Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 23.07.2026
MAMATA SAMAJDAR .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Manu Beri with Mr. Rauvek Raheja, Advocates.
Through: Mr. Nikhilesh Kumar, Advocate for R-1 & 2.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA TEJAS KARIA, J. (ORAL)
JUDGMENT
1. Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2. The Application stands disposed of. CM APPL.46745/2026 (Condonation of delay)
3. This Application has been filed on behalf of the Appellant under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking condonation of delay of 131 days in filing the present Appeal.
4. For the reasons stated in the Application, the same is allowed. The delay of 131 days in filing the present Appeal is hereby condoned.
5. The Application stands disposed of.
6. This intra-court Appeal assails the Order dated 04.02.2026 (“Impugned Order”) passed in W.P.(C) 1356/2026 (“Writ Petition”), whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the Appellant challenging the judgment dated 08.10.2025 (“Tribunal Judgment”) passed by the Delhi School Tribunal (“Tribunal”) in the appeal preferred by the Appellant under Section 15(3)(e)(iii) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 (“DSE Act”) read with the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 (“DSE Rules”), against the termination order dated 27.04.2023 (“Termination Order”) issued by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 terminating the Appellant’s engagement as Music Teacher.
7. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that, pursuant to a formal selection process, the Appellant was appointed as Music Teacher by Respondent No. 1 with effect from 01.04.2016. It was submitted that, at the time of appointment, Respondent No. 1 assured the Appellant that she would be placed on probation for a period of one year and, upon successful completion thereof, would be extended the regular Trained Graduate Teacher (“TGT”) pay scale together with all attendant service benefits available to regular teachers. Learned Counsel further submitted that the Respondents failed to issue any written appointment letter or formal contract of service, notwithstanding the mandatory requirement under Section 15 of the DSE Act, and that during the Appellant’s service of over seven years, no confirmation order, pay slip, or formal contract of service was ever issued to her.
8. It was further submitted on behalf of the Appellant that, on 24.07.2019, Respondent No. 2 issued a letter seeking to unilaterally recharacterise the Appellant’s service as a fresh contractual engagement commencing from 01.07.2019 on a consolidated salary of ₹25,000/- per month. It was also submitted that, from August 2021 onwards, the Respondents acted arbitrarily by stopping TDS deductions, restricting salary payment to only eleven months in a year, denying annual increments, and withholding statutory leave benefits. The Appellant was also allegedly compelled to discharge additional duties without remuneration.
9. On 24.04.2023, the Appellant addressed an email to Respondent No. 2 alleging systematic exploitation over a period of seven years and seeking grant of the TGT pay scale and regular service benefits on humanitarian as well as statutory grounds. On 27.04.2023, the Appellant was allegedly prevented from signing the attendance register, subjected to verbal humiliation by Respondent No. 2, and compelled to sign an allegedly exploitative eleven-month contract. Upon the Appellant leaving the premises to lodge an online police complaint regarding the alleged harassment, Respondent No. 1 issued the Termination Order citing “discontinuation of music training”, without issuance of any show cause notice or conduct of any inquiry, which, according to the Appellant, was in violation of the principles of natural justice and the procedural safeguards under the DSE Act and DSE Rules.
10. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the ground of “discontinuation of music training” relied upon by Respondent No. 1 for issuing the Termination Order is patently false, mala fide, contrary to law, and in direct violation of the mandatory Central Board of Secondary Education (“CBSE”) circular dated 10.04.2019, which makes Integrated Art Education, including music, dance, and theatre, compulsory in all CBSEaffiliated schools. The Appellant thereafter made repeated efforts for redressal, including a representation dated 23.05.2023 to Respondent No. 2 seeking sympathetic consideration of her case and requesting withdrawal of the Termination Order with permission to rejoin service forthwith. As no response was received, the Appellant issued a legal notice dated 06.06.2023 to Respondent No. 2, which also remained unanswered.
11. Aggrieved thereby, the Appellant preferred Appeal No. 27/2023 before the Tribunal, seeking quashing of the Termination Order and a direction to Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to execute a written contract of service, grant the Appellant the TGT pay scale upon completion of the probation period, and extend all consequential benefits, including salaries, back wages, allowances, and emoluments. The Tribunal, vide the Tribunal Judgment, dismissed Appeal No. 27/2023, granting only the limited relief of payment of three months’ salary as damages, along with issuance of an experience certificate.
