Brainlink International, INC & Anr. v. HT Media Limited & Anr.25; b) Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh and Ors.26; c) Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai27; d) Sesh Nath Singh and Anr. V. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

14. Heard learned Senior Counsels for the parties, and perused the record.

15. The case of the petitioner is that there is no delay on his part in filing the present petition, if the period for filing the same is reckoned from the order dated 25.09.2025 whereby, his review application was dismissed. It is further the case of the petitioner that the present application has been filed bonafidely to avoid the technicality on account of delay in challenging the impugned eviction judgement dated 06.07.2020. It is submitted that the petitioner was bonafidely and diligently pursuing his legal remedies in accordance with law and owing to such genuine reasons as explained herein before, the alleged delay, if any, had occasioned. The limitation to challenge an order/judgement by way of revision petition under Section 25B (8) of the DRCA is three years as held in Jai Prakash v. Jean Conea30.

16. It is also not in dispute that Hon’ble Supreme Court In Re- Cognizance on Extension of Limitation (supra) had given benefit of extension of limitation from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022. The period of limitation, therefore, for challenging the judgment dated 06.07.2020 for filing the revision petition would have commenced from 01.03.2022 and would

Civil Misc. Appeal No.1724 of 1980, order dated 18-11-1980 (Del) have expired on 28.02.2025. The review application filed by the petitioner in exercise of remedy available to him under Section 25B (9) of the DRCA cannot said to be malafide only because the same was subsequently dismissed after a substantial period of five years. In DSR Steel Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court while determining the issue of limitation in respect of an appeal filed against an original order of Tribunal against which a review petition had also been dismissed, had observed and held as under: -

17. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent had vehemently argued that the petitioner cannot get benefit of pendency of the review petition for the purposes of condonation of delay inasmuch as the same was a malafide attempt to delay the proceedings so that the respondent could not reap the benefit of the judgment of eviction dated 06.07.2020. Reliance was also placed on the judgment rendered by learned Single Bench of this Court in HT Media Limited & Anr. v. Barinlink International, Inc. & Anr. (supra) to submit that the extension of limitation period in terms of judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in In Re- Cognizance on Extension of Limitation (supra) would not be available to the petitioner as the Covid- 19 pandemic did not actually affect the petitioner from interacting with the counsels and take recourse to appropriate proceedings inasmuch as review petition was filed by him, and had been pursued by the petitioner before the concerned Court/learned RC. However, the fact remains that the petitioner could not have filed the review petition and revision petition simultaneously. Review petition, as noted hereinabove, was filed within prescribed limitation time and had to be brought to its logical end for the petitioner to challenge the impugned judgment dated 06.07.2020. The delay in disposal of the review petition has been attributed by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent to the conduct of the petitioner in moving frivolous applications and raising unnecessary objections to the impleadment of the legal heirs of the original respondent. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent had placed on record a list of dates in order to demonstrate the attempts made by the petitioner at various stages during the pendency of the review petition in order to delay the same. A perusal of the aforesaid list of dates would show that the proceedings were being adjourned not only on account of petitioner’s applications/objections; but also, for other reasons, including on account of COVID-19 protocol when en-bloc dates were given. It is also an admitted fact that there was no stay of operation of the impugned judgment dated 06.07.2020 passed in the aforesaid proceedings in the review petition and the respondent had parallelly initiated execution proceedings with regard to the same.

18. In view of the aforesaid judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in DSR Steel Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the period of limitation for challenging the original order would start from date of the order itself and not from the date of the dismissal of the review petition. However, as noted above, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, in cases, where the review petition had been pursued diligently, then the benefit of the said period would be given for the purposes of limitation. Taking legal recourse to a remedy available in law, cannot be said to be malafide exercise. Outcome of said remedy would have no bearing on the issue of limitation as in the present case. Delay in proceedings cannot be solely attributed to the petitioner in order to deny the benefit of the said period for computing the prescribed period of limitation. The period for the challenging the impugned judgment dated 06.07.2020 after giving the benefit of judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in In Re- Cognizance on Extension of Limitation (supra) would end on 28.02.2025, and since the review petition was pending and was disposed of on 25.09.2025, further period from 01.03.2025 till 25.09.2025 would not be reckoned in computing limitation for challenging the impugned judgment dated 06.07.2020 and the benefit of the same would be given to the petitioner. Thus, the said judgment dated 06.07.2020 ought to have been challenged by the petitioner immediately after dismissal of review application vide order dated 25.09.2025 but it was not done.

19. It is pertinent to note that the order of dismissal of the review petition was challenged by the petitioner by way of an appeal, RC ARCT NO. 13/2025, before learned Rent Control Tribunal under Section 38 of the DRCA, and the same was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to take recourse to appropriate remedy as permissible in law vide order dated 27.03.2026. It is the case of the petitioner that he is also entitled to exemption of the said period as the aforesaid exercise of the remedy of appeal under Section 38 of the DRCA before learned RCT was under bonafide mistake. The appeal was filed by the petitioners on 04.12.2025. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent had pointed out that on the very first date of hearing, i.e., on 04.12.2025, in the said appeal, learned RCT had raised issue of maintainability, and time was given to learned counsel for the petitioner to file written submissions alongwith relied upon precedents and the matter was, thereafter, listed for 05.01.2026. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has placed on record various ordersheets of the learned RCT showing that on 05.01.2026, petitioner had sought further time to place on record the written submissions, and had also moved an application under Order XXI Rule 22 read with Section 151 of the CPC for placing on record substantial question of law by way of additional affidavit. Learned RCT further adjourned the matter for the petitioner to file written submissions. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned from 03.02.2026 till 06.03.2026 on the request of the petitioner to place on record more precedents, and finally, the said appeal was disposed of as withdrawn on 27.03.2026 with liberty as noted hereinbefore.

20. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, reads as under: -

21. To bring the case of the petitioner within Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the proceedings were prosecuted “for the same relief” and in “good faith”. It is pertinent to note that impugned eviction judgment dated 06.07.2020 was not challenged after the dismissal of the review vide order dated 25.09.2025 by learned RC. As already noted hereinbefore in DSR Steel Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in case the review petition is dismissed, there is no question of any merger and anyone aggrieved by the original decree/order of the Tribunal or Court shall have to challenge within the time stipulated by law, the original decree and not the order dismissing the review petition. Therefore, the limitation to challenge the original eviction judgment would commence from 06.07.2020 and as already noted hereinbefore, the same, even after giving benefit of In Re- Cognizance on Extension of Limitation (supra) expired on 28.02.2025. Further, even if, the period till the passing of order/disposal of review application, i.e., 25.09.2025, is excluded, then also, the present petition qua judgment dated 06.07.2020 is time barred by 180 days as the present petition is dated 24.03.2026. The petitioner had not challenged said judgment dated 06.07.2020 after dismissal of the review application vide order dated 25.09.2025.

22. After dismissal of review application/petition, the petitioner could have separately challenged the original eviction judgment dated 06.07.2020. Even in the present petition, the petitioner has challenged the eviction judgment dated 06.07.2020, order dated 25.09.2025 whereby, review application was dismissed, and order dated 14.03.2026 passed in Execution proceedings together.

23. The petitioner had challenged the order dated 25.09.2025 whereby, the review application was dismissed by way of an appeal, RC ARCT 13/2025, before learned Rent Control Tribunal. The said appeal was filed and listed for hearing on 04.12.2025, and learned Rent Control Tribunal on the first date of hearing, i.e., 04.12.2025, had put the petitioner to the notice as to how the said appeal under Section 38 of the DRCA was maintainable. The petitioner still did not challenge the eviction judgment dated 06.07.2020 by way of a petition under Section 25B (8) of the DRCA. In any case, the benefit of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act cannot be granted to the petitioner as before learned Rent Control Tribunal order dated 25.09.2025 was challenged. The judgment dated 06.07.2020 and order dated 25.09.2025 are two distinct and separate orders. The reliefs sought in prayer ‘(b)’ of the instant petition is with respect to judgment dated 06.07.2020 and not order dated 25.09.2025 which was challenged way of an appeal under Section 38 of the DRCA before learned Rent Control Tribunal. Thus, the proceedings in appeal before the learned Rent Control Tribunal was not “for the same relief”. At this stage, a useful reference can be made to a judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh v. Walchand Ramchand Kothari31. In the said case, an execution application was filed after 12 years from the date of the final decree and to overcome the bar of limitation, amongst other contentions, the appellant therein sought the exclusion of period occupied in insolvency proceedings under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. In such circumstances, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed and held as under: - “5. Points 1 to 3 abovementioned are of no avail to the appellant. The decree was not a conditional one in the sense that some extraneous event was to happen on the fulfilment of which alone it could be executed. The payment of court fees on the amount found due was entirely in the power of the decree-holder and there was nothing to prevent him from paying it then and there; it was a decree capable of execution from the very date it was passed. There could be no exclusion of the time occupied by the insolvency proceedings which clearly was not for the purpose of obtaining the same relief. The relief sought in insolvency is obviously different from the relief sought in the execution application. In the former, an adjudication of the debtor as insolvent is sought as preliminary to the vesting of all his estate and the administration of it by the Official Receiver or the Official Assignee, as the case may be, for the benefit of all the creditors; but in the latter, the money due is sought to be realised for the benefit of the decree-holder alone, by processes like attachment of property and arrest of person. It may be that ultimately in the insolvency proceedings the decreeholder may be able to realise his debt wholly or in part, but this is a mere consequence or result. Not only is the relief of a different nature in the two proceedings but the procedure is also widely divergent.”

24. In the present case, by way of the appeal, RC ACRT 13 of 2025, under Section 38 of the DRCA before learned Rent Control Tribunal, the relief sought was distinct from the relief sought in prayer ‘(b)’ of the instant 1950 SCC 766: 1950 SCC OnLine SC 44 petition, i.e., impugned eviction judgment dated 06.07.2020 passed by learned RC.

25. No explanation has been forthcoming from the petitioner as to why the judgment of eviction dated 06.07.2020 was not challenged immediately after the dismissal of review application vide order dated 25.09.2025.

26. In these circumstances, the present application is dismissed and disposed of accordingly. CM APPL. 20128/2026, CM APPL. 20129/2026

27. Exemptions allowed, subject to all just exceptions. Applications are disposed of accordingly. RC.REV. 101/2026, CM APPL. 20127/2026, & CM APPL. 24388/2026

28. List this petition with respect to remaining prayers ‘c’ and ‘d’ on 24.08.2026 before Roster Bench.

29. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court, forthwith.

AMIT SHARMA (JUDGE) JULY 06, 2026/bsr/ns