Shalimar Paints Ltd & Anr. v. M/S Phelps and Company Pvt Ltd

the said challans were forged and fabricated, as the serial numbers and dates mentioned on them were inconsistent. It was submitted that challan No. 219 was dated 12.01.2023, whereas challan No. 216 was dated 17.01.2023, and thus, the challans did not mention any payment mode or GST details or mode of payment. The said challans are reproduced as under: -

9. Learned Senior Counsel further drew attention of this Court to the reply filed on behalf of the Respondent to the leave to defend application, and particularly on the following portion, to contend that the Respondent had failed to rebut to the said allegation of the challans being forged and fabricated: - “15. That the contents of paragraph no. 15 are false and hence denied. It is denied the said Challans are bogus or fabricated. The respondents have failed to peruse the said challans carefully. A bare perusal would reveal that the challan numbers are in fact irrelevant as the challan is a continuous document with articles added on two dates i.e 12.01.2023 and 17.01.2023. The three pages are one continuous invoice of 26 articles.” It was further submitted that no findings were given by the learned ARC qua the said contention of the challans being forged and fabricated.

10. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners further drew attention of this Court to the following portion of the leave to defend application to contend that the Respondent had admitted in the eviction petition that the said art business wing was already being operated from the third floor of the subject premises. It was further submitted that as per the official website of the Respondent’s said venture, namely “The Biv”, the Respondent was operating from a substantial commercial space on the third floor of the subject premises, which had ample area for conducting the said business activities. The relevant portion of the leave to defend application is reproduced as under: - “8. That the Petitioner has filed the Eviction Petition with the malafide Intention to harass the Respondents. The need of the Petitioner is not bonafide as sufficient alternative accommodation is available with the Petitioner for running its alleged “new stream of operations”. The Petitioner has admitted in Para 18(a)(v) of the Petition that the Petitioner is conducting the said business from the Third Floor of Building No. 9-A, Connaught Place, New Delhi

110001. As per the Website of the new venture namely “The Biv” thebiv.co.in, the Petitioner is operating in a huge space on the Third Floor of Building No. 9-A, Connaught Place - which includes a Reception Area, a Library, a “Camper” area (Work Space), a “Tent area” (Cabin Space), a Board Room, which is more than sufficient for the Petitioner to expand its business and conduct the Art Exhibitions.”

11. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that in view of the above, the alleged bona fide requirement set up by the Respondent was merely a sham and the Respondent already had sufficient alternate accommodation available with it for carrying out the said business activities. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner further drew attention of this Court to the screenshots placed on record of the website of the Respondent’s venture, i.e., “The Biv”, to demonstrate the Respondent is in possession of a full-fledged office space, which is being offered to general public for using the same for their office purposes. The same has been depicted in the following manner: - “ THE SPACE We have a solid 7,500 sq ft space spread across two floors that you can call your office. This includes a great terrace garden that looks straight on to an unfurling Indian flag dramatically set against an open sky.”

12. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that there was no denial of the fact by the Respondent that the latter was not in possession of 7,500 sq. fts. of space in the subject premises. It was further argued by the learned Senior Counsel that the Respondent had taken contrary stands qua bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises, as the latter in the eviction petition had claimed that the tenanted premises were required for expansion of its art business wing, and the Respondent in its reply to the leave to defend application had stated that the tenanted premises were required for making additional space for other directors of the Respondent company. The relevant portions of the eviction petition and the reply to the leave to defend application are reproduced as under: - “Eviction Petition: vi. That since the Petitioner's business is expanding need for a permanent physical space becomes indispensable. Dealing in paintings, art products, artifacts, sculptures, and decorative arts, which are best appreciated in person, necessitates a dedicated area for display. Additionally, the Petitioner requires offices for meetings with buyers, artists, and vendors, along with adequate storage space for these goods. Reply to Leave to Defend:

12. That the contents of paragraph no, 12 are false and hence denied. It is denied the Respondent No. 1 has not parted/sublet or assigned the possession of the subject premises to the Respondent No. 2. The Respondent No. 2 has duly reflected the subject premises as its registered office on the website of the Ministry of the Corporate Affairs and accordingly the Respondent are hereby falsely deposing that the Respondent No. 2 is not in possession of the subject premises. It is denied that the present petition is premises on false or flimsy grounds or the petition is without merit. The subject premises are bonafide required by the Petitioner for resolution of its need for the offices for the other two directors as well as the display rooms for its art business wing, accordingly the need of the subject premises is eminent, urgent and bonafide.”

13. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners further submitted that the Respondent, in the eviction petition, had stated that it was the owner of the second and third floors of the subject premises; however, in its reply to the leave to defend application, the Respondent had stated that the reference to the said second and third floors would actually mean the third floor and the terrace of the subject premises. It was submitted that the said inconsistent stand itself reflected that the Respondent was uncertain and unclear qua the exact portions/floors available in the subject premises. The relevant portions of the eviction petition and the reply to the leave to defend application are reproduced as under: - “Eviction Petition: xi. That the Petitioner also owns the Second Floor and the Third Floor, 9-A, Phelps Building, Connaught Place, New Delhi. However, the entrances to these premises are from the middle circle, contrasting with the said premises which benefits from an entrance in the inner circle. The inner circle enjoys significantly higher foot traffic compared to the middle circle, which is more suited for businesses not reliant on client engagement. There are no other commercial premises owned by the Petitioner. It is well settled law that a landlord is the best judge of his needs and requirements and the Petitioner requires the premises in question for its personal and bonafide use. Reply to Leave to Defend:

17. That the contents of paragraph no. 17 are false and hence denied. It is submitted that the reference to second floor and third floor in paragraph 18 (a) (xi) is actually the third floor and terrace of the said building and the same is in occupation of the co-working business. The Floor above the subject premises and below the coworking space was sold on 23.12.1993, 18.04.2000 and on 14.02.2017. The said floor is the earliest floor which is accessible from the Middle Circle and the same is not in possession of the Petitioner. It is further submitted that as has been stated hereinabove the third floor and terrace of the said building is in use and occupation by the co-working space business of the Petitioner. The said business is generating goad revenue and occupies the entire third floor as well as the terrace leaving no space for the office of the directors or the display area for art business. In regard to the formation of the middle circle and other businesses in the middle circle, it is submitted that the Petitioner has no space to use even in the middle circle and the law as has been laid down is clear on the fact that the Petitioner is the best and only judge of its needs and the tenant cannot be permitted to dictate the terms.”

14. It was argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners that the Respondent had failed to place anything on record to show how second and third floors of the subject premises were not being used by the Respondent for the purposes of art business wing.

15. Learned Senior Counsel further argued that no material whatsoever had been placed on record by the Respondent to demonstrate that any exhibition, as stated in the eviction petition, had ever been conducted from the subject premises. It was submitted that apart from making bald averments qua the art business activities, no document had been filed by the Respondent to substantiate the same and the entire plea of bona fide requirement was merely a false narrative projected before the learned ARC.

16. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners had placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santosh Devi Soni Vs. Chand Kiran[7], to contend that where a landlord seeks eviction for additional accommodation, and the tenant raises a dispute qua availability of accommodation already in possession of the landlord, the same would give rise to a triable issue. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced as under: - “3. The short question is whether in the light of the requirements put forward by the Respondent-landlady who is a widow and is in MANU/SC/3621/2000 occupation of the first floor of the building in which the suit premises are situated leave to defend to the Defendant- Appellant could have been refused. As this is a case for additional accommodation and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, especially in the light of the additional accommodation which is subsequently made available to the Respondent as mentioned by the Appellant, the question of Respondent's need was required to be thrashed out on merits by a full-fledged trial. This Court in the case of Dr. S.M. Misra v. D.D. Malik Civil Appeal NO. 120 of 1990, decided on 11.1.1990 has ruled that in the cases where additional accommodation is asked for in proceedings under Delhi Rent Control Act, normally leave to defend should not be refused.

4. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, therefore, we deem it fit to grant leave to defend to the Appellant and consequently the judgment and order passed by the Rent Controller and as confirmed by the High Court are set aside and the proceedings are remanded to the Rent Controller's Court for deciding the proceedings on merits by treating the Appellant to have been granted leave to defend. In view of the pendency of the proceedings since years we direct the Rent Controller to decide the remanded proceedings at the earliest and preferably within four months from the receipt of a copy of this order at his end.”

17. Learned Senior Counsel had further placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Charan Dass Duggal Vs. Brahma Nand[8], to contend that at the stage of deciding an application for leave to defend, the learned ARC shall only examine whether the tenant has prima facie raised a triable issue or not. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced as under: -

18. Attention of this Court was further drawn to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Inderjeet Kaur vs. Nirpal Singh[9], and it was submitted that burden placed on a tenant is of a light nature and the latter is only required to show such facts as would disentitle the 2000 INSC 605 landlord from obtaining an order of eviction. The relevant portions of the said judgment are reproduced as under: -

19. Learned Senior Counsel further placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Khem Chand and Ors. Vs. Arjun Jain and Ors10, and particularly on the following paragraphs: -

20. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned Senior Counsel had further placed reliance upon the following judgments: i. Deena Nath Vs. Pooran Lal11, (Para 15); ii. Rajhans Realtors Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajinder Kumar Goyal and Ors.12, (Para 5); iii. Devinder Kumar Choudhry Vs. Rambir Singh13, (Paras 13-16); iv. Sunil Kumar Jain Vs. Dinesh Bhatia14, (Para 13.3); v. Deepak Gupta Vs. Sushma Aggarwal15, (Paras 9, 13-19, 23 & 25); vi. Ashok Kumar Gupta Vs. Rajesh Kumar and Ors.16, (Paras 8-9).

