Managing Committee v. Lakshman Singh

1. This is an application on behalf of the Petitioner for condonation of delay in filing the review petition.

2. For the reasons stated in the application, the delay of 300 days in filing the review petition is condoned.

3. The application is disposed of.

REVIEW PET. 193/2026 & CM APPL. 27141/2026

4. The Petitioner seeks review of the Judgment and Order dated 31.07.2025 whereby this Court has dismissed the appeal filed by the Appellant.

5. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts leading to the present petition SINGH KIRMOLIYA 16.35.41 are as follows:i. The Respondent was appointed in the Petitioner school as PGT (Physics) with effect from 15.07.2011 and was appointed as a regular TGT (Maths) in Pay Band-II with Grade Pay Rs.4,600/w.e.f. 01.07.2013. ii. The Petitioner school is a private unaided school recognized by the Directorate of Education (DoE) and therefore it is governed by the Delhi School Education Act, 1973. iii. The Respondent approached this Court with a grievance that the school has neither fixed his pay correctly under the 6th CPC nor has it implemented 7th Pay Commission even though Department of Education has adopted the Central Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 2008 and directions were issued directing the Managing Committee of all private recognized private schools of Delhi (Unaided and Aided), to implement 6th CPC. iv. It was the case of the Respondent, i.e., the Petitioner in the writ petition, that the Petitioner is being paid only a meager amount that too upto 2020 and no salary was paid from October, 2020 though the Petitioner was taking classes regularly and therefore the Petitioner filed the writ petition for a direction for the benefit of pay revision under the 6th CPC and correct fixation of salary as per the Directorate of Education. v. The writ petition was contested by the Petitioner school stating that the Writ Petitioner had tendered an unconditional resignation on 28.10.2019 which was accepted by the competent authority of the school vide letter dated 20.02.2020 16.35.41 and the Petitioner was informed accordingly and once the resignation is accepted, the writ petition as framed cannot be entertained. vi. Reliance was also placed in the writ petition under proviso to Rule 114(A) of the Rules, if no approval is received within 30 days from the DoE, approval shall be deemed to have been received after the expiry of period of 30 days. vii. The learned Single Judge vide Judgment dated 19.12.2022 rejected the contention of deemed resignation stating that no approval was sought from the Directorate of Education as per the records available in the office of Directorate of Education and therefore in the absence of seeking approval under 114(A), it was not open for the school to invoke the proviso to the said Rule and seek benefit thereof. viii. On merits, the learned Single Judge held that the Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of 6th & 7th CPC. The said Judgment and Order was challenged by the school by filing LPA 406/2023. ix. During the hearing, learned Counsel for the Petitioner herein handed over the letter dated 28.10.2019, which is purportedly a letter sent by the school for the approval of resignation. However, the Directorate of Education made the following submission in LPA 406/2023:-

6. The scope of review has been categorically explained by the Apex Court in a number of Judgments. It is settled that the scope of review is extremely limited and must only be allowed when there is an error apparent on the face of the record or when there is any new or important evidence that is discovered which was not in the knowledge and could not be provided when the order was passed despite conducting due diligence. It is well settled that review cannot be an appeal in disguise. The Apex Court in Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, (2006) 4 SCC 78, has held as under:-

16.35.41 modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Where the order in question is appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection. This Court in Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. [(1964) 5 SCR 174: AIR 1964 SC 1372] held as follows: (SCR p. 186) “[T]here is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by „error apparent‟. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. … where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out.”

7. Similarly, the Apex Court in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170, has held as under:-

16.35.41 Reddy, J. has made the following pertinent observations: „It is true there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found, it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.‟ ” (SCC pp. 172-73, para 8)"

8. A perusal of the review petition shows that the Petitioner has virtually attempted to re-argue the case. In the opinion of this Court, the Petitioner has not pointed out any error apparent on the face of record.