Sandeep Kumar v. Sh Tarun Arora and Anr

Delhi High Court · 13 Jul 2026 · 2026:DHC:5628
Subramonium Prasad
CS(COMM) 826/2023
2026:DHC:5628
civil petition_dismissed

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court dismissed the Plaintiff's Review Petition challenging the refusal of summary judgment, holding that review jurisdiction is limited and cannot be used to reappraise evidence or substitute appellate scrutiny.

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CS(COMM) 826/2023
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 13th JULY, 2026
REVIEW PET. 290/2026
IN
SANDEEP KUMAR .....Plaintiff
Through: Ms Vishruti Chandoke, Dr. Anil Bakshi, Advocates
VERSUS
SH TARUN ARORA AND ANR .....Defendants
Through: Mr Sanjeev Mahajan and Ms Simran Rao, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
JUDGMENT
(ORAL)
REVIEW PET. 290/2026 & I.A. 17151/2026, I.A. 17152/2026

1. The present Review Petition has been filed by the Plaintiff under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908 seeking review of the Judgment dated 20.05.2026, passed by this Court dismissing I.A. No.38753/2024, filed by the Plaintiff under Order XIII-A of the CPC for passing a summary judgment in the Suit.

2. The facts, in brief, leading to the institution of the Suit are that the Plaintiff claims to be a Cost and Management Accountant who had worked in various Public Sector Undertakings before enrolling as an Advocate in the year 2005. According to the Plaintiff, the Defendants, who were involved in SINGH KIRMOLIYA 16.35.41 various litigations and disputes with their uncle since the year 1998, approached him in or about March, 2002 through a common acquaintance for obtaining professional consultancy in relation to the disputes faced by them both inside and outside the Court. The Plaintiff asserts that an oral arrangement was arrived at whereunder consultancy services were agreed to be remunerated at the rate of Rs.2,000/- per hour and that, after his enrolment as an Advocate in November, 2005, the Defendants also agreed to avail his legal services on separately agreed terms, namely Rs.15,000/- per appearance, Rs.5,00,000/- for preparation of final written arguments, besides certain charges relatable to other services allegedly rendered by him. It is also the Plaintiff's case that at the request of the Defendants, payment of the accumulated professional charges was deferred till the conclusion of the litigations between the Defendants and their uncle.

3. The Plaintiff further claims that between March, 2002 and January, 2021, he rendered extensive professional services to the Defendants in relation to numerous litigations, administrative proceedings and other disputes, and that notwithstanding the engagement of different Advocates by the Defendants from time to time, they continued to principally rely upon his professional advice and consultancy. According to the Plaintiff, upon culmination of the litigations in January, 2021, he called upon the Defendants to discharge the accumulated professional charges, which according to him aggregated to approximately Rs.2.65 crores. It is alleged that the Defendants paid only a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- on 08.02.2021, and subsequently repudiated the claim by asserting that the services had been rendered by the Plaintiff voluntarily and on a pro bono basis, compelling the Plaintiff to file the present Suit for recovery of the balance amount along 16.35.41 with interest and other consequential reliefs.

4. Upon issuance of summons, the Defendants entered appearance and filed their Written Statement disputing the claim in its entirety. The principal defence raised by the Defendants is that there never existed any oral or written agreement obligating them to pay the Plaintiff any professional charges. It is the categorical stand of the Defendant that no document evidences any agreement regarding consultancy charges, appearance fee or any other remuneration claimed in the Suit. The Defendants further dispute the very foundation of the Plaintiff's case by asserting that the Plaintiff had only assisted them in a limited capacity during certain stages of the litigation and was never engaged on the terms now alleged. It is also the case of the Defendants that the Plaintiff never raised any demand for professional charges for nearly two decades and that the present Suit has been filed only after conclusion of the litigations with an intent to extract money from the Defendants. In the Written Statement, the Defendants have also questioned the maintainability of the claim raised by the Plaintiff by referring to the provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961 and have disputed the nature, extent and value of the services allegedly rendered by the Plaintiff.

5. After completion of pleadings, the Plaintiff filed I.A. No.38753/2024 under Order XIII-A of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking summary judgment. The application substantially proceeds on the basis that the documentary material already available on record, including emails, WhatsApp communications and other contemporaneous documents, establishes beyond dispute that the Plaintiff had rendered professional services to the Defendants over a prolonged period in terms of the agreed fee structure and that the defence raised by the Defendants was wholly illusory, 16.35.41 sham and devoid of any real prospect of success. The Plaintiff further asserted that the denial contained in the Written Statement was contrary to the admitted documents and that the case also attracted the principles contained in Order XII Rule 6 of the Code.

