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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 30.07.2026 # CNR No. DLHC010264172026
PUNEET GUPTA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vikas Kumar and Ms. Sejal Jain, Advocates.
Through: Mr. Tarang Srivastava, APP with Mr. Abhay Sahni, Advocate.
ACP Ashok Kumar, SI Kevendra Singh.
Mr. Bipin Kumar Jha, Advocate for R2.
JUDGMENT
The applicant seeks to amend the cause title of the captioned bail application to include Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023.
For the reasons stated therein, the application is allowed.
The application stands disposed of.
1. By way of the present application under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [“BNSS”] (corresponding to Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [“CrPC”]) read with Section 528 of the BNSS [corresponding to Section 482 of the CrPC], the applicant seeks anticipatory bail in connection with FIR No. 0007/2026, dated 06.01.2026, registered at Police Station Laxmi Nagar, District East, Delhi, under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 [“the SC/ST Act”], and Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
2. I have heard Mr. Vikas Kumar, learned counsel for the applicant, Mr. Tarang Srivastava, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, and Mr. Bipin Kumar Jha, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 – complainant.
A. PROSECUTION CASE
3. The State has placed on record a Status Report dated 17.07.2026. The prosecution case, as emerging from the material on record, is as follows: a. The FIR was registered on the complaint of one Ram Avtar. The complainant stated that he belongs to the Scheduled Caste community and that, in October 2023, he entered into a partnership with the applicant in respect of a gym – ‘Vision Fitness Club’. b. On 23.03.2024, the applicant and one Vipin Tomar, in the presence of several persons, used caste-based derogatory words against him and assaulted him. c. The partnership was mutually dissolved in the presence of police officials of Police Station Laxmi Nagar, and the complainant left the business. d. However, even thereafter, the applicant and his wife continued to insult the complainant by using casteist slurs, whenever they saw him. e. On 15.07.2024, the applicant called one Atif Javed, who was present at his office, situated at 332A, West Guru Angad Nagar, Laxmi Nagar, Delhi, alongwith his friends, Atif and Abhishek. During the said conversation, the applicant abused the complainant by using caste-based slurs and further threatened to kill him. f. In December 2024, an unknown person, acting at the instance of the applicant, called the complainant and threatened him to leave Laxmi Nagar. g. On 30.06.2025, the applicant’s wife lodged a false complaint of molestation/sexual harassment against the complainant. Pursuant to an order dated 12.12.2025 of the Magistrate’s Court under Section 175(3) BNSS, FIR No. 343/2025 dated 17.12.2025, has been registered against respondent No. 2, under Sections 75/79/351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 [“BNS”]. h. In the present FIR, the statement of the complainant was recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS, in which he corroborated the aforesaid allegations. The statements of the eye-witnesses, Abhishek Sharma and Atif, were also recorded under Section 180 of the BNSS, wherein they supported the prosecution case. i. During the course of investigation, three notices under Section 35(3) of the BNSS were issued to the applicant on 30.03.2026, 31.03.2026, and 13.04.2026. However, he failed to join the investigation. j. The applicant then filed an application seeking anticipatory bail before the Sessions Court. He was initially granted interim protection, by order dated 23.04.2026, pursuant to which he joined the investigation on 30.04.2026. However, his application was subsequently dismissed vide order dated 30.05.2026. k. On 06.07.2026, the Sessions Court issued bailable warrants against the applicant, returnable on 19.08.2026. His house was found to be locked, and a copy of the bailable warrants was pasted on his house on 15.07.2026. l. As the instance of the applicant, FIR No. 344/2025 dated 17.12.2025, has been registered against respondent No. 2, under Sections 118(1)/117(2)/3(5) of the BNS. He alleges therein that he is owner of ‘Vision Fitness Club’ and that, on 16.12.2025, while he was present at his gym, 4-5 persons entered the premises with their faces covered, armed with stick, iron rod, knife, and assaulted him on his head and back. It is further alleged that one person stabbed him on his back. The complainant was arrested in connection with the said case, and was subsequently released on bail.