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHLAF OF THE RESPONDENT

21. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent, submitted the reference to the second and third floor of the subject premises in the eviction petition ought to have been read as third floor and the terrace of the subject premises. It was further submitted that the said portions are presently being run as a business of co-working space. It was further stated that the floor above the tenanted premises and below the third floor was sold by the Respondent. It was further submitted that the said fact was duly disclosed by the Respondent in the reply to the leave to defend application filed by the Petitioners before the learned ARC and the relevant portion of the said is reproduced as under: - AIR 2001 SC 2655 2024: DHC: 8477 2025: DHC: 10802 2024: DHC:7952 2013: DHC:3580 2016 (154) DRJ75 “That the contents of paragraph no. 17 are false and hence denied. It is submitted that the reference to second floor and third floor in paragraph 18 (a) (xi) is actually the third floor and terrace of the said building and the same is in occupation of the co-working business. The Floor above the subject premises and below the coworking space was sold on 23.12.1993, 18.04.2000 and on 14.02.2017. The said floor is the earliest floor which is accessible from the Middle Circle and the same is not in possession of the Petitioner. It is further submitted that as has been stated hereinabove the third floor and terrace of the said building is in use and occupation by the co-working space business of the Petitioner. The said business is generating good revenue and occupies the entire third floor as well as the terrace leaving no space for the office of the directors or the display area for art business. In regard to the formation of the middle circle and other businesses in the middle circle, it is submitted that the Petitioner has no space to use even in the middle circle and the law as has been laid down is clear on the fact that the Petitioner is the best and only judge of its needs and the tenant cannot be permitted to dictate the terms.”

22. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent drew attention of this Court to the following portion of the eviction petition, as filed before the learned ARC: - “(ii) The Petitioner is family run private company and the Petitioner is in urgent bona-fide requirement of the said premises for its Art Business Wing. The shareholding of the Petitioner is as under: Name of shareholder No. of shares Mr. Vikramjit Singh 6500 Mrs. Soni Manjit Singh 7500 Mrs. Bhagwanti Singh 3000 Ms. Niamat Singh 1500 Mr. Fateh Singh 1500

(iii) The Petitioner Company through Ms. Niamat Singh and Mr. Fateh

Singh who are also the shareholder, children of the Promoter Managing Director, Mr. Vikramjit Singh, as well as the employee of the Petitioner established a new stream of operations i.e. Art Business Wing of the - Petitioner Company under its trademark “the Biv” which is the business of curating, managing and running art galleries for exhibition of art and deal in paintings, art produce, artifacts, sculpture, decorative arts, furniture, textiles, costume, drawings, pastels, watercolors, collages, prints, artist books, photographs, installation art for hosting and curating art galleries being the Art Business Wing of the Petitioner Company. The trademark registration of the Biv by the Petitioner is annexed hereto as Annexure 4.

(iv) That Ms. Niamat Singh and Mr. Fateh Singh, both shareholders and employees of the Petitioner Company, possess the necessary qualifications to expand the Art Business Wing and create supplementary revenue streams for the company. Ms. Niamat Singh holds a postgraduate degree in International Relations with a specialization in the History of Art, while Mr. Fateh Singh has graduated in Business Administration.” It was submitted that the Respondent had specifically disclosed in the eviction petition that the tenanted premises were required for expansion of its new art business wing, which was being operated under the trademark “The Biv”. It was further submitted that the tenanted premises were required for establishing office space for two directors of the Respondent company, namely, Mr. Fateh Singh and Ms. Niamat Singh, along with display area for paintings, storage and allied business activities qua the said art business wing.

23. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent further drew attention of this Court to the site plan, as filed before the learned ARC, and the same is reproduced as under: - It was contended that the tenanted premises are situated on the first floor of the subject premises and access thereto is only possible from Connaught Place’s inner circle. It was further submitted that the contention advanced on behalf of the Petitioners that the third floor and terrace of the subject premises were available with the Respondent and the latter was already operating the said art business wing therefrom, is unfounded. It was submitted that access to the third floor and the terrace of the subject premises is only from Connaught Place’s middle circle and it is a matter of common knowledge that the inner circle enjoys substantially better commercial visibility and footfall as compared to the middle circle. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the first floor of the subject premises was best suited for the bona fide requirement of the Respondent, as access thereto was directly from Connaught Place’s inner circle. It was further submitted that the third floor and the terrace of the subject premises were already occupied and being utilised for co-working operations and were not in possession of the Respondent, and therefore, the same could not have been utilised for satisfying the bona fide requirement of the Respondent.

24. Learned Senior Counsel further drew attention of this Court to the proposed site plan, trademark registration and brochure of the exhibition carried out by the Respondent, as filed before the learned ARC, and the same are reproduced as under: - It was submitted that the argument advanced on behalf of the Petitioners that the Respondent did not intend to operate the said art business wing from the tenanted premises, is devoid of merit, inasmuch as the Respondent had already commenced operations qua the bona fide requirement and the same was not a mere desire or wish. It was further submitted that the trademark registration of the said venture had also not been disputed by the petitioners. Qua the proposed site plan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent submitted that the Petitioners had merely denied the same in their leave to defend application, and no substantive material had been placed on record to contradict the said proposed site plan.

25. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent further drew attention of this Court to the challans, as reproduced hereinbefore, and submitted that the plea of the said challans being forged and fabricated was never taken by the Petitioners before the learned ARC and the same has been raised for the first time before this Court. It was thus submitted that the Petitioners cannot be permitted to raise a fresh plea at this stage.

26. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent had placed reliance on Sunder Singh Talwar v. Kamal Chand Dugar17, in particular the following paragraphs: -

(ii) In Tarsem Singh v. Gurvinder Singh, (2010) 2 RCR

(Rent) 604: (2010) 173 DLT 379, it was observed that “If the landlord wants to start his own business in the premises owned by him then by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the requirement of the landlord for the premises is neither bonafide nor genuine.”

(iii) In Balwant Singh Chowdhary v. Hindustan

Petroleum Corporation Ltd., (2004) 1 RCR 487, it was held that “It is not necessary for the landlord to plead and prove the specific business he wants to set up, if the landlord wanted the premises for business purposes.”

(iv) In Gurcharan Lal Kumar v. Srimati Satyawati,

(2013) 2 RCR (Rent) 120 it was observed that “Merely because the exact nature of business has not been described would not take away their bonafide need to carry out a business (when admittedly both the sons are dependent upon petitioner for this need). It was observed that if the business need is not disclosed this would not wipe away the bonafide need of the landlord as has been pressed under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRCA, 1958.”

(v) In Raj Kumar Khaitan v. Bibi Zubaida Khatun,

(1995) 1 RCR (Rent) 495: (1997) 11 SCC 411: AIR 1995 SC 576, it was observed that “It was not necessary for the appellants-landlords to indicate the precise nature of the business which they intended to start in the premises. Even if the nature of business would have been indicated nobody would bind the landlords to start the same business in the premises after it was vacated.” Hence, the legal position is quite clear. The landlord need not to show evidence that he has experience of said business that he proposes to start. In fact, it is not necessary for landlord to indicate the precise nature of business which he intends to start in the premises. Hence if for some reason there is an impediment in the way of the petitioner/petitioner's son from starting a computer shop from the tenanted premises, the said petitioners would be free to change the nature of business and use the suit property for carrying on business which confirms to the legal requirements. There is no merit in the contention of the petitioner that the need for starting a computer shop is not bonafide requirement.”

23. Hence, it is settled law that the landlord need not show evidence that he has experience of said business that he proposes to start. In fact, it is not necessary for the landlord to indicate the precise nature of business which he intends to start in the premises. There is hence no merit in the said contention of the petitioner.”

27. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent had further placed reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Bajaj & Anr. v. Vinod Ahuja18, in particular on the following paragraph: -

28. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent further placed reliance on Sarwan Dass Bange v. Ram Prakash19, and particularly on the following paragraph: -

29. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent further placed reliance on the following portion of M/s A.K. Woolen Industries & Ors. v. Shri Narain Gupta20: -

30. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent further placed reliance on A.M. Shah v. Pushpa Sood 21, in particular on the following paragraphs: -