6. During the course of hearing of the said application, the Plaintiff also filed detailed written submissions as well as a written note, reiterating that the true controversy before the Court was whether the services rendered by him over a period of nearly eighteen years were rendered pursuant to an agreed professional arrangement or merely by way of gratuitous assistance as alleged by the Defendants. The Plaintiff emphasised the emails exchanged between the parties, WhatsApp conversations, the details of work allegedly performed by him, the rationale of the agreed fee structure and the inherent improbability of the defence taken by the Defendants. It was repeatedly urged by the Plaintiff that the defence taken by the Defendants was not merely weak but was wholly moonshine and, therefore, the conditions prescribed under Order XIII-A of the Code stood fully satisfied.

7. Upon hearing the parties, this Court, by judgment dated 20.05.2026, dismissed the said application under Order XIII-A CPC. While dismissing the Application, the Court noticed the pleadings of the parties, the rival submissions advanced on behalf of both sides, the written note filed by the Plaintiff and the legal principles governing summary judgment under Order XIII-A CPC as explained by the Supreme Court and this Court. Upon consideration of the material placed before it, the Court came to the conclusion that the disputes between the parties raised substantial questions requiring appreciation of evidence and that the present matter is not one where summary judgment could be granted without a full-fledged trial. 16.35.41

8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the Plaintiff has filed the present Review Petition.

9. The principal grievance of the Plaintiff is that while passing the judgment dated 20.05.2026, this Court failed to consider various material aspects which, according to the Plaintiff, went to the root of the controversy. It is contended that the written note dated 07.04.2026, the written submissions dated 25.09.2024, the additional written submissions filed in rebuttal of the Defendants' submissions, as well as the factual details contained in Documents 44 and 45, were omitted from consideration despite constituting the very foundation of the Plaintiff's case. It is further urged that the Court failed to appreciate that the application under Order XIII-A CPC had been filed after completion of pleadings and admission and denial of documents and that a substantial part of the Plaintiff's documentary case stood supported by admitted electronic communications accompanied by certificates under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act.

10. The Plaintiff further contends that the judgment under review proceeds on an erroneous understanding of the nature of the relationship between the parties. According to the Plaintiff, his consistent case throughout has been that the parties initially shared a consultant-client relationship and that even after his enrolment as an Advocate, consultancy services continued to remain distinct from legal services rendered in Court. It is submitted that the Court failed to appreciate this distinction and instead proceeded on the erroneous premise that the Plaintiff's case was founded entirely upon an advocate-client relationship. It is also contended that the defence taken by the Defendants in the Written Statement has been misunderstood and that the Court failed to appreciate that the Defendants' 16.35.41 actual plea was not that of an advocate-client arrangement but rather that the Plaintiff had merely worked as an intern, learner or junior advocate who was permitted to observe court proceedings. According to the Plaintiff, this defence is inherently absurd and incapable of acceptance even on a bare reading of the pleadings.

11. It is also urged that the Court failed to appreciate the true import of the emails, WhatsApp communications and other contemporaneous documents relied upon by the Plaintiff, which according to him clearly establish that the Defendants repeatedly sought professional advice from him, acknowledged the work performed by him and never disputed the services rendered until called upon to make payment after conclusion of the litigation. It is submitted that these documents, read together with the admissions allegedly emerging from the pleadings of the Defendants, left no real prospect of the Defendants successfully defending the Suit and fully satisfied the requirements of Order XIII-A CPC. The Plaintiff accordingly submits that non-consideration of the aforesaid material has resulted in errors apparent on the face of the record necessitating review of the judgment dated 20.05.2026.

12. Heard the learned Counsels for the parties and perused the material on record.

13. Before dwelling into the facts of the present case and adjudicating upon the contentions advanced by the contesting parties, this Court deems it fit to recall the parameters of a Court exercising its review jurisdiction. The Apex Court in Haridas Das vs. Usha Rani Banik, (2006) 4 SCC 78, while considering the scope and ambit of Section 114 CPC read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC observed as under: 16.35.41

“14. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury [(1995) 1 SCC 170 : AIR 1995 SC 455] it was held that: “8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47 Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court, in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [(1979) 4 SCC 389 : AIR 1979 SC 1047] speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J. has made the following pertinent observations: „It is true there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found, it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of
16.35.41 review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.‟ ” (SCC pp. 172-73, para 8)
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15. A perusal of Order 47 Rule 1 shows that review of a judgment or an order could be sought: (a) from the discovery of new and important matters or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant; (b) such important matter or evidence could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was passed or order made; and (c) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason.

16. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [(1979) 4 SCC 389: AIR 1979 SC 1047] this Court held that there are definite limits to the exercise of power of review. In that case, an application under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 151 of the Code was filed which was allowed and the order passed by the Judicial Commissioner was set aside and the writ petition was dismissed. On an appeal to this Court it was held as under: (SCC p. 390, para 3) “It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 1909] there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the 16.35.41 exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.”

17. The judgment in Aribam case [(1979) 4 SCC 389: AIR 1979 SC 1047] has been followed in Meera Bhanja [(1995) 1 SCC 170: AIR 1995 SC 455]. In that case, it has been reiterated that an error apparent on the face of the record for acquiring jurisdiction to review must be such an error which may strike one on a mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning. The following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale [(1960) 1 SCR 890: AIR 1960 SC 137] were also noted: (AIR p.

137) “An error which has to be established by a longdrawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from selfevident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a 16.35.41 writ.” (SCR pp. 901-02)

18. It is also pertinent to mention the observations of this Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [(1997) 8 SCC 715]. Relying upon the judgments in Aribam [(1979) 4 SCC 389: AIR 1979 SC 1047] and Meera Bhanja [(1995) 1 SCC 170: AIR 1995 SC 455] it was observed as under: (SCC p. 719, para 9)

“9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be „reheard and corrected‟. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be „an appeal in disguise‟.”

14. Since the present Review Petitions are largely based on the contention that there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of record of the Impugned Order, it is apposite to recall the Judgment of the Apex Court in State of West Bengal vs. Kamal Sengupta, (2008) 8 SCC 612, wherein the Apex Court considered as to what exactly can be said to be a ‘mistake or error apparent on the face of record’ and has held as under:

“35. The principles which can be culled out from the
abovenoted judgments are:
(i) The power of the Tribunal to review its order/decision under Section 22(3)(f) of the Act is akin/analogous to the power of a civil court under

16.35.41 Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

(ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not otherwise.

(iii) The expression “any other sufficient reason”

(iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power under Section 22(3)(f).

(v) An erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in the guise of exercise of power of review.

(vi) A decision/order cannot be reviewed under Section

22(3)(f) on the basis of subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench of the tribunal or of a superior court.

(vii) While considering an application for review, the tribunal must confine its adjudication with reference to material which was available at the time of initial decision. The happening of some subsequent event or development cannot be taken note of for declaring the initial order/decision as vitiated by an error apparent.

(viii) Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review. The party seeking review has also to show that such matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court/tribunal earlier.”

15. The jurisdiction of review is an extremely limited one. It is well 16.35.41 settled that a review proceeding is by no means an appeal in disguise. A review is maintainable only where there is discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, despite exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the party seeking review or could not be produced at the time when the judgment was rendered, or where there exists an error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason analogous thereto. The power of review does not permit the Court to re-hear the matter on merits or to substitute one possible view by another merely because the party seeking review believes that the earlier decision is erroneous. Re-appreciation of pleadings, re-evaluation of evidence or reconsideration of findings already rendered falls squarely within the province of appellate jurisdiction and not review jurisdiction.

16. The principal grievance of the Plaintiff in the present Review Petition is that while passing the judgment dated 20.05.2026, this Court failed to consider the written note dated 07.04.2026, the written submissions dated 25.09.2024, the additional written submissions filed thereafter and the documents relied upon by the Plaintiff, particularly Documents 42 to 50, which, according to him, constituted the foundation of the application under Order XIII-A CPC. It is contended that the judgment proceeds without considering the material pleadings, documentary evidence and electronic communications placed on record, resulting in errors apparent on the face of the record. The Plaintiff further submits that this Court failed to appreciate that the application under Order XIII-A CPC was filed after completion of pleadings and admission and denial of documents and that the Defendants' defence had no real prospect of succeeding.

