Vidya Devi v. Pawan Kumar Chauhan & Ors.

14. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the findings recorded by the learned ARC on the issues of bona fide requirement, availability of alternative accommodation and the subsequent developments during the pendency of the eviction proceedings are contrary to the material placed on record and suffer from patent illegality and perversity.

15. Learned counsel would submit that the learned ARC erred in holding that the Respondents had established a bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises. It would be contended that the requirement projected in the Eviction Petition is inherently self-contradictory inasmuch as the Respondents have simultaneously sought eviction for demolition and reconstruction of the existing structure as well as for expansion of the existing business.

16. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would contend that the material placed on record demonstrates that Respondent No.1 is carrying on a limited dairy business from the existing premises and, in view of the restrictions operating against the use of furnaces/bhattis, the projected expansion of business is neither feasible nor genuine. It would thus be submitted that the learned ARC failed to appreciate that the aforesaid plea, which, in itself, constituted a triable issue.

17. Leaned counsel for the Petitioner would further contend that the learned ARC failed to consider the specific plea that the requirement projected for the sons of the Landlords also raised a triable issue.

18. Learned counsel, in this regard, submits that the material placed on record indicated that one of the sons was employed in a private establishment and, therefore, the projected requirement for commencement of an independent business was wholly speculative. It would therefore be submitted that the learned ARC has failed to consider the aforesaid contention despite the same having been specifically urged before it.

19. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would also submit that the learned ARC has failed to appreciate that the Respondents were possessed of several reasonably suitable alternative accommodations, particulars whereof had been specifically disclosed in the LTD Application.

20. In this regard, learned counsel for the Petitioner would specifically urge that the findings returned by the learned ARC in respect of Property No.8/4, Kesri Mohalla, Property No.252, Old Dakkhane Wali Gali, Property No.66/2A/1, Pal Gali and Property No.3/49, Ram Gali are contrary to the material on record.

21. It would further be submitted that the sale of one of the properties during the pendency of the eviction proceedings itself constituted a material subsequent event giving rise to a triable issue, which has been erroneously discarded by the learned ARC.

22. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would further submit that the learned ARC failed to accord due consideration to the Applications preferred by the Petitioner to bring on record subsequent events, including the employment status of the landlords‟ sons and other developments pertaining to the alleged alternative accommodations.

23. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would therefore submit that these subsequent developments materially undermined the Respondents‟ claim of bona fide requirement and, at the very least, disclosed triable issues which could only be adjudicated after the parties had led evidence.

24. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the Petitioner would place reliance upon the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Kumar Aggarwal v. Rani Ravindran & Anr.10 to contend that where the tenant discloses facts giving rise to genuine triable issues, the LTD Application cannot be rejected at the threshold and the parties ought to be relegated to trial. It would be submitted that the present case similarly discloses several issues requiring adjudication upon evidence. AIR 2009 SC 2462

25. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would further place reliance upon the decisions of this Court in Kishore v. Prabodh Kumar11, Sukh Dev Raj Sharma v. Kuljeet Singh Jass12, Gopal Dass & Sons v. Dineshwar Nath Kedar13 and Kiran Sachdeva v. Pushpa Devi14 to contend that where the landlord projects a requirement founded upon expansion of an existing business, establishment of business for family members or alleges absence of alternative accommodation, the learned ARC is required to objectively examine whether the projected requirement is genuine and authentic.

26. It would be contended, while placing reliance upon the aforesaid authorities, that where the tenant raises plausible objections demonstrating that the projected requirement may be a mere wish or desire or raises questions regarding the existence of alternative accommodation, such issues ordinarily warrant grant of leave to defend.

27. Learned counsel would also place reliance upon V.P. Saxena v. Avinash Chander Bhasin15, Raj Kumari v. Hari Parshad16, B.R. Anand v. Prem Sagar17, O.P. Gupta v. R.K. Sharma18 and Smt. Bejoli Roy Chowdhary v. Amar Kumar & Ors.19 to contend that the existence of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation, concealment of material facts, the genuineness of the projected requirement and other disputed factual issues cannot be conclusively 2012 (132) DRJ 562 2012 (132) DRJ 632 2013 (133) DRJ 468 2013 (133) DRJ 725 2002 (1) RCR 701 2003 (2) RCR 540 2002 (1) RCR 234 2001 (2) RCR 240 1977 AIRCJ 897 determined on the basis of rival affidavits where the tenant has disclosed grounds which, if established, would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an eviction order.

28. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would, therefore, in the light of the foregoing submissions and Judicial precedents relied upon, pray that the Impugned Order be set aside and the LTD Application be allowed.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS:

29. Per contra, Mr. Vineet Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents, would support the Impugned Order and submit that the learned ARC has succinctly considered every objection raised by the Petitioner in the LTD Application and has rightly concluded that no triable issue arose warranting the grant of leave to defend under Section 25B of the DRC Act.

30. Learned counsel for the Respondents would submit that the findings recorded by the learned ARC on the issues of bona fide requirement, availability of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation and the other objections raised by the Petitioner are based upon the pleadings and material available on record and do not suffer from any illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its limited revisional jurisdiction under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

31. Learned counsel for the Respondents would also submit that the learned ARC has not only considered the LTD Application on merits, but has also independently adjudicated upon the various Applications preferred by the Petitioner to bring subsequent events and additional documents on record in respect of the alleged alternative accommodations and other subsequent developments. He would therefore submit that the ground of challenge of non-consideration of subsequent events by the learned ARC, as raised by the learned counsel for the Petitioner, is erroneous.

32. In this regard, learned counsel for the Respondents would submit that certain Applications were allowed and the documents sought to be introduced by way of those Applications were taken on record and duly considered by the learned ARC, while certain Applications were rejected on merits.

33. Learned counsel for the Respondents would also contend that the learned ARC has undertaken an exhaustive consideration of each of the properties alleged by the Petitioner to constitute reasonably suitable alternative accommodation and has rightly returned findings that none of the said properties either belonged to the Respondents in the manner alleged or constituted a reasonably suitable alternative for the purpose for which eviction had been sought.

34. Learned counsel for the Respondents would further submit that the reliance placed by the Petitioner upon various decisions, inter alia, in Ramesh Kumar Aggarwal (supra), Kishore (supra), V.P. Saxena (supra) is wholly misplaced.

35. It would be submitted that the said decisions were rendered in cases where the learned Rent Controller had either overlooked material triable issues, failed to objectively examine the landlord‟s claim or accepted the landlord‟s assertions without adequate scrutiny. In the present case, however, the learned ARC has considered each of the objections raised by the Petitioner, including the pleas regarding bona fide requirement, alternative accommodation and subsequent events, and has returned detailed and reasoned findings thereon.

36. Learned counsel would, therefore, contend that the present Revision Petition, in substance, seeks a re-appreciation of the factual findings recorded by the learned ARC, which is impermissible in exercise of the limited revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

37. Learned counsel for the Respondents would, accordingly, submit that once the learned ARC has considered every plea raised by the Petitioner and returned reasoned findings thereon, no interference is called for merely because the Petitioner seeks to persuade this Court to take a different view of the same material.

38. Learned counsel for the Respondent would, accordingly, in light of the limited revisional jurisdiction of this Court and foregoing submissions on the merits, pray that the present Revision Petition, being devoid of merit, be dismissed. ANALYSIS:

39. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and, with their able assistance, perused the material available on record, the Impugned Order, the Written Submissions and the Judicial precedents relied upon by the Petitioner.

40. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

41. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.20, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh21, and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua22, has consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

42. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.23, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover24.

43. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25B of the DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is, therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process, including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent Controller merely because another view on the material available on record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court read as under:

44. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court, upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an absence of adjudication warranting interference.

45. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B (8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute. Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left unconsidered or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be warranted.

46. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional scrutiny that the grounds urged on behalf of the Petitioner against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.

47. Adverting now to the facts of the present case and submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, the principal challenge of the Petitioner to the Impugned Order is that the learned ARC erred in holding that the Respondents had established their bona fide requirement.

48. It has been contended that the projected requirement is inherently contradictory inasmuch as the eviction has simultaneously been sought for demolition and reconstruction of the existing structure as well as for expansion of the existing business. It is further urged that the existing dairy business is limited in nature and, therefore, the projected expansion lacks genuineness.

