Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 07.07.2026
KAMLESH KOTHARI .....Petitioner
Mr. Naveen Malhotra and Mr. Ritvik Malhotra, Advocates for Petitioner.
Mr. Sanjay Jain, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Akhand Pratap Singh, SPP, Mr. Nishank Tripathi, Ms. Harshita Sukhija, Ms. Rishika Agarwal, Mr. Shreyan Srivastav, Ms. Samridhi Dobhal, Ms. Krishna Mohan Chandel, Mr. Hritwik Maurya, Ms. Lisa Pagwal, Ms. Apoorv Paliya, Mr. Utkarsh Singh, Advocates for State with ACP Virender Kadyan, Insp. Pradeep
Rai.
JUDGMENT
1. By way of the present application under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [“BNSS”] (corresponding to Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [“CrPC”]), the petitioner seeks regular bail in connection with FIR No. 208/2021, dated 07.08.2021, registered at Police Station Special Cell, Delhi, under Sections 170/384/385/388/419/420/506/120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [“IPC”], and Section 66D of the Information Technology Act, 2000 [“IT Act”]. At the time of filing of the chargesheet, Sections 3 and 4 of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 [“MCOCA”], were also invoked.
2. This is the second bail application filed by the petitioner before this Court. His first bail application[1] was dismissed by a judgment of this Court dated 11.07.2023 [hereinafter, “the 2023 judgment”]2.
3. I have heard Mr. Naveen Malhotra, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. Sanjay Jain, learned Senior Counsel for the State. The State has also filed a status report, which is on record.
4. At the outset, it may be mentioned that I have recently decided three bail applications arising out of the same proceedings, filed by coaccused Leena Paulose [hereinafter, “Leena”], Deepak Ramnani [hereinafter, “Deepak”], and Pradeep Ramdanee [hereinafter, “Pradeep”].The application filed by Leena[3] was dismissed, whereas the applications filed by Deepak[4] and Pradeep[5] were allowed.
I. PROSECUTION CASE:
5. The prosecution case, as it appears from the material on record, is as follows: a. FIR No. 208/2021, dated 07.08.2021, lodged at Police Station Special Cell, Delhi, under Sections 170/384/385/388/419/420/506/120B of the IPC and Section 66D of the IT Act, was registered at the instance of one Ms. Aditi Singh. BAIL APPLN. 4262/2021. It appears from the website of the Supreme Court that the petitioner had filed a Special Leave Petition [Diary No. 41706/2023] against the 2023 judgment, which was dismissed by order dated 09.07.2024, on account of being a defective matter not re-filed after 90 days. BAIL APPLN. 1802/2024, decided on 05.05.2026 [hereinafter, “Leena Paulose”]. An earlier application for bail filed by Leena in the State proceedings [BAIL APPLN. 3706/2022] was also rejected by the 2023 judgment. BAIL APPLN. 4286/2024, decided on 05.06.2026 [hereinafter, “Deepak Ramnani”]. BAIL APPLN. 4441/2024, decided on 05.06.2026. b. According to the complaint, on 15.06.2020, the complainant received a call on her mobile phone from a landline number. The caller introduced himself as a senior officer in the Ministry of Law and offered assistance in securing bail for her husband, who was in judicial custody in cases related to M/s Religare Enterprises Limited. c. It is alleged that the caller demanded Rs. 50 crores in exchange for facilitating the bail and explained the method of delivering the money. d. Subsequently, through his associates, the caller allegedly extorted money from the complainant on multiple occasions between June 2020 and August 2021, amounting to Rs. 217 crores. There are further allegations with regard to impersonation of senior officials, including the Home Secretary, Government of India, and misrepresenting the involvement of other government functionaries, including the Home Minister. e. Acting on the said information, on 07.08.2021, the police laid a trap and apprehended Pradeep, while he was receiving the extorted amount. He was arrested on the same day. During interrogation, he disclosed that he was acting on the instructions of his brother, Deepak, who was subsequently arrested on 08.08.2021. f. Using technical surveillance of the mobile phone used for making the calls, and the statements of co-accused, the caller was identified as one Sukesh Chandra Shekhar @ Sukash Chandra Shekhar [hereinafter, “Sukesh”]. g. At this time, Sukesh was already lodged in Tihar Jail as an undertrial prisoner in a separate case, involving allegations of collecting money from a political leader on the