Shri Durga Engineering Works v. Somnath Pandey

Delhi High Court · 29 Jul 2026 · 2026:DHC:6123
Amit Mahajan
W.P.(C) 7282/2014
2026:DHC:6123
labor appeal_allowed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court upheld the Labour Court's finding of illegal termination due to non-compliance with mandatory procedures and medical leave but modified relief by awarding lump-sum compensation instead of reinstatement.

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W.P.(C) 7282/2014
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 29th July, 2026
W.P.(C) 7282/2014 & CM APPL. 17058/2014
SHRI DURGA ENGINEERING WORKS THR ITS PROPRIETOR .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Nishtha Chawla, Advocate.
VERSUS
SOMNATH PANDEY .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Rajat Sharma, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN O R D E R 29.07.2026
AMIT MAHAJAN, J. (Oral)
JUDGMENT

1. The present petition is filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India assailing award dated 03.06.2014 (hereinafter ‘impugned award’) passed by the learned Labour Court awarding the respondent reinstatement with full back wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits.

2. Briefly stated, the respondent was working with the petitioner as a ‘helper’/ ‘machine man’. On 25.10.2009, while operating a kharad machine, the workman/respondent allegedly suffered serious injuries when a piece of iron broke and fell on him during the course of his employment. The workman was initially taken to ESI Hospital, thereafter shifted to DDU Hospital and finally to Safdarjung Hospital. After being discharged from the hospital, the workman remained on medical leave as advised by the doctors. Upon being declared fit, he reported for duty on 07.04.2010 but was allegedly refused employment and informed that his services had already come to an end with effect from 26.10.2009. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent wilfully abandoned his job and did not join back despite the petitioner sending various letters from November to December 2009 asking the respondent to join duty, otherwise his services would be deemed to have been abandoned.

3. The workman issued a demand notice to the petitioner seeking reinstatement with full back wages. Although the management replied to the notice, it did not reinstate him. Thereafter, the respondent raised an industrial dispute against the petitioner, which was referred to the learned Labour Court.

4. The learned Labour Court framed issues regarding (i) whether the services of the workman had been illegally and/or unjustifiably terminated, (ii) whether the workman had voluntarily absented himself from duty, and (iii) the relief to which he was entitled.

5. The learned Labour Court noted that the petitioner failed to establish voluntary abandonment, as the workman had remained on medical leave following the admitted workplace accident and the alleged letters calling upon him to resume duty were not proved to have been served. It was also found that no charge-sheet, domestic enquiry, notice of termination, notice pay, or retrenchment compensation under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act had been provided before terminating the workman's services.

6. Consequently, the Labour Court held that the termination was illegal and directed reinstatement of the workman with continuity of service, full back wages, and all consequential benefits.

7. Aggrieved thereby, the present petition has been filed.

8. This Court vide order dated 10.11.2014 stayed the operation of the impugned award qua the back wages awarded to the respondent. Further, this Court vide order dated 10.08.2016 noted that the respondent was offered reinstatement by the petitioner, however he denied the same as he was already employed elsewhere. Thus, the issue to be considered in the present petition is only in regard to the legality of termination and compensation, if any, since the respondent is not claiming reinstatement.

9. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Labour Court gravely erred in holding that the Respondent had not abandoned his employment.

10. She submits that the respondent initially joined the services of the petitioner as a helper on 28.07.2006. However, he voluntarily abandoned his employment on 28.02.2007. Thereafter, upon the respondent requesting the management for re-employment, he was engaged afresh with effect from 01.08.2009. She submits that the respondent was habitually irregular in attending duties and had a consistent practice of remaining absent from work for months together on the pretext of visiting his native village. She submits that the learned Labour Court failed to appreciate this consistent pattern of conduct while determining the issue of abandonment.

11. She submits that the learned Labour Court failed to appreciate that the respondent failed to join back duty even after he was declared medically fit. She submits that several letters were issued to the Respondent, duly dispatched through post, requiring him to report for duty and specifically informing him that failure to do so would result in his services being treated as having come to an end. She submits that despite receipt of such communications, the respondent neither resumed duties nor furnished any satisfactory explanation, thereby clearly demonstrating his intention to abandon employment.

12. She submits that the direction of the learned Labour Court reinstating the respondent with full back wages is wholly unjustified in the facts of the present case.

13. She submits that after the impugned award was passed on 03.06.2014, the petitioner discovered that the respondent had been working as a Security Guard with M/s Tiger 4 Security & Detective India Pvt. Ltd. for nearly three years. She submits that during the proceedings before this Court, the respondent, through his counsel, admitted his employment with the said establishment, and such admission was duly recorded in the order dated 10.08.2016.

14. The learned counsel for the respondent vehemently opposes the present petition and submits that the learned Labour Court has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and returned well-reasoned findings warranting no interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

15. He submits that the respondent never abandoned his service. He submits that on 25.10.2009, while performing his duties, the respondent sustained injuries in an accident at the workplace, a fact admittedly known to the management. He submits that the respondent remained under medical treatment and bed rest as advised by the doctors and, upon being declared fit, reported for duty on 07.04.2010. However, the management refused to permit him to resume duties and orally terminated his services.