“6. Mr. Kapur relied heavily on the decision of the Supreme Court in Santosh Devi Soni v. Chand Kiran, JT 2000 (3) SC 397 and Inderjeet Kaur v. Nirpal Singh, 89 (2001) Delhi Law Times 27 (SC): 2001 (57) DRJ 182, for his submission that leave to contest the petition should have been granted. Even in Santosh Devi's case (supra), the Court has stated in its Order that normally leave should be granted; and that in ‘considering the facts and circumstances of this case, we deem it fit to grant leave to defend’. It did not lay down a proposition calling for universal application per se, that even if facts prima facie incredible in nature were pleaded, they should like a password result in leave to contest being granted. In Inderjeet Kaur's case (supra), a reading of the following paragraph makes it evident that leave to contest should be granted only where a prima facie case has been disclosed. In this event, the Additional Rent Controller should grant leave to contest and desist from entering into a final consideration of the grounds disclosed on their possible merits. The Additional Rent Controller should not obviate a trial at this stage, by giving into the merits of the grounds, if a final conclusion is available only after evidence is led in the Trial. The only possible exception may be where the grounds raised are strictly legal in character, not necessitating the holding of a trial. It should be borne in mind that a Trial is required for establishing facts, and not law. The Apex Court opined in Inderjeet Kaur's case (supra) as follows:— “We are of the considered view that at a stage when the tenant seeks leave to defend, it is enough if he prima facie makes out a case by disclosing such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction. It would not be a right approach to say that unless the tenant at that stage itself establishes a strong case as would non-suit the landlord leave to defend should not be granted when it is not the requirement of Section 25B(5). A leave to defend sought for cannot also be granted for mere asking or in a routine manner which will defeat the very object of the special provisions contained in Chapter IIJA of the Act. Leave to defend cannot be refused where an eviction petition is filed on a mere design or desire of a landlord to recover possession of the premises from a tenant under Clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14, when as a matter of fact the requirement may not be bona fide. Refusing to grant leave in such a case leads to eviction of a tenant summarily resulting in great hardship to him and his family members, if any, although he could establish if only leave is granted that a landlord would be disentitled for an order of eviction. At the stage of granting leave to defend parties, rely on affidavits in support of the rival contentions. Assertions and counter assertions made in affidavits may not afford safe and acceptable evidence so as to arrive at an affirmative conclusion one way or the other unless there is a strong and acceptable evidence available to show that the facts disclosed in the application filed by the tenant seeking leave to defend were either frivolous, untenable or most unreasonable. Take a case when a possession is sought on the ground of personal requirement, a landlord has to establish his need and not his mere desire. The ground under Clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 enables a landlord to recover possession of the tenanted premises on the ground of his bona fide requirement. This being an enabling provision, essentially the burden is on the landlord to establish his case affirmatively. In short and substance wholly frivolous and totally untenable defence may not entitle a tenant to leave to defend but when a triable issue is raised a duty is placed on the Rent Controller by the statute itself to grant leave. At the stage of granting leave the real test should be whether facts disclosed in the affidavit filed seeking leave to defend prima facie show that the landlord would be disentitled from obtaining an order of eviction and not whether at the end defence may fail. It is well to remember that when a leave to defend is refused, serious consequences of eviction shall follow and the party seeking leave is denied an opportunity to test the truth of the averments made in the eviction petition by crossexamination. It may also be noticed that even in cases where leave is granted provisions are made in this very Chapter for expeditious disposal of eviction petitions. Section 25B(6) states that where leave is granted to a tenant to contest the eviction application, the Controller shall commence the hearing of the application as early as practicable. Section 25B(7) speaks of the procedure to be followed in such cases. Section 25B(8) bars the appeals against an order of recovery of possession except a provision of revision to the High Court. Thus a combined effect of Sections 25B(6), (7) and (8) would lead to expeditious disposal of eviction petitions so that a landlord need not wait and suffer for long time. On the other hand, when a tenant is denied leave to defend although he had fair chance to prove his defence, will suffer great hardship. In this view a balanced view is to be taken having regard to competing claims.”

7. In Madan Lal Gupta v. Ravinder Kumar, (2001) 1 SCC 252, the Apex Court declined to interfere in the concurrent refusal to grant leave to contest even after referring to the cases of Santosh Devi (supra) and Liaq Ahmed v. Habeeb-Ur-Rehman, (2000) 5 SCC 708: 2000 (56) DRJ (Suppl) 217.

8. Returning to the case in hand, it is to be seen whether the Additional Rent Controller could have arrived at the conclusion that a prima facie case had not been made out by the Tenant. If his conclusion is possible and not perverse, this Court would not interfere even if it favoured a different view. The Additional Rent Controller has opined that no accommodation was available to the landlady on the 2nd Floor which was fit for her habitation. This view is based on several precedents of this Court. It is well entrenched that the landlord is the best Judge of his needs, and if the demand is not absurd, the Court should desist from scrutinising it minutely. The Additional Rent Controller was obviously and correctly influenced by the size and temporary character of the rooms, and that whilst the second floor may well be used for the ‘factory’ and as quarters for employees, it was not reasonably suitable for the Landlady's residential need. Keeping in perspective the accommodation disclosed by both parties, the version of letting to persons other than the present Tenant is mere moonshine. The finding that the landlady/widow required the premises bona fide is not open to revision as no jurisdictional error has been committed.”

31. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent further placed reliance on Nirmala Kumari & Ors. v. Girish Kakkar & Anr.22, in particular on the following paragraph: -

32. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent had sought to distinguish the judgments relied upon by the Petitioners. Qua Santosh Devi (Supra), it was submitted that the observations contained therein, were rendered in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the said case, where additional residential accommodation had become available to the landlord during the pendency of the eviction proceedings.

33. Qua the judgment of Charan Dass Duggal (Supra), it was submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent that same was also distinguishable on facts, inasmuch as the landlord therein was residing at Pathankot, whereas the tenanted residential premises were situated in Delhi. Similarly, qua Inderjeet Kaur (Supra), it was submitted that the landlord therein was residing in the United Kingdom, and he had sought eviction of the tenant from the premises situated at Delhi.

34. Qua Khem Chand (Supra), it was submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent that the same was distinguishable on facts, as the entire first floor of the subject premises therein, was lying vacant and available with the landlord, and further, the sons for whose requirement the eviction was sought, were not dependent upon the landlord.

35. Qua Deena Nath (Supra), learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the said judgment is distinguishable on facts, inasmuch as the landlord therein had failed to explain the non-utilisation of a vacant showroom available with him. Qua Rajinder Kumar Goyal (Supra), it was submitted that the facts of the said case were entirely different, as the parties therein had consented to mediation and had agreed that execution proceedings would not be initiated during the pendency of the mediation proceedings.