pretext of helping him retain a particular election symbol. He was later shifted to Rohini Jail. h. A raid was conducted on the intervening night of 07/08.08.2021 by the Special Cell, during which two mobile phones were recovered from Sukesh, while he was in custody, and he was formally arrested in connection with the present FIR. His interrogation led to the identification and arrest of other associates and co-conspirators. The petitioner was arrested on 05.09.2021. i. During investigation, it was found that Sukesh was involved in multiple cases, including attempt to murder, criminal intimidation, cheating, and extortion, often by impersonating high-ranking officials. j. Part of the extorted amount was allegedly transmitted by Sukesh, through hawala channels, to his wife, Leena, in Chennai. k. Two criminal cases had been registered against the petitioner previously. Details of the said cases are as follows: i. FIR No. 1319/2017, lodged at Police Station Soundarapandiyanar Angadi, District T. Nagar, Tamil Nadu under Sections 294(b)/341/342/363/506(1)/149 of the IPC. ii. FIR No. 470/2012, lodged at Police Station Soundarapandiyanar Angadi, District T. Nagar, Tamil Nadu, under Section 75 of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 [“TNTCP Act”]. l. As far as the present petitioner is concerned, his role in the aforesaid offences is summarised in the chargesheet as follows: “8. Accused Kamlesh Kothari He is Car Dealer in Chennai. He knew Mohan Raj through Common Friend since 2018. He met Leena through Mohan Raj. Thereafter, he helped Leena &Sukash in purchasing High end luxury cars and property. He helped Leena in purchasing two cars in July-2020, by introducing his friend Surender Panwar (Financial Broker) to transfer the amount of Rs five Crores in the account of car owners. He got Rs 10 Lakh as commission. He with help of Mohan Raj purchased property of ECR in name of his relative Jitender Kothari in Aug 2020 for total consideration of Rs 7 Crores. The white amount of property i.e. Rs five Crores was paid from the account of Jitender Kothari, M/s Jai Jinender Construction to the owner of ECR house. He got Rs13.[5] Lakh as commission. Statement U/s 18 (1) MCOCA of Sukash and B.Mohan Raj.” m. The State relied upon confessional statements, under Section 18 of MCOCA, made by co-accused Sukesh and B. Mohanraj [hereinafter, “Mohanraj”]. In the status report filed on behalf of the State, the statements of Sukesh and Mohanraj, insofar as they are relevant in respect of the present petitioner, have been summarised as follows: “Confessional statements u/s 18 MCOC Act of accused Sukash Chander Shekhar: In the confessional statements got recorded U/s 18 MCOC Act by accused person namely Sukash V. Chandrashekhar. The accused Sukash Chander Shekhar confessed that “I told her to brief each of our aid. The said cash was received at sow carpet Chennai and collected by Sudheer and Joel. Cash was delivered to Mohanraj and further delivered to Kamlesh Kothari and Arun Muthu. Arun Muthu deals in providing bank entries and Kamlesh Kothari deals in high end cars and house.” Confessional Statement u/s 18 MCOC Act of accused B. Mohanraj: The accused B. Mohanraj confessed that (“In June 2020, I got a call from Sukash Chander Shekhar on Telegram app on my mobile phone and Sukash Chander Shekhar asked me to buy cars for Leena Paulose. I introduced my friend Kamlesh Kothari to Leena Paulose. Leena Paulose bought three cars and cars were bought in cash on paper and payments were made to others. I and Kamlesh Kothari arranged all this and got huge commission. Last year i.e. 2020, Sukash Chander Shekhar called me on telegram and asked me to buy a house for Leena Paulose in some other’s name. I discussed it with Kamlesh Kothari. The cash amount of Rs 7.75 Cr through Sudheer and Joel was handed over to Kamlesh Kothari at his office in T Nagar in my presence.”).”
JUDGMENT DATED 11.07.2023:
6. As noted above, an earlier bail application filed by the present petitioner before this Court, was dismissed by the 2023 judgment. It was Mr. Malhotra’s submission that the Court must re-consider the question of the petitioner’s entitlement to bail, in light of lapse of nearly three years since then. Mr. Malhotra placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Babu Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh[6], which holds that rejection of an earlier application for bail, does not preclude further consideration, in the light of “more materials, further developments and different considerations”.