49. This submission, however, to the mind of this Court, does not merit acceptance. A reading of Paragraph Nos. 19 and 20 of the Impugned Order reveals that the learned ARC has consciously examined the said contention and returned detailed reasons for concluding that the projected requirement neither suffers from any inconsistency nor raises any triable issue warranting the grant of leave to defend. The relevant observations read as under:

50. A perusal of the aforesaid portion of the Impugned Order makes it evident that the reasoning adopted by the learned ARC cannot be characterised as either perfunctory or divorced from the material available on record, rather it is evident that the learned ARC has considered the rival pleadings, appreciated the explanation furnished by the Respondents regarding the nature of the proposed business and the alleged use of a furnace, and has also taken note of the undisputed residential requirement of a family comprising twenty-one members residing in an accommodation admeasuring merely 83 square yards.

51. In the considered view of this Court, the conclusion arrived at by the learned ARC is one that is reasonably borne out from the pleadings and the material available on record. The Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Impugned Order suffers from any jurisdictional error, manifest perversity or material irregularity warranting interference under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act. Consequently, merely because another view on the material may also be possible would not justify this Court in exercising its limited revisional jurisdiction.

52. Equally, this is not a case where the learned ARC has accepted the Respondents‟ claim solely on the basis of their assertions as landlords. The Impugned Order demonstrates that the learned ARC has objectively evaluated the rival pleadings, examined the explanations furnished by the Respondents and independently considered whether the objections raised by the Petitioner disclosed any triable issue. It was only upon such examination that the learned ARC concluded that the defence raised did not warrant the grant of leave to defend.

53. The next limb of challenge relates to the alleged availability of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation with the Respondents. According to the Petitioner, several properties belonging to the Respondents or their family members were deliberately concealed and the learned ARC erred in holding that none of them gave rise to a triable issue.

54. The material on record, and the discussion undertaken by the learned ARC does not support the Petitioner‟s aforesaid contention. The Impugned Order demonstrates that each of the properties relied upon by the Petitioner, to be a suitable alternative accomodation, was separately examined and the learned ARC returned reasoned findings in respect of each property.

55. A perusal of the Impugned Order reveals that, insofar as Property No. 8/4, Kesri Mohalla is concerned, the learned ARC has considered the objection as well as the effect of the subsequent sale thereof and has recorded reasons for holding that the same does not constitute a triable issue. Paragraph Nos. 29 and 30 of the Impugned Order read as under:

56. Further, the challenge regarding the remaining properties, namely, Property No.252, Old Dakkhane Wali Gali, Property No.66/2A/1, Pal Gali and Property No.3/49, Ram Gali, has likewise been considered by the learned ARC. Paragraph Nos.23, 26, 27 and 28 of the Impugned Order, which deal with the said objections, read as under:

57. The aforesaid discussion, in the considered view of this Court, demonstrates that the learned ARC did not reject the Petitioner‟s objections in a summary or mechanical manner. Rather, each property relied upon by the Petitioner was independently examined on the basis of the material placed on record. In respect of Property No.66/2A/1, Pal Gali, the learned ARC found that the Respondents neither owned nor exercised legal control over the said property.

58. Further, as regards Property No.3/49, Ram Gali, the learned ARC concluded that the photographs relied upon by the Petitioner were insufficient to establish either ownership or the availability of suitable commercial accommodation. Similarly, while dealing with Property No.252, Old Dakkhane Wali Gali, the learned ARC considered the additional documents sought to be placed on record and returned specific findings as to why the said property could not be treated as an available alternative accommodation.

59. The grievance of the Petitioner is, therefore, not that the aforesaid objections remained unconsidered, but that the conclusions recorded by the learned ARC are erroneous. Acceptance of such a submission would necessarily require this Court to reassess the factual findings recorded by the learned ARC and substitute its own appreciation of the material on record. Such an exercise falls outside the limited ambit of revisional jurisdiction under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act. No jurisdictional error, material irregularity or perversity in the aforesaid findings has been demonstrated so as to warrant interference.

60. The distinction between Appellate and Revisional jurisdiction is one of substance and not merely of nomenclature. An Appellate Court is concerned with the correctness of the conclusion, while a Revisional Court is concerned with the legality of the process by which that conclusion is reached.

61. The next ground of challenge pertains to the subsequent events and additional material sought to be brought on record during the pendency of the eviction proceedings.

62. The Impugned Order does not support the Petitioner‟s contention that such material remained unconsidered. Rather, it demonstrates that the learned ARC consciously examined the various Applications preferred by the Petitioner under Section 151 of the CPC, considered the additional documents placed on record and returned reasoned findings as to whether the subsequent developments were of such a nature as to give rise to any triable issue. The alleged sale of Property No.8/4, Kesri Mohalla has already been dealt with hereinabove in Paragraph No. 55, while considering the challenge relating to alternative accommodation.

