X v. State & Ors.

16. He submitted that Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 have aided and encouraged the acts of the accused Mahesh and therefore the learned ASJ has erroneously discharged them.

17. He submitted that the learned ASJ erred in observing that the allegations levelled by the petitioner against Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 are vague, as the learned ASJ has not appreciated the contents of the complaint dated 11.05.2018, the statement of the petitioner under Section 164 of the CrPC, and the MLC of the petitioner wherein she has levelled specific allegations against them.

18. He argued that the Investigating Officer is hand in glove with the accused persons and had instructed the petitioner to not disclose the incidents from the year 2015 in regard to Respondent No. 5, in her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC.

19. It is submitted that the Investigating Officer has not filed the relevant documents in the chargesheet, such as the complaint filed by the petitioner with Delhi Commission for Women and that even the contents of the FIR were manipulated by the Investigating Officer and the same is not the version of the petitioner. The learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner has been kept in dark about the entire proceedings.

20. He relies on the judgements passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa: (1996) 4 SCC 659 and Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi): (2009) 16 SCC 605, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that if on the basis of material on record, it is seen that an offence is a probable consequence, the case of framing of charge exists, however, for conviction, the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence.

21. Per Contra, the learned counsel for Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 submitted that the present petition filed by the petitioner is vexatious and baseless, and that the impugned order has been passed after appreciation of the evidence and the law.

22. He submitted that Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 have been falsely implicated in the present case as they are the relatives, friend and colleague of the accused Mahesh. He submitted that they have nothing to do with the alleged offence, as is evident from a bare perusal of the FIR filed by the petitioner.

23. It is submitted that the petitioner has made several improvements in her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC, as well as in her supplementary statements, and the same is not in consonance with the contents of the FIR.

24. The learned counsel further argued that Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 have been discharged in the matter and have no reason to invite unnecessary trouble for themselves by threatening and intimidating the petitioner. He submitted that the petitioner has not filed a single piece of evidence in support of her allegations, and has merely implicated Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 in a vengeful manner. Analysis

25. At the outset, it is relevant to note that the scope of interference by High Courts while exercising revisional jurisdiction in a challenge to order framing charge/discharge is well settled. The power ought to be exercised sparingly, in the interest of justice, so as to not impede the trial unnecessarily.

26. Since the petitioner has assailed the impugned order whereby the respondents were discharged for the offences under Sections 506/120B of the IPC, it will be apposite to succinctly discuss the statutory law with respect to framing of charge and discharge as provided under Section 227 and 228 of the CrPC. The same is set out below:

(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of subsection (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.”

27. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal: (1979) 3 SCC 4, dealt with the scope of enquiry a judge is required to make with regard to the question of framing of charges. Inter alia, the following principles were laid down by the Court:

28. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Sajjan Kumar v. CBI: (2010) 9 SCC 368, has culled out the following principles in respect of the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the CrPC while observing that a prima facie case would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The relevant paragraphs read as under: “21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:

(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.

(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.

(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.

(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.

(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.” (emphasis supplied)

29. In State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh KishorsinhRao: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, the Hon’ble Apex Court has discussed the parameters that would be appropriate to keep in mind at the stage of framing of charge/discharge, as under: “7. It is trite law that application of judicial mind being necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for proceeding with trial and it would not be necessary to dwell into the pros and cons of the matter by examining the defence of the accused when an application for discharge is filed. At that stage, the trial judge has to merely examine the evidence placed by the prosecution in order to determine whether or not the grounds are sufficient to proceed against the accused on basis of charge sheet material. The nature of the evidence recorded or collected by the investigating agency or the documents produced in which prima facie it reveals that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused, so as to frame a charge would suffice and such material would be taken into account for the purposes of framing the charge. If there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused necessarily, the accused would be discharged, but if the court is of the opinion, after such consideration of the material there are grounds for presuming that accused has committed the offence which is triable, then necessarily charge has to be framed. xxxx xxxx xxxx

12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of existence of a prima-facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of prima-facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial.”

30. The Court at the stage of framing of charge is to evaluate the material only for the purpose of finding out if the facts constitute the alleged offence, given the ingredients of the offence. Thus, while framing of charges, the Court ought to look at the limited aspect of whether, given the material placed before it, there is grave suspicion against the accused which is not properly explained. Though, for the purpose of conviction, the same must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

31. It is the contention of the petitioner that the discharge of Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 was erroneous and unsupported by evidence. However, upon a meticulous review of the facts, evidence, and arguments presented, the impugned order aligns with established legal principles and requires affirmation. The petitioner alleged that Mahesh, the primary accused, allegedly sexually exploited the petitioner over 13–14 years under the false promise of marriage.In 2015, Mahesh allegedly took the petitioner to the house of Respondent No. 5, who locked the house from outside, enabling Mahesh to sexually assault the petitioner.Respondent Nos. 2 and 4 were accused of refusing Mahesh’s marriage proposal to the petitioner and threatening her with dire consequences.Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 allegedly intimidated the petitioner and her father to withdraw complaints.

