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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
W.P.(C) 6894/2026, CM APPL. 33826/2026
DEPUTY COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL (HUMAN RESOURCE, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, COORDINATION AND LEGAL) .....Petitioner
Through: Dr. S.S. Hooda, Mr. Aditya Hooda, Mr. Manpreet Singh, Mr. Shaurya Banshtu, Mr. Aayushman Aeron and Ms. Rashmi Rawat, Advs.
Through: Ms. Aanchal Anand, Mr. Amit Anand and Mr. Sunil Bansal, Advs.
Through: Dr. S.S. Hooda, Mr. Aayushman Aeron and Mr. Shaurya Banshtu, Advs.
Through: Mr. Nishant K. Srivastava and Ms. Ananya Pandey, Advs.
DEPUTY COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL .....Petitioner
SUMIT VAID .....Respondent
Through: Dr. S.S. Hooda, Mr. Manpreet Singh, Mr. Aayushman Aeron and Mr. Shaurya Banshtu, Advs.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD KUMAR
JUDGMENT
13.07.2026 C.HARI SHANKAR, J.
1. The respondents in these writ petitions, are employees of the Indian Audit and Accounts Department[1], a subordinate office of the Comptroller & Auditor General of India[2]. They were posted on deputation at various stations where their spouses were also posted, or proximate to the stations where their spouses were posted.
2. In implementation of a deputation policy circulated under letter dated 27 January 2025[3], issued by the Office of the CAGI to all heads of departments in the IA&AD, the respondents were, on completion of seven years at the stations to which they were posted on deputation, repatriated to their parent postings. This, naturally, resulted in their having to be separated from their spouses.
3. Aggrieved thereby, the respondents petitioned the Central Administrative Tribunal[4] in a batch of original applications[5], which have been disposed of, by the Tribunal, by judgment dated 15 April
2026. These writ petitions, at the instance of the office of the CAGI, challenge the said judgment.
4. The Tribunal has, by the impugned judgment dated 15 April 2026, disapproved the 2025 Policy and directed that the policy be reconsidered, and has also gone on to specify the lines on which such reconsideration was to take place. The Tribunal further directed that “IA&AD” hereinafter “CAGI” hereinafter “the 2025” policy hereinafter “the Tribunal” hereinafter OA 1263/2025 (Vishal Bhati v. The Deputy Comptroller and Auditor General of India), OA 2996/2025 (Shadab Akhtar v. The Deputy Comptroller and Auditor General of India), OA 2631/2025 (Sumit Vaid v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India), OA 1711/2025 (Sonam Kaushik v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India) and OA 2808/2025 (Ravijot Singh v. The Deputy Comptroller and Auditor General of India) the respondents, i.e., the applicants before the Tribunal, be permitted to remain in the postings in which they were, without having to abide by the repatriation order, pending such reconsideration.
5. With the passage of time, the field of controversy has narrowed. The respondents have all joined their parent postings consequent to the order of repatriations which were challenged before the Tribunal. As a result, the challenges to the repatriation, on the ground that they violated the principles of spousal postings, does not survive for consideration.
6. Dr. Hooda, who appears on behalf of the CAGI, submits that the observations of the Tribunal, with respect to the 2025 Policy, are unjustified and unwarranted. He submits that, while spousal postings are desirable, they cannot constitute an inexorable norm and one does not have an indefeasible right to be posted at or near the station where one’s spouse is posted, if administrative exigencies do not permit it. This, he submits, is well recognised in law.
7. Dr. Hooda further submits that, in so far as the present challenge is concerned, the issue is no longer res integra. The validity of the 2025 policy was decided by the Patna Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal in its decision dated 8 October 2025 in OA/051/00289/2025[6] and upheld. That decision was further impugned before the High Court of Jharkhand in Adwin Vinifred Tirkey v. Union of India[7]. The High Court, by a detailed judgment, which also Adwin Vinifred Tirkey v. Union of India 2025 SCC OnLine Jhar 3603 considered the judgments of the Supreme Court in SK Nausad Rahaman v. Union of India[8] and Bank of India v. Jagjit Singh Mehta[9], upheld the validity of the 2025 Policy.
8. Dr. Hooda submits that the attention of the Tribunal, in the present case, was specifically invited to the judgment of the High Court of Jharkhand, but the Tribunal has chosen to ignore it and ruled contrary to the said decision. This, he submits, with some degree of justifiable chagrin, was absolutely impermissible.
9. In that view of the matter, Dr. Hooda submits that the impugned judgment of the Tribunal deserves to be set aside and the present petitions allowed.
10. Ms. Aanchal Anand, learned Counsel for the respondents fairly acknowledges that the 2025 Policy has, in fact, been upheld by the High Court of Jharkhand.
11. Inasmuch as the respondents have already rejoined their places of posting in compliance with the orders of repatriation, Ms. Anand submits that the direction, in the impugned judgment, to allow them to continue where they were earlier posted, without complying with the orders of repatriation, does not further survive for consideration.
12. Ms. Anand however submits the fact that the respondents have complied with their orders of repatriation should not stand in the way of their representing to the petitioners for being permitted to be reposted at or near the station where their spouses are posted.
13. These being the limits of the controversy before us, it is not necessary to dwell deep into the legal intricacies of the dispute.
