M/S SHUBA ENTERPRISES v. M/S GULF PETROCHEM FZC

8. Further, the Supreme Court in PASL Wind Solutions Private Limited v. GE power Conversion India Private Limited articulated the meaning of a foreign award, as follows:

“24. The noticeable feature of this definition is that it is an inclusive definition and, where in a definition clause, the word “include” is used, it is so done in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute and when it is so used, these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things which they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include (see Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps [(1899) AC 99, 105: 79 LT 473]). Where in a definition section of a statute a word is defined to mean a certain thing, wherever that word is used in that statute, it shall mean what is stated in the definitions unless the context otherwise requires. But where the definition is an inclusive definition, the word not only bears its ordinary, popular and natural sense whenever that would be applicable but it also bears its extended statutory meaning. At any rate, such expansive definition should be so construed as not cutting down the enacting provisions of an Act unless the phrase is absolutely clear in having opposite effect (see Jobbins v. Middlesex County Council [(1949) 1 KB 142: (1948) 2 All ER 610] ). Where the definition of an expression in a definition clause is preceded by the words “unless the context otherwise requires”, normally the definition given in the section should be applied and given effect to but this normal rule may, however, be departed from if there be something in the context to show that the definition should not be applied (see Khanna, J., in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain [(1975) Supp SCC 1, 97]). It would thus appear that ordinarily one has to adhere to the definition and if it is an expansive definition the same should be adhered to. The frame of any definition more often than not is capable of being made flexible but the precision and certainty in law requires that it should not be made loose and kept tight as far as possible (see Kalya Singh v. Genda Lal [(1976) 1 SCC 304, 309: (1975) 3 SCR 783]).”

26. For this reason, it is not possible to accede to the argument that the expression “unless the context otherwise requires” can be held to undo the very basis of section 44 by converting it from a seatoriented provision in countries that are signatories to the New York Convention to a person oriented provision in which one of the parties to the arbitration agreement has to be a foreign national or habitually resident outside India. In any case, the context of section 44 is very far removed from the context of an international commercial arbitration in Part I which is defined for the purposes of section 11, section 28, section 29A(1), section 34(2A), and section 43I, all of which occur in Part I and deal with arbitrations which take place in India. Also, the argument of Mr. Himani would involve bodily importing the expression “international commercial arbitration” into section 44, which cannot be done because of the opening words of section 44, “In this Chapter” which is Chapter I of Part II, and then applying the definition contained in section 2(1)(f) of the Arbitration Act which, being restricted to Part I, must now be applied to Part II. No canon of interpretation would permit acceptance of such an argument.”

9. Upon a plain reading of the above, it can be understood that Section 44 of the Act is entirely party neutral and the law instead focuses on the seat of arbitration. The Supreme Court also delineated that Part I and Part II of the Act are distinct. The Court further held that ICA under Part I is party based since it only applies to arbitrations seated in India. However, since Section 44 falls under Part II, which is confined to foreign awards, the definition of ICA under Part I cannot be imported in Section 44.

10. Thus, in order to seek enforcement of an arbitral award under Section 48 of the Act, such an award must be a foreign award in terms of the Act. In the considered opinion of this Court, the mere existence of foreign party in the arbitral proceedings may render it an ICA under Section 2(1)(f), but it does not, by itself, make the award a foreign award under Section 44.

11. Adverting to the facts, it is pertinent to note that arbitration agreement has not been placed on record, however, upon reading of the arbitral award, it prima facie reflects that while the Sole Arbitrator was appointed by the Supreme Court, the award was passed at New Delhi. Therefore, the arbitral award for which the present petition is filed is prima facie a domestic award arising out of ICA and not a foreign award.

12. Needless to state that if the concerned arbitral award is a domestic award arising out of ICA proceedings seated in India, then enforcement of such an award is not maintainable under Section 48 of Part II of the Act.

13. Additionally, as per the petition, the assets of the judgment debtor are lying in Mumbai, Maharashtra. Thus, let the decree holder satisfy this court on the aspect of jurisdiction as it is now well settled by the Supreme Court in Sundaram Finance v. Abdul Samad that execution proceedings can be straightaway be filed in the court where the Judgement Debtor’s assets are located.

14. Thus, upon raising a query as to maintainability under Section 48 and Jurisdiction, the learned Counsel on behalf for the Decree Holder seeks time to satisfy the Court.

15. In the interest of justice, adverse orders are deferred.

16. Accordingly, list on 09.07.2026.”

2. Today, learned Counsel for the Decree Holder has submitted that he is willing to withdraw the present petition with liberty to file appropriate proceedings before appropriate Court. Permission is granted.

3. Accordingly, the present petition, along with pending application(s), stands dismissed as withdrawn.

OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J JULY 10, 2026