7. As the petitioner’s contentions have been considered in the 2023 judgment, it is necessary to enumerate the following prima facie factual findings and legal conclusions recorded therein: a. After noticing the case of the prosecution and the contents of various statements recorded in the course of investigation, the Court considered the submissions made on behalf of the present petitioner, including as to the petitioner’s limited role, and money received as commission in normal course of his business. b. In order to satisfy the ingredients of Sections 2(1)(d) of MCOCA, it is not necessary that the chargesheet should be against an individual, but a chargesheet against the syndicate as a whole, would also suffice[7].
2023 judgment, paragraph 45. c. Individual members of the syndicate may have different roles in the commission of the crime. Channelising the money obtained through the foundational crime of extortion is, in fact, sufficient to make out an offence under MCOCA[8]. d. Membership of the syndicate itself constitutes an offence under Sections 2(1)(d) and 2(1)(e) of MCOCA[9]. e. The Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that the provisions of MCOCA could not be invoked against him in the absence of more than one chargesheet having been filed against him10. f. The question of whether confessional statements recorded under Section 18 of MCOCA can be read into evidence in the absence of independent corroboration is a matter of trial11. Confessional statement may also be attributable to the co-accused12. g. Objections with regard to validity of the sanction under Sections 23(1)(a) and 23(2) of MCOCA can only be examined at trial, except when they touch upon inherent lack of jurisdiction, which was not argued in this case13. h. The twin conditions for grant of bail incorporated in Section 21(4) of MCOCA require the Court to be satisfied that there are “reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence”, which is “something more than prima facie grounds”14. 2023 judgment, paragraph 46. 2023 judgment, paragraph 47. 2023 judgment, paragraph 48. 2023 judgment, paragraph 49. 2023 judgment, paragraph 50. 2023 judgment, paragraph 54. 2023 judgment, paragraph 55. i. The present petitioner assisted Sukesh and Leena in purchasing luxury cars out of the extorted funds, including a Lamborghini Urus [TN04BE0006] with the help of one Surender Pawar [hereinafter, “Surender”], who was a financial broker. The said car was purchased in the name of Surender for Rs. 3.[5] crores, but was used by Sukesh and Leena through a rental agreement in the name of M/s Nail Artistry in return for a monthly rent of Rs. 2.42 lakhs per month. It was found that the said amount was immediately withdrawn by Surender and handed over to the petitioner after deducting tax. The petitioner would thereafter deliver the said amount to Mohanraj or Leena. The aforesaid car was recovered from Leena’s possession. The purchase of the aforesaid car through hawala channel showed involvement of the petitioner as an active member of the Organised Crime Syndicate [hereinafter, “OCS”] in disposal of the extorted amount from the complainant15. j. Another vehicle, being a Bentley, was allegedly purchased in the name of M/s Priyanka Arcade using approximately Rs. 1.[5] crores of the alleged extorted funds. It is alleged that the funds were routed through the petitioner, but the vehicle was ultimately used by Leena and Sukesh. The petitioner had allegedly stated that he handed the money to the owner of M/s Priyanka Arcade, although the owner later stated that payments had been received partly from the petitioner and partly from other persons. The vehicle was recovered from Leena’s possession. k. The petitioner’s brother, Manish Kothari, allegedly executed hirepurchase agreements with M/s Nail Artistry for three vehicles, 2023 judgment, paragraph 63. being a Bentley, a Range Rover, and a Toyota Fortuner, with financing of Rs. 40 lakhs, Rs. 30 lakhs, and Rs. 30 lakhs respectively. These vehicles were allegedly financed by Manish Kothari and the petitioner, and used by Leena and Sukesh16. l. The petitioner also introduced his relative, Jitender Kothari, to Mohanraj to facilitate the purchase of a house for Leena at Kannatur Village for approximately Rs. 7 crores. Out of this amount, Rs. 5 crores were routed through sham transactions, after being received in cash through hawala channels, while the remaining Rs. 2 crores were allegedly paid in cash to the property’s owner through the petitioner and Mohanraj. A lease agreement was then allegedly executed between Jitender Kothari and Leena for monthly rent of Rs. 2.[5] lakhs. As with the Lamborghini car transaction, the rental payments were withdrawn and cycled back through the petitioner and Mohanraj to Leena. During a raid by the Enforcement Directorate, the house was found in Leena’s possession, and was allegedly furnished with interiors worth several crores of rupees17. m. The petitioner is alleged to have received Rs. 10 lakhs as commission in relation to the vehicle transactions and Rs. 15 lakhs as commission in relation to the house transaction18. n. The investigation further alleges that Sukesh, assisted by Sudheer Abu and Joel, delivered money to Mohanraj, the petitioner, and others as part of the alleged laundering of the extorted funds19. 2023 judgment, paragraph 63. Ibid. Ibid. 2023 judgment, paragraph 64. o. The prosecution relies on the alleged confessional statements under Section 18 of MCOCA of Sukesh and Mohanraj, as well as the disclosure statement of the petitioner20. p. It is a matter of record that the petitioner had two previous involvements, being FIR No. 1319/2017, lodged at Police Station Soundarapandiyanar Angadi, District T. Nagar, Tamil Nadu under Sections 294(b)/341/342/363/506(1)/149 of IPC and FIR NO. 470/2012, lodged at Police Station Soundarapandiyanar Angadi, District T. Nagar, Tamil Nadu, under Section 75 of the TNTCP Act21.