12. Thereafter, the Appellant challenged the Tribunal Judgment before this Court by way of the Writ Petition. The learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition, inter alia, observing that the Appellant had failed to establish any legal right to be treated as a regular employee entitled to the TGT pay scale, in the absence of any appointment letter, written contract, terms of employment, confirmation order, or document evidencing appointment against a sanctioned vacancy through the prescribed recruitment process.
13. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the absence of a formal written contract could not be used as a shield by the Respondents to deny statutory protections, and that the Appellant could not be penalised for Respondent No. 1’s failure to comply with mandatory legal requirements. It was further submitted that the continuous and uninterrupted service rendered by the Appellant created a legitimate expectation of regularisation and entitlement to the TGT pay scale and benefits with effect from 01.04.2017.
14. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that both the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge erred in not appreciating the punitive character of the Termination Order and adopted a hyper-technical and restrictive approach by placing undue emphasis on the absence of advertisement and formal selection process, while overlooking the de facto regular nature of the Appellant’s engagement, evidenced by consistent salary payments, performance records, and long continued service. It was submitted that such an approach is contrary to the protective intent of the DSE Act and the settled principle that long and uninterrupted service in a recognised school cannot be disregarded on mere technicalities.
15. Having considered the submissions advanced by learned Counsel for the Appellant and having perused the material placed on record, we are of the considered view that the continuous nature of the Appellant’s engagement as a Music Teacher with Respondent No. 1, the alleged assurance extended at the time of appointment regarding grant of the TGT pay scale upon completion of probation, the asserted de facto regular character of her service, and the absence of a written contract of service, do not, by themselves, establish an enforceable right to the reliefs claimed under the DSE Act and the DSE Rules.
16. The learned Single Judge examined the findings returned by the Tribunal in the backdrop of the material placed on record and observed that the Appellant had failed to establish a legal right to be treated as a regular employee entitled to the TGT pay scale and consequential service benefits, as there was no appointment letter, written contract of service, terms of employment, confirmation order, or document showing appointment against a sanctioned vacancy through the prescribed recruitment process.
17. Learned Counsel for the Appellant placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the Appellant had continued in service for more than seven years and submitted that such uninterrupted service gave rise to a legitimate expectation of regularisation and entitlement to the TGT pay scale with effect from 01.04.2017.
18. However, the length of service, by itself, cannot substitute the requirement of establishing that the initial appointment was made in accordance with the statutory framework. The Appellant has not placed any material on record to show that her engagement was against a sanctioned post or that it was made through the prescribed recruitment process. In the absence of such material, mere continuance of engagement cannot confer an enforceable right to claim regular status or consequential service benefits.
19. The learned Single Judge rightly observed that the Tribunal evaluated the case on the footing that the Appellant’s engagement was contractual and had not been shown to be a regular statutory appointment made through the prescribed recruitment route. It was in these circumstances that the Tribunal declined the relief of reinstatement to the Appellant.
20. The Tribunal, vide the Tribunal Judgment, observed that the Appellant had admitted that no advertisement for recruitment to the post of Music Teacher was issued by Respondent No. 1 specifying the applicable age limit; that the Appellant was forty-nine years of age at the time of her appointment; and that she was not receiving benefits available to regular employees, including leave encashment, provident fund, and gratuity. The Tribunal also noted that show cause notices and memos had been issued to the Appellant, recording that she was overage and did not fulfil the eligibility criteria for appointment to the post of Music Teacher under the DSE Act, and that Respondent No. 1, being a minority institution, had appointed her purely on contractual basis for a period of eleven months on a fixed salary on humanitarian grounds.
21. The submission made on behalf of the Appellant that the absence of a written contract of service cannot be held against the Appellant, particularly when Section 15 of the DSE Act contemplates execution of such a contract, does not persuade us to take a different view. Even assuming that the Appellant was not responsible for the absence of a written contract of service, that circumstance, by itself, could not dispense with the requirement of establishing that the initial engagement was made against a regular post in accordance with the statutory recruitment framework.
22. We agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that, in service matters, the right claimed must be traceable to statute, rules, or a valid appointment under the governing framework, and that where the appointment itself is not shown to have been made in accordance with the recruitment scheme, the claim to regular scale and consequential benefits does not mature into an enforceable right.
23. In view of the above, we concur with the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge and find no perversity or misapplication of law warranting interference in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
24. For the aforesaid reasons, the present Appeal is dismissed. Pending Applications, if any, stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.
TEJAS KARIA, J DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ JULY 23, 2026