B. SUBMISSION OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES
4. In support of the present application, Mr. Kumar submits that the present FIR has been registered belatedly, in respect of alleged incidents stated to have occurred on 23.03.2024, 15.07.2024, and December 2024, and constitutes a retaliatory measure to a complaint filed by the applicant’s wife in relation to an incident of 28.06.2025, which was subsequently registered as an FIR [FIR No. 343/2025 dated 17.12.2025, Police Station Laxmi Nagar]. He submits that the complainant has himself referred to the said incident of 28.06.2025 in the present FIR, as one of the reasons for seeking registration of the same. It is submitted that there is no material in support of the present FIR, which has been registered in abuse of process of Court.
5. Mr. Srivastava and Mr. Jha, on the other hand, object to the maintainability of the present application, relying upon Section 18 of the SC/ST Act, which provides that Section 438 of the CrPC [corresponding to Section 482 of the BNSS] is inapplicable to any case under the said Act. They submit that the Supreme Court, in Prithvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India and Others[1], has held that anticipatory bail can be granted, only when no prima facie case is made out. Learned counsel submit that a prima facie case is, in fact, made out in the present case, and that two eyewitnesses have also corroborated the allegations made by the complainant.
6. Mr. Jha also submits that the complainant has been diligently pursuing his complaints against the applicant. He had earlier filed a complaint before the Station House Officer [“SHO”], Police Station Laxmi Nagar, on 30.06.2025, as also before the National Commission for Scheduled Castes[2], raising allegations similar to those contained in the FIR. In support of the submission with regard to the maintainability of the present application, he relies upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala and Another[3].
C. ANALYSIS
7. Section 18 of the SC/ST Act reads as follows:
(2020) 4 SCC 727 [hereinafter, “Prithvi Raj Chauhan”]. A copy of the said complaints have been handed over in Court, and are taken on record. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249 [hereinafter, “Shajan Skaria”].
8. Section 18-A was later inserted by the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2018[4]. Section 18-A(2) reads as follows: “18-A. No enquiry or approval required.— xxx xxx xxx (2) The provisions of Section 438 of the Code shall not apply to a case under this Act, notwithstanding any judgment or order or direction of any Court.”
9. These provisions came up for consideration before a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Prithvi Raj Chauhan. The Court held that the provisions of Sections 18 and 18-A(2) would apply, unless the complaint fails to make out a prima facie case for applicability of the SC/ST Act[5]. In a concurring judgment, S. Ravindra Bhat, J., observed as follows:
10. Further, in Shajan Skaria, the test to be applied was elaborated, as follows:
11. The aforesaid judgments, thus, hold that the grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the CrPC [corresponding to Section 482 of the BNSS] is barred, unless the ingredients of the offence are not prima facie disclosed in the complaint or in the FIR. However, the High Court retains the jurisdiction to consider an argument of malicious prosecution on account of political or private vendetta, in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the CrPC [corresponding to Section 528 of the BNSS], or Article 226 of the Constitution.
12. Applying these judgments to the facts of the present case, the first question to be answered is whether the FIR, prima facie, discloses the ingredients of the offences alleged.
13. In the present case, the applicant is accused of offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and (s) of the Act, which read as follows:
Emphasis supplied.
14. In this regard, the relevant contents of the FIR, which was recorded in Hindi, are extracted below:
15. Roughly translated, the aforesaid content may be summarised thus: a. In October 2023, the complainant started a gym in partnership with Punit Gupta under the name "VISION FITNESS CLUB". b. On 23.03.2024, at Mukut Complex Building No. 9/10, Laxmi Nagar, Delhi, Punit Gupta violated the agreed terms of their partnership in relation to the gym. During a conversation held in the presence of Avi, Atif, Abhishek, and other people who had come to exercise at the gym, Punit Gupta and his associate Vipin Tomar physically assaulted the complainant and addressed him by using casteist slurs such as "Chamar". c. Thereafter, their partnership was dissolved by mutual agreement at Police Station Laxmi Nagar. d. However, in the meantime, whenever Punit Gupta and his wife, Neha Gupta encountered the complainant on the road, they would insult him by using casteist slurs such as "Chamar". They would also spit on the ground in front of the complainant while passing by, and on some occasions, droplets of their spit fell on him. e. Even after about two years, on 25.04.2025, Punit Gupta called a person named Piyush Sharma and alleged that, at the complainant’s instance, Piyush Sharma was speaking negatively about the gym to its members. When Piyush Sharma asked, "Which Ram?", Punit Gupta replied, "Ram Chamar Saala who was gym trainer". f. Even before, on 15.07.2024, Punit Gupta called Atif Javed, when he was present at the complainant’s office in Laxmi Nagar, Delhi, with Avi and Abhishek. During that call, Punit Gupta abused the complainant by using casteist slurs such as "Chamar", and also threatened to kill the complainant, which was heard by the complainant and others present. g. Apart from this, in the month of December 2024, the complainant received a phone call from an unknown goon who threatened him to leave Laxmi Nagar, at the instance of Punit Gupta. h. Punit Gupta has also got a person named Swadesh to threaten the complainant, regarding which he had previously submitted a complaint at the police station. i. On 28.06.2025, Neha Gupta, the wife of Punit Gupta, lodged a false complaint of molestation against the complainant with the intention of mentally and physically harassing him. Due to these continuous incidents, the complainant is stated to have been suffering from severe mental stress and illness.