SUBMISSIONS BY LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES:
8. Mr. Malhotra’s principal submission concerned prolonged incarceration and likely delay in completion of trial. He submitted that the petitioner was arrested on 05.09.2021, and has thus remained in custody for a period of almost 4 years and 10 months. Charges have recently been framed, by an order of the Special Court dated 03.06.2026. However, the State has cited 403 witnesses, and the chargesheets collectively exceed 10,000 pages. Further, one of the co-accused, Navas KI, has been arrested recently, and it is likely that a supplementary chargesheet will have to be filed in relation to his case. Considering the aforesaid factors, Mr. Malhotra submitted that the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, has been defeated, and his continued custody pending trial is constitutionally unjustifiable.
9. With regard to the statutory restrictions on grant of bail, under Section 21(4) of MCOCA, Mr. Malhotra referred to several judgments 2023 judgment, paragraph 65. 2023 judgment, paragraph 66. and orders of Supreme Court22 as well as this Court23, in which bail has nonetheless been granted to MCOCA accused on ground of prolonged incarceration. Additionally, he referred to the judgment in Ranjitsingh Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.24, wherein the Supreme Court held that such statutory restrictions should not be “pushed too far”. He also relied upon the judgment in Suhail Ahmad Thokar v. National Investigation Agency25, which arose under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 [“UAPA”], to submit that, even recently, the Supreme Court has granted bail in a UAPA case, on the basis of period spent in custody, likelihood of prolonged trial, and parity with other co-accused, all of which are applicable to the present case also.
10. Mr. Malhotra further submitted that the legal position with regard to prolonged incarceration, vis-à-vis the restrictions on grant of bail under Section 21(4) of MCOCA, has been considered at length in the judgments in Leena Paulose and Deepak Ramnani. Applying the same yardstick to the present case, he submitted that the Court is required to examine the role attributed to the petitioner and the prima facie material supporting the allegations against him, to adjudicate whether his further custody is warranted. In this context, Mr. Malhotra argued that the petitioner’s role RockysinghJalindersingh Kalyani v. State of Maharashtra [Criminal Appeal No. 176/2022, decided on 03.02.2022]; Ranjana TanajiWanve v. State of Maharashtra [SLP (Crl.) No. 12740/2024, decided on 22.10.2024]; Siddhant v. State of Maharashtra [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3798]; Vinod v. State of Maharashtra [SLP (Crl.) No. 14166/2024, decided on 08.01.2025]; Vivek @ Vicky Janak Paneri v. State of Maharashtra [SLP (Crl.) No. 2677-2678/2025, decided on 15.04.2025]; Kailash Ramchandani v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. [SLP (Crl.) No. 4276/2025, decided on 06.01.2026]; Jagruti Dhanesh Thorat v. State of Maharashtra [SLP (Crl.) No. 17295/2025, decided on 13.01.2026]. Arun v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), BAIL APPLN. 3348/2023, decided on 07.04.2025; Ashish @ Deva v. State (NCT of Delhi), BAIL APPLN. 1618/2024, decided on 29.04.2025; Rajesh Kumar v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), BAIL APPLN. 2986/2023, decided on 08.05.2025; Jitender Dixit @ Bantu v. The State (Government of NCT of Delhi), BAIL APPLN. 3831/2023, decided on 19.05.2025.
