Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 02nd July 2026
ANIL LANGAN & ANR .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Vijay Kinger, Mr. Hemant, Mr. Ashwani Gehlot and Ms. Roopa Nagpal, Advocates
Through: Mr. Pradeep Gaur, Mr. Amit Gaur, Ms. Sweta Sinha & Mr. Kaarrtikey Parashar, Advs. for R-1
JUDGMENT
1. This appeal assails award dated 04th August 2018 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (West), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (‘MACT/Tribunal’), in Case No.253/2017, whereby recovery rights have been granted in favour of the Insurance Company/respondent no. 1 against the appellants, who are the owner and driver of the offending vehicle.
2. In the impugned Award, the MACT has considered the issue of apportionment of liability in paragraphs 36 to 42. It has, inter alia, been discussed that the Insurance Company led evidence to establish that, at the time of the accident, the driver was driving a truck carrying LPG cylinders but did not possess an endorsement on his driving licence (‘DL) authorising him to drive a vehicle carrying hazardous or dangerous goods. It has been noted in the award that R3W[1], Insurance Company's witness, was crossexamined, but no suggestion had been given to negate the assertion that the offending vehicle was carrying hazardous goods. Since the testimony remained uncontroverted, the MACT held that the Insurance Company was entitled to recovery rights, as admittedly the driver's licence did not bear the endorsement required under Rule 9(3) of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989.
3. Appellants have raised a plea before this Court that there is nothing in the evidence on record to establish that the offending vehicle was, in fact, carrying any hazardous goods. It is submitted that no such fact emerges from the FIR, the charge-sheet, the seizure memo, or the Detailed Accident Report (‘DAR’).
4. Mr. Kinger, counsel for appellants, has taken the Court through these documents to press the point that even the seizure memo pertaining to the offending truck does not record the seizure of any LPG cylinders.
5. Further, CM Appl. No. 46908/2023 was filed under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’), seeking to place on record additional evidence to show that the driver had undergone the training for transporting of driving hazardous products vehicle and had received the training certificate issued by Bharat Petroleum.
6. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of Coordinate Benches of this Court in Manish Garg and Anr. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr. 2025:DHC:4995 and Amit Sharma v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. 2025:DHC:3878, where in similar situations the Court was of the view that in the absence of any evidence establishing that the vehicle was carrying hazardous goods at the time of the accident, and where the driver possessed a valid driving licence along with the training certificates, the mere absence of an endorsement under the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 would not be fatal to the driver or owner and recovery rights would therefore, not be granted. These decisions, in turn, relied upon the earlier judgment of this Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Sonia Mittal (2017) SCC Online Del 11202, where a similar issue had been taken into account.
7. Mr. Pradeep Gaur, counsel for Insurance Company, countered these submissions by relying upon the decision of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Mangla Goods Carrier v. National Insurance Company Ltd. 2023:DHC:6745, wherein the court held where it was established that the vehicle was carrying hazardous goods, the endorsement on the driving licence was mandatory and that in the absence of such an endorsement rendered the driver/owner liable, thereby granted the Insurance Company right to recovery.
8. The decision in Mangla Goods (supra), in turn, relied upon the decision of this Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Saminuddin and Ors. (2019) SCC Online Del 10534 and a decision of the High Court of Allahabad in Ramesh Chandra Tiwari v. Madan Singh and Ors. (2020) 1 AHC 36813.
9. Mr. Gaur presses the point that they had made a statement in the testimony of R3W[1] that there was no endorsement and the vehicle was carrying hazardous goods, to which there was no rebuttal and no sufficient cross-examination in order to displace the testimony. Analysis CM 46908/2023
10. The decision in Manish Garg (supra) also considered the training certificates which had been filed subsequently at the appeal stage and had been permitted to be taken on record.
11. The Court has perused the training certificates placed on record by way of the application under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC. These certificates were issued by officials of Bharat Gas, operated under Bharat Petroleum, and included a refresher course card, which is appended along with it. The application explains that these certificates could not be produced during the pendency of the trial.
12. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, as well as the decision in Manish Garg (supra), which contains a detailed analysis regarding the acceptance of additional evidence of this nature, this Court finds it appropriate to allow the application and take the training certificates on record. Relevant paragraphs of Manish Garg (supra) are extracted as under:
16. Further the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand: (2022) 7 SCC 247 held that if the additional evidence sought to be adduced before the appellate court has a direct impact on the main issue of the case, then such application can be allowed and the additional evidence can be relied upon by the appellate court to pronounce its judgment. The relevant observations are reproduced hereunder:
17. In the present case, it is the contention of the appellants that during the course of trial, the said training certificates of Appellant No. 2 had been misplaced and even after due diligence they could not be recovered. Further, it was upon the advice of their counsel that they did not lead any evidence before the learned Tribunal.
18. In the present case, considering the beneficial legislation of the MV Act as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Ramchandra Rabidas alias Ratan Rabidas and another: (2019) 10 SCC 75, in the opinion of this Court, the appellants ought to be given an opportunity to adduce the said evidence on record.
19. It is pertinent to note that Respondent NO. 1/Insurance Company nowhere in their reply to the present application has disputed or denied in any way the authenticity of the said training certificates and has only opposed the present application on aspect of lapse by the appellants in not placing these documents at the stage of trial. ***
22. The present appeal has been filed by the/ appellants challenging the recovery rights granted to Respondent No. 1/Insurance Company. In the opinion of this Court, for pronouncing the judgment on the issue involved, the certificate evidencing that the driver had undergone training programme for safe transportation of hazardous goods is relevant and require consideration.
23. Therefore, in light of the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin and Ors. (supra) and Sanjay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand (supra) this court being an appellate court finds reasons to exercise its inherent power under Order XLI Rule 27 and take the training certificates of Appellant No. 2 on record. (emphasis added)
13. Mr. Gaur submits that they are disputing the authenticity of the training certificates. However, it is noticed that CM 46908/2023 under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC was filed in September 2023, and this Court, on 12th September 2023, issued notice, which was accepted by Mr. Pradeep Gaur, counsel for the Insurance Company, and a time of four weeks was granted to file a reply. The matter has thereafter been listed on several dates over the last 3 years. However, the Insurance Company chose not to file any reply to this application, therefore, persuading this Court to allow the application as uncontested.
14. In view of the application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC having been allowed, the training certificates are taken on record. A perusal of the certificates shows that the driver, Kameshwar Ray, had successfully undergone the prescribed training programme and was issued the certification upon completion of the training conducted from 20th June 2014 to 22nd June 2014 and he was given a certificate to that effect which was followed by refresher courses certified under the refresher cards which were 14th September 2016, 29th December 2016, 15th August 2017, 07th 2020 and 04th July 2021, showing that the gas company as well had sufficient and complete reliance on this driver to be carrying hazardous goods. Endorsement for hazardous goods
15. The views expressed by this Court in Manish Garg (supra) and Amit Sharma (supra), echoing the previous decision in Sonia Mittal (supra), are persuasive. These decisions hold that, in the absence of any concrete evidence establishing that the vehicle was carrying hazardous goods at the time of the accident, the question of whether the driver possessed the requisite endorsement or not will be irrelevant.
16. Even otherwise, consider a hypothetical situation. It could be that a vehicle which otherwise carries hazardous goods is on the road for various other reasons, including repair, servicing or just a commute for some administrative purposes. In such circumstances, where the driver possesses a valid licence to drive a Heavy Motor Vehicle (‘HMV’), the absence of endorsement would not, by itself, constitute a breach and would be legitimate.
17. Relevant paragraphs of Manish Garg (supra) are extracted as under:
38. In the present case, there is no evidence on record which shows that the offending oil tanker at the time of the accident was carrying any hazardous substance.
