State v. Dinesh

1. The present appeal is being filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 29.07.2019 (“Impugned Order”) passed by Additional Sessions Judge-05, Shahdara District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi in F.I.R. NO. 86/2018 under Sections 392/397/411 IPC, registered at P.S. Nand Nagri, whereby, the Ld. ASJ acquitted the respondent under sections 392/397/411 IPC.

2. The facts of the present case would indicate that on 14.01.2018, the complainant, Mandeep Sharma, produced the accused, Dinesh, before the Investigating Officer, ASI Devi Ram, alleging that while boarding a Route No. 165 bus at about 5:00 p.m., the accused had robbed him of his black KUMAR KAURAV Vivo V7+ mobile phone at the point of a cutter-like knife. The complainant apprehended the accused with the help of public persons, and the stolen mobile phone was recovered from his possession. Based on the complainant’s statement, the FIR was registered, and upon completion of investigation, a charge-sheet under Sections 392/397/411 IPC was filed on 14.03.2018. Charges under Sections 392/397 IPC and Section 411 IPC were framed on 28.05.2018, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. During the trial, the prosecution examined four witnesses, including the complainant (PW-1) and the Investigating Officer, ASI Devi Ram (PW-4).

3. The State has taken, primarily, the following four grounds to challenge the Impugned Order, and seek for its setting aside: 3.[1] The learned ASJ erroneously acquitted the respondent by extending the benefit of doubt despite cogent evidence on record; 3.[2] The Trial Court failed to appreciate that the complainant (PW-1) had unequivocally identified the accused, the weapon used in the commission of the offence, and the robbed mobile phone recovered from the accused; 3.[3] It further failed to consider that non-joining of public witnesses, PGR officials, or non-production of the bus ticket is not fatal to the prosecution case, particularly when the complainant’s testimony is reliable, there is no motive for false implication, and the recovery was effected at the spot; 3.[4] The learned ASJ also erred in placing undue emphasis on minor inconsistencies, overlooking the settled principle that the prosecution is only required to dispel reasonable doubts arising from the evidence and that Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1862 has no application where recovery is made from the accused at the spot; and 3.[5] The impugned judgment is further contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ashfaq v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi),[1] wherein it was held that for the purpose of Section 397 IPC, it is sufficient that the offender was armed with a deadly weapon visible to the victim so as to create terror, and actual use of the weapon is not necessary.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record.

5. In Ratheesh v. State of Kerala & Ors.,[2] the Supreme Court held as under:

6. The scope of interference by an Appellate Court against an order of acquittal was considered by the Supreme Court in Chandrappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka.[3] While summarising the principles governing appeals against acquittal, the Court held in para 30: “30.... ***

4. An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence... Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

5. If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

7. In the present case, this Court has carefully perused the impugned judgment and the material placed on record. The findings returned by the learned Trial Court cannot be said to be perverse, arbitrary or manifestly illegal so as to warrant interference. The submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant essentially seek a re-appreciation of the evidence, which by itself cannot be a ground to interfere with an order of acquittal.

8. The contention that the complainant had identified the respondent, non-joining of public witnesses is not fatal and that minor inconsistencies ought to have been ignored were duly considered by the learned Trial Court while extending the benefit of doubt. Merely because another view may also be possible on the evidence on record would not justify interference in an appeal against acquittal.

9. The reliance placed by the appellant on Ashfaq v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi),[4] is misplaced. The proposition laid down therein regarding the scope of Section 397 IPC is well settled. However, the applicability of the said provision arises only after the prosecution succeeds in establishing the foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, the learned Trial Court found that the prosecution had failed to discharge that burden.

10. This Court finds no infirmity, perversity or illegality in the appreciation of evidence by the learned Trial Court. The impugned judgment does not warrant interference.

11. Accordingly, the present petition seeking leave to appeal is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J JULY 7, 2026 lr