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16. He submits that the management's plea of abandonment is unsupported by evidence. He submits that although reliance was placed on certain letters allegedly calling upon the respondent to rejoin duty, the management failed to establish their service. He submits that the letters were not sent by registered post, no proof of delivery was produced, and the respondent was never confronted with the said letters during his cross-examination.

17. He submits that the medical documents placed on record establish that the respondent remained under treatment during the relevant period. He submits that the management did not dispute the accident or cross-examine the Respondent regarding his medical condition or the period of prescribed rest.

18. He further submits that the management admittedly did not issue any charge-sheet, conduct any domestic enquiry, or comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act before terminating the respondent's services. He submits that the learned Labour Court, therefore, rightly held the termination to be illegal.

19. I have heard the counsel and perused the record.

20. At the outset, it is necessary to note that the scope of interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India with an Award passed by the Labour Court is limited. This Court does not sit as a Court of appeal over findings of fact rendered by the Labour Court. Interference is warranted only where the findings are perverse, based on no evidence, suffer from patent illegality, or disclose a jurisdictional error. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment in International Airport Authority of India v. International Air Cargo Workers Union: (2009) 13 SCC 374 where the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:

47. It is true that in exercising the writ jurisdiction, the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings and award of the Industrial Tribunal and therefore, cannot reappreciate evidence. The findings of fact recorded by a fact-finding authority should ordinarily be considered as final. The findings of the Tribunal should not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction merely on the ground that the material on which the Tribunal had acted was insufficient or not credible.

48. It is also true that as long as the findings of fact are based on some materials which are relevant, findings may not be interfered with merely because another view is also possible. But where the Tribunal records findings on no evidence or irrelevant evidence, it is certainly open to the High Court to interfere with the award of the Industrial Tribunal.

21. Adverting to the merits of the present case, it is the case of the petitioner that the respondent had voluntarily abandoned his employment and that the learned Labour Court failed to appreciate that his prolonged and frequent absenteeism constituted abandonment of service. This contention does not merit acceptance.

22. The learned Labour Court examined the management's plea that the respondent had abandoned his services on 28.02.2007 and was subsequently re-employed on 01.08.2009. Upon appreciation of the evidence, it was rightly noted that the management had failed to produce any resignation letter, full and final settlement, or any contemporaneous record evidencing cessation of service. It was further noted that the management had admittedly issued only one appointment letter and one ESI Card to the respondent, and there was no material to show that his name had ever been struck off the rolls or that his ESI registration had been cancelled. The learned Labour Court, therefore, rightly concluded that the plea of abandonment in 2007 was unsupported by the record and that the Respondent's service was continuous from 25.10.2006 till 07.04.2010.

23. It is further the petitioner's case that several letters were dispatched to the respondent requiring him to resume duties, failing which his services would be deemed to have come to an end, and that the learned Labour Court erred in ignoring the same. This submission is equally unpersuasive. The learned Labour Court specifically examined the said letters and rightly found that they had merely been sent through UPC without any explanation as to why they were not dispatched by registered post. The Labour Court also noted that the respondent was never confronted with these letters during his crossexamination. In these circumstances, the Labour Court rightly declined to place reliance upon the said documents for drawing an inference of abandonment.

24. The petitioner further contends that the respondent failed to report for duty even after the expiry of the prescribed period of medical rest and that the accident itself had occurred due to the respondent's own negligence. This contention was also duly considered by the learned Labour Court. It was rightly noted that the occurrence of the accident dated 25.10.2009 was admitted by both parties. The respondent had placed on record medical documents evidencing his treatment and the period of bed rest advised by the doctors. Significantly, the petitioner neither effectively challenged the medical documents nor crossexamined the respondent on the duration of his treatment. The learned Labour Court also noticed that the ESI contribution records produced by the management itself reflected the respondent to be on leave during the relevant period. In view thereof, the finding that the Respondent could not be treated as having remained unauthorisedly absent or having abandoned his service cannot be faulted.

25. Having rightly held that the respondent had neither abandoned his service nor remained unauthorisedly absent, the learned Labour Court rightly concluded that the termination was illegal. The management admittedly neither issued a charge-sheet nor conducted a domestic enquiry, and further failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act by not issuing any notice of termination, notice pay or retrenchment compensation. In these circumstances, the finding that the Respondent's termination was illegal warrants no interference.

26. Having upheld the finding of illegal termination, the next issue that arises for consideration is the nature and extent of relief to be granted to the respondent. It is a matter of record that the petitioner had offered reinstatement to the respondent. However, the respondent is stated to be gainfully employed elsewhere. Thus, the same cannot be granted to the respondent.

27. At the same time, no material has been placed on record by the respondent to establish the date from which such employment was secured. In the absence of any evidence demonstrating that the respondent was not gainfully employed throughout the period from the date of termination, grant of back wages for the entire period would not be justified.

28. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Allahabad Bank v. Krishan Pal Singh: (2021) 19 SCC 227, has held that reinstatement with full back wages is not automatic in every case where termination or dismissal is found to be not in accordance with the procedure prescribed under law and that the relief can be moulded depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case.

29. In the opinion of this Court, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, ends of justice will be met if the respondent is awarded a lump-sum compensation of ₹2,00,000/-. The said amount shall be paid by the Petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of this order.

30. The present petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

31. Pending applications also stand disposed of. AMIT MAHAJAN, J JULY 29, 2026 DU