39. It is relevant to note that the Investigating Agency, during the course of trial, failed to establish that the offending vehicle driven by the appellant driver was in fact carrying any combustible or hazardous substance at the time of the incident. No witness examined during trial made any assertion to that effect, nor was any suggestion put to the witnesses during cross-examination indicating that the vehicle was laden with hazardous material.
40. There is no mention of the offending tanker containing oil or any hazardous substance, or of any seizure, in the FIR or the charge sheet. The DAR is conspicuously silent on this crucial factual aspect. No evidence on this aspect had been led by Respondent No. 1/Insurance Company to show that the offending oil tanker was carrying any combustible material at the time of the accident as well. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption that the vehicle was transporting dangerous goods cannot be sustained.
41. The Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Lakshmi, 2018 SCC OnLine All 6122 held that the requirement of endorsement arises only when a vehicle is actually carrying goods of a hazardous or dangerous nature. The Court held that an empty container or tanker, by itself, cannot be treated as hazardous unless there is evidence to prove that it contained or was carrying such goods at the time of the accident. In the absence of such evidence, no breach of Rule 9 of the MV Rules can be presumed. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:
42. Even otherwise, Appellant No. 2/driver was undisputably holding a valid driving license at the time of the accident and had undergone the requisite training for driving vehicles carrying hazardous goods, a fact duly evidenced by a training certificate which has not been disputed by Respondent NO. 1/Insurance Company. The endorsement referred to in Rule 9(3) of the MV Rules, is merely a ministerial act to be performed by the licencing authority and not a prerequisite that nullifies the competency or training of the driver. A coordinate Bench of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sonia Mittal, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 11202 while deciding somewhat similar issue, held as under:
43. The reliance placed by the Insurance Company on judgment in the case of Mangla Goods Carrier v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra), in the opinion of this Court, is misplaced, inasmuch as the said judgment did not consider the earlier binding decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sonia Mittal (supra), where as noted above, this Court held that the absence of endorsement on the license, despite the driver having the requisite certified training, would not amount to a disqualification or breach of policy conditions. The Court categorically held that securing such an endorsement was a ministerial act and the core requirement was possession of specialised training and knowledge.
44. I find myself in agreement with the reasoning adopted in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sonia Mittal (supra), which also drew strength from the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297, wherein it was held that a breach must be proved to be willful and fundamental to deny indemnity to the insured and rule of main purpose would apply. The relevant portion is reproduced hereunder: “Summary of findings
110. The summary of our findings to the various issues as raised in these petitions is as follows: xxx xxx xxx
(vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid license by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving license is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply “the rule of main purpose” and the concept of “fundamental breach” to allow defences available to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act.”
45. Therefore, in the present case, Appellant NO. 2/driver had undergone requisite training and was in possession of a valid driving license. Further, there is no evidence that the tanker was carrying hazardous goods at the relevant time, the mere absence of endorsement under Rule 9(3) of the MV Rules cannot be construed as a breach of statutory conditions sufficient to grant recovery rights to the insurer. At best, the absence of endorsement may attract an administrative penalty under the applicable rules, but it does not render the license invalid or the insurance policy inoperative vis-à-vis third-party claims.”
18. Relevant paragraphs of Amit Sharma (supra) are extracted as under:
15. However, a perusal of the record reveals that there is no evidence to substantiate the assertion that the vehicle in question was at the relevant time carrying hazardous goods. It is a matter of common experience and logic, as pointed out by learned counsel for the appellants, that any oil tanker entering an oil depot is likely to be empty after unloading its contents or would be arriving to load a fresh consignment. The DAR is conspicuously silent on this crucial factual aspect. No employee or representative of the concerned oil depot or any fuel station was examined to affirm that the tanker was carrying combustible material at the relevant time. I have also perused the panchnama, superdari documents, indemnity bond and seizure memo and the same do not disclose that the tanker was filled with any hazardous or flammable goods.