36. Qua Rajhans Realtors Pvt. Ltd. (Supra), learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the said judgment, in fact, supports the case of the Respondent, as the eviction petition therein had been allowed on the ground of bona fide requirement.

37. Qua Deepak Gupta (Supra), it was submitted that the landlord therein had already obtained possession of two other properties in the same vicinity through rent control proceedings and the said properties were available for the alleged requirement.

38. Qua Ashok Kumar Gupta (Supra), learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the said judgment is distinguishable on facts, as the landlord therein had taken contradictory stands with respect to the alleged requirement in the legal notice as well as in the eviction petition.

REJOINDER SUBMISSIONS

39. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that the third floor of the subject premises is admittedly in occupation of “The Biv” and the said entity is already operating therefrom. It was thus submitted that the question whether approximately 7,500 sq. ft. of space available with the Respondent was sufficient or insufficient for the alleged bona fide requirement, itself raises a triable issue which could not have been decided without a trial.

40. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners further submitted that objections qua the challans filed by the Respondent had already been raised by the Petitioners in their leave to defend application itself and the same formed part of the record before the learned ARC. It was submitted that despite the said objections having been specifically raised, the learned ARC had failed to deal with the same while rendering the impugned judgment.

41. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner had further argued that the learned ARC had failed to consider a substantial triable issue, as raised by the Petitioners qua applicability of Section 22 of the DRC Act in the present case. It was argued that the Petitioners had specifically contended that the issue of maintainability of the eviction petition required consideration in view of the order dated 17.03.2025 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajinder Kumar Goyal v. Rajhans Realtors Private Limited in SLP 4169/2025, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court had stayed the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Rajhans Realtors Pvt. Ltd. (Supra). It was submitted that the issue regarding the applicability of Section 22 of the DRC Act to eviction petitions filed by a company, which was considered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Rajhans Realtors Pvt. Ltd. (Supra), is presently pending consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It was contended that the said issue has not attained finality, and therefore, constituted a substantial triable issue. It was further submitted that despite the aforesaid contention having a direct bearing on the maintainability of the eviction petition, no finding qua the same was returned by the learned ARC in the impugned judgment.

42. In response to the aforesaid submission, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent had relied upon the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench of this Court in K.S. Bhandari v. International Security Printers Private Limited23, and had submitted that a company or any body corporate can file an eviction petition, invoking both Section 14 (1)(e) or Section 22 of the DRC Act. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced as under: - “Answer to the questions referred vide order dated 22-12-2017 (K.S. Bhandari v. International Security Printers (P) Ltd. [K.S. Bhandari v. International Security Printers (P) Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12520] )

80. Under these circumstances, the reference is answered as under:

(i) Where the landlord is a Company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution and the premises are required for the use of employees of such landlord, whether such landlord has a choice, whether to invoke Section 14(1)(e) or Section 22 of the Act. Answer — Yes, the landlord has a choice to invoke both Section 14(1)(e) and/or Section 22DRC Act, 1958 as may be applicable in the facts.

(ii) Whether the Chairman, Directors, trustees, members of the governing body and office-bearers, of a Company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution qualify as ‘employees, within the meaning of Section 22 of the Act and if not whether such landlord for requirement of such persons is entitled to invoke Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. Answer — The question whether such persons would qualify as employees or not, would depend upon the terms of employment between the employer and the employee as also on the facts of each case. The landlord is free to avail of remedies either under Section 14(1)(e) or Section 22DRC Act, 1958 as may be applicable. Each case has to be decided on its own facts as it is possible that in some cases, the employer-employee relationship may or may not exist, depending upon the terms of employment.

(iii) Whether the tenant of such a landlord can be construed as having acted in contravention of the terms under which he was authorized to occupy the premises or be construed as in 2025 SCC OnLine Del 3438 unauthorized occupation of the premises, within the meaning of Sections 22(b) and (c) of the Act, on continuing in occupation after determination of his tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act, 1882. Answer — The question as to whether upon termination of a tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 a tenant is under unauthorized occupation or not, or in contravention of the terms or not, would have to be determined on the basis of the contract or agreement between the parties. The question as to what the terms of the tenancy, whether there is a violation, whether there is termination, whether the termination is lawful and whether tenant is in unauthorized occupation, would have to be determined on the facts.

(iv) Whether the commercial or industrial or other requirement of a landlord, which/who is a Company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution, of premises, by allowing its employees to work or carry on its activities therein is within the ambit of Section 22 of the Act and if not, whether for such requirement such a landlord can invoke Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. Answer — The purpose of the tenancy i.e. whether the premises is let for residential or non-residential purposes, would no longer be relevant under Section 14(1)(e)DRC Act, 1958 in view of the judgment, Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India [Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 287]. The said judgment would have equal applicability even in the case of Section 22DRC Act, 1958.