17. The Plaintiff further contends that this Court misappreciated the 16.35.41 nature of the relationship between the parties by proceeding on the premise of an advocate-client relationship, whereas the Plaintiff's consistent case was that he was initially engaged as a consultant and thereafter also rendered legal services on agreed terms. It is also urged that the defence raised by the Defendants has been misconstrued and that the admissions allegedly emerging from the emails, WhatsApp communications and other contemporaneous documents were not properly appreciated. According to the Plaintiff, had the aforesaid pleadings, documents and submissions been duly considered and the principles governing Order XIII-A CPC correctly applied, this Court would have concluded that the Defendants had no real prospect of successfully defending the Suit. It is, therefore, the case of the Plaintiff that the judgment dated 20.05.2026 suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record warranting review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.

18. A perusal of the judgment dated 20.05.2026 shows that the Plaintiff's case has been noticed in paragraphs 3(a) to 3(i), the contents of the written note have been specifically recorded in paragraphs 5 and 6, the defence of the Defendants has been noticed in paragraphs 3(j) and 7 to 11, while the legal principles governing Order XIII-A CPC have been discussed in paragraphs 13 to 18. The grievance of the Plaintiff is, therefore, not that the aforesaid contentions escaped consideration but that the conclusions ultimately arrived at by this Court were not in his favour. The questions whether the alleged oral agreement existed, whether the electronic communications constitute admissions, whether the Plaintiff rendered the services claimed by him and whether the Defendants' defence is ultimately liable to be rejected are all matters falling within the realm of appreciation of evidence and adjudication on merits. Such issues cannot be reopened in 16.35.41 exercise of review jurisdiction, which is confined to correction of manifest errors apparent on the face of the record and cannot be invoked as a substitute for an appeal or for rehearing the matter on merits.

19. It is also significant that the Review Petition does not point out any finding recorded in the judgment which is demonstrably contrary to the pleadings or the record. Nor has the Plaintiff been able to identify any material document which was unavailable for consideration when the judgment was rendered. The entire endeavour of the Plaintiff is directed towards persuading this Court to reassess the same pleadings, documents and submissions with a view to arrive at a different conclusion. Such an exercise falls squarely within the realm of appellate scrutiny and not review jurisdiction.

20. An error apparent on the face of the record is one which is selfevident and does not require a process of elaborate reasoning to establish it. Where detection of the alleged error necessarily involves a detailed examination of pleadings, comparison of rival contentions, appreciation of documentary evidence and reconsideration of conclusions already arrived at, the matter ceases to be one of review and enters the domain of an appeal. The present case is a clear illustration of the latter. Every contention advanced by the Plaintiff in support of the Review Petition requires this Court to once again analyse the emails, WhatsApp communications, pleadings, written submissions and the rival versions of the parties in order to determine whether the application under Order XIII-A CPC ought to have been allowed. Such an exercise is wholly impermissible in review proceedings.

21. The judgment dated 20.05.2026 does not finally determine the rights 16.35.41 of the parties in the Suit. The application under Order XIII-A CPC was dismissed on the ground that the controversy raised issues requiring adjudication at trial. The Plaintiff continues to have a full opportunity to establish his claim by leading evidence in accordance with law, just as the Defendants remain entitled to substantiate the defence raised in the Written Statement. The dismissal of the application for summary judgment neither forecloses the Plaintiff's claim nor results in adjudication of the Suit against him.

22. Mere non-reference to every document or every submission advanced by a party does not ipso facto establish non-consideration of the same. A judgment has to be read as a whole and not in a piecemeal manner. Once the judgment demonstrates conscious application of mind to the rival pleadings, submissions and the issues arising for determination, it cannot be reviewed merely because each contention has not been separately dealt with or because the ultimate conclusion is adverse to one of the parties.

23. Having considered the matter in its entirety, this Court is of the opinion that the present Review Petition is, in substance, an attempt to secure a rehearing of the application under Order XIII-A CPC on the very same pleadings, documents and submissions which were available when the judgment dated 20.05.2026 was rendered. The Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate discovery of any new and important matter, any manifest error apparent on the face of the record or any other circumstance warranting exercise of review jurisdiction. None of the submissions advanced by the Plaintiff establishes that any material pleading, document or contention had escaped consideration while rendering the judgment under review. The grievance projected by the Plaintiff is essentially directed against the 16.35.41 conclusions arrived at by this Court on appreciation of the material on record. Such a grievance lies within the province of appellate jurisdiction and not review. The Review Petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed.

24. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court finds no merit in the present Review Petition. The same is, accordingly, dismissed. Pending Applications, i.e. I.A. 17151/2026, I.A. 17152/2026, also stands dismissed.

SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J JULY 13, 2026