16. It is also relevant to note that the Investigating Agency, during the course of trial, failed to establish that the offending vehicle driven by the appellant driver was in fact carrying any combustible or hazardous substance at the time of the incident. No witness examined during trial made any assertion to that effect, nor was any suggestion put to the witnesses during cross-examination indicating that the vehicle was laden with hazardous material. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption that the vehicle was transporting dangerous goods cannot be sustained.
17. In this regard, reliance placed by the appellant on the judgment of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Lakshmi: 2018 SCC OnLine All 6122, is well-founded. The Court in that case observed that the requirement of endorsement arises only when a vehicle is actually carrying goods of a hazardous or dangerous nature. The Court held that an empty container or tanker, by itself, cannot be treated as hazardous unless there is evidence to prove that it contained or was carrying such goods at the time of the accident. In the absence of such evidence, no breach of Rule 9 of the MV Rules can be presumed. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced hereunder: “10. The object behind the proviso is that a person who is driving vehicle carrying such goods must be trained enough so that no causality of any kind takes place on account of careless or negligent driving. The purpose of endorsement on the license is also same. The question, therefore, is as to whether empty container of such goods by itself to be treated as dangerous or hazardous to human life. In the opinion of the Court an empty container or cylindrical bottle cannot be termed as goods dangerous or hazardous nature to human life. Rule 9(3) makes endorsement obligatory if one intends to carry goods that are dangerous or hazardous by nature to human life. So emphasis is that goods by very nature should be dangerous or hazardous to human life. A mere container or bottle that might be used to contain dangerous or hazardous goods cannot be treated itself as dangerous or hazardous by nature. It is quite possible that empty containers are carried from one place to another place and, therefore, unless sufficient evidence is led by the parties that those containers that were loaded on a truck carried dangerous or hazardous goods, the driver while driving such vehicle with a valid license entitling him to a drive transport vehicle will not get rendered ineligible just for carrying empty cylinders and in such circumstances the insurance company will not get absolved from its liability in a third party claim. It could be a case where manufacturer transports cylinders to the industry/company and it could equally be a case where containers are transported from production unit to sale unit or to a Godown at distant place. In such circumstances, transportation of such empty cylinders or containers from one place to another would not require driver to have endorsement under proviso to section 14 of Act, 1988. Since containers or cylinders are not dangerous or hazardous goods by nature, therefore, in the event of a road accident involving transport vehicle carrying such empty cylinders/containers the insurance company cannot get rid of its liability to meet third party claim as per terms of insurance policy.”
18. Even otherwise, the appellant-driver was holding a valid driving license at the time of the accident and had undergone the requisite training for driving vehicles carrying hazardous goods, a fact duly evidenced by a training certificate which has not been disputed by the insurer. The endorsement referred to in Rule 9 of the MV Rules, is merely a ministerial act to be performed by the licencing authority and not a prerequisite that nullifies the competency or training of the driver. A coordinate Bench of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sonia Mittal: 2017 SCC OnLine Del 11202 while deciding somewhat similar issue, held as under:
19. A perusal of Rule 9 of the MV Rules mandates that the driver must have knowledge and training so that no causality of any kind takes place on account of careless or negligent driving — not necessarily a formal endorsement whose purpose is also the same.
20. The circular dated 20.04.2022 relied upon by the insurance company, issued by the Transport Department of the GNCTD, merely directs licencing authorities to make such endorsements henceforth. It does not cast any burden upon existing license holders to seek endorsements retrospectively nor does it affect the validity of licenses or the training already acquired by drivers.
21. The reliance placed by the Insurance Company on judgment in the case of Mangla Goods Carrier v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra), in the opinion of this Court, is misplaced, inasmuch as the said judgment did not consider the earlier binding decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sonia Mittal (supra), where as noted above, this Court held that the absence of endorsement on the license, despite the driver having the requisite certified training, would not amount to a disqualification or breach of policy conditions. The Court categorically held that securing such an endorsement was a ministerial act and the core requirement was possession of specialised training and knowledge.”