14. We do not deem it necessary to independently examine the validity of the 2025 Policy, as we are in entire agreement with the view of the High Court of Jharkhand in Adwin Vinifred Tirkey in that regard. We, therefore, deem it appropriate to reproduce, to advantage, the following passages from the said decision:
20. Thus, what can be taken to be well settled that the power to transfer an employee in a transferable services is within the prerogative of the employer. It is the employer who must best weigh the employee that should be deployed for an effective discharge of his/her duties for the establishment.
21. The inconvenience caused to the employee and his/her family consequent to transfer are not sufficient cause to interfere with the orders of transfer. Generally, the
Court exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not interfere with the orders of transfer of an employee issued by the employer for administrative reasons as it will adversely affect the smooth functioning of the institution unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of malafide exercise of power or stated to be in violation of statutory provision prohibiting any such transfer. The Court or the tribunal cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine as though they are appellate authority substituting their own decisions for that of the institution, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the services concerned. The scope of judicial review in this area is very limited.
22. In view of the aforesaid discussions and for the reasons stated above, we find no infirmity much less any illegality in the order passed by the Tribunal particularly when the same has been passed on the basis of the instructions issued by the respondents and as otherwise been passed in accordance with law. Consequently, there is no merit in this petition; the same is dismissed leaving the parties to bear the costs.”
15. We are, however, unable to appreciate the manner in which the Tribunal has, in the impugned judgment, dealt with the decision of the High Court of Jharkhand. The Tribunal has chosen to merely hold that the “factual matrix of the present case is materially distinguishable”. We are unable to agree.
16. The circumstances in which the petitioners in Adwin Vinifred Tirkey were placed are similar to those in which the respondents before us found themselves. The challenge to the very 2025 Policy which was impugned in the present case by the respondents failed, both before the Patna Bench of the Tribunal and, thereafter, before the High Court of Jharkhand. Ergo, in the light of the judgment of the High Court of Jharkhand, there was no way in which the prayers of the respondents in the OAs filed by them before the Tribunal could be granted.
17. The Tribunal, despite being a high judicial authority and entitled to respect, is hierarchically lower than the High Court. It is not open to any Bench of the Tribunal, therefore, to rule contrary to the judgment of a High Court. While it is always open to the Tribunal to distinguish the judgment of the High Court – or even of the Supreme Court – if cited before it, any such attempt at distinguishing the judgment has to be on clear and cogent grounds, with clear and cogent reasons for doing so. The manner in which the Tribunal has, in the present case, brushed aside the judgment of the High Court of Jharkhand, is far from satisfactory.
18. In view of the judgment of the High Court of Jharkhand in Adwin Vinifred Tirkey, with which we are in respectful agreement, we cannot sustain the view of the Tribunal that the 2025 Policy requires any reconsideration.
19. Moreover, the Tribunal has, in paragraph 72 of the impugned judgment, ruled as under:
20. To our mind, in the afore-extracted paragraph from the impugned judgment, the Tribunal has travelled far beyond the justifiable limits of its jurisdiction. Assuming, arguendo, that the Tribunal could have recommended reconsideration of the 2025 Policy, the Tribunal was certainly not justified in directing such reconsideration on specified lines. It is well settled that no Court can direct the executive either to frame a policy11, much less along lines specified by the court itself.
21. The Tribunal, needless to say, could not have frowned upon a policy the validity of which stood affirmed by the Jharkhand High Court.
22. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of the Tribunal, insofar as it disapproves the 2025 Policy and requires its reconsideration. We once again express our respectful agreement with the view of the High Court of Jharkhand in Adwin Vinifred Tirkey. Union of India v. K. Pushpavanam, (2023) 20 SCC 736, State of J&K v. AR Zakki (1992) Supp (1) SCC 548 and Employees’ Welfare Association v. Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 187
23. The Tribunal has further directed that the respondents be not repatriated to their parent cadre pending reconsideration of the policy.
24. The respondents have already been repatriated to their parent cadres and, therefore, the direction to maintain status quo qua the respondents does not survive. Conclusion
25. We, therefore, quash and set aside the impugned judgment of the Tribunal to the extent it has disapproved the policy dated 27 January 2025 and has directed that it be reframed.
26. However, Ms. Anand has prayed that our judgment should not stand in the way of the respondents seeking the benefit of the DOPT OM dated 30 September 2009 which deals with spousal postings.
27. We feel this to be a very fair request.
28. Accordingly, while we set aside the judgment of the Tribunal insofar as it has disapproved the deputation policy dated 27 January 2025 of the petitioner and directed its reframing, and also hold that the direction for maintaining status quo regarding the respondents postings at Delhi also does not survive for consideration, we reserve liberty with the respondents, should they so choose, to seek the benefit of the DOPT OM dated 30 September 2009 in accordance with law. They are at liberty to approach the petitioner in that regard.
29. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the availability or otherwise of the benefit of the DOPT OM dated 30 September 2009. We are sanguine that the petitioner would address the matter in accordance with the legal principles that have been evolved in that regard.
30. Needless to say, should the respondents seek the benefit of the said OM and not obtain any relief, their rights in that regard would also remain reserved.
31. These writ petitions are disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
VINOD KUMAR, J. JULY 13, 2026