H.N. Wadhwa v. Punjab National Bank

13. The Division Bench[8] upheld the view of the learned Single Judge that the inquiry on the second imputation was vitiated due to procedural delay and, therefore, dismissed the Bank’s appeal. On the crossobjections filed by the petitioner herein, the Court also upheld the view taken by the learned Single Judge, that the first imputation of charge did not warrant interference. While dismissing both the appeal and the crossobjection, the Division Bench, however, remitted the matter to the Reviewing Authority “to take a fresh decision with respect to the penalty to be awarded to the respondent in respect of the first charge which is the only charge established against the respondent”.[9] Emphasis supplied. Judgment dated 04.03.2013 in LPA 191/2007. Paragraph 9 of the Division Bench judgment. [It may be noted that the petitioner herein was the respondent before the Division Bench].

14. The petitioner sought review of the order, to the extent that the remand had been directed to the Reviewing Authority, rather than the Disciplinary Authority. However, his review petition was dismissed by the order of the Division Bench dated 05.07.201310.

15. The petitioner also challenged the orders of the Division Bench before the Supreme Court11, but the Special Leave Petition was dismissed, both on delay and merits, by order dated 25.08.2014.

16. During the pendency of the appeal before this Court, the petitioner attained the age of superannuation on 31.10.2008.

17. The present petition arises out of an order of the Reviewing Authority dated 26.04.2013, passed on remand. The Reviewing Authority has upheld the earlier order of removal with the following observations:

In RP 265/2013. SLP (C) CC Nos. 12925-12926/2014.

18. I have heard Mr. Anuj Kapoor, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. Rajesh Kumar Gautam, learned counsel for the respondent.

19. The legal position with regard to the charges on merits has been conclusively decided in the first round of proceedings - the first imputation of charge stands proved, and the second imputation stands rejected. The challenge in this writ petition thus pertains to the quantum of punishment imposed by the respondent. While considering such a challenge, the Court ordinarily exercises significant deference to the Disciplinary Authority. The charges having been established, it is for the authority to decide the quantum of punishment to be imposed. However, this principle is subject to an important qualification, that the punishment must be in proportion to the charges proved. The threshold for interference by the Court is nonetheless a high one – only when the Court finds a punishment to shock the conscience, is interference warranted13. The question is whether the present case reaches that high threshold.

20. Upon a consideration of all the facts noted above and, most importantly, the judgments rendered by this Court in the first round of challenge, which have been upheld by the Supreme Court, I have come to the conclusion that the petitioner’s request for interference in the present case, is merited. My reasons are as follows: a) The imputations of charge, upon which the disciplinary proceedings were originally conducted and the penalty of removal imposed upon the petitioner, were two-fold. The first charge related to the submission of “fake hotel bills” for his stay at Reference may be made, inter alia, to Union of India & Ors. v. Managobinda Samantaray, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 284. Bhadoi, whereas there was no hotel at Bhadoi under the name and style of “Seth Lodging and Boarding”. The inquiry report, accepted in the original order of the Disciplinary Authority, disbelieved the petitioner’s contention that no licensed hotel was available at Bhadoi, and that he was, therefore, staying at an unregistered guest house for which he had paid the claimed amount. An affidavit of Mr. B.K. Seth, the owner of the guest house, was disregarded on the ground that he was not produced for cross-examination. The inquiry officer noted that the Bank permitted a claim for TA/DA to be made only in respect of a regular licensed hotel. This charge – that the petitioner had submitted TA/DA bills in respect of a guest house, whereas the rules only permitted him to claim for a licensed hotel - has been upheld in the first round of litigation. b) As against this, the charge which has been held to be vitiated is that the purported guest house was owned by a person to whom the respondent-Bank had advanced credit facilities. The second imputation of charge has been described in the judgment of the learned Single Judge as the “more serious charge”, and the fact that the said charge was deleted, is what led the Court to remand the matter for a fresh consideration on the quantum of punishment. c) Indeed, a close reading of paragraph 13 of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, extracted above, records the conclusion that the “earlier order of punishment cannot hold good”, after deletion of the second imputation of charge. d) The judgment of the Single Judge14 required the authority on remand, to keep in mind the petitioner’s defence that he did stay in the private guest house and paid charges equivalent to his entitlement, for which receipts were duly issued by the owner. This aspect has not been considered in the impugned order dated 26.04.2013. e) The fact that only one imputation of charge stands proved, instead of the two that were originally considered, has been noticed in the impugned order, but has also not been alluded to in the reasoning of the authority. The impugned order, in fact, proceeds on the reasoning that the petitioner has not been able to bring forth any new points, or any factors which mitigate the gravity of the charge. Such observations entirely miss the crucial aspect which necessitated the remand, i.e., that one of the two imputations was unsustainable.

21. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view that the order of the Reviewing Authority dated 26.04.2013 is inconsistent with the orders of this Court dated 20.12.2006 and 04.03.2013, and imposes a punishment wholly disproportionate to the proven charge.

22. Two judgments- Union of India & Ors. v. Ex. Constable Ram Karan15, and Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Now Allahabad, U.P. Gramin Bank) & Anr. v. Rajendra Singh16, have been cited by Mr. Gautam, in support of his submission that the Court ought not to interfere if the quantum of punishment is justified by the charges which have been Supra (Note 2) paragraph 14.

proved, even if certain charges which were upheld by the Disciplinary Authority, are ultimately rejected by the Court. Even accepting this proposition, the Court must still ensure that the punishment imposed is in proportion to the surviving charge. This is the essential point on which I have arrived at a conclusion against the respondent.

23. Further, on a proper consideration, the view taken in the judgments cited by Mr. Gautam, in fact fortifies my conclusion. In the first round of litigation, the Disciplinary Authority had taken a view based on two proven imputations. The Court upheld one, and rejected one. If the penalty imposed was justified on the basis of the proven charge, it was open to the Court at that stage to uphold the penalty, without recourse to an order of remand. This is the clear ratio of both the judgments cited. However, in the facts of the present case, the Court did not adopt that course, but instead remanded the matter for a fresh consideration, with observations which clearly indicate that the punishment imposed was disproportionate to the surviving charge.

24. The question that now arises is whether the Court ought to remand the matter again for a fresh consideration, or to pass a consequential order. In general, the appropriate order is one of remand, based on a reluctance of the writ Court to substitute its view for that of the decisionmaking authority. However, this is not an absolute bar on jurisdiction. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India17, the Supreme Court held as follows:

with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.”18 In Delhi Police, through Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Sat Narayan Kaushik,19 this course of action adopted by the High Court, has been upheld by the Supreme Court, as follows:

25. Having regard to these judgments, I am of the view that the present case falls within the exceptional category where the Court ought to substitute the punishment, which it finds to have been illegally imposed, rather than remand the matter to the respondent again. The foremost factor, in this regard, is that the disciplinary proceedings relate to events of 1985, i.e., almost four decades ago. The proceedings commenced in 1988, and have been pending at one stage or the other for 37 years. The petitioner is now approximately 74 years of age. The option of remand has also been exercised once, but the respondents have persisted in their original order of punishment.

26. The Regulations of the respondent enumerate the following major penalties: “(f) Save as provided for in (e) above reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay for a specified period, with further directions as to whether or not the officer will earn increments of pay during the period of such reduction and whether on the expiry of such period the reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the future increments of his pay; (g) Reduction to a lower grade or post; (h) Compulsory retirement;

(i) Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment; (j) Dismissal which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment.”

27. The facts of this case have already been considered in the earlier round of litigation, where this Court has come to the conclusion that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner cannot be sustained solely on the basis of the first imputation of charge. As noted above, the Court has recorded the finding that the second imputation was “more serious”, and specifically noted that the punishment to be imposed must consider the fact that the petitioner did stay in the guest house and paid the claimed charges to Mr. B.K. Seth. It was directed that the extent of the misconduct must be viewed accordingly while imposing a commensurate punishment. Having regard to these findings in the judgment of the learned Single Judge, which has been upheld by the Division Bench and Special Leave to Appeal declined by the Supreme Court, I consider it appropriate to impose a punishment upon the petitioner at the level immediately below “removal from service”, as imposed by the respondent. The punishment is, therefore, substituted with an order of compulsory retirement.

28. The respondent is directed to compute the entitlements of the petitioner on this basis and to remit the same to him within a period of three months.

29. The writ petition is disposed of.

PRATEEK JALAN, J JANUARY 27, 2025 MR/Jishnu/