19. An embellishment has been further provided in Manish Garg (supra) and Amit Sharma (supra), wherein it has been held that the issue of endorsement arises only when a vehicle is actually carrying goods of hazardous or dangerous nature, relying upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v Lakshmi (2018) SCC Online All 6122. Further reliance on Sonia Mittal (supra), where a view was taken by this Court that securing an endorsement in wake of such certification of the special skill in terms of getting a training certificate, was more of a ministerial nature. The crucial requirement, even as per Sonia Mittal (supra), is that the driver must have undergone the prescribed specialised training for driving a vehicle meant for the transportation of hazardous goods.
20. The decision in Mangla Goods (supra) was premised, as is evident from paragraph 9 of the decision, on a finding that the vehicle was indeed carrying LPG cylinders at the point of time of the accident, and therefore distinguishable on facts. Whether carrying hazardous goods
21. The Court has perused the FIR, charge sheet and the documents appended therewith, including the DAR and seizure memo and finds that there is absolutely no mention of any LPG cylinders being carried on the said vehicle. Even the earlier set of documentation prepared post the accident, dated 28th January 2017, notes that the truck is of an ‘open body’ which has ‘Bharat Gas’ written on the front and back, but does not record any observation that it was carrying LPG cylinders. It is quite obvious that in case a seizure had been made of a vehicle of this nature with LPG cylinders, which are of a hazardous nature, seizure memo would have recorded the same, or there would have been a subsequent reference at the time of release of the vehicle to its owner. Nothing of this nature is found on the record.
22. Mr. Kinger has drawn attention to the DAR, in particular Part IV, where, in Serial No.33(i), there is a requirement to mention if it was a goods carriage and against which the entry is made “commercial HTV”. He has further drawn attention of this Court to Serial No.76 in Part IX, where, in sub-section (m), a mention has to be made under Section 177 Rule 29 whether it was carrying high/long load, to which the entry is ‘No’.
23. Notwithstanding the above, Mr. Pradeep Gaur submitted that R3W[1], an Assistant with the National Insurance Company, had deposed that "the truck carrying LPG cylinders was being driven at the time of the alleged accident". To this, admittedly, there was no cross-examination which has persuaded the MACT to grant recovery rights in favour of the Insurance Company. However, it is also noted that the Insurance Company, in its written statement, did not raise any such defence in any manner whatsoever. In fact, there is not even a shred of mention of the fact that there was no endorsement and that the truck was carrying LPG cylinders. Since no such plea was raised in the pleadings, the driver and owner had no occasion to lead evidence to establish that the vehicle was not carrying LPG cylinders. A stray statement by R3W[1] without any support cannot sway the evidence in favour of Insurance Company.
24. Considering the MACT proceedings are in the nature of an inquiry, strict rules of evidence do not apply. The burden of having not provided proper testimony at that stage cannot militate against the actual record of the police, which makes no mention of any hazardous goods being carried.
25. In this scenario, the Court is of the view that, there being no such positive evidence of hazardous goods being carried, the question of endorsement would not arise. Lack of endorsement as a valid defence for the insurance company will not provide recovery rights, and the Court resonates with the decisions in Manish Garg Sharma (supra) and Amit Sharma (supra) and, in turn, with Sonia Mittal (supra). In this regard, the decision in Mangla Goods (supra) can be easily distinguished on the facts.
26. Accordingly, the impugned Award is set aside to the limited extent that it grants recovery rights in favour of the Insurance Company against the appellants.
27. Mr. Gaur however, informs that the decision in Amit Sharma (supra) has been challenged before the Supreme Court, and notice has been issued in SLP No.24217/2025 by order dated 09th September 2025. He, however, confirms that no stay has been granted.
28. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
29. Statutory deposit, if any, be refunded to appellant.
30. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court.
JUDGE JULY 02, 2026/sm/bp