SLP (CRL.) No. 83/2024, decided on 22.05.2026. was limited to handling the allegedly extorted funds. He played no role in the planning or execution of the foundational offence of extortion, but only in management of the funds sent by Sukesh to Leena in Chennai. To this extent, he submitted that the petitioner’s role is at the highest, comparable to that of Deepak, who was granted bail by judgment of this Court dated 05.06.2026. In fact, Mr. Malhotra submitted that the principal allegation against the petitioner was that he actively participated in the disposal of proceeds of crime, specifically by facilitating investments in luxury vehicles and immovable properties for Sukesh and Leena, and receiving a commission. According to Mr. Malhotra, the petitioner was not in contact with the main accused, i.e. Sukesh, and the alleged money trail also does not show that any part of the extorted funds were in the petitioner’s hand at any time.
11. Mr. Malhotra also submitted, without prejudice to the aforesaid contentions, that the offences alleged against the petitioner are not made out at all, even on the prosecution’s own showing, as the petitioner had no knowledge or reason to believe that any of the activities in which he participated were connected with a criminal offence. In the absence of such mens rea, learned counsel submitted that the offences of assistance and abetment in a MCOCA offence cannot be established. For this purpose, he relied upon the judgments of the Madras High Court in Kumar Ganesaperumal v. Directorate of Enforcement26 and VMT Spinning Mills India Pvt. Ltd. v. Directorate of Enforcement27. Mr. Malhotra also submitted that the petitioner has no prior criminal involvements involving Sukesh/Leena, and the allegation of “continuing unlawful activity” under Section 2(1)(d) of MCOCA cannot be made out against him.
12. With regard to the two earlier alleged criminal proceedings against the petitioner, referred to in the 2023 judgment, Mr. Malhotra submitted that proceedings arising out of FIR No. 1319/2017 were quashed, as against the petitioner by judgment of the Madras High Court28. He also submitted that FIR No. 470/2012 was closed without any further proceedings against the petitioner. He further stated that in the connected proceedings29 under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 [hereinafter, “PMLA”], the petitioner has already been granted bail30.
13. Mr. Jain, in contrast, submitted that the petitioner had a direct role in handling of the extorted funds in Chennai, alongwith other accused persons, with full knowledge of the illegal activities of the OCS. He was thus not only involved in abetment of the activities of the OCS, but was also directly involved in the “continuing unlawful activities”, within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) of MCOCA, which reveals “membership” of the OCS under Section 3(4) of MCOCA. He submitted that the petitioner and Mohanraj, alongwith other Chennai based co-accused, participated in planning and execution of the activities related to handling of the extorted funds sent by Sukesh to Leena.
14. Mr. Jain urged the Court, at the stage of bail adjudication, to have due regard to Section 21(4) of MCOCA, which places restrictions on the grant of bail in such offences. According to him, grant of bail in such cases cannot be determined solely by the length of custody, for which Crl.O.P. No. 5801/2021: Kamlesh Kothari v. The State and Anr., decided on 27.06.2023. ECIR/54/DLZO-II/2021, dated 08.08.2021, under Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA. Order of the Special Court dated 14.08.2025. purpose he reiterated the submissions recorded in Leena Paulose31 and in Deepak Ramnani32. Mr. Jain further urged that in the present case 17 adjournments have been taken by the accused alone, resulting in delay in framing of charges.
IV. ANALYSIS:
15. As noted above, this Court has, in the 2023 judgment, considered the petitioner’s application for bail, in the course of which the prosecution case against the petitioner was discussed in detail. The role ascribed to the petitioner, as described in the 2023 judgment, has been summarised in paragraphs 6(i) to 6(n) above. As this Court has already analysed the material on record, albeit on a prima facie basis, I do not consider it appropriate to revisit that question at this stage.
16. However, the lapse of a period of three years since the 2023 judgment, raises a question of the interplay between the constitutional rights of an undertrial, who remains in custody for a prolonged period, with the statutory restrictions on grant of bail found in several special statutes such as the UAPA33, the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 198534, MCOCA35, and PMLA36. I have had the opportunity to consider the legal position governing this question, both in Leena Paulose and Deepak Ramnani.
