IFFCO TOKIO GENERAL INSURANCE CO LTD v. VINOD YADAV & ORS

1. This appeal has been filed by the Insurance Company seeking recovery rights against respondent no.6/driver and respondent no.7/owner which were denied by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, North District, Rohini Courts, Delhi (‘MACT/Tribunal’) in MACT No. 4434/2016 by way of impugned award dated 01st June 2019 awarding Rs. 9,10,000/- along with 9% interest.

2. The accident occurred on 16th June 2009 when one, Satish (hereinafter, ‘deceased’) was travelling on his motorcycle and proceeding towards Center 18, Jail Road when he was hit by a TATA-709 bearing registration no. DL-1-LB-2991 (hereinafter, ‘offending vehicle’) driven by respondent no.6, owned by respondent no.7 and insured with appellant. Deceased was taken to BJRM Hospital, however, he succumbed to his injuries the next day. While, appellant/Insurance Company claimed that there was no valid permit on the date of accident, which amounted to a fundamental breach of insurance policy and therefore, recovery rights ought to have been granted to them, MACT rejected their contention and affixed liability on them to satisfy the impugned award.

3. Mr. Brijesh Bagga, counsel for appellant/Insurance Company, points to paragraph 12 of the impugned award, where the statement of counsel for respondent no. 6/driver and respondent no.7/owner (respondent no. 1 & 2 before the MACT) has been noted. It was recorded by MACT that, “it is admitted by the learned counsel for respondent no.1 that the permit was not valid but simultaneously it is argued that the vehicle was not plied by the respondent no.1 for the purpose of carrying goods, rather he was going to his house.” On this basis, Mr. Bagga submits that the question of readdressing this issue, at the stage of appeal, does not arise. Further, he also challenges the finding of MACT, wherein it was held that plying the offending vehicle/truck even for personal use does not amount to commercial use.

4. For this, reliance is placed upon the decision of Supreme Court in Amrit Paul Singh v. TATA AIG General Insurance Co. Ltd & Ors. (2018) 7 SCC 558. In this case, the Supreme Court dealt with a case, where there was no permit for the vehicle and at the time of accident, the vehicle was coming out of a workshop when it met with an accident. The Supreme Court reached a conclusion that exceptions carved out under Section 66 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (‘MV Act’) are to be pleaded and proved and cannot be taken aid of in case of an argument seeking absolution from liability. Supreme Court further stated that “use of a vehicle in a public place without a permit is a fundamental statutory infraction”.

5. Further, Mr. Brijesh Bagga, counsel for appellant/Insurance Company, vehemently argued that there is nothing on record to state that the period of renewal started from May 2009.

6. Mr. Sameer Khan, counsel for respondent no.6/driver & respondent no. 7/owner, counters this by stating that a concession of the counsel cannot possibly work against a statutory protection governed under Section 81(5) of the MV Act. Though, it was admitted that on the date of accident, there was no valid permit, Mr. Khan, draws attention of this Court to the testimony of R1W[1], officer from the Permit Department and the documents filed as Ex.R1W1/R[3], which was the permit transaction details (a computer printout of the same). The said document showed that the permits were renewed yearly from 1996 onwards, till it was surrendered in 2003 and, thereafter, in 21st May 2004, a fresh permit entry was given for a period of 5 years and yet again renewed on 11th August 2009.

7. Mr. Khan, stated that they had applied for renewal of permit in July 2009 and, thereafter, the permit was granted in August 2009. He placed reliance on the provision of Section 81(5) of MV Act which reads as under:

8. He further relies upon the decision of High Court of Karnataka in Dr. Narasimulu Nandini Memorial Education Trust v. Banu Begum & Ors., Miscellaneous First Appeal No. (‘MFA’) 202022/2016, where the Court was considering a similar situation and analysed the provisions of Section 81 of the MV Act in some detail. The High Court arrived at the conclusion that the permit was in force on the date of accident and the renewal would be validated from date of expiry. The High Court relied upon the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of the Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Yasmin Begum & Ors., MFA 3338/2015, wherein, the Court held as under:

9. The High Court of Karnataka in Yasmin Begum (supra) had distinguished the decision in Amrit Paul Singh (supra) on account that, in that case, the offending vehicle did not have a permit at all.

10. Taking into account these submissions, the Court is of the opinion that Section 81(5) of MV Act does provide a deeming fiction for a permit renewal to be valid from the date of expiry of the previous permit. There is no doubt that renewal of the permit was applied for in July 2009 albeit after the accident, but that does not take away the fact that renewal obtained in August 2009 will operate from May 2009 onwards, which was when the previous permit expired.

11. There is no caveat in the statute that the reasons for delay have to be considered. On the contrary, Section 81(3) of the MV Act provides that application for renewal can be filed even after the expiry of permit and states as under: “(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (2), the Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport Authority, as the case may be, may entertain an application for the renewal of a permit after the last date specified in that sub-section if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by good and sufficient cause from making an application within the time specified.”