(v) Whether a public charitable trust carrying on public activities qualifies as a public institution. Answer — No to the extent that a public charitable trust carrying on public activities which is set up by private persons would not be covered under Section 22DRC Act, 1958.

(vi) Whether a deity in a temple owning properties or a trust or a society managing a place of worship qualifies as a public institution. Answer — Yes. So long as the trust or the society managing the place of worship is not a private trust. Insofar as a deity is concerned, if the society or trust or any other entity managing the temple is controlled by the Government, State or local authority, directly or indirectly, Section 22DRC Act, 1958 would apply. However, if the same is controlled by a private body/private trust, it would not fall under the ambit of Section 22DRC Act, 1958.

(vii) Whether the choice if any with such a landlord, to invoke either Section 14(1)(e) or Section 22 of the Act, is to the detriment of the tenant and if so to what effect.” Answer — The remedies provided under the statute to a landlord or the protection extended to tenants under the statute, have to be presumed to be in balance with each other. So long as the remedies are availed by the landlord in terms of the provisions DRC Act, 1958 the same cannot be construed as being to the detriment of the tenant.”

43. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners had further refuted the argument of the Respondent that the issue regarding the genuineness of the challans was never raised before the learned ARC and it is only before this Court that the said issue is being raised by the Petitioners for the first time. It was submitted that the said issue was raised before the learned ARC in the application seeking leave to defend, and despite the said contention, the learned ARC had failed to return any findings qua the same in the impugned judgment. The relevant portion of the said application is reproduced as under: - “15. That it is submitted that the Petitioner has filed certain Challans from Pages 30 to 33 of the Petition. A bare perusal of the same would suggest that the said Challans appear to be bogus and fabricated, as can be clearly seen from the Serial Number and Dates mentioned on them. For instance, Challan No. 219 Is dated 12.01.2023 whereas Challan No. 216 is dated 17.01.2023.” ANALYSIS

44. Heard the learned Senior Counsels for the parties and perused the record.

45. The relevant portion of the impugned judgment passed by the learned ARC reads as under: -

48. From the above, it is apparent that the Respondent had fully disclosed the availability of the space on the third floor and terrace of the subject premises and had justified the need of their bona fide requirement for the tenanted premises, on the ground of it’s location as well as additional space required for expansion of the art business wing. In fact, in the reply to the leave to defend application filed on behalf of the Petitioners, the Respondent had stated that it was suffering loss of business on account of non-availability of adequate space for its art business wing. It was further stated that exhibitions had been held previously at the co-working space being operated on the third floor and terrace of the subject premises; however, the same was not adequate for such exhibitions. It was further pointed out that the said space is divided into smaller cabins and rooms, and therefore, the same was not appropriate for conducting art exhibitions.

49. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners had drawn the attention of this Court to a website pertaining to the aforesaid space, under the trademark “The Biv”, as to show that the said space was being utilised by the Respondent for offering “a place to camp out and work hard”. It was submitted that the said space is being offered by the Respondent for people to come and work in the following manner: - “The space spread across two floors that you can call your office. This includes a great terrace garden that looks straight on to an unfurling Indian flag dramatically set against an open sky”

50. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent had drawn the attention of this Court to the proposed site plan, trademark registration and brochures of the exhibitions carried out by the Respondent. A perusal of the aforesaid documents would reflect that the Respondent is running an Art Business under the trademark of “The Biv”. It is also a matter of record that the subject premises is located on the first floor and the same can be accessed from Connaught Place’s inner circle. It was rightly noted by the learned ARC that the tenanted premises was situated at a location affording greater footfall and enhanced visibility, owing to its access from the Connaught Place’s inner circle. In fact, the screenshots placed on record by the Petitioners with respect to property available with the Respondent itself shows that the same is more in a nature of working stations and offices. The co-working office being run by the Respondent is one it’s business venture and it cannot be said that the same should be shut-down so that the space utilised by it be then used for art exhibitions, while the Petitioners continue to retain possession of the tenanted premises. It is a well-settled law that a tenant cannot dictate as to how the landlord has to utilise its premises. The contention of the Petitioners that the space in possession of the Respondent is sufficient to cater to the requirements of its expanding art business wing cannot be accepted.

51. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners had submitted that the learned ARC while passing the impugned judgment, had mechanically applied the proposition that the landlord is the best judge to decide his needs, and did not appreciate that present case is of additional accommodation. In support of the said contention reliance was placed on judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Khem Chand and Ors. (Supra) to argue that the question whether the accommodation available, comprising of 7500 sq. feet, was sufficient, suitable or reasonable for the Respondent to carry on its business had to be examined.