17. In Leena Paulose, upon consideration of the interpretation of the three-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Gulfisha Fatima v. Paragraphs 15, 16, 24, and 25. Paragraphs 9(a)-(c), 25, and 26. Section 43-D (5). Section 37. Section 21(4). Section 45. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)37,which had interpreted an earlier threejudge bench judgment in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb38, I had proceeded on the following basis: “29. The decision in Gulfisha Fatima, in my view, provides guidance on the approach to be adopted while adjudicating bail application under MCOCA also. Section 21(4) of MCOCA being on a “higher pedestal” than Section 43D(5) of UAPA, I agree with Mr. Jain that, at the very least, the same principles would govern the interplay between Section 21(4) of MCOCA and the Article 21 rights of an accused. Theapparently distinct lines of authority cited above can, in my view, be reconciled, by applying the ratio of Gulfisha Fatima.
30. The position which emerges therefrom is that statutory restrictions on grant of bail cannot preclude constitutionally protected claims, referrable to Article 21 of the Constitution. The ground of prolonged pretrial incarceration without likelihood of culmination of proceedings must therefore be considered, even in cases involving special statutes. However, these are not stand-alone considerations, but require to be analysed alongwith the nature of the offence and the prima facie material on record. Conversely, while adjudicating the satisfaction required in terms of the statutory conditions, the material must be assessed through the lens of the right under Article 21 of the Constitution.In order to adjudicate such a question, the factors to be borne in mind include the length of custody already undergone, the possible sentence for the offence, the possibility of concluding the proceedings within a reasonable time, whether delay in proceedings is attributable to the prosecution or the defence, and the nature of the prima facie case made out against the accused.
31. Haris Nisar Langoo, in my view, does not depart from the above principles, but provides an example in which the Court was satisfied that the petitioner was entitled to bail, even after applying Section 43D(5) of UAPA. In fact, it may be noted that, even in Gulfisha Fatima, some of the accused were granted bail, having regard to the specific facts of their cases.”39
18. Soon after the judgment in Leena Paulose was delivered, the Supreme Court’s decision in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency40 expressed reservations, with regard to the 2026 SCC OnLine SC 10 [hereinafter, “Gulfisha Fatima”]. (2021) 3 SCC 713 [hereinafter, “K.A. Najeeb”]. Emphasis supplied. 2026 SCC OnLine SC 881 [hereinafter, “Andrabi”]. correctness of Gulfisha Fatima. This has led to a reference to a larger bench of the Supreme Court in Tasleem Ahmad v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi41. Pending resolution of the issue by the larger bench, this Court, in Deepak Ramnani, considered it appropriate to adopt the following approach: “22. The question that arises before this Court, in light of the aforesaid decisions, is to determine the approach which must be adopted in adjudication of the present applications. Needless to say, the differing approaches expounded by the Supreme Court in Gulfisha Fatima and Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, are both binding upon this Court. Although the question has been referred to a larger bench in Tasleem Ahmed 2, the factum of reference itself does not denude a Supreme Court decision of its binding authority42.
23. The possible course of awaiting an authoritative decision by the larger bench of the Supreme Court does not commend to me, in the context of these applications for bail, which by their very nature require expeditious resolution. Instead, having considered the judgments cited by both sides, which were rendered after Gulfisha Fatima, I am of the view that a practical approach must be adopted, at least until the reference is answered by a larger bench. In the present case, such an approach requires this Court first to adjudicate upon Mr. Malik’s submission that, even in terms of the interpretation of K.A. Najeeb in Gulfisha Fatima, as understood by this Court in Leena Palouse-II, the petitioners are entitled to bail. If this contention is accepted, it is unnecessary to delve further into the exercise of reconciliation between the views expressed in Gulfisha Fatima and Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, with regard to the competing interpretation of K.A. Najeeb.