32. The petitioner alleged that the respondents acted in concert with Mahesh, aiding and abetting his acts, and creating a hostile and threatening environment.

33. Respondent No.5 (Alleged Facilitator in the 2015 incident) - The petitioner accused Respondent No. 5 of facilitating her sexual assault in 2015 by locking her in his house with Mahesh. However, this claim is merely based on the petitioner’s statement and lacks corroborative evidence. There are no witnesses or evidence to corroborate the petitioner’s assertion that Respondent No. 5 left the house intentionally or was aware of Mahesh’s intentions. Respondent No.5 alleged statement, ‘kaam hogaya’, is cited for his awareness of the alleged incident. However, this statement, at best, indicates afterthe-fact knowledge rather than active involvement.

34. The learned ASJ rightly noted that the petitioner’s statements regarding the 2015 incident are inconsistent. She first mentioned it in her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC, years after the alleged event, raising questions about its credibility. It was noted that the petitioner has also not made complaint qua the said incident to any other person.

35. The petitioner accused Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 of criminal intimidation, alleging in her supplementary statement dated 03.05.2019 that they threatened her father with dire consequences if any legal action was taken against Mahesh. However, these allegations are unsubstantiated.The petitioner failed to mention these allegations in her initial complaint and statement recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. The learned ASJ rightly observed that no explanation was provided for this delay or omission, which casts doubt on the authenticity of these claims.

36. Further, the Investigating Officer did not collect any documentary or medical evidence to corroborate the petitioner’s claim that her father was hospitalized due to the alleged threats. The petitioner’s allegation against Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 appear to be rooted in animosity toward Mahesh’s family rather than any concrete actions taken by these respondents. Disapproval of the petitioner’s relationship with Mahesh, even if true, does not constitute criminal intimidation under Section 506 of the IPC.

37. The petitioner alleged that Respondent No. 4 (Mahesh’s mother) threatened her when she confronted her about Mahesh’s actions. However, this allegation remains vague and unsubstantiated. Even if Respondent No. 4 opposed the petitioner’s relationship with Mahesh, such disapproval does not amount to criminal intent or actionable intimidation.

38. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it clear that before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that an accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant. Mere threats given by the accused not with an intention to cause alarm to the complainant would not constitute an offence of criminal intimidation.

39. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka: (2015) 7 SCC 423, quashed the FIR registered against the appellant therein under Sections 353/506 of the IPC and held as under: “11. Section 506 IPC prescribes punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation. “Criminal intimidation” as defined in Section 503 IPC is as under: “503.Criminal intimidation.—Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section.” A reading of the definition of “criminal intimidation” would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.

12. In the instant case, the allegation is that the appellants have abused the complainant and obstructed the second respondent from discharging his public duties and spoiled the integrity of the second respondent. It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of “criminal intimidation”. The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the mind of the second respondent causing obstruction in discharge of his duty. As far as the comments posted on Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping the public and the act of the appellants posting a comment on Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC.”

40. The learned ASJ’s observations regarding the petitioner’s allegations against Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 are well-founded. The evidence on record does not substantiate the claims of facilitation, conspiracy, or criminal intimidation. The petitioner’s delayed and inconsistent statements, coupled with the absence of corroborative evidence, justify the discharge of Respondent Nos. 2 to 5. The trial court’s decision to proceed solely against Mahesh, where sufficient evidence exists, ensures that justice is pursued without implicating individuals against whom a prima facie case cannot be made.

41. The petitioner claimed to have lodged several complaints against Respondents No. 2–5 with various authorities, including the DCW and police. However, despite alleging serious offences, no formal complaint against Respondents No. 2–5 was filed in court prior to the present revision petition. This omission raises doubts about the credibility of the petitioner’s allegations. The DCW complaints referenced general harassment but did not provide sufficient specificity or evidence implicating Respondents No. 2–5 in the alleged offenses.

42. The petitioner accused the IO of bias and misconduct, alleging that the officer misrepresented facts and manipulated her statements. However, an objective review of the interaction records and investigation placed before this court reveals the advisory role of the IO. The transcript of the recording prima facie show that the IO provided procedural guidance to the petitioner rather than misleading or coercing her. This undermines the claim of misconduct by the IO. The FIR was ultimately registered after the petitioner’s interaction with the DCW and subsequent complaints.

43. Notably, the petitioner’s story is plagued with infirmities that it does not raise grave suspicion against Respondent Nos. 2 – 5 and the material on record does not point towards commission of the alleged offence.

44. As discussed above, the learned Trial Court has evidently applied its judicial mind and considered the totality of the facts before discharging Respondent Nos.[2] – 5 of the alleged offences in light of the absence of grave suspicion against them.

45. Considering the aforementioned facts, no ground is made out to warrant any interference in the impugned order.

46. The present petition, along with the pending applications, are dismissed in the aforesaid terms. AMIT MAHAJAN, J JANUARY 27, 2025