16. Having regard to the aforesaid contents of the FIR, and the scope of enquiry mandated by the Supreme Court, I am unable to hold that the FIR does not, prima facie, disclose the ingredients of the alleged offences. The allegations are specific and discussed with precision. Sections 18 and 18- A(2) of the SC/ST Act, therefore, bar the grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the CrPC [corresponding to Section 482 of the BNSS].
17. Mr. Kumar, however, submitted that anticipatory bail can be granted in exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC [corresponding to Section 528 of the BNSS], or Article 226 of the Constitution. Drawing upon the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 49 of Shajan Skaria, he contended that the present case has been instituted by the complainant as a “private vendetta”. He submitted that the incidents which form the subject matter of the present FIR occurred in July 2024 and December 2024, but the complainant made his first complaint in this regard only on 30.06.2025. In the complaint, he referred to the aforesaid incidents, and also to the complaint made by the applicant and his wife against him on the same day, while characterising the complaint of the applicant and his wife as false and fabricated, with the intention to harass him mentally and physically. He requested an independent investigation into the complaints of the applicant’s wife, and also sought action under the SC/ST Act.
18. Even accepting Mr. Kumar’s submission that this Court retains the discretion to grant anticipatory bail in the circumstances of a “private vendetta”, by virtue of paragraph 49 of Shajan Skaria, I do not find this to be a fit case for exercise of that discretion. It is correct that the subject FIR was registered only on 06.01.2026, after the applicant’s wife and the applicant had caused two FIRs to be registered against the complainant – both on 17.12.2025. However, the undisputed documents placed on record by Mr. Jha show that the first complaint was made by the complainant to the SHO and the Deputy Commissioner of Police on 30.06.2025. He thereafter also made a complaint to the National Commission for Scheduled Castes. While the lodging of formal complaints was after the first complaint made by the applicant’s wife, Mr. Kumar’s contention that this, by itself, demonstrates a “private vendetta”, cannot be accepted. There was a preexisting business relationship between the applicant and the complainant. His allegations are specific and supported by his statement under Section 183 of the BNSS, as well as statements of two eye-witnesses under Section 180 of the BNSS. In such circumstances, the timing of the complaint alone is insufficient to establish an argument of “private vendetta”, particularly in the face of the express statutory provisions referred to above.
19. It is expressly clarified that, in view of the aforesaid findings in the facts of the present case, I do not render any conclusive opinion on whether the High Court is empowered to grant anticipatory bail in respect of offences under the SC/ST Act, in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the BNSS [corresponding to Section 438 of the CrPC], or Article 226 of the Constitution, as argued by Mr. Kumar.
20. Having regard to the statutory mandate, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, I do not consider this to be an exceptional case, in which the power to grant anticipatory bail can be exercised. As noted above, in matters arising under the SC/ST Act, the Supreme Court has cautioned that the said power is required to be exercised with circumspection and only in exceptional cases, as a liberal exercise of such jurisdiction would risk defeating the legislative intent underlying the enactment.
D. CONCLUSION:
21. The bail application, alongwith pending application, is accordingly dismissed.
22. It is made clear that the observations made herein are solely for the purpose of adjudication of the present bail application and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case, nor shall they prejudice the rights and contentions of the parties at any stage of the proceedings.
23. Similarly, I have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the FIRs filed by the applicant or his wife against the complaint herein.
PRATEEK JALAN, J JULY 30, 2026 PV/KA/