52. The aforesaid judgment relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners was rendered in the facts and circumstances of the said case. In the said case, the demised premises for which eviction was sought was located on ground floor of property No. 10, Sundar Nagar. However, it had come on record that the landlord therein was already running his office from ground floor of property No. 9A of Sundar Nagar, and was also in occupation of the first floor of property No. 10, Sundar Nagar, which was lying vacant. It was also noted by the learned Single Judge in the said case that the proposed need of the landlord therein, as stated in the eviction petition, was not a felt need, but one which could have been said to be farfetched, based on desire and imagination. The relevant observation reads as under: -

53. Similarly, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners, that the invoices placed on record are at variance with each other, with respect to the dates, and therefore, the same becomes a triable issue is again not tenable. A perusal of the challans placed on record by the Respondent along with the eviction petition shows their GST details, as well as further scrutiny of the said challans would indicate that the first two challans dated 12.01.2023 bearing serial nos. 218 and 219, pertain to items listed from serial no. 1 to 14 and 15 to 24, respectively. The next challan placed on record is dated 17.01.2023 bearing no. 216 but serial nos. of item contained therein start from serial no. 25 till 26, and the fourth challan placed on record dated 20.01.2023 bearing NO. 221 pertains to items listed at serial nos. 27 to 38. These challans have been made separately on separate dates with separate items; however, the continuity of the item numbers shows that they were bought in the same time period, though on different dates. Merely because challan no. 216 is dated 17.01.2023 whereas challan nos. 218 and 219 are dated 12.01.2023 cannot by itself give rise to any triable issue. The Respondent, in the eviction petition, had also placed on record relevant materials to show the previous exhibitions organised by them in furtherance of their art business wing. Thus, even if the challans are ignored, the fact that the Respondent is running an art business wing had been brought on record.

54. In the considered opinion of this Court, as pointed out hereinbefore, the bona fide need of the Respondent herein can neither be stated to be one based on desire and imagination. Enough material had been placed on record to demonstrate that Respondent is indeed running an art business wing and had conducted exhibitions prior to the filing of the eviction petition. The Respondent had categorially explained in its eviction petition as to why the property in its possession is not sufficient and that the tenanted premises is an alternate suitable accommodation to run the art business wing. The other judgments relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners were rendered on their own peculiar facts. The proposition of law in the said judgments is not in dispute; however, the same have been adequately distinguished on facts by the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent, as noted hereinbefore.

55. It is noted that the location of the tenanted premises, having access from Connaught Place’s inner circle, was not the only fact considered by the learned ARC, and the same was read in context with the requirement of tenanted premises for the Respondent to expand their art business wing. The aforesaid business is not a proposed plan, and the same is being run as demonstrated by the documents placed on record. It is not the case of proposed business plan for which the tenanted premises is required, but the same is required for expansion of an already running business for which the concerned tenanted premises is suitable for the Respondent.

56. In Anil Bajaj & Anr. (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court had categorically reiterated the settled principle of law that it was not for the tenant to dictate the landlord as to how the property belonging to the landlord should be utilised for the purposes of his business, and also the fact that the even if the landlord is doing business from various other premises, the same cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction from the tenanted premises, so long as he intends to use the same for his own business. The case of the Respondent is on the same footing.

57. With regard to the submission made on behalf of the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners qua the applicability of Section 22 of the DRC Act in the eviction petition, this Court finds no merits in the same. As pointed out hereinabove, the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in K.S. Bhandari (Supra), had already answered the said question and has held that a company or a body corporate is not barred from invoking the provisions of Section 22 or Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, as applicable to the facts of the said case. This Court further notes that challenge to the said judgment had been dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 03.11.2025 passed in SLP(C) NO. 32272/2025.

58. This Court has perused the record and considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties. It is well settled that the powers of this Court under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act are limited and not as wide as those of an Appellate Court. The scope of interference is confined to examining whether the impugned order suffers from any illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional error. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.24, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed and held as under: -

59. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua25, has held that this Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 25B-(8) of the DRC Act, is not expected to substitute its own view for that of the learned ARC’s and the scope of interference is extremely limited. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under: - “Scope of revision

22. We are, in fact, more concerned with the scope and ambit of the proviso to Section 25-B(8). The proviso creates a distinct and unequivocal embargo by not providing an appeal against the order passed by the learned Rent Controller over an application filed under sub-section (5). The intendment of the legislature is very clear, which is to remove the appellate remedy and thereafter, a further second appeal. It is a clear omission that is done by the legislature consciously through a covenant removing the right of two stages of appeals.

23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the (2022) 6 SCC 30: (2022) 3 SCC (Civ) 287: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 419 High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature.”

60. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that no interference with the findings returned by the learned ARC in the impugned judgment is warranted and the same is upheld.

61. The Petitioners-Tenants are directed to vacate and hand over vacant, peaceful and physical possession of property bearing No. 9-A, First Floor, Inner Circle, Connaught Place, New Delhi-110001, to the Respondent-Landlord, forthwith, as the benefit of six months’ period as per Section 14(7) of the DRC Act has already lapsed.

62. The present petition is dismissed and disposed of accordingly, in the aforesaid terms.

63. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

64. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court, forthwith.

AMIT SHARMA (JUDGE) JULY 06, 2026/sn/db