24. Before embarking upon this exercise, I may only add that this course is also not, in my view, inconsistent with the interpretation of K.A. Najeeb in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi. The position of law laid down in Gulfisha Fatima, as I have understood it in Leena Paulose-II, was that the ground of prolonged incarceration without likelihood of culmination of proceedings, must be considered even in cases involving statutory restrictions on grant of bail. However, these must be analysed, alongwith the nature of offence, and the prima-facie material available against the accused. The articulation in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, is that the statutory limitation on the grant of bail cannot override rights under Article 21, but that “of course, in an appropriate case, bail can be SLP (CRL.) No. 3867/2026, dated 22.05.2026 [hereinafter, “Tasleem Ahmad”]. Harbhajan Singh and Another v. State of Punjab, (2009) 13 SCC 608, paragraph 15; National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Union Territory of Ladakh and Ors. v. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference and Anr., (2024) 18 SCC 643, paragraph 35. denied having regard to the facts of that particular case”43. Syed Iftikhar Andrabi therefore also requires a factual examination, to determine whether a particular accused is to be granted bail, despite an argument based upon his/her Article 21 rights. It may be noted that, both in Gulfisha Fatima and in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, the Supreme Court examined the case of accused on merits, in the backdrop of period of incarceration and the likely length of trial. In Gulfisha Fatima, five of the seven accused were granted bail, as was the sole accused in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi.”44
19. I propose to adopt the same approach in the present case also. I may also note that, in Khuram Parvez v. National Investigation Agency45, which was rendered after the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court, including the reference order in Tasleem Ahmad, a Division Bench of this Court has adopted a similar approach. The case concerned an application for bail in a UAPA offence. The Court’s approach is indicated by the following observations:
20. Applying the same benchmark to the present case, it may be noted that the petitioner is not accused of participation in the alleged acts of extortion, against the complainant or any other person. Even as per the prosecution case, as noted in the 2023 judgment, the role attributed to him concerns planning and management of funds transferred by Sukesh to Leena, including acquisition of immovable properties and luxury cars in the names of other individuals or entities, and handling of the said cars. The alleged confessional statements, of the petitioner and Sukesh, relied upon by the prosecution, do not prima facie accord any higher role to the petitioner than this.
21. As against this, the petitioner has already spent approximately 4 years and 10 months in custody as an undertrial. The offence under Section 3(4) of MCOCA carries a sentence which may extend to imprisonment of five years to life imprisonment. However, the factors indicated above, including the number of accused [24], number of witnesses [403], and the complexity of the case, make expeditious conclusion of the proceedings unlikely. Having regard to the role ascribed to the petitioner by the prosecution, I am of the view that his further incarceration as an undertrial, is inappropriate. Although I have held, in Leena Paulose47, that the delay in the present case cannot be attributed to prosecutorial delays or court inaction alone, I am nonetheless of the view Paragraph 37. that the facts of each case have to be examined on their own merits, with due consideration of the specific roles ascribed to the individual in question.
22. As I have held that the petitioner is entitled to bail even if the prosecution case is taken at its highest, I do not consider it necessary to address the other contentions raised by Mr. Malhotra.
V. CONCLUSION:
23. For the aforesaid reasons, the application is allowed, and it is directed that the petitioner be released on bail in connection with FIR NO. 208/2021, dated 07.08.2021, registered at Police Station Special Cell, Delhi, subject to furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 2,50,000/-, alongwith two sureties in the like amount, to the satisfaction of the concerned Special Court/Duty Magistrate, and subject to the following further conditions: a. The petitioner shall appear before the Special Court on each and every date of hearing; b. The petitioner shall surrender his passport before the Special Court, and shall not leave the country without prior permission of the concerned Court; c. The petitioner shall provide his permanent address to the concerned Court, as also the address where he is residing during the pendency of the case. The petitioner shall intimate the Investigating Officer [“IO”], and file an affidavit before the Special Court, regarding any change in residential address; d. The petitioner shall provide his mobile number to the concerned IO/Station House Officer, which shall be kept in working condition at all times. The mobile number shall not be switched off or changed without prior intimation to the IO during the pendency of the trial; e. The petitioner shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case or tamper with the evidence of the case, in any manner whatsoever; f. The petitioner shall not commit any offence during the period of his release.
24. The bail application is disposed of in terms of the above.
25. It is clarified that any observations made in the present judgment are solely for the purpose of deciding the present bail application, and shall neither influence the trial proceedings, nor be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
26. Copy of the judgment be communicated to the concerned Jail Superintendent electronically for information and necessary compliance.
PRATEEK JALAN, J JULY 7, 2026 ‘PV’/AD/KA/