63. Insofar as the subsequent change in the employment status of the elder son of Respondent No.1 is concerned, the learned ARC has considered the same in Paragraph Nos.17 and 18 of the Impugned Order, which read as under:

64. A reading of the aforesaid findings makes it evident that the learned ARC did not reject the subsequent material on technical grounds or decline to consider it merely because it arose during the pendency of the proceedings. On the contrary, the learned ARC examined the material on its merits and returned a reasoned finding that neither the alleged employment of Gaurav Chauhan nor the material relating to Saurabh Chauhan diluted the Respondents‟ bona fide requirement or gave rise to any triable issue. The Petitioner has been unable to demonstrate that the aforesaid findings are vitiated by any jurisdictional infirmity, material irregularity or perversity warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The challenge, once again, is directed against the conclusions arrived at by the learned ARC and not against any failure to consider the subsequent events. Such a challenge travels beyond the limited scope of the revisional jurisdiction exercisable by this Court.

65. In the facts of the present case, the subsequent developments relied upon by the Petitioner neither alter the substratum of the dispute nor dilute the Respondents‟ projected bona fide requirement. Having been examined by the learned ARC and found insufficient to raise any triable issue, they cannot now be relied upon merely to invite a fresh appraisal of findings already returned upon due consideration.

66. In the backdrop of foregoing discussion, it would now be apposite to consider the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the Petitioner upon Ramesh Kumar Aggarwal (supra), Kishore (supra), Sukh Dev Raj Sharma (supra), V.P. Saxena (supra), Raj Kumari (supra), Gopal Dass (supra), Kiran Sachdeva (supra), B.R. Anand (supra), O.P. Gupta (supra) and Bejoli Roy (supra). The principal contention advanced on the strength of the aforesaid decisions is that the learned ARC ought to have granted leave to defend, as the defence raised by the Petitioner disclosed triable issues.

67. There can be no quarrel with the legal principles enunciated in the aforesaid decisions. They consistently reiterate that where the tenant discloses facts which, if established, would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction, leave to defend ought not to be refused mechanically and the learned ARC is required to objectively examine the landlord‟s projected requirement.

68. The aforesaid decisions, however, arose in factual situations where the learned Rent Controller had either overlooked material pleas, accepted the landlord‟s assertions without adequate scrutiny, or otherwise failed to examine whether the defence disclosed genuine triable issues. It was in those circumstances that interference was found to be warranted.

69. The present case, however, stands on an entirely different footing. As noticed hereinabove, the learned ARC has returned independent and reasoned findings on every material objection raised by the Petitioner, including the projected bona fide requirement, the alleged inconsistency in the Respondents‟ case, the requirement projected for the Respondents‟ family members, each of the properties alleged to constitute alternative accommodation, as well as the subsequent developments sought to be brought on record during the pendency of the proceedings.

70. Acceptance of the Petitioner‟s submission would necessarily require this Court to reassess the factual findings recorded by the learned ARC and substitute its own view of the evidence. Such an exercise plainly falls outside the limited ambit of revisional jurisdiction under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

71. Accordingly, while the legal principles laid down in the aforesaid authorities remain unexceptionable, the said decisions are distinguishable on facts and do not advance the Petitioner‟s case.

72. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid discussion leaves little manner of doubt that the present Revision, in essence, invites this Court to undertake a re-appreciation of the factual findings recorded by the learned ARC and substitute its own conclusions therefor. Such an exercise, however, falls beyond the limited scope of the revisional jurisdiction conferred upon this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

73. The essence of revisional jurisdiction lies not in substituting one plausible conclusion with another, but in ensuring that the conclusion ultimately reached is the product of a lawful, reasoned and fair adjudicatory process. Once that threshold is met, the mere possibility of another plausible view on facts cannot, by itself, furnish a ground for interference.

74. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid principles, this Court is satisfied that the Impugned Order reflects due application of mind to the rival pleadings and the material placed on record. The Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any jurisdictional error, material irregularity or perversity warranting interference under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act. DECISION:

75. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Impugned Order does not suffer from any jurisdictional infirmity, manifest illegality, material irregularity or perversity warranting interference under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

76. Accordingly, the present Revision Petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. There shall be no Order as to the Costs.

77. The present Revision Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any, stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J. JULY 28, 2026